PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

IN SEVENTEEN VOLUMES

XIII

PART II

1033 A—1086 B

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

XIII

PART II

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PREFACE

THE following are the manuscripts used for the edition of the six essays in this volume and the sigla that refer to them :

A = Parisinus Graecus 1671 (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris)—A.D. 1296.

B = Parisinus Graecus 1675 (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris)—15th century.

E = Parisinus Graecus 1672 (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris)—written shortly after A.D. 1302.

F = Parisinus Graecus 1957 (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris)—written at the end of the 11th century.

J = Ambrosianus 881 - C 195 inf. (Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan)—13th century.

X = Marcianus Graecus 250 (Biblioteca Nazionale di S. Marco, Venice)—the first part (containing the *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*) written in the 11th century, the second part (containing the *Platonicae Quaestiones*) written in the 14th century.

d = Laurentianus 56, 2 (Biblioteca Laurenziana, Florence)—15th century.

e = Laurentianus 70, 5 (Biblioteca Laurenziana, Florence)—14th century.

f = Laurent. Ashburnham. 1441 (not 1444 as in Hubert-Drexler, *Moralia* vi/1, pp. xvi and xx) (Biblioteca Laurenziana, Florence)—16th century.

g = Vaticanus Palatinus 170 (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome)—15th century.

m = Parisinus Graecus 1042 (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris)—16th century.

n = Vaticanus Graecus 1676 (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome)—14th century (*cf.* *Codices Vaticani Graeci* : Codices 1485-1683 rec. C. Giannelli [1950], pp. 441-443).

r = Leiden B.P.G. 59 (Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden)—16th century (see p. 150, n. *b* in the Introduction to the *De An. Proc. in Timaeo*).

t = Urbino-Vaticanus Graecus 100 (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome)—A.D. 1402.

u = Urbino-Vaticanus Graecus 99 (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome)—15th century.

v = Vindobonensis Philos. Graec. 46 (Nationalbibliothek, Vienna)—15th century.

z = Vindobonensis Suppl. Graec. 23 (Nationalbibliothek, Vienna)—15th century.

α = Ambrosianus 859 - C 126 inf. (Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan)—finished in A.D. 1295 (*cf.* A. Turyn, *Dated Greek Manuscripts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries in the Libraries of Italy* [University of Illinois Press, 1972] i, pp. 81-87).

β = Vaticanus Graecus 1013 (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome)—14th century.

γ = Vaticanus Graecus 139 (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome)—written shortly after A.D. 1296.

δ = Vaticanus Reginensis (Codices Graeci Reginae Suecorum) 80 (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome)—15th century.

ϵ = Codex Matritensis Griego 4690 (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid)—14th century.

Bonon. = Codex Graecus Bononiensis Bibliothecae Universitatis 3635 (Biblioteca Universitaria, Bologna)—14th century.

C.C.C. 99 = Codex Oxoniensis Collegii Corporis Christi 99 (Corpus Christi College, Oxford)—15th century.

Escor. 72 = Codex Griego Σ-I-12 de El Escorial (Real Biblioteca de El Escorial)—15th and 16th centuries (ff. 75^{r}-87^{r}, which contain the *De An. Proc. in Timaeo*, were written in the 16th century).

Escor. T-11-5 = Codex Griego T.11.5 de El Escorial (Real Biblioteca de El Escorial)—16th century.

Laurent. C. S. 180 = Laurentianus, Conventi Soppressi 180 (Biblioteca Laurenziana, Florence)—15th century.

Tolet. 51, 5 = Toletanus 51, 5 (Librería del Cabildo Toledano, Toledo)—15th century.

Voss. 16 = Codex Graecus Vossianus Misc. 16 (I) = Vossianus P 223 (Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden)—15th century.

In such matters as accent, breathing, crasis, elision and spelling I have followed without regard to the manuscripts the usage explained in the Introduction to the *De Facie* (*L.C.L. Moralia* xii, pp. 27-28).

The readings of the Aldine edition I have taken from a copy that is now in the library of The Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, New Jersey) and that has on the title-page the inscription in ink, —: Donati Jannoctii :—Ex Bibliotheca Jo. Huralti Borstallerii : Jannoctii dono ; and from the margins of this copy I have cited the corrections or conjectures which in a note at the end of the volume

(pp. 1010 f.) [a] written in the same ink as the inscription on the title-page are ascribed to Leonicus and Donatus Polus.

For the editions and other works to which there is frequent reference in the *apparatus criticus* and notes the following abbreviations or short titles are used :

Amyot = *Les œuvres morales et philosophiques de Plutarque*, translatées de Grec en François par Messire Jacques Amyot, . . . corrigées et augmentées en ceste presente édition en plusieurs passages suivant son exemplaire, Paris, Claude Morel, 1618.[b]

Andresen, *Logos und Nomos* = Carl Andresen, *Logos und Nomos : Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum*, Berlin, 1935.

Armstrong, *Later Greek . . . Philosophy* = *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, edited by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge, 1967.

Babut, *Plutarque de la Vertu Éthique* = *Plutarque de la Vertu Éthique : Introduction, texte, traduction et commentaire* par Daniel Babut, Paris, 1969 (Bibliothèque de la Faculté des Lettres de Lyon XV).

[a] It is the same note as that quoted by R. Aulotte (*Amyot et Plutarque* [Genève, 1965], p. 180) from the end (p. 877) of the Basiliensis in the Bibliothèque Nationale (J. 693), the title-page of which, he says, bears the inscription *Donato Giannotti*.

[b] This definitive edition has been compared with the first edition, *Les œuvres morales et meslées de Plutarque . . .*, Paris, Michel de Vascosin, 1572, and with *Œuvres Morales et Mêlées de Plutarque* traduites du Grec par Jacques Amyot avec des Notes et Observations de MM. Brotier et Vaulvilliers, Paris, Cussac, 1784–1787 = Tomes XIII-XXII of *Œuvres de Plutarque . . .*, 25 vols., 1783–1805.

Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* = Daniel Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, Paris, 1969 (Publications de l'Université de Lyon).

Basiliensis = *Plutarchi Chaeronei Moralia Opuscula . . .*, Basiliae ex Officina Frobeniana per H. Frobenium et N. Episcopium, 1542.

Benseler, *De Hiatu* = G. E. Benseler, *De Hiatu in Scriptoribus Graecis*, Pars I : *De Hiatu in Oratoribus Atticis et Historicis Graecis Libri Duo*, Fribergae, 1841.

Bernardakis = *Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia* recognovit Gregorius N. Bernardakis, Lipsiae, 1888–1896 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana).

Bidez-Cumont, *Les Mages Hellénisés* = Joseph Bidez et Franz Cumont, *Les Mages Hellénisés*, 2 volumes, Paris, 1938.

Bolkestein, *Adversaria* = Hendrik Bolkestein, *Adversaria Critica et Exegetica ad Plutarchi Quaestionum Convivalium Librum Primum et Secundum*, Amstelodami, 1946.

Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa* = Adolf Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa : Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie*, Stuttgart, 1890.

Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik . . .* = Adolf Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet*, Stuttgart, 1894.

Bréhier, *Chrysippe* = Émile Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme*, Paris, 1951 (nouvelle édition revue).

Bréhier, *Théorie des Incorporels* = Émile Bréhier, *La Théorie des Incorporels dans l'ancien Stoïcisme*, Paris, 1928 (deuxième édition). This was originally published in 1908 as a " Thèse pour le doctorat." It was reprinted in 1962.

Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft* = Walter Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft : Studien zu Pythagoras,*

Philolaos und Platon, Nürnberg, 1962 (Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft X). There is an English edition, " translated with revisions," *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Harvard University Press, 1972); but this appeared too late to permit the use of it instead of the German original.

Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato . . .* = Harold Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, Vol. I, Baltimore, 1944.

Cherniss, *Crit. Presoc. Phil.* = Harold Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, Baltimore, 1935.

Cherniss, *The Riddle* = Harold Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1945.

Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* = *Plato's Cosmology : The Timaeus of Plato* translated with a running commentary by Francis Macdonald Cornford, London/New York, 1937.

Diels-Kranz, *Frag. Vorsok.*[6] = *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Griechisch und Deutsch von Hermann Diels, 6. verbesserte Auflage hrsg. von Walther Kranz, 3 volumes, Berlin, 1951–1952 (later " editions " are unaltered reprints of this).

Döring, *Megariker* = *Die Megariker, Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien . . .* vorgelegt von Klaus Döring, Amsterdam, 1972 (Studien zur antiken Philosophie 2).

Dübner = *Plutarchi Chaeronensis Scripta Moralia.* Graece et Latine ed. Fr. Dübner, Paris, 1841.

Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa* = Adolf Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, Berlin, 1897 (Berliner Studien für classische Philologie u. Archaeologie, N.F. 2ter Band).

Dyroff, *Programm Würzburg*, 1896 = Adolf Dyroff, *Ueber die Anlage der stoischen Bücherkataloge*, Programm des K. Neuen Gymnasiums zu Würzburg für das Studienjahr 1895/96, Würzburg, 1896.

Elorduy, *Sozialphilosophie* = Eleuterio Elorduy, *Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa*, Gräfenhainichen, 1936 (= *Philologus*, Supplementband XXVIII, 3).

Emperius, *Op. Philol.* = *Adolphi Emperii Opuscula Philologica et Historica Amicorum Studio Collecta* edidit F. G. Schneidewin, Göttingen, 1847.

Festa, *Stoici Antichi* = *I Frammenti degli Stoici Antichi* ordinati, tradotti e annotati da Nicola Festa, Vol. I e Vol. II, Bari, 1932–1935.

Giesen, *De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus* = Carolus Giesen, *De Plutarchi contra Stoicos Disputationibus*, Monasterii Guestfalorum, 1889 (Diss. Münster).

Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien* = Victor Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps*, Paris, 1953 (Seconde édition revue et augmentée, Paris, 1969).

Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* = Josiah B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus*, Leiden, 1970 (Philosophia Antiqua XVII).

Grilli, *Il problema della vita contemplativa* = Alberto Grilli, *Il problema della vita contemplativa nel mondo Greco-Romano*, Milan/Rome, 1953 (Università di Milano, Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Serie prima : Filologia e Letterature Classiche).

Grumach, *Physis und Agathon* = Ernst Grumach, *Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa*, Berlin, 1932 (Problemata 6).

H. C. = the present editor.

Hahn, " De Plutarchi Moralium Codicibus " = Victor Hahn, " De Plutarchi Moralium Codicibus Quaestiones Selectae," *Académie Polonaise : Rozprawy Akademii Umiejetności*, Wydzial Filologiczny, Serya ii, Tom xxvi (1906), pp. 43-128.

Hartman, *De Avondzon des Heidendoms* =J. J. Hartman, *De Avondzon des Heidendoms : Het Leven en Werken van den Wijze van Chaeronea*, 2 volumes, Leiden, 1910.

Hartman, *De Plutarcho* =J. J. Hartman, *De Plutarcho Scriptore et Philosopho*, Lugduni-Batavorum, 1916.

Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* =Sir Thomas Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos, The Ancient Copernicus*, Oxford, 1913.

Heath, *History* =Sir Thomas Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics*, 2 volumes, Oxford, 1921.

Heath, *Manual* =Sir Thomas L. Heath, *A Manual of Greek Mathematics*, Oxford, 1931.

Helmer, *De An. Proc.* =Joseph Helmer, *Zu Plutarchs " De animae procreatione in Timaeo ": Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis des Platon-Deuters Plutarch*, Würzburg, 1937 (Diss. München).

Hirzel, *Untersuchungen* =Rudolf Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften*, 3 volumes, Leipzig, 1877–1883.

Holtorf, *Plutarchi Chaeronensis studia . . .* =Herbertus Holtorf, *Plutarchi Chaeronensis studia in Platone explicando posita*, Stralesundiae, 1913 (Diss. Greifswald).

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legit H. Drexler, Lipsiae, 1959 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana).

Hutten =*Plutarchi Chaeronensis quae supersunt omnia* . . . opera Joannis Georgi Hutten, Tubingae, 1791–1804.

Jagu, *Zénon* =Amand Jagu, *Zénon de Cittium : Son Rôle dans l'établissement de la Morale stoïcienne*, Paris, 1946.

Joly, *Le thème . . . des genres de vie* =Robert Joly, *Le Thème Philosophique des Genres de Vie dans l'Antiquité Classique*, Bruxelles, 1956 (Académie Royale de Belgique, Mémoires de la Classe des Lettres, Tome XXIX, fasc. 3).

Jones, *Platonism of Plutarch* =Roger Miller Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch*, Menasha (Wisconsin), 1916 (Diss. Chicago). References are to this edition, in which the pagination differs somewhat from that of the edition of 1915.

Kaltwasser =*Plutarchs moralische Abhandlungen* aus dem Griechischen übersetzt von Joh. Fried. Sal. Kaltwasser, Frankfurt am Main, 1783–1800 = *Plutarchs moralisch-philosophische Werke* übersetzt von J. F. S. Kaltwasser, Vienna/Prague, 1796 ff.

Kilb, *Ethische Grundbegriffe* =Georg Kilb, *Ethische Grundbegriffe der alten Stoa und ihre Uebertragung durch Cicero im dritten Buch de finibus bonorum et malorum*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1939 (Diss. Freiburg i.Br.).

Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Comm. Not.* =Otto Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Communibus Notitiis Librum Genuinum esse demonstratur*, Marpurgi Cattorum, 1907 (Diss. Marburg).

Krämer, *Arete* =Hans Joachim Krämer, *Arete bei*

Platon und Aristoteles : Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der platonischen Ontologie, Heidelberg, 1959 (Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Kl., 1959, 6).

Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik* = Hans Joachim Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik : Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin*, Amsterdam, 1964.

Krämer, *Platonismus* = Hans Joachim Krämer, *Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie*, Berlin/New York, 1971.

L.C.L. = The Loeb Classical Library.

Latzarus, *Idées Religieuses* = Bernard Latzarus, *Les Idées Religieuses de Plutarque*, Paris, 1920.

Madvig, *Adversaria Critica* = Jo. Nic. Madvigii *Adversaria Critica ad Scriptores Graecos et Latinos*, 3 volumes, Hauniae, 1871–1884 (Vol. I : *Ad Scriptores Graecos*).

Mates, *Stoic Logic* = Benson Mates, *Stoic Logic*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1953.

Maurommates = *Πλουτάρχου περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας, ἐκδόντος καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν συνέχειαν ἀποκαταστήσαντος Ἀνδρέου Δ. Μαυρομμάτου Κορκυραίου*, Athens, 1848.

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vertauschung bei Plutarch," *Hermes* iv (1870), pp. 390-403.

B. Müller (1871) =Berthold Müller, "Zu Plutarch *περὶ ψυχογονίας*," *Hermes* v (1871), p. 154.

B. Müller (1873) =Berthold Müller, *Plutarch über die Seelenschöpfung im Timaeus*, Gymnasium zu St. Elisabet, Bericht über das Schuljahr 1872–1873, Breslau, 1873.

Nogarola =*Platonicae Plutarchi Cheronei Quaestiones.* Ludovicus Nogarola Comes Veronensis vertebat, Venetiis apud Vincentium Valgrisium, 1552.

Pearson, *Fragments* =A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes with Introduction and Explanatory Notes*, London, 1891.

Pohlenz, *Moralia* i =*Plutarchi Moralia*, Vol. I recensuerunt et emendaverunt W. R. Paton† et I. Wegehaupt†. Praefationem scr. M. Pohlenz, Lipsiae, 1925 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana).

Pohlenz, *Moralia* vi/2 =*Plutarchi Moralia*, Vol. VI, Fasc. 2 recensuit et emendavit M. Pohlenz, Lipsiae, 1952 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana).

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Pohlenz, *Grundfragen* =Max Pohlenz, *Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie*, Göttingen, 1940 (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Kl., Dritte Folge Nr. 26).

Pohlenz, *Stoa* =Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa : Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, 2 volumes, Göttingen, 1948–1949 (ii =2. Band : *Erläuterungen*, 4. Auflage, Zitatkorrekturen, bibliographische Nach-

träge und ein Stellenregister von H.-Th. Johann, 1972).

Pohlenz, *Zenon und Chrysipp* = M. Pohlenz, *Zenon und Chrysipp*, Göttingen, 1938 (Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Kl., Fachgruppe I, Neue Folge: Band II, Nr. 9) = Max Pohlenz, *Kleine Schriften* i, pp. 1-38.

Problems in Stoicism = *Problems in Stoicism* edited by A. A. Long, London, 1971.

R.-E. = *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* . . ., Stuttgart, 1894–1972.

Rasmus, *Prog.* 1872 = Eduardus Rasmus, *De Plutarchi Libro qui inscribitur De Communibus Notitiis Commentatio*, Programm des Friedrichs-Gymnasiums zu Frankfurt a.O. für das Schuljahr 1871–1872, Frankfurt a.O., 1872.

Rasmus, *Prog.* 1880 = Eduardus Rasmus, *In Plutarchi librum qui inscribitur De Stoicorum Repugnantiis Coniecturae*, Jahres-Bericht über das vereinigte alt- und neustädtische Gymnasium zu Brandenburg von Ostern 1879 bis Ostern 1880, Brandenburg a.d.H., 1880.

Reiske = *Plutarchi Chaeronensis, Quae Supersunt, Omnia*, Graece et Latine . . . Io. Iacobus Reiske, Lipsiae, 1774–1782 (Vols. VI-X [1777–1778]: *Opera Moralia et Philosophica*).

Rieth, *Grundbegriffe* = Otto Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik : Eine traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, Berlin, 1933 (Problemata 9).

Robin, *Pyrrhon* = Léon Robin, *Pyrrhon et le Scepticisme Grec*, Paris, 1944.

S.V.F. = *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* collegit Ioannes ab Arnim, 3 volumes, Lipsiae, 1903–1905.

Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics* = S. Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, London, 1959.

Schäfer, *Ein frühmittelstoisches System* = Maximilian Schäfer, *Ein frühmittelstoisches System der Ethik bei Cicero*, Munich, 1934.

Schmekel, *Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* = A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange dargestellt*, Berlin, 1892.

Schroeter, *Plutarchs Stellung zur Skepsis* = Johannes Schroeter, *Plutarchs Stellung zur Skepsis*, Greifswald, 1911 (Diss. Königsberg).

Stephanus = *Plutarchi Chaeronensis quae extant opera cum Latina interpretatione* . . . excudebat Henr. Stephanus, Geneva, 1572.

Taylor, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* = A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford, 1928.

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Treu, *Lampriascatalog* = Max Treu, *Der sogenannte Lampriascatalog der Plutarchschriften*, Waldenburg in Schlesien, 1873.

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Turnebus, *Plutarchi de procreatione* = *Plutarchi dialogus*

de procreatione in Timaeo Platonis Adriano Turnebo interprete, Parisiis, 1552.

Usener, *Epicurea* = *Epicurea* edidit Hermannus Usener, Lipsiae, 1887.

Valgiglio, *De Fato* = *Ps.-Plutarco De Fato* (*περὶ εἱμαρμένης*) : *Introduzione testo commento traduzione* di Ernesto Valgiglio, Rome, 1964.

van Straaten, *Panétius* = Modestus van Straaten, *Panétius : sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine avec une édition des fragments*, Amsterdam, 1946. The third part of this book, the text of the fragments (pp. 325-393), is replaced by *Panetii Rhodii Fragmenta* collegit tertioque edidit Modestus van Straaten O.E.S.A., editio amplificata, Leiden, 1962 (Philosophia Antiqua V).

Verbeke, *Kleanthes* = G. Verbeke, *Kleanthes van Assos*, Brussel, 1949 (Verhandelingen van de K. Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Kl. der Letteren, XI [1949], No. 9).

Volkmann, *Philosophie des Plutarch* = Richard Volkmann, *Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeronea*, Zweiter Teil : *Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeronea*, Berlin, 1869.

Wegehaupt, *Plutarchstudien* = Hans Wegehaupt, *Plutarchstudien in italienischen Bibliotheken*, Höhere Staatsschule in Cuxhaven, Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Bericht über das Schuljahr 1905/1906, Cuxhaven, 1906.

Wegehaupt, " *Corpus Planudeum* " = Hans Wegehaupt, " Die Entstehung des Corpus Planudeum von Plutarchs Moralia," *Sitzungsberichte der K. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1909, 2. Halbband, pp. 1030-1046.

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Weissenberger, *Die Sprache Plutarchs* i and ii = B. Weissenberger, *Die Sprache Plutarchs von Chaeronea und die pseudoplutarchischen Schriften* I. Teil (Programm des K. hum. Gymnasiums Straubing für das Schuljahr 1894/1895), II. Teil (Programm des K. hum. Gymnasiums Straubing für das Schuljahr 1895/96), Straubing, 1895 and 1896.

Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes* = Rolf Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes : Seine Schrift " Adversus Colotem " als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle*, Helsingfors, 1955 (Acta Philosophica Fennica, Fasc. vii, 1955).

Witt, *Albinus* = R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, Cambridge, 1937 (Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. vii).

Wyttenbach = *Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, id est Opera, exceptis Vitis, Reliqua* . . . Daniel Wyttenbach, Oxonii, 1795–1830 (Wyttenbach, *Animadversiones* = Vols. vi and vii ; *Index Graecitatis* = Vol. viii).

Xylander = *Plutarchi Chaeronensis omnium, quae exstant, operum Tomus Secundus continens Moralia* Gulielmo Xylandro interprete, Francofurti, 1599. At the end of this volume, separately paged, there are Xylander's annotations followed by those of Stephanus and then variant readings ascribed to Turnebus, Vulcobius, Bongarsius, and Petavius as well as those of the Aldine and the Basiliensis.

Zeller, *Phil. Griech.* =Eduard Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, 3 parts in 6 volumes, Leipzig, 1920–1923 (last revised editions) : I/1 and 2, 6. Auflage hrsg. von Wilhelm Nestle ; II/1, 5. Auflage mit einem Anhang von Ernst Hoffmann ; II/2, 3. Auflage (4. Auflage =Obraldruck) ; III/1, 4. Auflage hrsg. von Eduard Wellmann ; III/2, 4. Auflage.

THE TRADITIONAL ORDER OF THE BOOKS of the *Moralia* as they appear since the edition of Stephanus (1572), and their division into volumes in this edition.

		PAGE
I.	De liberis educandis (Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς)	1A
	Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat (Πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν)	17D
	De recta ratione audiendi (Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν)	37B
	Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur (Πῶς ἄν τις διακρίνειε τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου)	48E
	Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus (Πῶς ἄν τις αἴσθοιτο ἑαυτοῦ προκόπτοντος ἐπ' ἀρετῇ)	75A
II.	De capienda ex inimicis utilitate (Πῶς ἄν τις ὑπ' ἐχθρῶν ὠφελοῖτο)	86B
	De amicorum multitudine (Περὶ πολυφιλίας)	93A
	De fortuna (Περὶ τύχης)	97C
	De virtute et vitio (Περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας)	100B
	Consolatio ad Apollonium (Παραμυθητικὸς πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον)	101F
	De tuenda sanitate praecepta (Ὑγιεινὰ παραγγέλματα)	122B
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III.	Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata (Ἀποφθέγματα βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν)	172A
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	Instituta Laconica (Τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιτηδεύματα)	236F

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	Lacaenarum apophthegmata (Λακαινῶν ἀποφθέγματα)	240C
	Mulierum virtutes (Γυναικῶν ἀρεταί)	242E
IV.	Quaestiones Romanae (Αἴτια Ῥωμαϊκά)	263D
	Quaestiones Graecae (Αἴτια Ἑλληνικά)	291D
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	De fortuna Romanorum (Περὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων τύχης)	316B
	De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute, libri ii (Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχης ἢ ἀρετῆς, λόγοι β′)	326D
	Bellone an pace clariores fuerint Athenienses (Πότερον Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ πόλεμον ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν ἐνδοξότεροι)	345C
V.	De Iside et Osiride (Περὶ Ἴσιδος καὶ Ὀσίριδος)	351C
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	De Pythiae oraculis (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ χρᾶν ἔμμετρα νῦν τὴν Πυθίαν)	394D
	De defectu oraculorum (Περὶ τῶν ἐκλελοιπότων χρηστηρίων)	409E
VI.	An virtus doceri possit (Εἰ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή)	439A
	De virtute morali (Περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς)	440D
	De cohibenda ira (Περὶ ἀοργησίας)	452E
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* This work, by Aëtius, not Plutarch, is omitted in the current edition.

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ON STOIC SELF-CONTRADICTIONS

(DE STOICORUM REPUGNANTIIS)

INTRODUCTION

PLUTARCH'S criticism of Stoic doctrine in his extant philosophical essays is not confined to those the titles of which declare them to be polemics against the Stoics,[a] and this was probably true also of the works now lost[b]; but the very titles listed in the *Catalogue of Lamprias* expressly designate eight works as directed against the Stoics and a ninth as dealing with both Stoics and Epicureans. This last,

[a] So *e.g.* the *Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus* and the *De Virtute Morali* are essentially anti-Stoic polemics, much of the *De Facie* is devoted to the refutation of Stoic theories, and even in the Platonic exegesis of the *De An. Proc. in Timaeo* occasion is found for express criticism of Stoic doctrine (1015 B-C). An elaborate study of Plutarch's acquaintance with Stoics and Stoic writings and of his consistently critical opposition to Stoic doctrine has been made by D. Babut in his book, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* (Paris, 1969). This opposition, extreme as it was in fundamental issues, did not imply disagreement with every Stoic attitude and tenet; and Babut's account of it wants some qualification with more allowance made for the distinction between polemic and doctrinal contexts (*cf.* A. A. Long, *Class. Rev.*, N.S. xxii [1972], p. 28).

[b] So *e.g.* No. 45 of the *Catalogue of Lamprias*, Περὶ τῆς εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπιχειρήσεως, probably contained the retort to Chrysippus to which Plutarch refers in 1036 B *infra* (see note *a* there); and what Cicero says in *De Oratore* iii, 65 (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 291) and i, 83 (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 95, 30-31) shows that No. 86, Εἰ ἀρετὴ ἡ ῥητορική, must have dealt with this Stoic thesis.

Selections and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans (No. 148), is lost; and of the other eight there are extant only two and what is called a conspectus of a third: *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* (No. 76), *Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions* (No. 77), and *Conspectus of the Essay, "The Stoics Talk More Paradoxically than the Poets"* (No. 79).[a]

The purpose of the first of these three is simply to convict the Stoics and especially Chrysippus of as many express self-contradictions and implied inconsistencies as possible, to make Chrysippus appear to be "a man who says absolutely anything that may come into his head"[b]; and, although in

[a] Of the other five, the subject of No. 154 (*Against the Stoics on What is in our Control*) and of the corresponding essay against Epicurus (No. 133), which is also lost, is touched upon in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1045 B-F, 1050 C, and 1056 C-D (*cf. De An. Proc. in Timaeo* 1015 B-C and *De Sollertia Animalium* 964 C). No. 59 (*Against Chrysippus on Justice*) may be the work to which Plutarch refers in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1040 D (see note *e* there), and No. 78 (*Against the Stoics on Common Experience*) has been thought to be intended by Plutarch's apparent promise in *De Comm. Not.* 1073 D (see note *f* there). Of Nos. 149 and 152 even the meaning of the titles is uncertain. The former, Αἰτίαι τῶν περιφερομένων Στωικῶν, may mean not "Explanations of Current Stoic Doctrines" (Sandbach) but "Reasons Why the Stoics Vacillate" (*cf. Galba* vi, 2 [1055 C-D]); and the latter, *Against Chrysippus on the First Consequent*, probably had to do not with the "derivation of ethics from οἰκείωσις" (Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 67, n. 4) but with the controversy about valid inference (*cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* viii, 112-117; Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 143 and ii, 95-98 with Plutarch's assertion [*De Comm. Not.* 1059 D-E] that the dialectic of Chrysippus subverts the preconception of proof and destroys its own principles).

[b] Chapter 28 *sub finem* (1047 B); *cf.* chapter 14 *init.* (1039 D), where Chrysippus is said to be least concerned to

the course of doing this Plutarch cannot refrain from criticism of Stoic doctrine itself, he repeatedly protests that this is not his present purpose and emphasizes the limited scope to which he professes to confine himself.[a] His purpose and procedure were probably similar to this in the corresponding essay now lost, *On Epicurean Self-Contradictions* (No. 129), where he may also have used the Stoics to belabour the Epicureans as he here uses the latter to belabour the Stoics.[b] To refute a speech or statement by alleging that it contains self-contradictions or is contradicted by the speaker's own action was a procedure that had been recommended by manuals of rhetoric and debate[c] and one to which according to Sextus (*Adv. Math.* i, 281) even the leading philosophers were vulnerable. The Stoics, however, would be especially sensitive to such a polemic, since they proudly maintained that

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avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency when he is disputing others; and on Chrysippus' unconcern about contradicting himself and his "sophistical" methods of defending his statements *cf.* Galen, *De Placitis Hippoc. et Plat.* iv, 4 (p. 351, 3-7 [Mueller] = *S.V.F.* iii, p. 116, 12-16 and pp. 351, 14–352, 14 [Mueller]).

[a] *Cf.* 1042 F (*τούτων . . . ἀφῶμεν, ὅτι δὲ μάχεται . . . τίς οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν;*), 1046 E (chap. 26 *sub finem*), 1049 B (*οὐ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ καλῶς ἀλλὰ ὅσα πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς διαφόρως λέγουσιν ἐξετάσαι μόνον πρόκειται*), 1049 F (*ὥσπερ ἡμῶν ἄλλο τι νῦν πραττόντων ἢ τὰς ἐναντίας αὐτοῦ φωνὰς καὶ ὑπολήψεις παρατιθεμένων*), 1051 B (. . . *οὐ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστὶ λόγου τὸ ζητεῖν· αὐτὸς δὲ . . . μαχόμενόν τι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ*).

[b] *e.g.* in 1033 C, 1034 C (chap. 6), 1043 B, 1045 B-F (chap. 23), 1046 E (chap. 26 *sub finem*), 1050 C, 1052 B (chap. 38 *sub finem*).

[c] *Cf.* [Aristotle], *Rhet. ad Alexandrum* 1430 a 14-22 and Aristotle, *Soph. Elench.* 174 b 19-23.

their philosophy was a completely coherent and thoroughly consistent system [a] and that this consistency, moreover, must manifest itself in the life of the true Stoic.[b]

It is with this last point that Plutarch begins his polemic. Emphasizing the necessity for a philosopher's life to be in accord with his theory (chap. 1), he tries to show that the Stoics in their practice contradict their own doctrines about the relation of the philosopher to society. Either they abstained from politics, about which they wrote so much, and lived a life which by their own admission is more in accord with the Epicurean ideal than with their own (chap. 2) or, if they went into politics, acted inconsistently with their own assertions about actual states, laws, and statesmen (chap. 3). Moreover, in their treatment of their native countries they differed from one another [c] or were irrationally inconsistent (chap. 4). The prescriptions of Chrysippus for the political behaviour of the sage amount to an admission that the Stoic theories are impracticable (chap. 5), and in regard to religious institutions and ceremonies the contradiction between

[a] See note *a* on 1033 A *infra* and *cf.* M. Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), p. 7 ; I. G. Kidd, *Class. Quart.*, N.S. v (1955), p. 187, n. 4 ; A. A. Long, *Problems in Stoicism*, pp. 102-103.

[b] See besides note *e* on 1033 B *infra* Epictetus, *Diss.* I, iv (14-16) and II, xix (13-28) and *Encheiridion*, chap. 49.

[c] That Chrysippus acted differently from Zeno and Cleanthes, for which a work by Antipater is cited, Plutarch treats as by the way, saying *παρείσθω*, though the implication is that, since not all could have acted rightly, one or another must have acted inconsistently with Stoic doctrine. The main point, however, is the irrational inconsistency in the behaviour of Zeno and Cleanthes, who insisted upon remaining loyal in name only to countries that they had deserted in fact.

the doctrine and the practice of the Stoics is even greater than that for which they criticize the Epicureans (chap. 6).

So far Plutarch has kept to a single subject, though without having developed it as logically as he might have done [a]; but now (chap. 7) without any form of transition he abruptly charges Zeno with contradicting himself on the subject of the unity or distinct plurality of the virtues and Chrysippus too with contradicting himself by attacking Ariston's position and yet defending that definition of Zeno's which comes to the same thing, as does that given by Cleanthes also. The subject of this chapter [b] might reasonably suggest that it was to be the beginning of a section devoted to self-contradictions in ethics. It is no such thing, however, for it is followed immediately and again without formal transition by the charge (chap. 8) that Zeno in writing against Plato, refuting sophisms, and recommending the study of dialectic implicitly contradicted his own argument that it is unnecessary

[a] The material of chapter 4 belongs logically at the end of chapter 2 in continuation of *οἵ γε καὶ τὰς αὑτῶν κατέλιπον πατρίδας* . . . (1033 E), and that of chapter 5 immediately after chapter 3. The material of chapter 5 might have been used in chapter 20 or that of chapter 20 to develop chapter 5, though Plutarch's purposes in the two are different: here to show that the Stoic theories are by their own admission impracticable and in chapter 20 to convict Chrysippus of self-contradiction.

[b] It is not, as Pohlenz says it is (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 8), the exposure of "Lehrdifferenzen zwischen den Schulhäuptern" but the explicit self-contradiction of Zeno and the implicit one of Chrysippus in attacking Ariston for espousing that one of Zeno's contradictory positions which both he and Cleanthes adopt.

to hear both sides of a controversy before rendering a verdict; and this in turn is followed by two long chapters formally unconnected with each other or with what precedes and follows them and attacking Chrysippus first (chap. 9) for contradicting himself about the order in which logic, ethics, and physics and its consummation, theology, should be studied and then (chap. 10) for arguing both sides of a question in a way that contradicts his prescriptions for doing so.[a] Then there is an abrupt return to an ethical theme (chap. 11), the inconsistencies resulting from the Stoic doctrine of " right action," right action being what the law prescribes but of which only the sage is capable and wrong what it prohibits but what all others than the sage cannot avoid doing.

Had Plutarch intended to arrange his material by subject, chapter 9 would certainly not have been placed between chapters 8 and 10 or any of chapters 8-10 between 7 and 11; but before chapter 7 the subjects of 8 and 10 would have been treated in sequence,[b] and before this the methodical confusion charged to Chrysippus in chapter 9 would have been used as an introduction to explain why the inconsistent procedure of the Stoics makes it difficult to present in logical order and without repetition or overlapping all their contradictory statements and inconsistencies of doctrine. As it is, chapter 7, though its subject is unconnected with that of chap-

[a] For criticism of the prescriptions themselves Plutarch refers to " other writings " (1036 A-B and page 438, note *a*).

[b] According to this criterion the material of chapters 24 and 29 should have been used to develop the criticism in these chapters or the theme of chapters 14-16, their connexion with which was observed by von Arnim (*S.V.F.* i, p. XI).

ters 1-6, is like chapter 6 concerned with an express self-contradiction of Zeno's; and so is chapter 8, which is connected with chapter 7 in this way and in this way only. Chapter 9 turns to Chrysippus, who in it and in chapter 10 is alone the object of attack.[a]

The sequence of thought connecting chapters 11, 12, and 13 is clear.[b] Chapter 11, beginning abruptly, as has been said, with the doctrine of right action as prescribed and wrong as prohibited and developing the contradiction between this and the doctrine that the action of the sage is always right and that of the base always wrong, leads to the citation in chapter 12 of the work by Chrysippus on right actions for the contention that to the base nothing is serviceable, appropriate, or congenial, which he is then accused of contradicting by repeatedly asserting that from the moment of birth all have a natural "congeniality" to themselves, their mem-

[a] Three works by Chrysippus are quoted in chapter 9 ("On Ways of Living," "On the Gods," and "Physical Propositions"), and a fourth is paraphrased ("On Use of Discourse"). Two quotations from the last of these, one from the first, and one from the third are given in chapter 10, which begins with a quotation from an unnamed work by Chrysippus and cites but without quotation or explicit paraphrase six books composed by him "against common experience."

[b] This seems to have been recognized by Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 10) but not by Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 21), who divided chapters 12-22 from chapters 7-11, apparently because chapter 12 has no particle connecting it with the preceding chapter. In taking chapters 12-22 as a well defined "section" with chapters 14-16 as a "digression" he says "there is connexion between the majority of chapters"; but in fact of the six chapters of this "section" that follow the "digression," four (17, 18, 19, 20) begin without any connecting particle.

bers, and their offspring but which is expressly said at the beginning of chapter 13 to be a consequence of the fundamental Stoic principle that there is no difference of degree either in vice or in virtue, a principle adhered to by Chrysippus but contradicted, Plutarch contends, by many of his other statements and arguments.

From these self-contradictions imputed to Chrysippus Plutarch at the beginning of chapter 14 makes a formal transition by saying that Chrysippus acts this way in many places but when disputing others is least concerned to avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency. Of this he then gives four examples : Chrysippus attacks Plato for saying that one who does not know how to live had better not be alive, but he praises Antisthenes and Tyrtaeus for saying what amounts to the same thing and blames Theognis for not having said it (chap. 14) ; he censures the Platonic Cephalus for holding the fear of divine chastisement to be a deterrent from injustice, and yet he asserts that this is the purpose for which the gods chastise the wicked (chap. 15 [1040 A-C]) ; he denounces Plato for calling good other things besides justice, saying that all the virtues are annihilated by those who do not hold that only the fair is good, but then in criticizing Aristotle maintains that the other virtues can exist as goods even though justice is annihilated by those who treat pleasure as a goal, a position which, moreover, contradicts his own assertion of the unity of the virtues (chap. 15 [1040 C—1041 B]) [a] ; and on the

[a] In chapter 27 Chrysippus is said to have contradicted this in another way by saying that the good man is not always being courageous or the base man cowardly or intemperate.

ground that injustice exists only in relation to another than oneself he rejects as absurd Plato's notion of injustice within the individual soul, but elsewhere he argues that the wrongdoer does himself injustice too and so does he to whom injustice is done (chap. 16).

These chapters have been commonly regarded as a digression by which the sequence from chapter 13 to chapter 17 is interrupted.[a] According to Pohlenz chapter 17, beginning with the designation of the next theme as *τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον*, carries on precisely from the point where in chapters 11-13 the discussion had reached the proposition *μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν*.[b] Yet it is this very proposition with regard to which in the second and larger part of chapter 15 (1040 C—1041 B) Chrysippus is

[a] According to von Arnim (*S.V.F.* i, p. XI) chapters 14-16 (and 24 and 29 too) were taken by Plutarch from a second source and inserted into the organized primary source that he used for chapters 11-30; and Pohlenz argued that this "second source" was Plutarch's own work, *Against Chrysippus on Justice*, or unused material that he had collected for it (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 10-11 and 13). Sandbach, accepting this as the source of chapters 15-16 but contending that the quotations in chapter 14 must have come from an hypothetical "formless collection of inconsistencies in the works of Chrysippus," the source according to him of most of the material that by selection and arrangement Plutarch transformed into the present essay, held that the digression thus "involves the calculated conjunction of elements from two sources" and that Plutarch inserted it here into "the longest continuous section of the essay" (*i.e.* chaps. 12-22) "for variety's sake," the literary structure of the whole essay being "an alternation between inconsistencies heaped up without arrangement and inconsistencies gathered under a head" (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], pp. 21-23).

[b] Pohlenz, *op. cit.* (see the preceding note), p. 11.

accused of having contradicted himself in his criticisms of Plato and Aristotle, and here this accusation is begun (1040 c) with a quotation already used in chapter 13 (1038 D) to convict him of contradicting himself in another way about this same proposition.[a] So, if it is upon this that the theme of chapter 17 is supposed to follow, chapter 17 should have been said to carry on not from chapter 13 but from chapter 15. It carries on, however, by returning to the subject of chapter 14, beginning with citations from the *Προτρεπτικά* of Chrysippus,[b] the work which in chapter 14 is alone quoted and paraphrased.[c] There

[a] The repetition of the quotation itself was adduced by Pohlenz as support for his theory about the source of chapters 14-16 (see p. 377, n. *a supra*), but he did not observe that the proposition in question is immediately connected with it in chapter 13 (1038 D : *ἀλλ' εἴπερ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν . . .*) or that it is at all involved in chapter 15 (*cf.* 1040 D and 1041 A).

[b] Comparison of 1041 E with 1048 B and *De Comm. Not.* 1060 D proves that by the *Προτρεπτικά* and *τὰ περὶ τοῦ Προτρέπεσθαι* Plutarch means the same work.

[c] This Sandbach adduced in support of his contention that the quotations in chapter 14 were taken not from the source of chapters 15-16 but from his hypothetical " collection of inconsistencies " (see p. 377, n. *a supra*). In that collection, he conjectured, the quotations appeared in the order in which the compiler had excerpted them as he read through one book after another, and this is why in Plutarch's essay there are cases of adjacent inconsistencies based on quotations from the same work, *e.g.* on *περὶ Βίων δ'* in chapters 9 and 10 and on *Ἠθικὰ Ζητήματα ϛ'* in chapters 26 and 27. Both chapters 9 and 10, however, contain quotations from the *περὶ Λόγου Χρήσεως* and the *Φυσικαὶ Θέσεις* as well as from the *περὶ Βίων* ; and Sandbach's hypothesis does not explain why all three works are quoted in these successive chapters but a quotation from the *Φυσικαὶ Θέσεις* is the basis of chapter 29, though it is not mentioned elsewhere in this essay, and the *περὶ Βίων* is next quoted in chapter 20 and is then the first

Chrysippus was accused of criticizing a dictum of Plato's on the ground that it would require us to die whereas even for the base it is more advantageous to remain alive, virtue by itself being no reason for our living or vice for our departing this life, and then of contradicting himself by subscribing to statements of others that imply exactly what he censured Plato for saying, that for the vicious and stupid not being alive is more advantageous than living. Now in chapter 17 he is accused of the same kind of contradiction in his general statements about his own doctrine of goods and evils, which in the same work he said is most consistent with living and yet again both there and elsewhere said transcends human nature because it abstracts us from living as from something of no concern to us. The connexion with chapter 14 becomes specific in chapter 18, which begins with the attempt to reveal a contradiction between this doctrine of good and evil and the assertion that even for the foolish and vicious it is more advantageous to remain alive than not to do so. Chapters 14-16, then, containing as they do the continuation of the theme of chapter 13 and the introduction of that continued in chapter 17-18, despite their common purpose of exemplifying the special unconcern of Chrysippus about contradicting himself in his criticism of others,[a] are no more than

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of Chrysippus' works mentioned by title in chapter 30. In chapter 30 a passage of the Προτρεπτικά already used in chapter 17 is again paraphrased (see page 533 and notes *a* and *b* there); and chapter 22 is based upon this work, though it is not mentioned in the interval between chapters 17 and 22.

[a] To treat here from this special point of view part of the

some other sections of the essay an intrusion into an otherwise organized sequence of thought or a digression from it.[a]

Chapter 18 continues with the argument (1042 C-E) that in defending Chrysippus against the charge of contradicting his doctrine of goods and evils by holding it to be better to live a fool than not to remain alive the Stoics contradict themselves further, for according to this defence the criterion that he says makes it proper for the unhappy fool to continue living and the happy sage sometimes to commit suicide is not goods and evils at all but the intermediates or so-called indifferents, though none of these but only good and evil is an object of choice

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theme of chapter 13 and then others in the same way may have been suggested to Plutarch by his own remark made shortly after the first mention in chapter 13 (1038 D) of the proposition *μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν*, ". . . for I would not give the impression of cavilling at words, although Chrysippus attacks Plato and the rest tooth and nail in this way" (1038 E).

[a] It is strange, however, that Plutarch did not put the second part of chapter 15 (1040 C—1041 B) immediately after chapter 13 and chapter 14 immediately before chapter 17. Chapter 16, Chrysippus' self-contradictory criticism of Plato concerning injustice, follows naturally upon the end of chapter 15, his alleged self-contradiction concerning justice. The first part of chapter 15 (1040 A-C), however, is related to what precedes and follows it by nothing but its being another example of Chrysippus' self-contradictory criticism of a Platonic passage and possibly by its being based upon two of the works of his that are quoted and paraphrased in the second part of chapter 15 and chapter 16; and it cannot be said to anticipate chapter 35 or to be continued by it, for, though the subject there also is divine chastisement, the context and argument as well as the statements of Chrysippus used and the books from which they are drawn are all entirely different from those here and unrelated to them.

and of avoidance. This contradiction in the relation of the sage to things good, evil, and indifferent suggests that in chapter 19 of the sage unaware of the presence of goods and the absence of evils, though these are asserted to be entirely different and all perceptible, and then that in chapter 20 of the tranquil, retiring, and unofficious sage who yet engages in politics, seeks profit, and takes precautions against being defrauded [a]; and this is followed in chapter 21 by the charge that Chrysippus has the sage admit into his city nothing for the purpose of pleasure or beauty and yet in his teleological explanations ascribes this very purpose to providence, extolling her for providing what he censures men for not forgoing. Here Chrysippus is expressly accused of deriding nature and legislating in competition with the lawgiver of the universe (1044 c) and by implication in making the sage do so of contradicting the Stoic doctrine that the sage is in perfect accord with nature and providence.[b]

Chapter 22, which has been regarded as the

[a] For the relation of chapter 20 to chapter 5 see p. 373, n. *a supra*.

[b] Two works by Chrysippus are paraphrased or quoted in this chapter, the περὶ Πολιτείας, which is mentioned here thrice and not elsewhere in this essay, and the περὶ Φύσεως, which is mentioned here twice and is cited also in chapters 20 and 22. This chapter begins by citing the former work and quoting from it part of a passage from Euripides, with an adaptation of which the chapter also ends. The lines quoted at the beginning of this chapter had already been quoted in the preceding chapter (1043 E), where they were said to have been praised by Chrysippus in many places; and it may have been the quotation of them there that called to Plutarch's mind the passage of the περὶ Πολιτείας with which he begins chapter 21.

beginning of an unarranged collection of miscellaneous inconsistencies, accuses Chrysippus of contradictory statements about using the behaviour of irrational animals as a paradigm for human conduct. For one of these statements his *Προτρεπτικά* is cited and for the other the fifth book of his *περὶ Φύσεως*. The latter had been quoted in the preceding chapter also (1044 D), and it may have been this and the references in that chapter to irrational animals in Chrysippus' teleological explanations that led Plutarch next to the apparently unrelated theme of chapter 22. The material of this chapter is itself related, however, to that of the preceding chapters, for it comes from contexts concerned with certain actions treated by Chrysippus as being in themselves neither good nor evil but "indifferent" [a]; but Plutarch uses this material to show that Chrysippus at different times passed contradictory judgments on the relevance of the same evidence.

With this chapter 23 is connected in similar fashion. Inasmuch as it purports to show that Chrysippus contradicted his own criticism of the Epicureans, it might have been used as another example in addition to the four adduced to support the charge made in the first sentence of chapter 14; but here too as in chapter 22 it is with regard to "indifferents" that Plutarch professes to find him contradicting his own doctrine of the non-existence of the un-

[a] The actions mentioned in the *Προτρεπτικά* cited in this chapter by Plutarch were treated by Chrysippus *ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀδιαφόρων τόπῳ* (*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 743-745). So Sandbach's statement (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 21) that chapter 22 "does not belong to the *τόπος περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν*," while true of the use to which Plutarch here puts his material, is not true of the material itself or its original context.

caused and spontaneous, on the basis of which he criticized the Epicurean assertion of an adventitious force and uncaused motion manifesting itself in the case of indistinguishable alternatives.[a]

On the other hand, it is because chapter 22 does accuse Chrysippus of inconsistency in his treatment of evidence and chapter 23 of contradicting his own criticism of other philosophers that it is psychologically appropriate for this to be followed by chapter 24, for the accusation here, though the particular occasion of it, Chrysippus' advocacy of dialectic as advocated by Plato and Aristotle and others, would have provided a logical development of the criticism in chapters 8 and 10,[b] is not of self-contradiction in statements or doctrines but of inconsistency in appealing for support in one matter to the authority of those whose treatment of the most important matters is otherwise stigmatized as self-contradictory and mistaken.

Without any formal transition Plutarch next in chapter 25 accuses Chrysippus of contradicting his own assertion that spiteful joy (ἐπιχαιρεκακία) is non-existent because joy is impossible for the base.[c]

[a] For the kind of ἀδιάφορα with regard to which Chrysippus is accused of contradicting his own doctrine see note *c* on 1045 F *infra*. The statements concerning these, not so accessible according to Plutarch as the frequent and familiar assertions of the doctrine against the Epicureans, for which no specific work is cited, are quoted from two works by Chrysippus, the περὶ τοῦ Δικάζειν, which is cited by title only here and in chapter 33, and the sixth book of the περὶ Καθήκοντος, the seventh book of which is cited in chapter 30.

[b] See p. 374, n. *b supra*.

[c] Because of this Pohlenz said (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 11) that the tenor of chapter 25 is the same as that of chapter 12.

For this, however, the ground was the Stoic doctrine that the base are always thoroughly unhappy (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 671); and with this and its complement, the good are always thoroughly happy, was connected Chrysippus' contention that momentary happiness does not differ in kind or degree from enduring happiness and so is as much an object of choice as is the latter (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 14, 8-13), which is the doctrine that in chapter 26 he is next accused of contradicting. In chapter 27 he is charged with contradicting in another way this same Stoic doctrine that the good are always thoroughly happy and the base unhappy, for this was said to follow from the imperfection of the latter in partaking of no virtue and the perfection of the former in lacking none, every action of the good being perfect and because perfect performed in accordance with all the virtues [a]; and this Plutarch here contends is contradicted by Chrysippus when he says that the good man is not always being courageous or the base man cowardly or intemperate. So chapters 25, 26, and 27 are connected with one another by the context of the Chrysippean arguments to which they all refer.[b] They have still another characteristic in common, however. The charge in chapter 27 that Chrysippus contradicts

[a] *Cf.* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, 7, 11[g] (p. 98, 14-17 [Wachsmuth], the sentence that precedes *S. V.F.* iii, p. 14, 8-13 [Δι' ὃ . . .] and should not have been omitted by von Arnim there) and *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 557 with Plutarch's sentence here, 1046 F= *S. V.F.* iii, p. 73, 32-34.

[b] Sandbach thought that chapters 26 and 27 are adjacent to each other because "being based on quotations from the same work," Ἠθικὰ Ζητήματα ς', the one followed the other in Plutarch's source (see p. 378, n. *c supra*).

the Stoic doctrine of the unity of the virtues and their implication of one another is related to that in chapter 15, contradiction of the same doctrine in his criticism of Aristotle [a]; Chrysippus' thesis, the subject of chapter 26, that happiness does not depend upon temporal duration, flatly gainsays Aristotle's assertion that for happiness a brief time will not suffice but a complete life is required [b]; and his contention in chapter 25 that ἐπιχαιρεκακία as a kind of joy is non-existent also denies what Aristotle had asserted.[c] This characteristic common to chapters 25-27 is the only discernible link between them and chapter 28. Here Chrysippus is charged with reckless inconsistency not in anything related to ethical doctrines [d] but for requiring attention to

[a] See 1041 A-B and p. 376, n. *a supra*; and for the difference, often disregarded, between the Aristotelian and the Stoic versions of the ἀνταικολουθία τῶν ἀρετῶν *cf.* R. A. Gauthier et J. Y. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* ii, pp. 558-559 *ad* 1145 a 1-2.

[b] Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1098 a 18-20 and 1100 a 4—1101 a 21; *cf.* R. Beutler und W. Theiler, *Plotins Schriften* iii b (Hamburg, 1964), pp. 465-466 on *Enn.* I, v and A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics* (Leiden, 1972), pp. 59-60.

[c] Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1107 a 9-10 and 1108 b 1-6; *cf. Rhetoric* 1386 b 34—1387 a 3. Aristotle seems to have been the first to use the noun (F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles: Magna Moralia*, p. 303 *ad* p. 32, 14).

[d] Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 22) said that chapters 24 and 28 "certainly seem out of place among others devoted to ethical doctrines"; and he explained their appearance here by observing that the books cited in both chapters belong to the ἠθικὸς τόπος and supposing that Plutarch simply followed the order of the quotations in his hypothetical source, a collection of inconsistencies excerpted book by book (see p. 378, n. *c supra*). It is presumably the περὶ Ῥητορικῆς of Chrysippus that is quoted and paraphrased in chapter 28; and, since this work had already been cited

be given to the disposition and delivery of a speech and yet recommending that obscurities and even solecisms be disregarded, a recommendation which, though this is not mentioned here, is a clear rejection of Aristotle's canon of style.[a] So the four self-contradictions in chapters 25-28 all exemplify that opposition to Aristotle on the part of Chrysippus which in chapter 24 was said to be inconsistent with his appeal to the authority of Aristotle and of Plato for the purpose of supporting a thesis of his own; and, though it is not said why they are placed directly after chapter 24, that this was the reason is strongly suggested by the nature of chapter 29, which follows them.

In this chapter a statement of Plato's criticized by Chrysippus as an example of mistakes that should be avoided by reticence concerning scientific matters

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in chapter 5 and is cited nowhere else in this essay, Plutarch's use of it in chapter 28 is not plausibly explained by the hypothesis of Sandbach.

[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1404 b 1-3 (*ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι . . .*) and 1404 b 35-37; 1407 a 19 (*ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἑλληνίζειν*) with 1407 b 18-20 (*ἔτι δὲ ποιεῖ σολοικίζειν . . .*) and *Soph. Elench.* 165 b 20-21 (*σολοικίζειν = τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν*). So *ἑλληνισμός* and *σαφήνεια* were treated by Theophrastus as primary requisites of style, whether or not he called them *ἀρεταὶ λέξεως* (*cf.* for the two sides of this controversy G. M. A. Grube, *T.A.P.A.*, lxxxiii [1952], pp. 180-181 and G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* [Princeton, 1963], pp. 274-275), and were later named the first two of the five *ἀρεταὶ λόγου* by the pupil of Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon, who also specified as vices *βαρβαρισμός* and *σολοικισμός* (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 214, 11-22), which he distinguished from each other (*cf.* H. M. Hubbell, *The Rhetorica of Philodemus* [New Haven, 1920] p. 295, n. 4). In defending solecisms Chrysippus was apparently following the example of Zeno (*cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 81).

is made the occasion of charging Chrysippus with violating in his own practice the very principle of his criticism of Plato and therewith committing a gross error that is refuted by specialists, whereas the statement of Plato's that he attacks had the support of competent authorities. This chapter is joined to chapter 28 by a connecting particle and so was meant to be taken with what precedes it,[a] and its affinity with chapter 24 is apparent. It has been observed that, as was the case there, the particular occasion here, Chrysippus in practice contradicting his criticism of Plato, could have been used to develop the theme of chapters 8 and 10 or of chapters 14-16 [b]; but, as was the case there, so here the gravamen of Plutarch's charge is not self-contradiction in state-

[a] Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 21, n. 1) observed that of chapters 23-30, which he called "miscellaneous inconsistencies," chapter 29 alone begins with a connecting particle; but he offered no explanation of this. He said that this chapter "clearly does not come from the source-book" and for this statement merely referred to Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 11-12 and 32), who declared it to be beyond doubt that Plutarch had here condensed his own expositions in *Quaest. Conviv.* 698 A—700 B and 732 F. The latter of these two passages contains the calculation by Chrysippus and the refutation of it by Hipparchus used in this chapter; and the former discusses Plato's assertion that liquid nourishment goes to the lungs and gives in support of it quotations from the same physicians and poets named in this chapter, but of its opponents it names besides the speaker, Nicias the physician, only Erasistratus and does not mention Chrysippus or any Stoic. It is therefore beyond doubt that this chapter 29, in which Plutarch quotes the Φυσικαὶ Θέσεις of Chrysippus on the subject, is *not* just a condensation of the exposition in *Quaest. Conviv.*, though for that and for this chapter Plutarch may have used a single source containing the materials of both.

[b] See *supra* p. 383, n. *b* and p. 374, n. *b*.

ments or doctrines but inconsistency in the attitude of Chrysippus to expert authority in general and the authority of Plato and Aristotle in particular.[a] It is not, then, just a collection of " miscellaneous inconsistencies heaped up without arrangement " that chapters 22-29 contain, for a sequence of thought is discernible from the first through the last of these chapters, and the dominant theme is the inconsistency of Chrysippus in his treatment of evidence and authority.

Chapter 30 begins a new theme and a new sequence of thought. It begins with a bon mot of " earlier times " about the difficulty that Zeno created by " promoting " some " indifferents " and so making them in fact neither good nor indifferent, goes on to show that Chrysippus increased the difficulty by his self-contradictions about this " promoted " class, and then says that with these contradictions he consequently infected not only virtue but providence as well. This is the transition to the main theme of the new " section," to which all the preceding part of chapter 30 is the introduction.[b]

[a] Of whom and their followers he is reported in chapter 24 to have said " one would be willing even to go wrong with so many men of such stature as these " (1046 A). In the light of this there would be an additional sting in Plutarch's remark at the end of *Quaest. Conviv.* vii, 1 about the opponents of Plato's theory, *οὐκ ἔδει πρὸς φιλόσοφον δόξῃ καὶ δυνάμει πρῶτον ἀπαυθαδίσασθαι περὶ πράγματος ἀδήλου . . .* (700 B), if, as Babut suggests (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 52, n. 5), it applies to Chrysippus and the quotation from the *Φυσικαὶ Θέσεις* in 1047 C rather than to Nicias in the *Quaest. Conviv.*

[b] In chapters 18, 22, and 23 Plutarch had already used for other arguments material drawn from contexts that dealt with the indifferents and in chapters 17 and 20 several

This main theme is begun by the argument that what Chrysippus said of the " promoted indifferents," as it would make virtue petty and stupid to busy itself about them, would make the gods ridiculous, since these are the subjects of their oracles and the things they are thought to bestow on men in accordance with providence (chap. 30 [1048 B-C]). The gods would have to bestow these gifts, moreover, upon men who put them to pernicious use, for according to the Stoic demonstration they are proved not to be good by the fact that they are put to bad use by the stupid and virtue, which alone is good and beneficial, is according to the Stoics not given by god but an object of free choice ; and from this it follows that the gods either will not benefit man or cannot do so, a difficulty for the Stoics made glaringly explicit by the contradictory statements of Chrysippus that the state of man is utterly wretched and vicious and that it is ordered by divine

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of the very passages that for a different purpose and once with a different interpretation are paraphrased in chapter 30 (see the references in the notes on 1047 E—1048 B *infra*) ; and it was apparently this latter fact that led both Sandbach and Pohlenz to take chapter 30 with what precedes it as part of what they call the unarranged miscellaneous inconsistencies in chapters 22-30. Yet Pohlenz himself said (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 12, parag. 2) that the subsequent unbroken sequence begins with διὸ τῶν ἐναντιωμάτων τούτων οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναπέπληκεν (1048 B). This is *within* chapter 30, however, and clearly connects what precedes it with what follows. What precedes it certainly goes back to the very beginning of the chapter, the origin of these contradictions in Zeno's " promoted " class ; and what follows it continues uninterrupted with ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον . . . φανερώτερον, the first sentence of chapter 31. The modern division of chapters at this point is misleading.

providence in the best possible fashion (chap. 31). This self-contradiction is developed in the next six chapters. Chrysippus is said always to give the gods epithets that are humane but to ascribe to them deeds that are barbarously cruel (chap. 32), to make divinity induce the vices that pervert man to his ruin but to say that divinity cannot be accessory to anything shameful (chap. 33) and yet to insist that nothing at all—and so not shameful acts and vices either—can occur otherwise than in conformity with providence and the reason of Zeus (chap. 34),[a] and then to assert that of vice, which originates in accordance with the reason of Zeus, there is divine chastisement and to intensify the contradiction by saying that vice is not useless for the universe as a whole and so in effect not only that the injurious is not useless but that Zeus chastises that which is itself blameless and for the useless or useful existence of which he is himself to blame (chap. 35). In this there is further self-contradiction, for, as Plutarch continues (chap. 36),[b] Chrysippus in another passage says that the gods oppose some wrongful acts, suggesting by this that wrong actions are not all equally wrong,[c] and that the complete abolition of

[a] The implications of this are compared unfavourably here with the desire of Epicurus " not to leave vice free from blame " ; see *infra* 1050 c and note *c* there with the references to 1045 B-C in chapter 23, where what is here called the device of Epicurus for liberating volition is said to have been criticized by Chrysippus who contradicted his own criticism of it.

[b] Chapter 36 is a continuation of chapter 35 and should not have been separated from it. Here too as in the case of chapters 30 and 31 the modern division into chapters is misleading.

[c] See page 557, note *a infra*.

vice is neither possible nor good, whereby his own attempt to abolish it by philosophizing becomes an act in conflict with his own doctrine and with god.[a] Moreover, by admitting that there are besides vice and its chastisements " dreadful accidents " and " inconvenient things that happen to the virtuous "[b] he contradicts his thesis that there is nothing reprehensible in the universe and by accounting for them as he does imputes to divinity negligence or incompetence and acknowledges necessity beyond the control of providence and events that are not in conformity with divine reason (chap. 37).

Thus far Chrysippus has been accused of contradicting his own doctrine that all things are ordered by the providence of beneficent divinity, but now he is charged with impugning his own evidence for the doctrine itself. Against those who deny providence he is said to have defended its existence by appealing to the common conception of divinity as beneficent (chap. 38 [1051 D-E]) but by what he says of the gods himself to controvert this same common conception, for according to it the gods are animate beings not only beneficent but also blessed

[a] *Cf.* the charge in chapter 21 (1044 c) that Chrysippus legislates " in competition with the lawgiver of the universe."

[b] These are mentioned in the passages of Chrysippus from the *περὶ Θεῶν* and the *περὶ Φύσεως* cited in chapter 35 for the question of vice and its chastisement (1050 E [*ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*] and 1050 F [*τὰ δεινὰ συμπτώματα*]). When in chapter 37 Plutarch takes up the question of these " accidents " (*cf. τὰ τοιαῦτα συμπτώματα* in 1051 c), he uses for Chrysippus' explanation a passage from his *περὶ Οὐσίας* and does not mention as relevant to it the clause, *κατ' ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν*, in another of the passages that he quoted in chapter 35 (see note *b* on 1050 E *infra*).

and indestructible [a] and he denies to all the gods except Zeus, *i.e.* the universe,[b] indestructibility and self-sufficiency and therewith blessedness too (chaps. 38-40).

What follows is not unrelated to this self-contradiction, not an abrupt transition to what has been called [c] a miscellany of unconnected inconsistencies in physics. In chapters 38-40 it was emphasized that according to Chrysippus except for Zeus, the universe, all the gods including the sun and the moon arise out of fire, require nourishment from without, and are absorbed again into fire, save for which there is nothing indestructible in them. It is implied that Chrysippus conforms with the common conception in conceiving the gods to be animate but that he holds them to be so only in so far as they are igneous, and this becomes explicit in chapter 41. Here he is said to have explained the process of animation as the subtilization and etherealization of air, the sun being animate as the igneous product of vaporous exhalations, and to have identified the soul with fire, the universe when thoroughly fiery in the " ecpyrosis " being its own soul, but to have contradicted himself in this by asserting that the vital spirit of the foetus becomes soul when at birth

[a] For this Plutarch here quotes Antipater of Tarsus (1051 E-F and 1052 B). In *De Comm. Not.* 1075 E (chap. 32 *init.*) he ascribes it to the Stoics generally.

[b] In the " diacosmesis " Zeus is the body of the universe and providence is his soul ; in the " ecpyrosis " this body is etherealized and " completely absorbed " by the soul (1052 C in chap. 39 [ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ . . . αὔξεται . . . μέχρι ἂν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην] and *De Comm. Not.* 1077 D-E [chap. 36 *sub finem*]).

[c] *Cf.* Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 12-13) and Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 21).

it is chilled—and so condensed—by air (1052 F—1053 C), which is itself contradicted by his professed evidence for the generation of soul, the resemblance of offspring to parents (1035 C-D). This alleged contradiction of ascribing animation to chilling air instead of kindling fire leads to the further charge in chapters 42 and 43 that Chrysippus contradicts himself and Stoic doctrine in regard to the nature of air in relation to fire and especially in making air, which is said to be primarily cold because the opposite of fire and which should be inert matter, the habitude or power that produces the cohesion, shape, and character of bodies.

In chapters 38-40 it was said that according to Chrysippus Zeus or the universe alone of the gods is indestructible and self-sufficient because it alone requires no nourishment but is sustained by the interchange of its own parts and grows by absorbing its own matter. There Plutarch argued (chap. 39) that these statements contradict one another. In chapters 44-45 he returns to this indestructibility of the universe but now to show that Chrysippus accounts for it in another way that contradicts his own enunciations of both physical and theological principles.[a] According to this account the universe

[a] It has been argued that these chapters 44-45 must have been written earlier than chapters 8-15 of *De Facie* and these in turn earlier than chapters 26-28 of *De Defectu Orac.* (H. Görgemanns, *Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Dialog De facie in orbe lunae* [Heidelberg, 1970], pp. 111-116, especially p. 112); but this argument is inconclusive at least in so far as it concerns chapters 44-45 of this essay. In these Plutarch's purpose is only to show that a particular explanation given by Chrysippus is incompatible with other principles that he maintains and not to refute directly any of

is indestructible because in the infinite void it occupies the middle, which it is accidental to its substance always to have occupied. With this explanation, Plutarch argues, Chrysippus not only contradicts the argument used against Epicurus that in an infinite there are no limits and no middle and no differences of direction but also by saying that the universe would be dissolved if it were not in the middle implies that its parts would move away from the whole structure to the centre of space and so contradicts his own contention that in a void there is no differentiation to cause bodies to move in any direction and his doctrine of the cohesiveness of the whole, whereby the parts of the universe naturally move to the centre of the whole substance and not of space (chap. 44); and moreover with these statements he contradicts not only his physical theory but his doctrine of god and providence, leaving them as the cause of trivialities only and making that which is most important, the preservation of the universe, the work of accident and not of destiny and providence (chap. 45).

With his theory of destiny, Plutarch continues,[a]

these or to propose a different hypothesis, as is the purpose of the other two passages, in which moreover both Stoic and Aristotelian doctrines are criticized together. Consequently Plutarch might have had at his disposal all the material of chapters 8-15 of *De Facie* and chapters 26-28 of *De Defectu Orac.* or even have already written one or both of these two essays and yet from this material and these arguments have selected as pertinent to his purpose for chapters 44-45 of this essay only what he does here use to prove that Chrysippus contradicts himself (*cf.* also Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 129).

[a] Since importance has been attached to the presence or absence of connecting particles (see p. 375, n. *b supra*), it

his theory of possibilities is also in conflict (chap. 46), and so is his way of exempting destiny from responsibility for the error and injury resulting from the false mental images caused by it (chap. 47). According to the former many events not in accordance with destiny are possible ; but then, Plutarch contends, either destiny is not the all-prevailing force that Chrysippus says she is or, if she is, what is possible will often be impossible and everything true will be necessary and everything false impossible (chap. 46). According to the latter the assent to false mental images, which is necessary for action, is not determined by destiny, which is a predisposing and not a sufficient cause. This, Plutarch maintains, contradicts Chrysippus' assertion that even the slightest event is in conformity with destiny, which unlike a predisposing cause brooks no impediment and so should determine assent also, just as his assertion that of particular motions there are many impediments but of the universal motion none at all contradicts his doctrine that the latter motion extends to all the former [a] ; but moreover his device does not achieve its purpose, for destiny, which is the reason of Zeus, in not causing assent but causing false mental images in order to prompt action must know either that contrary to Stoic doctrine the mental

should be observed that chapter 46 begins with such a particle connecting it with chapter 45, as that is connected by such a particle with chapter 44 and chapter 47 is with chapter 46.

[a] Plutarch here uses against Chrysippus doctrines for which he quoted him in chapter 34, where without reference to the question of mental image, assent, and action the contradiction in the doctrine of all-pervading providence and divine inculpability had been developed.

image without assent suffices or that, as Chrysippus insists, the action can follow only upon assent to the image and so in either case is by intention responsible for the erroneous behaviour that ensues upon the presentation of the image (chap. 47).

As this analysis shows, the essay, which like some others ends without any epilogue or formal conclusion,[a] is neither a mere congeries of alleged contradictions nor a combination of some well organized sections and others that are logically unconnected with these and are themselves unorganized accumulations of miscellaneous material. It has seemed to be so only because it was not organized according to the topical disposition expected by modern critics. Because it does not conform to their preconceived notion of a proper design they have disregarded the sequences of thought and association of ideas that lead from one argument to the next[b] even in the apparently unorganized sections and give the whole essay a continuity seldom interrupted,[c] though the several connexions themselves differ from one another, being sometimes the nature of the material used or its provenience, sometimes the context of the Stoic doctrines or arguments them-

[a] So *e.g.* do *De Comm. Not.* and *De Iside.* Concerning the absence of the epilogue in earlier literature *cf.* B. A. van Groningen, *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque*[2] (Amsterdam, 1960), pp. 70-76 and 255.

[b] Too little attention has been given to the rôle of this phenomenon in Greek literature; but *cf.* W. J. Verdenius, " L'association des idées comme principe de composition dans Homère, Hésiode, Théognis," *Rev. Études Grecques*, lxxiii (1960), pp. 345-361.

[c] Such interruptions or entirely unconnected beginnings occur at chapter 11 and chapter 30.

selves, sometimes the particular use to which these are put by Plutarch, and sometimes only a suggestive term or reference.

In so far, then, as hypotheses about the source of the essay rest, as do those of von Arnim and Pohlenz, upon the assumption that it consists in part of organized sections and in part of unorganized miscellanies they are all without foundation. So is the argument that Plutarch's source must have been an Academic polemic or collection composed in the time of Antipater because no later Stoic is mentioned by name in the essay and after the first few chapters Chrysippus is almost the only Stoic quoted, paraphrased, and attacked.[a] In Plutarch's time Chrysippus was the recognized authority for Stoic doctrine; and among the Stoics themselves, as Epictetus makes clear, erudition meant knowledge of the older Stoics and particularly of the works of Chrysippus, "the great benefactor who points the way."[b] If this supreme authority of the school could be convicted of self-contradiction, there was no need for Plutarch to trouble himself about his followers, for they would themselves be involved in his conviction. It is gratuitous also to suppose that the source of this essay must have been a collection of inconsistencies

[a] For this reason von Arnim (*S.V.F.* i, pp. XII-XIV) suggested that the source of this essay and of *De Comm. Not.* also was Clitomachus, who compiled the arguments of Carneades. Both Pohlenz and Sandbach thought that in this von Arnim had gone beyond the evidence (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 32 and *Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 24).

[b] Epictetus, *Diss.* I, iv, 28-32 and x, 10 and *cf.* I, iv, 6-9 and xvii, 13-18; II, xvii, 40 and xix, 5-10; III, ii, 13-16 and xxi, 7; IV, ix, 6; Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 17-18; J. B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus*, pp. 12-14.

made from the works of Chrysippus by some earlier compiler because Plutarch could not himself have collected all the passages from the books of Chrysippus that he cites here.[a] It has been shown that Plutarch even in his other works evinces knowledge of the writings of Chrysippus much more extensive and intimate than had generally been acknowledged[b] and that in this essay itself he often gives clear evidence of knowing the larger contexts from which his quotations and paraphrases have been taken, knowledge that he could not have got from a mere "formless collection of inconsistencies."[c] Moreover, the comparisons with Epicurean doctrine that appear in this essay would not have been contained in such a compilation of passages made from the writings of Chrysippus; and the assumption of such a compilation as the source of this essay would in consistency require the further assumption of another such compilation as the source of the parallel essay, *On Epicurean Self-Contradictions* (No. 129). Such a multiplication of hypotheses is neither plausible nor necessary.

It is known that Plutarch kept "note-books"

[a] Sandbach, *Class. Quart.*, xxxiv (1940), pp. 20 and 23 (see *supra* p. 377, n. *a*).

[b] *Cf.* Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 225-238.

[c] *Cf.* Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 28-33 (*n.b.* p. 29, notes 1 and 3; p. 32, n. 2). Plutarch in this essay frequently gives the number of the book that he is citing. It has been observed in other connexions that he seems to do this only when he has direct access to the work (C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* [Oxford, 1971], p. 83). For the wide range of Plutarch's reading and his own knowledge of the primary historical sources that he cites *cf.* J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford, 1969), pp. xliii-xlvi with his references to other studies of the subject.

(ὑπομνήματα), to which he had recourse for relevant material when he wished to compose an essay on a particular subject.[a] In such form probably from the time when he was a student in Athens he must have kept quotations taken from the books that he read and résumés of passages with comments of his own perhaps and those that he had heard in the Academy. Among the books thus read and excerpted were certainly Stoic and Epicurean works and the Academic polemics against them, and from these entries in his note-books he might have selected the excerpts to be used in the present essay. It is more probable, however, that there was an intermediate stage, for he composed a work entitled *Selections and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans* (No. 148). For this he must certainly have collected from his note-books all the relevant excerpts and refutations, arranging them in some order and perhaps supplementing them ; and it is reasonable to suppose that this compilation was the immediate source from which he took material to be used in his special polemics against Stoics and Epicureans, among them both the present essay and its Epicurean counterpart (No. 129)[b] and the *De*

[a] *Cf. De Tranquillitate* 464 F and *De Cohibenda Ira* 457 D-E. On the implications of these passages *cf.* H. Martin, *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*, x (1969), pp. 69-70 and J. Hani, *Plutarque : Consolation à Apollonios* (Paris, 1972), pp. 41-42 ; and see also *supra* p. 4, n. *b* in the Introduction to the *Platonic Questions*.

[b] The contrary suggestion made by Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 33, n. 6), that these two essays were simply combined and rearranged to produce No. 148, is more than improbable. It does not do justice to the general title ἐκλογαὶ καὶ ἔλεγχοι and it leaves out of account entirely the existence of the ὑπομνήματα and the relation to them of all three essays.

Communibus Notitiis also. This would explain why in this last work and in the present essay many of the same passages of Chrysippus are quoted or paraphrased but often to a different extent or in a different fashion [a] and how Plutarch can indicate that they have been selected as alone relevant to his purpose from a larger context known to him while others are being purposely "passed over," how traditional Academic arguments against the Stoics can appear along with passages excerpted from Chrysippus by Plutarch himself, why in the present essay there are frequent comparisons with Epicurean doctrines and attitudes, and how it is that many of the passages or doctrines referred to in these essays appear sporadically and for different purposes in other writings of Plutarch.

The occurrence of such passages with variations in different essays, if their immediate source was a compilation of Plutarch's own, either the *Selections and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans* or his notebooks or both, cannot be used to establish a relative chronology of the essays in which they appear. So there is no cogency in the argument that Plutarch was an old man when he composed the two polemics against the Stoics because chapter 29 of the present essay must be a condensation of *Quaest. Conviv.* 698 A—700 B and 732 F and *De Comm. Not.* 1082 A

[a] *Cf. e.g.* the statement of the contradiction in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 A-B, which is concise to the point of obscurity, and the fuller and therefore clearer exposition of the context in *De Comm. Not.* 1068 E (*cf.* Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 27, n. 2); and, on the other hand, the much more compendious statement in *De Comm. Not.* 1084 D-E (chap. 46) of the contradiction developed in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 E—1053 D (chap. 41).

(chap. 42) must have been written after 392 B [a] or in the argument of Görgemann's that chapters 44-45 of the present essay must have been written before the *De Facie* and the *De Defectu Orac.*[b] Even that the present essay antedated the *De Communibus Notitiis* is only a plausible inference from the general impression made by the two works and cannot be supported by any decisive evidence.[c] On the other hand, it is certain that even apart from the *Selections and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans* there were essays earlier than the present one in which Plutarch openly opposed Stoic doctrine or attacked Chrysippus, for in this one he refers at least twice to such earlier polemics himself.[d]

His treatment of Stoicism especially in the present

[a] This argument of Pohlenz's (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 32-33) is rejected by Ziegler (*R.-E.* xxi/1 [1951], col. 760, 6-19) and by Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 52, n. 5); see also p. 387, n. *a supra* and note *e* on *De Comm. Not.* 1082 A *infra*. There is, however, no more cogency in Babut's contention (*loc. cit.*) that *De Primo Frigido* 946 C must have been written later than *De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 F—1053 C and *De Comm. Not.* 1084 D-E or in the arguments by which he attempts to prove that *De Stoic. Repug.* must antedate the *De Virtute Morali* (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 49-50 and *Plutarque de la Vertu Éthique*, pp. 81-83).

[b] See p. 393, n. *a supra*.

[c] What Pohlenz thought to be such (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 17-18) is inconclusive, as Babut has shown (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 51, n. 1; *cf.* Ziegler, *R.-E.* xxi/1 [1951], col. 759, 35-46); and Babut's own suggestion (p. 51) that *De Comm. Not.* 1070 F (chap. 25 *sub finem*) may be a discreet allusion to *De Stoic. Repug.* is no more convincing than Pohlenz's assertion (*op. cit.*, p. 7, n. 3) that *De Comm. Not.* 1062 E " weist auf den Eingang von *Stoic. Repug.* zurück."

[d] See *infra* 1036 B and 1040 D and *supra* p. 369, n. *b* and p. 370, n. *a*.

essay and in the *De Communibus Notitiis* has frequently been severely censured. C. Giesen in his dissertation of 1889, *De Plutarchi contra Stoicos Disputationibus*, tried to prove that the Stoics were for the most part not guilty of the self-contradictions with which they are charged in these essays; and he concluded (pp. 111-112) that Plutarch like a malicious judge cleaves to the words and perverts their meaning and that consequently what he says about the Stoics apart from his quotations of their own words cannot be used to interpret their philosophy unless it is confirmed by independent and reliable evidence. This conclusion was approved by Ziegler (*R.-E.* xxi/1 [1951], col. 756, 2-36), for whom the critique of the Stoics in the present essay is " lacking in scientific earnestness " and characterized by " litigious prejudice," " genuine misunderstanding of the opponent's train of thought," and " superficial literalness " ; and it is echoed by R. H. Barrow (*Plutarch and His Times* [London, 1967], p. 105), who calls the essay " a most valuable storehouse of quotations from Stoic writers " but as a criticism of Stoicism " almost useless " because of Plutarch's " obtuse literalness " and his " inability to understand Stoicism." Seven years earlier and apparently unknown to Barrow quite a different conclusion had been reached by G. Verbeke, who of Plutarch's evidence about Stoicism and Epicureanism wrote : " wherever his reports can be controlled by evidence from other sources, their accuracy will generally be apparent. Wherever the exact account is a matter of guesswork Plutarch is giving his personal interpretations, drawing inferences or concentrating on the explanation of a term with a view to criticizing

the doctrines he recounts ; and quite often it will be apparent that these interpretations and criticisms miss the real meaning of the doctrine considered. But all this does not weaken the incontestable value of the numerous pieces of information that our author gives us about the Stoics and Epicureans." [a] This estimate of Verbeke's is quoted with approval by Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 266), who goes much further and, calling Giesen's conclusion arbitrary and unjust, says that an objective examination of the texts can find Plutarch treating his adversaries unjustly only a few times and never ignorantly, incompetently, or in bad faith. Yet Babut himself admits that at least sometimes Plutarch does treat his adversaries unjustly, while Giesen at the other extreme before pronouncing his severe censure of Plutarch concedes to him (*op. cit.*, p. 111) a large area in which the Stoics did contradict themselves or expressed themselves in terms apparently inconsistent with the strict implication of their principles ; and these complementary concessions of the apologist and the prosecutor tend to vindicate the earlier and more measured judgment of R. Volkmann (*Philosophie des Plutarch*, p. 30) that the self-contradictions imputed in this essay to the Stoics and especially to Chrysippus are sometimes palpable but that Plutarch took a one-sided view of many statements which detached from their context

[a] *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century* edited by I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (Göteborg, 1960), pp. 246-247. Verbeke in this article is intent upon vindicating what Plutarch reports—or Verbeke thinks he reports—about Aristotle, and it is to support this thesis that he appeals to the accuracy of Plutarch's evidence concerning the Stoics and Epicureans.

in the Stoic system he misused for his polemic.[a] A polemic the present essay was meant to be, not an exposition of the Stoic system or an exegesis to reconcile the apparently inconsistent statements of Chrysippus. Plutarch's purpose in writing it was to convince others that, as he certainly himself sincerely believed, the Stoics and especially Chrysippus habitually contradicted themselves and their own principles; and, if to this end he took advantage of every opportunity that he recognized even in their *obiter dicta*, careless expressions, and unclear formulations,[b] it does not follow that he was either unfamiliar with the works of theirs in which these occurred or ignorant of their systematic philosophy and incapable of understanding what was intended by it.

The harshest critic of his treatment of the Stoics here seems nevertheless to have had complete confidence in the accuracy of his quotations.[c] Yet many of the passages that had been taken for quotations are not quotations but paraphrases[d]; and paraphrase may always involve interpretation to some extent, even if it be unintentional interpreta-

[a] For the ease with which the successive theses of the Stoic system, when isolated and detached from the unifying continuity of it, can be made literally incompatible with one another *cf.* V. Goldschmidt in *Les Stoïciens* (Paris, Bibl. de la Pléiade, 1962), pp. 90-91.

[b] Chrysippus was notorious for his careless, involved, repetitious, and obscure writing: *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vii, 180 and x, 27; *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 26, 28, 29, 288, and 902.

[c] *Cf.* Giesen (*op. cit.*, p. 112): ". . . praeter ipsorum Stoicorum verba ab eo allata, quorum videlicet summa est fides atque auctoritas, . . ."

[d] *Cf.* Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), pp. 15-17.

tion. Moreover, as can be established in a case subject to verification, Plutarch, though he often quotes the text of Plato accurately, sometimes substitutes for the original term a different one of his own and sometimes abridges the original text, omitting words that may have seemed to him to be irrelevant to the purpose of his quotation or less innocently something that would have embarrassed his interpretation but the omission of which in any case affects the original implication and connexion of what is quoted.[a] Most of his quotations of the Stoics cannot now be compared with the original texts from which they were taken. They may be accurate and in default of evidence to the contrary must be accepted as such ; but it is always possible that they may not be so [b] and, even if accurate so far as they go, may be incomplete and in any case that in their original context they might have been seen to have a significance or nuance which has been obscured or obliterated by their isolation. Like Plutarch's paraphrases and interpretations his quotations of the Stoics as of others must each be judged for itself both in the context of his own purpose in using it and in comparison with all other available and relevant evidence. The only general conclusion likely to be valid for his treatment of the Stoics is the unspectacular one recently drawn in another case :

[a] See *supra* p. 139, n. *a* in the Introduction to the *De An. Proc. in Timaeo* with the references there.

[b] Babut himself (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 288, n. 1) acknowledges Plutarch's " manière, peu scrupuleuse, de citer " and his " autonomie par rapport à ses sources." Cases of his altering the words of the author whom he cites have been observed in another connexion by H. Martin (*A.J.P.*, lxxxii [1961], pp. 165-166).

" sometimes Plutarch is a reliable reporter of Empedocles ; sometimes he is not." [a]

A Latin translation of the present essay by Edward Henryson with an appendix containing emendations of the text was published in 1555, the same year in which Cornarius published his translation of it.[b] The most recent translation known to me is the French by E. Bréhier revised and published with introduction and brief notes by V. Goldschmidt in *Les Stoïciens* (Paris, Bibl. de la Pléiade, 1962), pp. 87-134 and pp. 1261-1264. There is also an unpublished dissertation by Hans Deike, *Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 1-10 : *Beiträge zu einem kritischen Kommentar* (Diss. Göttingen, 1963), which I have been unable to procure but some notion of which may be got from the comments made by Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 24, n. 4 and p. 266, n. 3.

Of the essay, which is No. 76 in the *Catalogue of Lamprias* and No. 66 in the Planudean order, the text here printed is based upon F X g d v z α A β γ n E B. These MSS. have been collated afresh from photostats, and their readings except for those of n are fully reported in the *apparatus*.[c] Those of n, of Toletanus

[a] J. P. Hershbell, *A.J.P.*, xcii (1971), p. 183 in his article, " Plutarch as a Source for Empedocles Re-examined," *ibid.*, pp. 156-184.

[b] It is the translation by Cornarius that was reprinted by Stephanus in his edition of 1572. For Henryson's (Lugduni apud G. Rouillium, 1555), which I have not myself seen, *cf.* R. Aulotte, *Amyot et Plutarque* (Genève, 1965), p. 186, n. 2 and p. 336.

[c] The advisability of rereading these MSS. and giving a new report of their readings was impressed upon me by the discrepancies between the *apparatus* of the new Teubner edition (Pohlenz, *Moralia* vi/2 [1952] and Pohlenz -Westman, *Moralia* vi/2 [1959]) and an unpublished collation previously

51, 5[a] and other descendants of γ and β, and of Vat. Reg. 80 are included only where they are of some special interest.

F in its present state begins at the top of the first folio with the words *ἀλλ' οἴχεται ὁ λόγος* (1039 C of this essay), over the initial *α* of which there is a later rubricated *A* and above which there is a later inscription, scarcely legible but unrelated to the title of the essay. It seems, therefore, that the MS. originally contained the whole of this essay and possibly also three others preceding it, since in the margin against the beginning of the next essay there is written, though in a hand not that of the scribe's, *λόγος ε'*. With this loss may be connected the large omission after the sixth folio, for following the last words there, *τόπον οὐ δίδωσι* (1044 C), and without indication of a lacuna the first words of the next folio are *διαφέρειν, ἡ ἐπελευστικὴ δύναμις* (1045 B).

That the ultimate source of F and X was the same is most strikingly shown by the fact that in the original hands of both there is in the margin at 1047 E a scholium on Plato's statement criticized by Chrysippus in 1047 C. Of X folios 148-149, beginning *τῶν τοιούτων ἄτοπον μὲν οὖν* (1045 B) and ending *τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὅρι-* (1047 A), are written in a later hand (X^4) and were apparently a replacement from a different source for pages lost from X after the MS. had been corrected by two hands,[b] which are not

made by F. H. Sandbach and by him most generously put at my disposal.

[a] For the readings of this MS. I depend upon the collation by G. B. A. Fletcher, *Class. Quart.*, xxi (1927), pp. 166-176.

[b] *Cf.* Pohlenz, *Moralia* i, p. xx; Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2, p. 224. In four cases, one of these being a

clearly distinguishable from each other and so are indiscriminately designated X^3. A hand similar to that of the original X but not identical with it wrote folios 153, beginning *ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν* (1050 A) and ending *εἴτε ποιήσας οὐ-* (1051 A), and 160, beginning *-νην αἱ συγκαταθέσεις γίνεσθαι λέγονται* and ending with the end of the essay and the beginning of Plan. No. 8.

The three MSS. d, v, z all pass immediately from the words *Χρύσιππος ἐν οἷς* (1052 E) to *τοῦ χρηστηρίου κ.τ.λ.* of *De Defectu Oraculorum* 412 C. Moreover, the passage *οἷς ὁ σοφὸς* (1044 C) . . . *κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως* (1050 C) is omitted by v and z (where a large part of f. 175 v and all of f. 176 are left empty) and in d is written (from *ὥσπερ ἀντινομοθετῶν* in 1044 C) by a different hand copying from a different source, which was identified by Sandbach as Laurentianus 80, 5. The defective archetype of these three MSS. was itself descended, however, from the ultimate common ancestor of F and X, from which descent some good readings have been preserved by this group.

For g a similar independent descent from the common Byzantine archetype was postulated by Pohlenz.[a] He was criticized for this by Sandbach,[b] who maintained that g derives from a manuscript copied from X after it had been corrected by X^3 and

correction, X^4 has what would otherwise be a unique reading of B. In ten cases X^4 disagrees with B, however: three of these are unique mistakes of B, four are unique mistakes of X^4, and one is a mistake which X^4 shares with g, γ, n, and E.

[a] *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), p. 6; *Moralia* vi/2 (1952), p. vi.

[b] *Class. Rev.*, N.S. iv (1954), p. 250; *cf. Class. Quart.*, xxxv (1941), p. 115.

that its testimony is valuable only for the section (1045 B—1047 A) where the original X is missing,[a] although he admitted that elsewhere two unique readings of g are clearly correct. Pohlenz made the most of this admission when in reply he argued at more length [b] that g derives not from X but from a twin of X which was also the source of X^3 for those corrections of X with which g agrees. The greater plausibility of Pohlenz's postulate is supported not only by the good readings of g upon which he insists but also by at least a dozen other places and among these especially by four, where, though X is perfectly legible and intelligible, g left empty spaces, as if unable to read the text from which he was copying : 1041 A : *λέγ* vac. 4 *οητῷς* -g^1 (*λέγοντος οητῳς* -g^2 ; *λέγει ῥητῶς* -X) ; 1044 D : *οὐκαναπ* vac. 3 -g (*οὐκ ἀνάπαλιν* -X) ; 1055 F : *πυ* vac. 8 *αὐτοτελεῖς* -g (*ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς* -X) ; 1056 A : *ψ* vac. 3 *ἔσται* -g (*ψευδοῦς ἔσται* -X).

Such a source of X^3 and g might also account for the relation of B to X and g in this essay. B can have been copied neither from X before or after correction nor from g [c] ; and yet against all other MSS. B agrees with X g 30 times, with X^3 g 38 times, with X^3 alone 7 times, and with g alone thrice, though it should be observed that in 40 of these passages the evidence of d v z is wanting and in 13 others F is not extant.

[a] Paton had argued that in Plan. No. 68 g was copied directly from X after its correction by X^3 (*Plutarchi Pythici Dialogi Tres* rec. Guil. R. Paton, Berlin 1893, pp. XVI-XVII).

[b] *Moralia* v/3 (1955), pp. 115-117 = Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2 (1959), pp. 225-226.

[c] Among many passages *cf.* especially 1033 B, 1033 E, 1041 B, 1042 B, 1049 B, 1053 E, 1055 C.

Where the evidence of d v z is available B agrees against all other MSS. with X g d v z 9 times,[a] with X^3 g d v z twice, with X (not g) d v z thrice,[b] with g z twice, and with g d once; but in 15 of these passages the evidence of F is missing. Against all other MSS. B agrees with F X g d v z thrice and with F X g 10 times, 9 of which are passages not preserved in d v z.[c] It is probable that, if the whole essay were preserved in F, d, v, and z, the figures for the agreement of B X g and B X^3 g against all other MSS. would be smaller than they are, though still not insignificant[d]; but it is also probable that the agreement of B with Planudean MSS. and without support of F, d, v, or z would be less frequent than it is, for it is now very infrequent when F, X, g, d, v, and z are all present. When they are present, B agrees with E against them only half a dozen times. It is certain that this essay in B was not copied from E, which more than a dozen times omits words or phrases preserved by B and other MSS., though one omission there is common to E and B and to them alone (1041 D), one of the two readings in which they agree against all other MSS. The original of E seems

[a] In one further case with X g d v (not z).

[b] In one of these three cases (1036 A) X^1 was changed by X^3 to agree with g against B d v z.

[c] In one of these (1048 E) X and F and in another (1053 E) F were later changed to disagree with B g and B X g respectively. In two places, one of which is missing in F, B agrees with d v z and in another with z alone against all other MSS.

[d] See *e.g.* these passages where in the presence of F d v z words are preserved by X g B or X^3 g B only: 1040 B (*τά*), 1043 E (*Δήμητρος . . . ὑδρηχόου*), 1044 B (*δεῖ* and *πώματός θ' ὑδρηχόου*), 1050 D (*καὶ*), 1051 E (*γραφομένων καὶ λεγομένων*), 1052 C (*οὖν*).

to have been a corrected copy of γ,[a] whereas the distinctively Planudean readings of B tend rather to be those of α or of A.

[a] See *e.g.* 1035 A and B, 1038 F, 1039 A, 1044 A, 1057 A.

(1033)

ΠΕΡΙ ΣΤΩΙΚΩΝ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΜΑΤΩΝ[1]

1. Πρῶτον ἀξιῶ τὴν τῶν δογμάτων ὁμολογίαν ἐν τοῖς βίοις θεωρεῖσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως τὸν
B ῥήτορα κατ' Αἰσχίνην ταὐτὸ φθέγγεσθαι καὶ τὸν νόμον ὡς τὸν βίον τοῦ φιλοσόφου τῷ λόγῳ σύμφωνον εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ λόγος τοῦ φιλοσόφου νόμος αὐθαίρετος καὶ ἴδιός ἐστιν, εἴ γε δὴ[2] μὴ παιδιὰν καὶ εὐρησιλογίαν[3] ἕνεκα δόξης ἀλλ' ἔργον ἄξιον σπουδῆς τῆς μεγίστης, ὥσπερ ἔστιν, ἡγοῦνται φιλοσοφίαν.

[1] X, g, F (subscription in margin), Catalogue of Lamprias ; ΠΕΡΙ omitted by the rest ; ἐναντιουμένων -v.
[2] δὴ -omitted by B.
[3] εὑρεσιλογίαν -X[3](ras.), g, d, v, z ; εὑρεσιολογίαν -B.

[a] The Stoics emphasized the coherence and internal consistency of their system : Diogenes Laertius, vii, 40 ; Sextus, *Adv. Math.* vii, 17-19 ; Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 74 with iv, 53 and v, 83. *Cf.* Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 60-67.

[b] Plato, *Laches* 188 c-E (*cf.* Plutarch, *Adv Colotem* 1117 E). Zeno the Stoic was praised on this very account in the honorary decree recorded by Diogenes Laertius, vii, 10-11 (*S.V.F.* i, p. 7, 26-27) : . . . παράδειγμα τὸν ἴδιον βίον ἐκθεὶς ἅπασιν ἀκόλουθον ὄντα τοῖς λόγοις οἷς διελέγετο. . . .

[c] Aeschines, *In Ctesiphontem* 16.

[d] *Cf.* the statement in *Maxime cum Princ. Philos. Disserendum* 779 B that οἱ λόγοι τῶν φιλοσόφων, if inscribed in the minds of political leaders, νόμων δύναμιν λαμβάνουσιν and in *Ad Principem Ineruditum* 780 c the identification of the νόμος that should rule the ruler as ἔμψυχος ὢν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγος.

ON STOIC SELF-CONTRADICTIONS

1. In the first place I require that the consistency of men's doctrines [a] be observed in their way of living, for it is even more necessary that the philosopher's life be in accord with his theory [b] than that the orator's language, as Aeschines says,[c] be identical with that of the law. The reason is that the philosopher's theory is a law freely chosen for his own,[d]—at least it is if they believe philosophy to be not a game of verbal ingenuity played for the sake of glory but, as it really is, an activity worthy of the utmost earnestness.[e]

[e] *Cf.* Cicero, *Pro Murena* 62 : "haec (*scil.* Stoic doctrines) . . . M. Cato . . . adripuit neque disputandi causa, ut magna pars, sed ita vivendi." The Stoics themselves insisted that philosophy is the art of life (*cf.* Plutarch, *Quaest. Conviv.* 613 B), the practice of virtuous living, and not mere intellectual virtuosity or erudition : *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 35 and iii, frags. 202 and 598 ; Seneca, frag. 17 (in Lactantius, *Divin. Inst.* iii, 15, 1) ; Musonius Rufus, frags. iii (p. 9, 13-16 ; p. 10, 6-7 ; p. 12, 11-19 [Hense]), iv (p. 19, 6-14 [Hense]), and vi ; Epictetus, *Diss.* III, ii, x (6-16), xv (8-13), xxiv (78-83) and IV, iv (8-18), viii (4-20). For the connexion of θεωρία and πρᾶξις in *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 202 see also Diogenes Laertius, vii, 126 and 130 and Seneca, *De Otio* v, 1 and 8 and vii (interpreted differently by Grilli, *Il problema della vita contemplativa*, pp. 96-102 and pp. 252-257 and by Joly, *Le thème . . . des genres de vie*, pp. 143-147).

(1033) 2. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μὲν ὡς ἐν ὀλίγοις[1] αὐτῷ[2] Ζήνωνι πολλὰ δὲ Κλεάνθει[3] πλεῖστα δὲ Χρυσίππῳ γεγραμμένα[4] τυγχάνει περὶ[5] πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν καὶ ῥητορεύειν ἐν δὲ τοῖς βίοις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν εὑρεῖν οὐ στρατηγίαν, οὐ νομοθεσίαν, οὐ πάροδον εἰς βουλήν, οὐ συνηγο-
C ρίαν ἐπὶ δικαστῶν, οὐ στρατείαν ὑπὲρ πατρίδος, οὐ πρεσβείαν,[6] οὐκ ἐπίδοσιν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ξένης ὥσπερ τινὸς λωτοῦ γευσάμενοι[7] σχολῆς τὸν πάντα βίον οὐ βραχὺν ἀλλὰ παμμήκη γενόμενον διήγαγον ἐν λόγοις καὶ βιβλίοις καὶ περιπάτοις, οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι τοῖς ὑφ' ἑτέρων γραφομένοις καὶ λεγομένοις μᾶλ-

[1] X, g, d, v, z ; λόγοις -a, A, β, γ, E, B (*cf.* 1036 B *infra*). [2] τῷ -E. [3] Κλεάνθη -E. [4] γεγραμμένα -omitted by X, g. [5] παρὰ -d. [6] πρὸς βίαν -g. [7] γευσάμενοι λωτοῦ -B.

[a] 1033 B-C = *S.V.F.* i, frag. 27 (p. 11, 5-15) and frag. 262 (p. 61, 7-9). Zeno of Citium (*ca.* 336–262/1) after long study in Athens founded there (*ca.* 300) the school later called Stoic. He was succeeded as head by his pupil, Cleanthes of Assos (331–232) ; and he in turn was succeeded by his pupil, Chrysippus of Soli (*ca.* 280–206), who was called the " second founder " of the school. On the lives of these men see Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 22-30 and ii, pp. 14-18 and 232 ; Verbeke, *Kleanthes*, pp. 22-27 and 50-68.

[b] For Zeno's terseness *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vii, 18 and 20 ; Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* ii, 20 ; Pearson, *Fragments*, pp. 32-35. In contrast to this see for the prolixity of Chrysippus : Diogenes Laertius, vii, 180 ; *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 27 and 883.

[c] *e.g.*, there were the πολιτεία and the περὶ νόμου by Zeno, and by Cleanthes a πολιτικός, περὶ νόμων, περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν, and περὶ βασιλείας (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 4 and 175 ; Pearson, *Fragments*, pp. 29-30 ; Verbeke, *Kleanthes*, pp. 87-89) ; and Plutarch himself later in this essay cites " by title " works of Chrysippus περὶ νόμου (1037 F), περὶ πολιτείας (1044 B and D), and περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν (1045 D, 1049 E).

[d] *Cf. Adv. Colotem* 1126 E, where similar language is

2. Well then,[a] it happens that Zeno, his conciseness considered,[b] himself wrote quite a bit, Cleanthes much, and Chrysippus a very great deal about government, ruling and being ruled, and judging and pleading cases[c] ; and yet in the career of none of them can there be found any military command or legislation or attendance in council or advocacy at the bar or military service in defence of country or diplomatic mission or public benefaction,[d] but in a foreign land they tasted the lotus of leisure[e] and spent all their lives, and very long lives too, with talk and books and strolling in the schools. Consequently it is not unevident[f] that they lived consistently[g] with the writings and sayings of others

used against the Epicureans but not, of course, to argue that their civic inactivity is inconsistent with their doctrine.

[e] *i.e.* leisure, the taste of which affected them as if it had been the lotus of *Odyssey* ix, 94-97 ; *cf.* Leutsch, *Corpus Paroem. Graec.*, ii, p. 515, 2-4 with note and add Lucian, *De Saltatione* 3-4 ; *Anth. Pal.* xv, 12, 8.

[f] This was technical terminology in Stoic logic (Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii, 140-143 and *Adv. Math.* viii, 310-314 ; *cf.* Mates, *Stoic Logic*, pp. 61-63) and is probably used here with intentional irony.

[g] Here again an ironical twist is given to a Stoic term. See *S.V.F.* i, frag. 179, where according to Stobaeus (*Ecl.* ii, p. 75, 11-12 [Wachsmuth]) the τέλος was defined by Zeno as τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν but according to Diogenes Laertius (vii, 87) as τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν (so Cleanthes and Chrysippus [*S.V.F.* i, frag. 552 and iii, frags. 4 and 5] ; *cf.* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, p. 76, 1-8 [Wachsmuth] and Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 1060 D). For the simple ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν = κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν = κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν *cf.* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, p. 77, 16-19 (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 16) ; for κατ' ἐπιστήμην ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν *cf.* 1036 A *infra* (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 127). See Pearson, *Fragments*, pp. 162-163 (no. 120) ; Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, pp. 220-223 ; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 116-118 and ii, pp. 67-68 and 235.

(1033) λον ἢ τοῖς ὑφ' αὑτῶν[1] ὁμολογουμένως[2] ἔζησαν, ἣν Ἐπίκουρος ἡσυχίαν ἐπαινεῖ καὶ Ἱερώνυμος ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ παράπαν καταβιώσαντες. αὐτὸς γοῦν[3] Χρύσιππος[4] ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Βίων οὐδὲν οἴεται τὸν[5] σχολαστικὸν βίον τοῦ ἡδονικοῦ διαφέρειν· αὐτὰς δὲ παραθήσομαι τὰς λέξεις· "ὅσοι[6] δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις ἐπιβάλλειν[7] μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τί[8] μοι δοκοῦσι διαμαρτάνειν, ὑπονοοῦντες διαγωγῆς τινος[9] ἕνεκεν δεῖν[10] τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τούτῳ παραπλησίου[11] καὶ τὸν ὅλον βίον οὕτω πως διελκύσαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν σαφῶς[12] θεωρηθῇ, ἡδέως· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ λανθάνειν τὴν ὑπόνοιαν αὐτῶν, πολλῶν μὲν σαφῶς τοῦτο λεγόντων οὐκ ὀλίγων δ' ἀδηλότερον."[13] τίς οὖν μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ σχολαστικῷ βίῳ τούτῳ[14] κατεγήρασεν ἢ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων[15] καὶ Ἀντίπατρος, οἵ γε καὶ τὰς αὑτῶν κατέλιπον πατρίδας οὐδὲν ἐγκαλοῦντες ἀλλ' ὅπως

[1] αὑ^{ω}τὸν -g. [2] Turnebus; ὁμολογουμένοις -mss.
[3] οὖν -B.
[4] Χρύσιππος -omitted by v^{1}; ὁ Χρύσιππος -g, d, z.
[5] τὸν σχολαστικὸν . . . μάλιστα -omitted by A and added by A^{2} in margin.
[6] ὅσους -g; τοῖς -d; ὅσον -v.
[7] ἐπιβαλεῖν -d, z.
[8] τί -X, g; οὐ τί (or οὔ τι) -d, v, z, α, A^{1}, β, γ, E; οὗτοί A$^{corr.}$, B, Tolet. 51, 5.
[9] Omitted by A^{1}, superscript by A^{2}.
[10] Omitted by g. [11] τοῦτο παραπλήσιον -g.
[12] σοφῶς -X, g. [13] ἀδηλώτερον -g.
[14] τούτῳ βίῳ -g, z, B. [15] Ζήνων καὶ Διογένης- d, v, z.

[a] Frag. 426 (Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 284).
[b] Frag. 11 (F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, x, p. 13 and pp. 30-31.)
[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 702. On Ways of Living by Chrysippus as a polemic against the work with the same title by Epicurus (Usener, *Epicurea*, pp. 94-96) see Joly, *Le thème . . . des genres de vie*, pp. 141 and 144.
[d] The former are the Epicureans, the latter the Peripatetics (*cf.* Zeller, *Phil. Griech.* iii, i, p. 54, n. 1; Joly, *op. cit.*, p. 142).
[e] *Cf. De Exilio* 605 B. For Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes of Assos, and Chrysippus of Soli see p. 414, n. *a supra* and the references there. Diogenes of Babylon (*i.e.* Seleucia, *cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 210, 2-18) studied under Chrysippus, succeeded another of his pupils, Zeno of Tarsus (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 209), as head of the school, and was succeeded in turn by his own pupil, Antipater of Tarsus (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 244, 2-7 and p. 245, 24-34). On their lives see Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 180-181 and ii, pp. 91-92. The Zeno named by Plutarch here between Diogenes and Antipater is probably Zeno of Tarsus (*cf.* H. von Arnim, *R.-E.* v [1903], col. 773, 52-66).
[f] *Cf.* Plato, *Crito* 50 c 9–D 1.

rather than with their own, since their lives were passed altogether in that tranquillity which is commended by Epicurus [a] and Hieronymus.[b] Chrysippus himself at least in his fourth book on Ways of Living thinks that the scholastic life is no different from the life of pleasure. I shall quote him verbatim [c]: "All who suppose that the scholastic life is especially incumbent upon philosophers seem to me to make a serious mistake from the beginning by presuming that one should engage in this for the sake of some activity or some other similar purpose and drag out one's whole life in some such fashion—which, if accurately examined, means 'pleasantly,' for we ought not to miss their underlying meaning, since many make this assertion openly and not a few more obscurely." [d] Who, then, grew old in this scholastic life if not Chrysippus and Cleanthes and Diogenes and Zeno and Antipater? They even forsook their own countries [e] not because they had any grievance [f]

(1033) *καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἐν τῷ 'Ωιδείῳ*[1] *καὶ ἐπὶ Ζωστῆρος σχολάζοντες καὶ φιλολογοῦντες*[2] *διάγωσιν; 'Αριστοκρέων γοῦν ὁ Χρυσίππου μαθητὴς καὶ οἰκεῖος εἰκόνα χαλκῆν ἀναστηλώσας ἐπέγραψε τόδε τὸ ἐλεγεῖον*

τὸν νέννον[3] *Χρύσιππον 'Αριστοκρέων ἀνέθηκε,*
τῶν 'Ακαδημεϊκῶν[4] *στραγγαλίδων*[5] *κοπίδα.*

τοῦτ' οὖν ὁ Χρύσιππος, ὁ γέρων, ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὁ τὸν βασιλικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ἐπαινῶν βίον, τὸν δὲ[6] *σχολαστικὸν οὐδὲν οἰόμενος τοῦ ἡδονικοῦ*[7] *διαφέρειν.*

3. *Ὅσοι γε μὴν*[8] *πολιτείᾳ προσίασιν ἔτι μᾶλλον*[9]

[1] Salmasius ; *ἡδίωι* -X ; *ἰδίῳ* -g ; *ἡδίονι* -d, v, z, *α*, A, *β*, *γ*, E ; *ἡδείῳ* -B.
[2] *φιλοσοφοῦντες* -v, z.
[3] A. Wilhelm ; *τὸν νέον* -X, g[1], d, v, *α*[1] ; *τόνδε νέον* -z, A, *β*, *γ*, E, B(*δε* superscript -g[2], *α*[2]).
[4] Wilamowitz ; *ἀκαδημαικῶν* -g ; *ἀκαδημιακῶν* -all other MSS.
[5] *—ίζων* -X, g ; *—αγαλίζων* -d, v, z.
[6] *δὲ* omitted by X, g.
[7] *ἡγεμονικοῦ* -g (*ἡδονῆς* -g[2] in margin).
[8] H. C. after suggestion by Sandbach ; *γε ἄλλη* -X(*—η*⧹), g ; *γε μὴν ἄλλοι αὐτῶν* -d, v, z ; *δὲ ἄλλοι αὐτῶν* -*α*, A, *β*, *γ*, E, B.
[9] Leonicus ; *ἐπιμᾶλλον* -MSS.

[a] *τίς οὖν . . . διάγωσιν*=*S.V.F.* i, frag. 27 (p. 11, 15-19) and iii, p. 210, 19-23. Diogenes Laertius (vii, 184) reports that Hermippus spoke of Chrysippus as *ἐν τῷ 'Ωιδείῳ σχολάζοντα* (*cf.* Plutarch, *De Exilio* 605 A and Athenaeus, 336 e= Alexis, frag. 25 [ii, p. 306, Kock]). The significance of Cape Zoster (*cf.* Strabo, ix, 1, 21 [c. 398] ; Pausanias, i, 31, 1) in this context remains obscure, no evidence having been found to support Madvig's " ad quod philosophos aestivare et otiare solitos apparet " (*Adversaria Critica* i, p. 143) ; but the emendations thus far proposed have no plausibility. With this passage in particular and with Plutarch's charge in this chapter generally *cf.* Dio Chrysostom, *Oratio* xxx (=xlvii [von Arnim]), 2-3 and Seneca, *De Otio* vi, 4-5 and

but in order to pass the time tranquilly lecturing and conversing in the Odeum and at Zoster.[a] Aristocreon at any rate, the pupil and kinsman of Chrysippus, set up the latter's likeness in bronze and inscribed the following distich :

Of uncle Chrysippus Aristocreon this likeness erected :
The knots the Academy tied the cleaver, Chrysippus, dissected.[b]

So that's Chrysippus, the elder, the philosopher, the one who commends the life of king and statesman and thinks the scholastic life no different from the life of pleasure.

3. As many as do enter government,[c] however, are

viii ; for Chrysippus' own epigrammatic apology for refraining from politics *cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 694. See Grilli, *Il problema della vita contemplativa*, pp. 90-99.

[b] *'Αριστοκρέων γοῦν . . . κοπίδα*=*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 3b and *Inscriptiones Graecae Metricae* ed. Th. Preger (Lipsiae, 1891), 160 on p. 127. Aristocreon, who with his brother had been educated by their maternal uncle Chrysippus (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 185) and to whom the latter had dedicated at least nine of his works (*ibid.*, 196, 197, and 202), himself wrote a book entitled *αἱ Χρυσίππου ταφαί* (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 12). For his distich and the later decrees honouring him (*IG* II[2], 785 and 786) see A. Wilhelm, *Hermes*, xxxv (1900), pp. 669-670 and *'Εφ.'Αρχ.*, 1901, cols. 50-58 (*cf.* B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, v [1936], pp. 427-428). For other references to a statue of Chrysippus in Athens see *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 1 (p. 2, 5-7) and 3a and iii, frag. 158 and *cf.* V. Poulsen, *Les portraits grecs* (Copenhague, 1954), no. 46 on pp. 70-71 ; Gisela M. A. Richter, *Catalogue of Greek Sculptures in the Metropolitan Museum of Art* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), no. 188 on pp. 97-98 and *The Portraits of the Greeks* (London, 1965), ii, pp. 190-194.

[c] As Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus advised (*S.V.F.* i, frag. 271 and iii, frag. 697). On the participation of Stoics in government see M. van Straaten, *Panétius* (Amsterdam, 1946), pp. 204-208 ; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 25-26, 139-140, and pp. 284-286.

(1033) F ἐναντιοῦνται[1] τοῖς αὑτῶν δόγμασι· καὶ γὰρ ἄρχουσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ συμβουλεύουσι καὶ νομοθετοῦσι καὶ κολάζουσι καὶ τιμῶσιν ὡς πόλεων μὲν[2] οὐσῶν ἐν αἷς πολιτεύονται βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ δικαστῶν ἀεὶ τῶν λαγχανόντων στρατηγῶν δὲ τῶν χειροτονουμένων νόμων δὲ τῶν Κλεισθένους καὶ Λυκούργου καὶ Σόλωνος, οὓς φαύλους καὶ ἀνοήτους γεγονέναι[3] λέγουσιν. ὥστε καὶ πολιτευόμενοι μάχονται.

1034 4. Καὶ μὴν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Κλεάνθους[4] καὶ Χρυσίππου διαφορᾶς ἱστόρηκεν ὅτι Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης οὐκ ἠθέλησαν[5] Ἀθηναῖοι γενέσθαι, μὴ δόξωσι τὰς αὑτῶν πατρίδας ἀδικεῖν. ὅτι μέν, εἰ καλῶς οὗτοι, Χρύσιππος οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐποίησεν[6] ἐγγραφεὶς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν παρείσθω· πολλὴν δὲ μάχην καὶ παράλογον ἔχει τὸ τὰ σώματα καὶ τοὺς βίους οὕτω μακρὰν ἀποξενώσαντας τὰ ὀνόματα ταῖς πατρίσι τηρεῖν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὴν γαμετὴν ἀπολιπὼν ἑτέρᾳ[7] δὲ συζῶν[8] καὶ συναναπαυόμενος καὶ παιδοποιούμενος ἐξ ἑτέρας[9] μὴ συγγράφοιτο γάμον[10] ὅπως ἀδικεῖν μὴ δοκῇ[11] τὴν προτέραν.

[1] ἐναντιοῦται -d, v, z.
[2] μὲν -X, g, d, v, z, B ; omitted by a, A, β, γ, E.
[3] γεγονέναι omitted by g. [4] Κλεάνθου -B.
[5] οὐκ ἠθέλησαν omitted by g (ἠβούλοντο in margin).
[6] ἐποίησεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς -g.
[7] ἑταίρᾳ -d, v, z, g²(αι superscript).
[8] συνὼν -g. [9] ἑταίρας -d, v, z.
[10] γαμῶν -X³(ο changed to ω), g ; νόμον -B.
[11] δοκοίη -X³(οίη over εἶν [?] erased), g.

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 324, 327, 599, 612, 617, 619 ; Diogenes of Babylon, frag. 117 (*S.V.F.* iii, pp. 241, 35–242, 4 [text uncertain]) ; Cicero, *De Officiis* iii, 16. Plutarch wrote separate biographies of Lycurgus and Solon, who as the traditional authors of the Spartan and the Athenian constitutions respectively are often mentioned together (*e.g.* by Plato in *Republic* 599 D-E, *Phaedrus* 258 B-C, and *Laws* 858 E and by Aristotle in *Politics* 1273 b 30-34) ; and to Cleisthenes (*cf.* Aristotle, *Politics* 1275 b 34-37, 1319 b 19-22, and *Ath. Pol.* xx, 1–xxii, 1) he refers as the author of the Athenian constitution established after the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (*Pericles* iii, 2 [153 C-D]).

[b] Antipater, frag. 66 (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 257, 23-26).

contradicting their own doctrines still more sharply, for in holding administrative and judicial offices, in acting as councillors and legislators, and in meting out punishments and rewards they imply that they are taking part in the government of genuine states and that those really are councillors and judges who are at any time so designated by lot, those really generals who are at any time so elected, and those really laws which were instituted by Cleisthenes, Lycurgus, and Solon, men whom they declare to have been base and stupid.[a] So when they take part in government they are inconsistent too.

4. Moreover, Antipater in his book on the difference between Cleanthes and Chrysippus [b] has reported that Zeno and Cleanthes declined to become Athenians lest they appear to wrong their own countries. If they did well in this, Chrysippus did not do right in having himself naturalized. But let that pass. There is, however, a violent and irrational inconsistency in their preserving their names for their countries when they had removed their persons and their careers so far from home. It is as if a man who had abandoned his wife and was living and sleeping with another woman and begetting children on her should refrain from contracting marriage with her for fear that he might appear to wrong the former woman.

(1034) B 5. Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων οὕτως ῥητορεύσειν[1] καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι[2] τὸν σοφὸν ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν[3] ἀνεξόδους εἶναι καὶ ἀπολιτεύτους καὶ τὰ δόγματα ταῖς χρείαις ἀνάρμοστα καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν.

6. Ἔτι[4] δόγμα Ζήνωνός ἐστιν ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἰκοδομεῖν· ἱερὸν γὰρ μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξιον καὶ ἅγιον οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκοδόμων δ' ἔργον καὶ βαναύσων οὐδέν ἐστι πολλοῦ ἄξιον. οἱ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐπαινοῦντες ὡς εὖ ἔχοντα μυοῦνται μὲν ἐν ἱεροῖς ἀναβαίνουσι δ' εἰς ἀκρόπολιν προσκυνοῦσι δὲ τὰ ἕδη καὶ στεφανοῦσι[5] τοὺς C ναούς, οἰκοδόμων ὄντας ἔργα καὶ βαναύσων ἀνθρώπων. εἶτα τοὺς Ἐπικουρείους ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκοῦσι θύοντας θεοῖς, αὐτοὶ δὲ μᾶλλον[6] ἐλέγχονται θύοντες ἐπὶ τῶν βωμῶν καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν, ἃ μήτ'[7] εἶναι μήτ' οἰκοδομεῖσθαι δεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν.

[1] ῥητορεύειν -X[3](in erasure), d, v, z.
[2] πολιτεύεσθαι -X, g, d, v, z, Aldine, Basil.
[3] αὐτοῦ -a, A, β, γ, E.
[4] τί -E.
[5] στεφανοῦσι δὲ -X(with δὲ erased), v, z.
[6] μᾶλλον ἐκείνων -X, d, v, z, B.
[7] μήθ' ⟨ἅγια⟩ -van Herwerden, *Mnem.*, xxxvii (1909), p. 218.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 698. *Cf.* O. Luschnat, *Philologus*, cii (1958), p. 187.

[b] *S.V.F.* i, frag. 264 (p. 61, 31-34). See also the passages of Clement, Theodoret, and Epiphanius included by von Arnim in this fragment and the passage of Origen in fragment 265. *Cf.* Pearson, *Fragments*, p. 200 and Festa, *Stoici Antichi* i, p. 22. Clement purports to quote Zeno verbatim, but the καὶ ἅγιον in his last clause (p. 377, 6 [Stählin]) spoils the syllogism that Zeno evidently intended and shows that he misunderstood the καὶ before ἅγιον in the

5. Chrysippus, again, by writing in his treatise on Rhetoric that the sage will speak in public and participate in government just as if he considered wealth to be a good and reputation and health likewise admits that the Stoic theories are impracticable and antisocial and their doctrines unfit for use and action.[a]

6. Moreover, it is a doctrine of Zeno's not to build temples of the gods, because a temple not worth much is also not sacred and no work of builders or mechanics is worth much.[b] The Stoics, while applauding this as correct,[c] attend the mysteries in temples, go up to the Acropolis, do reverence to statues, and place wreaths upon the shrines, though these are works of builders and mechanics. Yet they think that the Epicureans are confuted by the fact that they sacrifice to the gods,[d] whereas they are themselves worse confuted by sacrificing at altars and temples which they hold do not exist and should not be built.

preceding clause, as do also those modern scholars like van Herwerden, Castiglioni, and Westman who propose to emend in one way or another the text of Plutarch here.

[c] *e.g.* Seneca, frag. 120 (in Lactantius, *Divin. Inst.* ii, 2, 14).

[d] Concerning Epicurean participation in conventional religious ritual (Usener, *Epicurea*, frags. 13, 169, 386-387), the charge that this was inconsistent and hypocritical (Plutarch, *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1102 B-C and *Adv. Colotem* 1112 C; Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* i, 85 and 123 and iii, 3), and Epicurean retorts upon the Stoics (Philodemus, *De Pietate* 9-19 [pp. 75-86, Gomperz, *cf.* Usener, *Epicurea*, p. lxxii]) see A. J. Festugière, *Épicure et ses dieux*[2] (Paris, 1968), pp. 86-100; W. Schmid, *Rhein. Mus.*, N.F. xciv (1951), pp. 133-139 and pp. 152-154; L. Perelli, *Riv. Filologia . . . Classica*, N.S. xxxiii (1955), pp. 38-52.

(1034) 7. Ἀρετὰς ὁ Ζήνων ἀπολείπει πλείονας κατὰ διαφοράς,[1] ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων, οἷον φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην,[2] ὡς ἀχωρίστους μὲν οὔσας ἑτέρας δὲ καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων. πάλιν δὲ ὁριζόμενος αὐτῶν ἑκάστην τὴν μὲν ἀνδρείαν φησὶ εἶναι φρόνησιν[3] ⟨ἐν ὑπομενετέοις τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην φρόνησιν ἐν αἱρετέοις τὴν δ' ἰδίως λεγομένην φρόνησιν φρόνησιν⟩ ἐν ἐνεργητέοις[4] τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην φρόνησιν ἐν ἀπονεμητέοις, ὡς μίαν οὖσαν ἀρετὴν ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα σχέσεσι
D κατὰ[5] τὰς ἐνεργείας διαφέρειν δοκοῦσαν.[6] οὐ μόνον δὲ ὁ Ζήνων περὶ ταῦτα φαίνεται αὐτῷ μαχόμενος,[7] ἀλλὰ καὶ[8] Χρύσιππος Ἀρίστωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν ὅτι μιᾶς ἀρετῆς σχέσεις ἔλεγε τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι[9] Ζήνωνι δὲ συνηγορῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένῳ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἑκάστην. ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐν Ὑπομνήμασι

[1] καὶ διαφόρους -X(over erasure), g.
[2] δικαιοσύνην σωφροσύνην -g.
[3] d, v, z, B ; φρόνησιν εἶναι -all other MSS.
[4] Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 8, n. 2) ; ⟨ἐν ὑπομενετέοις τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην φρόνησιν⟩ ἐν αἱρετέοις -Kuester ; *cf.* Hirzel, *Untersuchungen* ii, p. 99, n. 2 (on p. 100) ; ἐν ἐνεργητέοις -X[3](ἐν prefixed in margin), d[corr.], z[corr.], a, A, β, E, B ; ἐνεργητέοις -X, g, v, γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5.
[5] καὶ -g. [6] δοκούσας -B.
[7] μαχόμενος αὐτῷ -Benseler(to avoid hiatus).
[8] καὶ ὁ -d. [9] ἔλεγε σχέσεις εἶναι τὰς ἄλλας -E.

[a] Ἀρετὰς . . . διαφέρειν δοκοῦσαν = *S. V.F.* i, frag. 200 ; *cf.* Pearson, *Fragments*, pp. 173-175. If in referring to Plato here Plutarch had a single passage in mind, it was probably *Republic* IV (427 E—435 B and 441 C—444 A) ; but *cf.* especially *Laws* 963 C 5—964 B 7.

[b] *Cf.* Plutarch, *De Virtute Morali* 441 A (*S. V.F.* i, frag. 201) and *De Fortuna* 97 E.

[c] The term ἐνεργητέα seems not to occur elsewhere ; but for such a definition of φρόνησις in the specific sense *cf.*

7. Zeno, like Plato, admits [a] a plurality of specifically different virtues, namely prudence, courage, sobriety, justice, which he takes to be inseparable but yet distinct and different from one another. On the other hand, when defining each one of them, he says [b] that courage is prudence ⟨in things to be endured, sobriety is prudence in things to be chosen, prudence in the specific sense is prudence⟩ in things to be performed,[c] and justice is prudence in things to be distributed, the implication being that virtue is really single but in its operations appears to vary with its relations to its objects. Not only does Zeno manifestly contradict himself on this subject ; but Chrysippus does so too, arraigning Ariston for asserting that virtue is single and the rest are its relative states and yet defending Zeno for defining each of the virtues in this way.[d] Cleanthes too in his

S. V.F. i, pp. 85, 38–86, 1 and 86, 12-13 and iii, p. 63, 23-24 and 39.

[d] οὐ μόνον δὲ . . . ἑκάστην = *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 258 (Chrysippus) and i, frag. 373 (Ariston). For the latter's doctrine referred to here see also *S. V.F.* i, frags. 374 and 375 (= Plutarch, *De Virtute Morali* 440 E—441 A) ; and for the attack upon it by Chrysippus see *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 259. Chrysippus objected to Ariston's placing the multitude of virtues ἐν τῇ πρός τι σχέσει instead of recognizing that they are distinguished by qualities of their own (*cf. S. V.F.* iii, p. 60, 3-4). It has been asserted that this objection is consistent with defence of Zeno's definitions (Giesen, *De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, pp. 84-85), but the very point of Plutarch's argument is that these definitions reduce the various virtues to the πρός τί πως ἔχοντα which Ariston asserts them to be (*cf. De Virtute Morali* 440 E—441 A) and which by Stoic doctrine cannot be κατὰ διαφοράν (*cf. S. V.F.* ii, pp. 132, 37-39 and 133, 1-2). *Cf.* Galen's criticism of Chrysippus, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* vii, 2, 596-600 = pp. 592, 2–596, 3 (Mueller). For Ariston of Chios, pupil of Zeno,

(1034) Φυσικοῖς εἰπὼν ὅτι πληγὴ[1] πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα, ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν "ἡ δ' ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ[2] τοῖς φανεῖσιν[3] ἐμμενετέοις[4] ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν, ὅταν δ' ἐπὶ[5] τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, E ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ δικαιοσύνη· περὶ δὲ[6] τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις[7] σωφροσύνη."

8. Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα

μηδὲ[8] δίκην δικάσῃς, πρὶν ἄμφω[9] μῦθον ἀκούσῃς[10]

ἀντέλεγεν ὁ Ζήνων τοιούτῳ τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος

[1] πηγὴ -X[3](λ erased).
[2] ἐν -d, v, z, B.
[3] Hirzel (*Untersuchungen* ii, p. 97, n. 2); ἐπιφανέσιν -MSS.
[4] ἐν μενετέοις -X[1]; ἐν ἐμμενετέοις -X[3].
[5] van Herwerden (*Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinae* [1882], p. 121), Festa (*Stoici Antichi* ii, p. 124, n. e); ἐν -MSS.
[6] δὲ -omitted altogether by α, A, β, γ, E and written after αἱρέσεις instead in d, v, z.
[7] ἐγκλίσεις -g, Aldine, Basil.; ἐγκλήσεις -z, (ἐκ— [?]) d, v.
[8] μηδὲ -Basil., Pseudo-Phocylides; μήτε -g, Lucian, *Calum. non tem. credendum* 8; μηδενὶ -all other MSS., Aldine.
[9] MSS. (ἂν ἄμφω -B), Pseudo-Phocylides, Lucian (*loc. cit.*); ἀμφοῖν -[Plato], *Demodocus* 383 c 1, *Corpus Paroem. Graec.*, p. 759, 14-15; ἂν ἀμφοῖν -Aristophanes, *Wasps* 725 (see Schol. *ad loc.*).
[10] ἀκούσεις -g.

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see H. von Arnim, *R.-E.* ii (1896), cols. 957, 10–959, 11; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 27-28, pp. 122-123, p. 163 and ii, pp. 16-17, p. 70, p. 72; J. Moreau, *Rev. Ét. Anciennes*, l (1948), pp. 27-48.

Physical Treatises,[a] after saying that tension is impact of fire [b] and that, if in the soul it becomes adequate for the accomplishment of what is incumbent, it is called strength and power, continues in so many words: "This strength and power, when present in the case of things manifestly to be adhered to, is continence and, when in the case of things that are to be endured, is courage; concerned with deserts it is justice, and concerned with choices and avoidances it is sobriety." [c]

8. Against him who said

Nor give your verdict till you've heard both sides [d]

Zeno asserted the contrary with an argument some-

[a] ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης . . . σωφροσύνη = *S. V.F.* i, frag. 563 (Pearson, *Fragments*, pp. 301-302; Festa, *Stoici Antichi*, ii, pp. 123-124). See Verbeke, *Kleanthes*, pp. 221-224.
[b] For the Stoic principle of τόνος see *S. V.F.* i, frags. 497, 513, 514, 563 (p. 129, 3-5: Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, pp. 62, 24–63, 1 [Wachsmuth]) and ii, frags. 441, 444 (Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 1085 D), 447, 451, 546, 766, 876; Pearson, *Fragments*, pp. 45, 253-254, and 267; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 74-75 and 147-148 (*cf.* Edelstein, *A.J.P.*, lxxii [1951], p. 428); Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, pp. 5 and 29-33. With πληγὴ πυρός *cf.* on lines 10-11 of the *Hymn to Zeus* (*S. V.F.* i, p. 122, 6-7) Pearson, *Fragments*, p. 277; Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxv (1940), p. 120 and *Stoa* ii, pp. 62-63 (*contra*: Verbeke, *Kleanthes*, pp. 244-245; Zuntz, *H.S.C.P.*, lxiii [1958], pp. 294-295).
[c] In *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 295 ἐμμενετέα are correlated with σωφροσύνη, and ἐγκράτεια is not mentioned. For ἀξία in the definition of justice see *S. V.F.* iii, p. 30, 21-24 and p. 63, 27-28.
[d] Pseudo-Phocylides, 87 (*Theognis . . . Ps.-Phocylides . . .* iterum ed. D. Young [1971], p. 102; Th. Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, ii [1882], p. 93); Hesiod, frag. 271 (Rzach) = 338 (Merkelbach-West); Leutsch, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum*, ii, p. 759, 14-15.

(1034) "εἶτ' ἀπέδειξεν ὁ πρότερος εἰπών, οὐκ ἀκουστέον τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος (πέρας γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ζητούμενον), εἶτ' οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν (ὅμοιον γὰρ[1] ὡς εἰ μηδ' ὑπήκουσε κληθεὶς ἢ ὑπακούσας ἐτερέτισεν[2]). ἤτοι δ'[3] ἀπέδειξεν ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν[4]· οὐκ ἀκουστέον ἄρα τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος." τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας αὐτὸς ἀντέγραφε[5] μὲν πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν ἔλυε δὲ σοφίσματα, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην ἐκέλευε παραλαμβά-
F νειν τοὺς μαθητάς. καίτοι ἢ[6] ἀπέδειξε Πλάτων ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξε τὰ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, κατ' οὐδέτερον δ'[7] ἦν ἀναγκαῖον ἀντιγράφειν ἀλλὰ πάντως περιττὸν καὶ μάταιον. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ[8] περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων ἔστιν εἰπεῖν.

1035 9. Ὁ Χρύσιππος οἴεται δεῖν τῶν λογικῶν πρῶτον ἀκροᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους δεύτερον δὲ τῶν ἠθικῶν μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν φυσικῶν ὡς ἂν τέλος[9] δὲ τούτοις[10] τὸν περὶ θεῶν[11] λόγον[12] ἔσχατον παραλαμβάνειν. πολλαχοῦ δὲ τούτων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένων, ἀρκέσει παραθέσθαι τὰ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Βίων ἔχοντα κατὰ λέξιν[13] οὕτως· "πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ

[1] ὅμοιον γὰρ -X(over erasure); ὅμοιον γὰρ . . . ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν -omitted by d.
[2] ἐτερέττισεν -a^2, A, β, γ, E.
[3] δ' -omitted by B.
[4] ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν -written twice in v.
[5] ἀντέγραψε -Stephanus.
[6] εἰ -B, Turnebus.
[7] δ' -X, g, d, v, z; omitted by all other MSS.
[8] καὶ -omitted by α, A, β, γ, E.
[9] Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 9, n. 1); ὡσαύτως -MSS.
[10] τούτοις -omitted by γ, E.
[11] τῶν θεῶν -B.
[12] λόγων -g.
[13] κατὰ λέξιν ἔχοντα -g.

thing like this[a]: The second speaker must not be heard whether the former speaker proved his case (for then the inquiry is at an end) or did not prove it (for that is tantamount to his not having appeared when summoned or to having responded to the summons with mere gibberish); but either he proved his case or he did not prove it; therefore, the second speaker must not be heard. After he had propounded this argument, however, he continued to write against Plato's Republic,[b] to refute sophisms, and to bid his pupils learn dialectic on the ground that it enables one to do this.[c] Yet either Plato proved or did not prove what is in the Republic, and either way it was not necessary but was utterly superfluous and vain to write against it. The same thing can be said about sophisms also.

9. Chrysippus thinks that young men should hear lectures on logic first, on ethics next, and after that on physics and should get theology last as the termination for these studies. He says this in many places, but it will suffice to quote the statement in the fourth book on Ways of Living, which runs word for word as follows[d]: "Now I believe in the first

[a] *S.V.F.* i, frag. 78. See Pearson, *Fragments*, pp. 80-81; and Festa, *Stoici Antichi* i, pp. 115-116, who takes this to be a fragment, and the only one preserved, of the work Ἔλεγχοι δύο (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 4 [*cf.* Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 28]). Weische (*Cicero und die Neue Akademie*, pp. 77-78) assumes that Zeno's argument was directed against the "antilogistic method" of Arcesilaus, for which see note *a* on 1036 A *infra*.
[b] *S.V.F.* i, frag. 260. See Festa, *Stoici Antichi* i, p. 14.
[c] *S.V.F.* i, frag. 50; *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vii, 25 and 47-48.
[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 42.

(1035) μοι κατὰ τὰ ὀρθῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰρημένα τρία γένη τῶν τοῦ φιλοσόφου θεωρημάτων εἶναι, τὰ μὲν λογικὰ τὰ δ' ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ φυσικά[1]· εἶτα τούτων δεῖν τάττεσθαι[2] πρῶτα μὲν τὰ λογικὰ δεύτερα δὲ τὰ ἠθικὰ τρίτα δὲ τὰ φυσικά· τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν
B ἔσχατος εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος· διὸ καὶ τελετὰς προσηγόρευσαν[3] τὰς τούτου[4] παραδόσεις." ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε[5] τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἔσχατόν φησι δεῖν τάττεσθαι, ⟨τὸν⟩[6] περὶ θεῶν, ἔθει προτάττει καὶ προεκτίθησι παντὸς ἠθικοῦ ζητήματος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τελῶν οὔτε περὶ δικαιοσύνης οὔτε περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὔτε περὶ γάμου καὶ παιδοτροφίας οὔτε περὶ νόμου καὶ πολιτείας φαίνεται τὸ παράπαν φθεγγόμενος, εἰ μή, καθάπερ οἱ τὰ ψηφίσματα ταῖς πόλεσιν εἰσφέροντες προγράφουσιν Ἀγαθὴν Τύχην, οὕτως καὶ[7] αὐτὸς προγράψειε τὸν Δία, τὴν Εἱμαρμένην, τὴν Πρόνοιαν, τὸ συνέχεσθαι μιᾷ δυνάμει

[1] τὰ δὲ φυσικά, . . . δεύτερα δὲ τὰ ἠθικὰ -omitted by g.
[2] δεῖν τάττεσθαι -X, d, v, z, B ; δεῖν προτάττεσθαι -a ; δεῖ προτάττεσθαι -A, β, γ, E.
[3] Bernardakis (*cf.* 1053 E *infra*) ; ἠγόρευσαν -MSS. (which despite Plutarch's later paraphrase may be right, *cf.* Plato, *Laws* 950 E 1-2 and Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca*, no. 258, 7).
[4] τούτου -X, g ; τούτων -all other MSS.
[5] γε -omitted by z ; γὰρ -d, v.
[6] ⟨τὸν⟩ -Reiske.
[7] καὶ -omitted by γ, E.

[a] This tripartition of philosophy was frequently ascribed to Plato : Cicero, *Acad. Post.* i, 19 ; Apuleius, *De Platone* i, 3 ; Aristocles in Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* xi, 3, 6 (and Eusebius himself, *ibid.* xi, 1, 1) ; Diogenes Laertius, iii, 56 ; Hippolytus, *Refutatio* i, 18, 2 ; Augustine, *Civ. Dei* viii, 4. Sextus Empiricus, however, makes Plato its originator only by implication (δυνάμει) and ascribes its explicit formulation before the Stoics to Xenocrates and the Peripatetics (*Adv. Math.* vii, 16 ; *cf.* R. Heinze, *Xenokrates*, pp. 1-2 and frag. 1).

place, conformably with the correct statements of the ancients, that the philosopher's speculations are of three kinds, logical, ethical, and physical [a] ; then that of these the logical must be put first, the ethical second, and the physical third [b] ; and that of physical speculations theology must be last, which is why its transmission has also been called 'confirmation.'" [c] Yet this very doctrine, theology, which he says must be put last he habitually puts first and makes the preface to every ethical inquiry, for it is plain to see that, be the subject goals or justice or good and evil or marriage and child-rearing or law and government, he makes no remark about it at all unless in the same fashion in which the movers of public decrees prefix the phrase " Good Fortune " [d] he has prefixed Zeus, Destiny, Providence, and the statement that the universe, being one and finite, is held together by a

[b] *Cf.* Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* vii, 22-23 and Diogenes Laertius, vii, 39-40, where at the end, however, both Chrysippus and Zeno are cited for the order : logic, physics, ethics. See on this discrepancy Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii, 13 and *Adv. Math.* vii, 20-21 ; Pearson, *Fragments*, pp. 55-57 ; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 33-34 ; Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 61-67.

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1008. The untranslatable original means that τελεταί, the word for religious " rites " or " initiatory mysteries," is equivalent to τελευταῖα, " final," from τέλος, " end " or " goal." *Cf.* Plutarch, *Quaest. Conviv.* 718 D (. . . τὴν νοητὴν καὶ ἀΐδιον φύσιν, ἧς θέα τέλος ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας οἷον ἐποπτεία τελετῆς) and *De Iside* 382 D-E (chap. 77 *sub finem* with Reiske's emendation) ; and Plato, *Phaedrus* 249 C 6-8 and 250 B 5–C 6, where, however, τελετή is connected rather with τέλεον, " perfect."

[d] *Cf.* W. Larfeld, *Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik* i (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 437-438 and ii/2 (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 592-593.

(1035) τὸν κόσμον ἕνα ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένον. ὧν οὐ-
C δὲν[1] ἔστι πεισθῆναι μὴ διὰ βάθους ἐγκραθέντα[2] τοῖς φυσικοῖς λόγοις. ἄκουε δὲ ἃ λέγει περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν· "οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ[3] τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομέν τι[4] ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν." πάλιν ἐν[5] ταῖς Φυσικαῖς Θέσεσιν "οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως οὐδ' οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγα-
D θῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδ' ἐπ' εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' ⟨ἢ⟩[6] ἀπὸ[7] τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως." προελθὼν[8] δ' αὖθις· "δεῖ γὰρ τούτοις συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνονος οὐδ'[9] ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὔσης ἢ[10] πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν." γίγνεται τοίνυν "ἅμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω" τῶν ἠθικῶν ὁ φυσικὸς λόγος κατὰ Χρύσιππον· μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλως ἄπορος ἡ περιτροπὴ τῆς τάξεως εἰ μετὰ ταῦτα τακτέον ἐκεῖνον ὧν[11] καταλαβεῖν οὐδὲν ἐκείνου χω-

[1] οὐθενί -X[3], g, B.
[2] συγκραθέντα -Cobet (*Novae Lectiones*, p. 513); ἀνακραθέντα (?).
[3] ἐκ -omitted by d, v, z.
[4] μέλλομέν τι -Basil.; μέλλομεν (μέλλοιμεν -X[3][οι over erasure], g, B; μέλλωμεν -d) ἔρωτι -mss., Aldine; μέλλομεν ὀρθῶς τι -Pohlenz; *cf.* Castiglioni, *Gnomon*, xxvi (1954), pp. 83-84.
[5] ἐν -omitted by A, β, γ, E.
[6] ⟨ἢ⟩ -Leonicus.
[7] ἐπὶ -a, A, β, γ, E.
[8] Erasure between ο and ε -X.
[9] οὐδὲν -γ.
[10] ἢ -omitted by d, v, z.
[11] ὃν -X[3](ὁ over erasure), g, B.

single power,[a]—none of which can carry any conviction for anyone who has not been thoroughly steeped in physical theory. Hear what he says about this in the third book on the Gods[b]: "It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature,[c] for thence everything of the kind must have its beginning if we are going to have anything to say about good and evil." Again in his Physical Propositions he says[d]: "For there is no other or more suitable way of approaching the theory of good and evil or the virtues or happiness ⟨than⟩ from the universal nature and from the dispensation of the universe." And further on once more: "For the theory of good and evil must be connected with these, since good and evil have no better beginning or point of reference and physical speculation is to be undertaken for no other purpose than for the discrimination of good and evil." According to Chrysippus, then, physical theory turns out to be "at once before and behind"[e] ethics, or rather the whirligig of the arrangement is utterly bewildering if the former must be placed after the latter, no part of which can be grasped

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 30; *cf.* ii, frag. 234 and E. Elorduy, *Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa*, pp. 1-4.
[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 326.
[c] *Cf.* 1050 A-D *infra* (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 937) and *S.V.F.* i, frag. 555 and ii, frags. 599 and 1076. Identified with Zeus, Destiny, and Necessity, the universal nature is essentially the creative fire, πῦρ τεχνικόν (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 774, 1133, and 1134).
[d] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 68 (p. 17, 3-11); *cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 73 (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 282).
[e] *Iliad* i, 343; *cf. Quaest. Romanae* 279 c and *An Seni Respublica Gerenda Sit* 788 E.

(1035) ρὶς ἔστιν· καὶ πρόδηλος ἡ μάχη τοῦ τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον ἀρχὴν μὲν εἶναι τοῦ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τιθεμένου κελεύοντος δὲ μὴ πρότερον ἀλλὰ ὕστερον
E ἐκείνων παραδίδοσθαι. εἰ[1] δέ τις ἐρεῖ γεγραφέναι τὸν Χρύσιππον ἐν τῷ περὶ Λόγου Χρήσεως ὡς οὐ καθάπαξ ἀφεκτέον ἐστὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ τὴν λογικὴν ἀναλαμβάνοντι πρώτην ἀλλὰ κἀκείνων μεταληπτέον κατὰ τὸ διδόμενον, ἀληθῆ μὲν ἐρεῖ βεβαιώσει δὲ[2] τὴν αἰτίαν· μάχεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ὅπου μὲν ἔσχατον τὸν περὶ θεῶν[3] λόγον ἀναλαμβάνειν κελεύων καὶ τελευταῖον, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τελετὴν προσαγορευόμενον, ὅπου δὲ πάλιν ἐν πρώτοις ἅμα καὶ τούτου μεταληπτέον εἶναι λέγων· οἴχεται γὰρ ἡ τάξις,[4] εἰ πάντων ἐν πᾶσι μεταλαμβάνειν δεήσει. τὸ δὲ μεῖζον, ὅτι τοῦ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν
F λόγου τὸν[5] περὶ θεῶν ἀρχὴν πεποιημένος οὐκ ἀπὸ τούτου κελεύει τὸν ἠθικὸν[6] ἀρξαμένους ἀναλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον ἀναλαμβάνοντας τούτου μεταλαμβάνειν κατὰ τὸ διδόμενον, εἶτα μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀπ' ἐκείνων,[7] οὗ χωρὶς οὐδεμίαν ἀρχὴν [ἀπ'][8] ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἔφοδον εἶναί φησι.[9]

10. Τὸ πρὸς τἀναντία διαλέγεσθαι καθόλου μὲν οὗ φησιν[10] ἀποδοκιμάζειν, χρῆσθαι δὲ τούτῳ[11] παρ-

[1] ὡς -d, v, z.
[2] δὲ -omitted by α, A.
[3] θεοῦ -α, A, β, γ.
[4] ἡ τάξις -omitted by g.
[5] τὸν -X, g, B ; τὴν -d, v, z ; omitted by A, α, β, γ (τὸν περὶ θεῶν omitted by E).
[6] τὸν ἠθικὸν -X[3](. . . ὸ . . . ὸ over erasure), g, d, v, z, B ; τῶν ἠθικῶν -α, A, β, γ, E.
[7] ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον -g.
[8] Pohlenz's deletion anticipated by Reiske ; ἀπ' -X, g, α, Aldine, Basil. ; ἐπ' -d, v, z, A, β, γ, E, B.
[9] φασί -X, B ; φασίν -g.

without it ; and the inconsistency is obvious in the man who, while asserting that physics is the beginning of the theory about good and evil, still orders it to be taught not before but after the latter. Still, Chrysippus, it may be said, in the treatise on Use of Discourse has written [a] that one taking up logic as the first subject is not to abstain altogether from the rest but is to take such part of them also as opportunity offers. If anyone say this, his assertion will be true but will confirm the accusation, for Chrysippus is at odds with himself in here ordering theology to be taken up as last and terminal, on the ground that for this reason it is called " confirmation " also,[b] and elsewhere again saying that part of this too should be taken along with the first subjects. In fact, there is nothing left of the arrangement, if in all subjects part of all will have to be taken ; but, what is more, after having taken theology to be the beginning of the theory of good and evil, his order is not that people begin with the former and thence proceed to take up ethical theory but that in taking up the latter they take such part of the former as opportunity offers and then pass to the former from the latter, though to the latter he says there is no beginning at all or any access apart from the former.

10. He says [c] that he does not absolutely reject the practice of arguing the opposite sides of a question, but he recommends that this be used

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 53 (p. 20, 10-14) and *cf.* ii, frag. 41.
[b] See note *c* on 1035 A-B *supra.*
[c] τὸ πρὸς τἀναντία . . . αὐταῖς λέξεσιν εἴρηκεν = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 127.

[10] φασιν -g.
[11] τούτῳ -X, g ; οὕτω -all other MSS.

(1035) αινεῖ μετ' εὐλαβείας ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις
1036 μὴ μετὰ συνηγορίας ἀλλὰ διαλύοντας αὐτῶν τὸ πιθανόν· "τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐποχὴν ἄγουσι περὶ πάντων ἐπιβάλλει" φησὶ "τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ συνεργόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βούλονται[1] τοῖς δ' ἐπιστήμην ἐνεργαζομένοις[2] καθ' ἣν ὁμολογουμένως βιωσόμεθα, τἀναντία, στοιχειοῦν καὶ κατατειχίζειν[3] τοὺς εἰσαγομένους ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι[4] τέλους, ἐφ' ὧν καιρός ἐστι μνησθῆναι καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων λόγων, διαλύοντας αὐτῶν τὸ πιθανὸν καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις"· ταυτὶ γὰρ αὐταῖς[5] λέξεσιν εἴρηκεν.[6] ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄτοπός[7] ἐστι τοὺς φιλοσόφους τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον οἰόμενος[8] δεῖν τιθέναι μὴ μετὰ συνηγορίας ἀλλὰ

[1] καὶ συνεργόν . . . ὃ βούλονται -omitted by g.
[2] ἐργαζομένοις -g, z, B.
[3] H. C. (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 15, 25 and p. 16, 7-9; Wyttenbach's revision of Xylander's version: "eosque quasi sepimento munire"); καταστιχίζειν -X, g, d, v, z; κατασστοιχίζειν -all other MSS.; κατασφαλίζειν -Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 9, n. 2); τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ στοιχειοῦν, καὶ καταστοιχίζειν -Bourgeaud et Roussel, *Rev. Études Grecques*, lxxxii (1969), pp. 71-75.
[4] ἄχρι -d, v, z.
[5] ἐν ταῖς -g, d, B.
[6] εἴρηκα -g.
[7] ἄτοπος -X, g; ἄτοπον -all other MSS.
[8] οἰόμενος -X, g; οἰομένους -all other MSS.

[a] Arcesilaus and his circle in the Academy (*cf. Adv. Colotem* 1120 c). Arcesilaus (316/15–241/40) succeeded Crates of Athens as head of the Academy, the "middle" Academy as it was later called because of the sceptical turn that he gave to it: Ἀρκεσίλαος . . . ὁ τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημείας κατάρξας, πρῶτος ἐπισχὼν τὰς ἀποφάσεις διὰ τὰς ἐναντιότητας τῶν λόγων. πρῶτος δὲ καὶ εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπεχείρησε . . . (Diogenes Laertius, iv, 28). See also Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i,

cautiously as it is in the court-room not by way of putting the case for them but by way of destroying their plausibility. "For," he says, "while that practice is incumbent upon those who in all matters observe suspension of judgment[a] and is conducive to their purpose, it is, on the contrary, incumbent upon those who inculcate knowledge in accordance with which we shall live consistently[b] to instruct their pupils in the principles and to fortify them from beginning to end by destroying the plausibility of the opposite arguments, just as is done in the court-room too, when an opportunity arises to mention them also." This he has said in so many words. Now, that it is monstrous of him to believe it necessary for philosophers to state the opposite argument without

220 and 232-234; Cicero, *Acad. Post.* i, 45-46 and *Acad. Prior.* ii, 15, 59, 67, and 103-104, *De Finibus* ii, 2, and *De Oratore* iii, 67-68 with P. Couissin, *Rev. de Philologie*, 3 Sér. xi (1937), pp. 401-403. Couissin had already shown (*Rev. Études Grecques*, xlii [1929], pp. 373-397) how Arcesilaus intended his ἐπιχείρησις εἰς ἑκάτερον to issue in the withholding of assent from each of the opposite theses, the ἐποχὴ περὶ πάντων which he developed out of Zeno's own theory in his polemics against Zeno (*cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 76-78 and Sextus, *Adv. Math.* vii, 150-158). Weische, while adopting Couissin's explanation, has recently attempted to derive from Peripatetic practice the method of Arcesilaus, who before entering the Academy was a pupil of Theophrastus (*Cicero und die Neue Akademie*, pp. 13-26, 50-54, 68-82, 104-111). In the present passage, the source of which may be the Πρὸς τὸ Ἀρκεσιλάου μεθόδιον (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 8, 20), Chrysippus probably meant his remark about the method of Arcesilaus ironically: "a method appropriate to an irresponsible purpose"; what Plutarch—or the Academics—professed to think of Chrysippus' relation to the work of Arcesilaus and what the Stoics thought of it can be seen from 1037 A *infra* and from *De Comm. Not.* 1059 B respectively.

[b] See note *g* on 1033 C *supra*.

(1036) B ὁμοίως τοῖς δικολόγοις κακοῦντας[1] ὥσπερ οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ περὶ νίκης ἀγωνιζομένους, εἴρηται πρὸς αὐτὸν[2] δι' ἑτέρων. ὅτι δ' αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐν ὀλίγοις[3] ἀλλὰ πολλαχοῦ τοὺς ἐναντίους οἷς[4] δοκιμάζει[5] λόγους κατεσκεύακεν ἐρρωμένως καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς καὶ φιλοτιμίας τοσαύτης ὥστε μὴ παντὸς εἶναι καταμαθεῖν τὸ ἀρέσκον αὐτοῖ[6] δήπου λέγουσι, τὴν δεινότητα θαυμάζοντες τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι λέγειν ἴδιον ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἐπεχείρησε Χρύσιππος εἰς[7] τοὐναντίον ὁρμώμενον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ καὶ πολλάκις[8] παραφθέγγεσθαι "δαιμόνιε, φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος," ὡς C μεγάλας ἀφορμὰς καθ' ἑαυτοῦ διδόντα τοῖς κινεῖν τὰ δόγματα καὶ διαβάλλειν βουλομένοις. ἐπὶ δὲ

[1] κακοῦντας -X[3], g ; κακοῦντα -all other MSS.
[2] αὐτὸν -d, v, z ; αὐτῶν -all other MSS.
[3] Meziriac ; λόγοις -MSS. (*cf.* 1033 B *supra*).
[4] οὓς -X[3], g, B.
[5] ἀποδοκιμάζει -X[3](ἀπο superscribed), g.
[6] MSS. (οἱ in erasure -X[3]) ; <αὐτῷ> αὐτοῖ -Reiske (but see *Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internosc.* 51 F and 53 A 1).
[7] ἐκ -d, v, z.
[8] πολλάκις γε -B.

[a] In the *Catalogue of Lamprias* numbers 45 and 156, neither of which is extant, are entitled respectively Περὶ τῆς εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπιχειρήσεως βιβλία ε' and Εἰ πᾶσι συνηγορητέον. Pohlenz has suggested (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 9) that it is one of these to which Plutarch here refers. See also number 198 : Περὶ τῶν συνηγορούντων.

[b] ὅτι δ' αὐτὸς . . . διαβάλλειν βουλομένοις = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 32.

[c] *Iliad* vi, 407. *Cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 87-88 where the Stoics are said to complain "ab eo [*scil.* Chrysippo]

putting the case for it but after the fashion of barristers maltreating it like contenders for victory and not strivers after the truth, this retort has been made to him in other writings [a] ; but that he has himself in not a few but in many places [b] maintained arguments the opposite of those which he approves and has done so with such vigour, zeal, and contentiousness that to discern his opinion is not within the competence of everyone,—this surely is what the Stoics themselves mean by their admiration of the man's cleverness and by their belief that Carneades says nothing original but attacks the arguments of Chrysippus by basing himself upon those to the contrary which Chrysippus devised and that in the aside which Carneades often utters, "Hapless thou art and thy strength will destroy thee," [c] he refers to Chrysippus as giving to those who wish to upset and discredit his doctrines large means with which to

armatum esse Carneaden." In *De Comm. Not.* 1059 E Carneades' simile of the self-devouring octopus is applied to the dialectic of Chrysippus, of whom the Stoics had just been said (1059 B-C) to boast that his replies to the arguments of Arcesilaus had providentially forestalled those of Carneades. In a sense different from that here imputed by the Stoics to Carneades' use of *Iliad* vi, 407 the latter is said (Diogenes Laertius, iv, 62) to have acknowledged that he owed all his success to the works which Chrysippus had composed for him to refute, for this is the meaning of his verse, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐγώ, a parody of that other famous tribute to Chrysippus, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν Στοά (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 183). For a good general account of Carneades (*ca.* 214/13–129/28), called the founder of the "third" Academy, see Robin, *Pyrrhon*, pp. 71-129 ; *cf.* also B. Wiśniewski, *Karneades Fragmente : Text und Kommentar*, Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków, 1970 (Archiwum Filologiczne, xxiv), which is inadequate, however, and to be used with caution.

(1036) τοῖς[1] κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας[2] ἐκδοθεῖσιν οὕτως κομῶσι καὶ μεγαληγοροῦσιν ὥστε τοὺς πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν λόγους εἰς ταὐτὸ συμφορηθέντας οὐκ ἀξίους εἶναι παραβαλεῖν οἷς Χρύσιππος ἔγραψεν εἰς διαβολὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπειρίας τῶν λεγόντων ἢ φιλαυτίας σημεῖόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο δ' ἀληθές, ὅτι βουληθεὶς αὖθις συνειπεῖν τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐνδεέστερος γέγονεν αὑτοῦ[3] καὶ τὸ σύνταγμα τοῦ συντάγματος μαλακώτερον. ὥστ' αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ[4] μάχεσθαι,
D κελεύοντα μὲν ἀεὶ τἀναντία μὴ μετὰ συνηγορίας ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐνδείξεως τοῦ ὅτι ψευδῆ[5] ἐστι παρατίθεσθαι, τῶν δὲ αὑτοῦ[6] δογμάτων κατήγορον ὄντα δεινότερον ἢ συνήγορον, καὶ φυλάττεσθαι μὲν ἑτέροις παραινοῦντα τοὺς εἰς τἀναντία[7] λόγους ὡς περισπῶντας τὴν κατάληψιν αὐτὸν[8] δὲ τῶν βεβαιούντων τὴν κατάληψιν λόγων φιλοτιμότερον συν-

[1] τῆς -d, v.

[2] τῆς συνηθείας -X, v, z, E, B (*cf.* 1036 E and 1037 A *infra*) ; συνηθείας -a, A, β, γ ; συνήθειαν -g, d.

[3] ἑαυτοῦ -g ; αὐτοῦ -γ.

[4] ἐν τῷ -γ, E.

[5] ψευδῆ -X[3](ῆ over erasure), g, B ; ψευδής -all other MSS.

[6] ἑαυτοῦ -g ; αὐτῶν -Tolet. 51, 5 ; αὑτοῦ or αὐτοῦ -all other MSS.

[7] τοὺς ἐναντίους -a, A, β, γ, E.

[8] αὐτὸν -X[3](o in erasure), d, v, z ; αὐτῶν -all other MSS.

[a] ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κατὰ συνηθείας . . . μαλακώτερον = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 109 (p. 33, 31-37). *Cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 75 and 87 (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 34, 8-21) and especially " ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem fuisse " of § 87 with Plutarch's ἐνδεέστερος γέγονεν αὑτοῦ . . . μαλακώτερον. Besides Λόγοι παρὰ τὰς συνηθείας α' (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 6, 14), probably concerned with violations of linguistic usage and so irrelevant here, Diogenes Laertius (vii, 198 = *S.V.F.* ii, p. 8, 22-23) lists among the writings of Chrysippus a work in six books κατὰ

attack him. On the subject of his publications against common experience [a] they go so far in their vainglory and boastfulness as to assert that the arguments of all the Academics together rolled into one are not worth comparing with those that Chrysippus composed to discredit the senses. While that is another sign of the ignorance or the self-conceit of those who say so, this is true, that, when later he desired to speak on the side of common experience and the senses, he fell short of his own achievement and the second treatise was feebler than the first. So he is in conflict with himself [b] : while prescribing that the opposite side always be cited along with an indictment of its falsity and without putting the case for it, yet he is more clever as a prosecutor than as a defender of his own doctrines ; and, while exhorting others to beware of arguments for opposite sides of a question on the ground that they divert the apprehension,[c] yet he does himself more eagerly construct arguments that destroy apprehension than argu-

τῆς συνηθείας and another in seven περὶ (ὑπὲρ -Cobet) τῆς συνηθείας and before this (vii, 183) cites Sotion as stating that Chrysippus was associated with Arcesilaus and Lacydes in the Academy δι' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἐπεχείρησε (a story rejected by Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, p. 11 ; but see von Arnim, *R.-E.* iii [1899], col. 2502, 43 ff. and Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, p. 29). For συνήθεια in this semi-technical sense in which it was attacked by the Sceptics and the Academics and defended by the Stoics see Epictetus, *Diss.* I, xxvii, 15-21 and A. Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, pp. 8 and 129-130.

[b] ὥστ' αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ μάχεσθαι . . . δυναμικωτέρων ἐρωτημάτων (1036 E *infra*) = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 270.

[c] For the rôle of κατάληψις in Stoic epistemology see Cicero, *Acad. Post.* i, 40-42 and *Acad. Prior.* ii, 145 ; Sextus, *Adv. Math.* vii, 151-152 and viii, 397-399.

(1036) τιθέντα τοὺς ἀναιροῦντας. καίτοι αὐτὸς[1] ὅτι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ φοβεῖται σαφῶς ὑποδείκνυσιν ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Βίων, ταῦτα γράφων· "οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχε δ' οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐναντίους[2] ὑποδεικτέον[3] λόγους οὐδὲ ⟨τὰ⟩[4] E πρὸς τἀναντία πιθανὰ ἀλλ' εὐλαβουμένους μὴ καὶ[5] περισπασθέντες[6] ὑπ' αὐτῶν τὰς καταλήψεις ἀφῶσιν, οὔτε[7] τῶν λύσεων ἱκανῶς ἂν ἀκοῦσαι δυνάμενοι καταλαμβάνοντές τ' εὐαποσείστως· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὴν[8] συνήθειαν καταλαμβάνοντες καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τἆλλα ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ῥᾳδίως προΐενται ταῦτα, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Μεγαρικῶν ἐρωτημάτων περισπώμενοι καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πλειόνων καὶ δυναμικωτέρων ἐρωτημάτων." ἡδέως ἂν οὖν[9] πυθοίμην τῶν Στωικῶν εἰ τὰ Μεγαρικὰ ἐρωτήματα δυναμικώτερα νομίζουσιν εἶναι τῶν ὑπὸ Χρυσίππου κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας ἐν ἓξ βιβλίοις γεγραμμένων. ἢ F τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῦ Χρυσίππου δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι; σκόπει γὰρ οἷα περὶ τοῦ Μεγαρικοῦ λόγου γέγραφεν ἐν τῷ περὶ Λόγου Χρήσεως οὕτως[10]· "οἷόν τι συμβέβηκε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Στίλπωνος λόγου καὶ

[1] αὐτὸς -Bernardakis ; αὐτὸ -g ; omitted by other MSS.
[2] ἐναντίον -X[1](. . . ους -X[3]).
[3] ὑποδεκτέον -X[3](ε[1] over ει erased), g, d, v.
[4] ⟨τὰ⟩ -Pohlenz ; προσ⟨ακτέον⟩ -Reiske ; προσ⟨ετέα⟩ -Wyttenbach (assuming ὑποδεκτέον instead of the correct ὑποδεικτέον preceding).
[5] καὶ μὴ -d, v, z.
[6] X[3](last ε over erasure), g, B ; περισπασθέντας (. . . πεισθέντας -v) -all other MSS.
[7] Reiske ; οὐδὲ -MSS.
[8] κατὰ τὴν -X[1], d, v, z, B ; κατὰ -erased by X[3], omitted by g ; τὴν -omitted by α, A, β, γ, E.
[9] οὖν -omitted by A, β, γ, E.
[10] οὕτος -X[3](ο over erasure), g, omitted by z.

[a] ἡδέως ἂν . . . γεγραμμένων = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 109 (pp. 33, 38–34, 2) ; *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 8, 22 and note *a* on 1036 c *supra*.

ments that confirm it. That he does fear this very thing, however, he clearly shows himself in the fourth book on Ways of Living, where he writes as follows : "The opposite arguments and the plausibilities on opposite sides are to be exhibited not at random but with care lest the hearers be diverted by them and actually lose hold of their apprehensions because they cannot understand the solutions adequately and have their apprehensions insecurely, since the very people who apprehend in accordance with common experience both sensible objects and the other things that depend on the senses easily give these up when diverted by the dialectical questions of the Megarians or by others more numerous and more cogent." Well then, I should like to have the Stoics tell me whether they consider the Megarian questions to be more cogent than those against common experience which Chrysippus composed in six books.[a] Or should this question be put to Chrysippus himself? For look at the kind of things he has written about the Megarian reasoning in his treatise on Use of Discourse, to wit [b] : "Something of the kind has happened also in the case of Stilpo's reasoning and that of Menedemus,[c] for,

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 271 and Döring, *Megariker*, frag. 186.

[c] Stilpo (*ca.* 380–300), third head of the Megarian school, was in Athens about 320. Zeno studied with him for a while (*cf.* Diogenes Laertius, ii, 114 and 120 ; vii, 2 and 24 ; and *S.V.F.* i, frag. 11) ; and so also did Menedemus of Eretria (*ca.* 339/37–265/63), founder of the Eretrian school and statesman, who for political reasons later became a bitter enemy of Persaeus, the pupil of Zeno. On Stilpo see K. Praechter, *R.-E.*, Zweite Reihe iii/2 (1929), cols. 2525, 23–2533, 20 ; and on Menedemus see K. von Fritz, *R.-E.* xv/1 (1931), cols. 787, 54–794, 8.

(1036) Μενεδήμου· σφόδρα γὰρ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ γενομένων αὐτῶν ἐνδόξων, νῦν εἰς ὄνειδος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος περιτέτραπται, ὡς τῶν[1] μὲν παχυτέρων[2] τῶν δ' 1037 ἐκφανῶς[3] σοφιζομένων." ἆρά γε[4] τούτους μέν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τοὺς λόγους ὧν καταγελᾷς καὶ καλεῖς ὀνείδη τῶν ἐρωτώντων ὡς ἐμφανῆ τὴν κακίαν ἔχοντας ὅμως δέδιας μή τινας περισπάσωσιν ἀπὸ τῆς καταλήψεως αὐτὸς δέ, τοσαῦτα βιβλία γράφων κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας, οἷς ὅ τι ἀνεῦρες[5] προσέθηκας, ὑπερβαλέσθαι φιλοτιμούμενος τὸν Ἀρκεσίλαον, οὐδένα τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων ἐπιταράξειν προσεδόκησας; οὐδὲ γὰρ ψιλοῖς χρῆται τοῖς κατὰ τῆς[6] συνηθείας ἐπιχειρήμασιν, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἐν δίκῃ μετὰ πάθους[7] τινὸς συνεπιπάσχων μωρολογεῖν τε πολλάκις λέγει καὶ κενοκοπεῖν.[8] ἵνα τοίνυν μηδ' ἀντίρ- B ρησιν ἀπολίπῃ τοῦ τἀναντία λέγειν, ἐν μὲν ταῖς Φυσικαῖς Θέσεσι ταῦτα γέγραφεν· "ἔσται δὲ καὶ καταλαμβάνοντάς τι πρὸς τἀναντία ἐπιχειρεῖν τὴν ἐνοῦσαν συνηγορίαν ποιουμένους[9] ποτὲ δ' οὐδέτε-

[1] τον -g.

[2] Wyttenbach (but conjecturing τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ for τῶν μὲν . . . τῶν δὲ); ταχύτερον -X^1, d, v, z; παχύτερον -X^3 and all other MSS. (*cf.* Apelt, *Philologus*, lxii [1903], p. 287: τῶν μὲν παχύτερον τῶν δ' . . .).

[3] ἐμφανῶς -g.

[4] H. C.; ἔργα -MSS.; εἶτα -Reiske.

[5] E; ὅτι ἂν εὕροις -z; τι ἀνεῦρα -X^1, d, v; τινὰ νεῦρα -X^3, g; τι ἀνεῦρες -a, A, β, γ, B; εἴ τι ἀνεῦρες -Turnebus; τιν' ἀναιροῦντα -Apelt (*Philologus*, lxii [1903], pp. 287-288).

[6] τῆς -omitted by a, A, β, γ, E.

[7] βάθους -Pohlenz, thus giving precisely the wrong sense, "serenity" or "placidity" (*cf.* L. and S., Addenda, p. 2056 *s.v.* βαθύς; F. Zucker, *Philologus*, xciii [1938/39], pp. 34 and 44); for μετὰ πάθους here *cf.* Plutarch, *Brutus* xxxiv, 2=999 E.

[8] καινοκοπεῖν -g^1, corrected with ε superscribed over α.

though they had become very highly esteemed for skill, their reasoning has now redounded to their disgrace, some parts of it being considered clumsy and others manifest sophistry."[a] What, my dear sir, these arguments, which you deride and for their glaring defectiveness call the disgrace of their propounders, these you still fear may divert people from their apprehension but that you would yourself disturb any of your readers by writing against common experience so many books,[b] where in your ambition to outdo Arcesilaus you added whatever you had invented, this you did not expect? Of course not, for it is not merely the dialectical arguments against common experience that he employs either, but as if carried away by emotion in a law-suit he frequently exclaims with a kind of passion that it talks nonsense and is idle chatter. Then, to leave no possibility of denying that he contradicts himself, he has in his Physical Propositions written this[c]: "Even when they have a definite apprehension it will be possible to argue to the contrary by making out such a case as the subject permits and sometimes to state

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 75, where Stilpo, Diodorus, and Alexinus are called "minutos . . . quorum sunt contorta et aculeata quaedam *σοφίσματα*," and Diogenes Laertius, ii, 120 where Stilpo's dialogues are called "frigid." In ὁ λόγος περιτέτραπται there is a double pun: upon the argument called περιτροπή, "reversal," and upon their "reasoning" which was the reason for their "reputation."

[b] αὐτὸς δέ, τοσαῦτα βιβλία γράφων . . . κενοκοπεῖν = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 109 (p. 34, 2-7). The subject of μωρολογεῖν and κενοκοπεῖν (for which *cf.* κόπις and *Acme*, i [1948], p. 324) is, as Amyot saw, συνήθειαν.

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 128.

[9] X^3(ους over erasure), g; ποιούμενος -d, v, z, a, A^1(ς changed to ν); ποιούμενον -β, γ, E, B.

(1037) ρον καταλαμβάνοντας[1] εἰς ἑκάτερον τὰ ⟨ἐν⟩όντα[2] λέγειν." ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τῆς τοῦ Λόγου Χρήσεως, εἰπὼν ὡς οὐ δεῖ τῇ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμει πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐπιβάλλοντα χρῆσθαι καθάπερ οὐδὲ ὅπλοις, ταῦτ' ἐπείρηκε· "πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶν εὕρεσιν δεῖ χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ[3] καὶ πρὸς τὴν τούτων συγγυμνασίαν,[4] εἰς τἀναντία δ' οὔ, πολλῶν ποιούντων τοῦτο," πολλοὺς δὴ[5] λέγων ἴσως τοὺς ἐπέχοντας.

C ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐδέτερον καταλαμβάνοντες εἰς ἑκάτερον[6] ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ὡς εἴ τι[7] καταληπτόν ἐστιν[8] οὕτως ἂν μόνως ἢ μάλιστα κατάληψιν ἑαυτῆς τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχουσαν. σὺ δέ, ὁ κατηγορῶν ἐκείνων, αὐτός τε[9] τἀναντία γράφων οἷς καταλαμβάνεις περὶ[10] τῆς συνηθείας ἑτέρους τε[11] τοῦτο ποιεῖν μετὰ συνηγορίας προτρεπόμενος, ἐν ἀχρήστοις καὶ βλαβεροῖς ὁμολογεῖς τῇ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμει χρώμενος ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας νεανιεύεσθαι.

[1] X(ς possibly added by X[3]), g, E, Aldine, Basil.; καταλαμβάνοντα -all other MSS.
[2] R. M. Jones (*cf.* ἐνοῦσαν *supra*); ὄντα -MSS.
[3] X[3](ῃ over erasure), g, E; αὐταῖς -all other MSS. (αὐτ῀ -α, A, γ).
[4] Pohlenz (*cf.* *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 9, n. 2); συγγένειαν -MSS.
[5] Emperius (*Op. Philol.*, p. 340); δὲ -MSS.; deleted by Bernardakis.
[6] ἕτερον -X, g, d.
[7] εἴ τι -Meziriac ("si quid possit percipi" -Xylander's translation); ἔστι -MSS.
[8] ἐστιν . . . παρέχουσαν -omitted by E with 1½ lines blank.
[9] τε -omitted by E.

the possibilities on either side, though they have an apprehension of neither"; and yet in his treatise on the Use of Discourse, after having said that the faculty of reason must not be used for inappropriate ends just as weapons must not either, he has added this statement [a]: "It must be used for the discovery of truths and for their organization, not for the opposite ends, though this is what many people do." By "many people" he probably means those who suspend judgment.[b] They frame arguments on either side, however, without having an apprehension of either, their notion being that, if anything is apprehensible, only or especially in this way would the truth yield an apprehension of itself [c]; but you who denounce them, when on the subject of common experience you write the opposite to what you apprehend and exhort others to do this with a show of making out a case, you do yourself confess that from ambition you are showing off by using the faculty of reason in ways unprofitable and harmful.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 129.
[b] See note *a* on 1036 A *supra*.
[c] *Cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 7 (". . . neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant . . . aliquid quod aut verum sit . . .") and *Tusc. Disp.* ii, 9 (". . . in contrarias partis disserendi . . . quod aliter non posset quid in quaque re veri simile esset inveniri . . ."), which resemble more closely the reason here imputed by Plutarch to the Academics in defence of their method than do such passages as *De Primo Frigido* 955 C, *De Defectu Orac.* 431 A, and *Quaest. Conviv.* 700 B (Schroeter, *Plutarchs Stellung zur Skepsis*, pp. 40-41; *cf.* De Lacy, *Class. Journ.*, xlix [1953/54], pp. 82-85).

[10] παρὰ -d, z.
[11] τε -omitted by E; δὲ -z.

(1037) 11. Τὸ κατόρθωμά[1] φασι νόμου πρόσταγμα εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἁμάρτημα νόμου ἀπαγόρευμα, διὸ τὸν
D νόμον πολλὰ τοῖς φαύλοις ἀπαγορεύειν προστάττειν δὲ μηδέν· οὐ γὰρ δύνανται[2] κατορθοῦν. καὶ τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ κατορθοῦν ἀδύνατόν ἐστι μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν; αὐτὸν οὖν αὐτῷ μαχόμενον ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον, προστάττοντα μὲν ἃ ποιεῖν ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἀπαγορεύοντα δὲ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι μὴ δύνανται· ὁ γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενος σωφρονεῖν ἄνθρωπος[3] οὐ δύναται μὴ ἀκολασταίνειν, καὶ ὁ μὴ[4] δυνάμενος φρονεῖν οὐ δύναται μὴ ἀφραίνειν. αὐτοί γε μὴν λέγουσι τοὺς ἀπαγορεύοντας ἄλλο μὲν λέγειν ἄλλο δ' ἀπαγορεύειν ἄλλο δὲ προστάττειν· ὁ γὰρ λέγων "μὴ κλέψῃς" λέγει μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο
E "μὴ[5] κλέψῃς"[6] ἀπαγορεύει δὲ ⟨κλέπτειν προστάττει δὲ⟩[7] μὴ κλέπτειν. οὐδὲν οὖν ἀπαγορεύσει τοῖς φαύλοις ὁ νόμος εἰ μηδὲ[8] προστάξει. ἔτι[9] καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν τῷ μαθητῇ προστάττειν λέγουσι τεμεῖν καὶ καῦσαι κατὰ παράλειψιν[10] τοῦ εὐκαίρως καὶ μετρίως καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν λυρίσαι καὶ ᾆσαι κατὰ

[1] κατόρμα -X[1](corrected with θω superscript -X[3]).
[2] δύναται -B.
[3] ἄνθρωπος -omitted by d, v, z.
[4] μὴ -omitted by E.
[5] τὸ μὴ -d, v.
[6] λέγει μὲν . . . κλέψῃς -omitted by g.
[7] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by Meziriac.
[8] μηδὲ -d, v, z; δὲ μὴ -all other MSS.; [δὲ] -Turnebus; καὶ μὴ -Reiske; γε μὴ -Wyttenbach.
[9] προστάξει. ἔτι -X, g, d, v, z, a, B; προστάξειέ τι -A, β, γ, E.
[10] παράληψιν -g, a[1].

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 520. *Cf.* Pohlenz, *Stoa* ii, p. 75, ¶ 1 and Kidd, *Class. Quart.*, N.S. v (1955), p. 193, n. 10, both of whom cite *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 519 against Plutarch's argument in this chapter. For the relation of νόμος and κατόρθωμα

11. Right action, they say,[a] is what law prescribes and wrong what it prohibits; that is why the law has many prohibitions for the base but no prescriptions, for they are incapable of right action. And who does not know, then, that for one incapable of right action it is impossible not to go wrong? So they reduce the law to the inconsistency of prescribing what people are incapable of doing and prohibiting what they cannot avoid, for the man who cannot be sober cannot help being intemperate and the man who cannot be sensible cannot help being foolish. Yet they themselves say[b] that those who pronounce a prohibition say one thing, prohibit another, and prescribe a third: for example, he who says "do not steal" says just this, "do not steal," but he prohibits ⟨stealing and prescribes⟩ not stealing. The law, then, would not be prohibiting the base anything without also prescribing. Furthermore, they say[c] that the physician's prescription to his pupil to cut and cauterize is given with ellipsis of the phrase "in due time and measure" and the musician's to play the lyre and sing with ellipsis of the phrase "in tune and in time"; that is why the pupils who have performed

see 1041 A-B *infra* (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 297) and *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 502; and besides these for κατόρθωμα, which, as being not merely "appropriate" but also motivated by right intention, is possible only for the sage, since such intention implies integral virtue, which is the result of having apprehended the laws of life as a whole, see *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 11, 13, 494, 498, 500 (*cf.* Festugière, *Class. Phil.*, xlviii [1953], p. 238, n. 2), 501, and 517; van Straaten, *Panétius*, pp. 195-197; Kidd, *Class. Quart.*, N.S. v (1955), pp. 186-187.

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 171. *Cf.* Mates, *Stoic Logic*, p. 11, n. 6.

[c] καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν . . . προστάγματα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι = *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 521. Of this only τὸν ἰατρὸν . . . οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐποίησαν is a paraphrase of what the Stoics said and so a "fragment."

(1037) παράλειψιν[1] τοῦ ἐμμελῶς καὶ συμφώνως, διὸ τοὺς ταῦτα ποιήσαντας ἀτέχνως καὶ κακῶς κολάζουσιν· [ὡς][2] προσετάχθη γὰρ ⟨ὡς⟩ ὀρθῶς, οἱ δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς[3] ἐποίησαν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ σοφὸς τῷ θεράποντι προστάττων εἰπεῖν τι καὶ πρᾶξαι κἂν[4] μὴ εὐκαίρως τοῦτο πράξῃ μηδὲ ὡς δεῖ κολάζων δῆλός ἐστι μέσον προστάττων, οὐ κατόρθωμα[5]· εἰ δὲ
F μέσα[6] προστάττουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς φαύλοις, τί κωλύει καὶ τὰ[7] τοῦ νόμου προστάγματα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι; καὶ μὴν ἡ ὁρμή, κατά γ' αὐτόν, τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος ἐστὶ προστατικὸς αὐτῷ[8] τοῦ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐν τῷ[9] περὶ Νόμου γέγραφεν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ἀφορμὴ λόγος ἀπαγορευτικός, καὶ ἡ ἔκκλισις[10] ⟨, εὔλογός γ' οὖσα· τῇ ὀρέξει γὰρ ἐναντία· ἡ δ' εὐλάβεια
1038 κατ' αὐτὸν⟩[11] εὔλογος[12] ἔκκλισις.[10] καὶ ἡ εὐλάβεια

[1] παράληψιν -X[1], g.
[2] ὡς -omitted by z, deleted by Meziriac and Reiske; transposed after γὰρ -H. C.; retained by Pohlenz, who with Sieveking changes γὰρ to μέν.
[3] ὀρθῶς οὐκ -g. [4] ἂν -X[3](κ erased), g.
[5] μέσον . . . κατόρθωμα -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica* i, p. 667); κατόρθωμα προστάττων οὐ μέσον (μέσων -X, g, d; μέγα -z) -mss.
[6] Xylander; μέγα -mss. [7] τὰ -omitted by g.
[8] αὐτοῦ -n, E. [9] ᾧ -g.
[10] ἔκκλισις (twice) -Turnebus; ἔγκλισις -mss.
[11] H. C.; ⟨ἡ δὲ εὐλάβεια⟩ -von Arnim; ⟨ἀφορμῆς γάρ ἐστιν εἶδος· ἡ δ' εὐλάβεια κατ' αὐτόν⟩ -Pohlenz.
[12] X, E; ἄλογος -g; καὶ εὔλογος -d, v, α, A, γ, B: καὶ ἡ εὔλογος -β, z.

[a] The Stoic sage, being infallible (*cf. e.g. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 548), knows that the non-wise cannot perform right action; and so he would not prescribe it. What he prescribes and holds a servant responsible for, therefore, can only be "intermediate" actions. For this term and concept in Stoic ethics *cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 231 and iii, frags. 494, 496, 498, 515,

inartistically and poorly are chastised, for "correctly" was implied in the prescription and they performed incorrectly. Well then, the sage also in prescribing some word or action to his servant whom he chastises if it is not performed at the right time and as it should be is clearly prescribing intermediate action and not right action[a]; but, if sages prescribe intermediate actions to the base, what prevents the contents of the law too from being prescriptions of that kind? What is more, he holds,[b] as he has written in his treatise on Law, that impulse in man is reason prescriptive of action for him. Well then, repulsion is prohibitive reason and so is avoidance ⟨, at least when it is rational (for it is opposite to conation); and caution is according to him⟩ rational avoidance.[c]

522; Hirzel, *Untersuchungen*, ii, p. 45, n. 1 (on p. 46); and Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik . . .*, pp. 208-212.

[b] *i.e.* Chrysippus does. καὶ μὴν . . . ἃ εὐλαβοῦνται = *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 175 (though the "fragment" is really only ἡ ὁρμὴ . . . τοῦ ποιεῖν). Plutarch, having just proved that contrary to the Stoic assertion the law on Stoic principles can contain positive prescriptions for the base, now proceeds in similar fashion to show that it can contain prohibitions for the sage, although the Stoics deny this too (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 519 and 590).

[c] For this Stoic definition of caution (εὐλάβεια) *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 275 (p. 67, 42-43), 431 (p. 105, 18-19), 432 (p. 105, 29), 411, and 438 (p. 107, 10-14). In the last two places fear is defined as irrational avoidance, so that the avoidance which Plutarch here says is prohibitive reason must be limited to that which is εὔλογος. That it is prohibitive would follow from the fact that, avoidance being the contrary of conation (ὄρεξις, *cf.* Simplicius, *In Epicteti Ench.* i, 1 = 8a [p. 17, 2-4, Schweighaeuser = p. 4, 25-28, Dübner]) and conation rational impulse or a species of it (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 115, 38-39 and p. 40, 8-9), impulse itself, as has just been said, is according to Chrysippus λόγος προστατικός. The Stoics used ὁρμή—and so also ἀφορμή—in wider and nar-

(1038) τοίνυν λόγος ἐστὶν ἀπαγορευτικὸς[1] τῷ σοφῷ· τὸ γὰρ εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφῶν ἴδιον, οὐ φαύλων, ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ[2] σοφοῦ λόγος καὶ[3] ἕτερον ὁ νόμος, μαχόμενον τῷ νόμῳ λόγον οἱ σοφοὶ τὴν εὐλάβειαν ἔχουσιν· εἰ δ' οὐκ ἄλλο τι νόμος ἐστὶν ἢ ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ λόγος, εὕρηται νόμος ἀπαγορεύων τοῖς σοφοῖς ποιεῖν[4] ἃ[5] εὐλαβοῦνται.

12. Τοῖς φαύλοις οὐδὲν εἶναι χρήσιμον ὁ Χρύσιππός φησιν οὐδ' ἔχειν χρείαν τὸν φαῦλον[6] οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δεῖσθαι. ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ[7] Κατορθωμάτων αὖθις λέγει καὶ τὴν εὐχρηστίαν καὶ τὴν χάριν εἰς τὰ μέσα διατείνειν, ὧν
B οὐδέν ἐστι χρήσιμον κατ' αὐτούς. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' οἰκεῖον οὐδὲ ἁρμόττον οὐδὲν[8] εἶναι τῷ φαύλῳ φησὶν ἐν τούτοις· " κατὰ ταὐτὰ[9] δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀστείῳ ἀλλό-

[1] ἀπαγορευτικός ἐστιν -E.
[2] ὁσοῦ -E.
[3] καὶ ἕτερον . . . ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ -omitted by d.
[4] ἀπαγορευτικὸς τοῖς σοφοῖς τοῦ ποιεῖν -g (*cf.* Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2, pp. 225-226 and p. 230).
[5] ἃ ποιεῖν -B.
[6] τὸν φαῦλον -X, g, d, v, z, B ; τῶν φαύλων -all other MSS.
[7] περὶ -d, v, z (*cf.* 1068 A *infra*) ; τῶν -all other MSS. ; περὶ τῶν -Reiske.
[8] οὐδὲν -omitted by B.
[9] κατὰ ταὐτὰ (ταῦτα -d, v, z) -X, g, B ; κατ' αὐτὰ -all other MSS.

rower senses (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 169), and it is only as occurring in rational animals (*cf.* τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in Plutarch's citation of Chrysippus here) that it is defined as λόγος προστατικὸς κτλ.

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iv, 13 = *S.V.F.* iii, p. 107, 11-12.
[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 316, 613, and 614.
[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 674 (p. 168, 27-36). *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1068 A-C and Seneca, *Epistle* ix, 14 (both quoted in *S.V.F.*

And consequently caution is prohibitive reason for the sage, since to be cautious is characteristic of sages and not of the base.[a] If, then, the sage's reason is one thing and the law another, the caution that sages have is reason in conflict with law ; but, if law is nothing other than the sage's reason,[b] it turns out that law does prohibit sages from doing things of which they are cautious.

12. Chrysippus says [c] that to the base nothing is serviceable and that there is nothing for which the base man has any use or need. After stating this in the first book concerning Right Actions he says later on that both utility and gratification extend to the intermediates,[d] none of which according to the Stoics is serviceable. Moreover, that nothing is either congenial [e] or appropriate to the base man he states in these words : " As nothing is repugnant to the

iii, frag. 674) and Shorey's concise explanation with his references in *Class. Phil.*, vi (1911), pp. 477-478.

[d] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1068 E. For τὰ μέσα, " intermediates," see the references in note *a*, page 450 *supra*, and for εὐχρηστία *cf.* εὔχρηστος in *De Comm. Not.* 1066 B, 1068 A, 1070 A ; εὐχρηστήματα in Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 69 ; and Porphyry, *De Abstinentia* iii, 20 (p. 210, 6-7 [Nauck]) : . . . ⟨τὸ⟩ τῆς ὠφελείας, ἣν εὐχρηστίαν οὗτοι λέγουσιν, . . .

[e] For the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις and its terminology see the concise note by M. H. Fisch in *A.J.P.*, lviii (1937), pp. 149-150, the excursus by Grumach, *Physis und Agathon*, pp. 76-77, the articles by C. O. Brink in *Phronesis*, i (1955/1956), pp. 123-145 (especially pp. 123-124 and 139-144) and *H.S.C.P.* lxiii (1958), pp. 193-198, and those by S. G. Pembroke in *Problems in Stoicism* ed. A. A. Long (London, 1971), pp. 114-149 and by G. B. Kerferd in *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library*, lv, No. 1 (1972), pp. 177-196. With *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 178 compare the theory of A. N. Whitehead summarized by Morton White, *The Age of Analysis* (Boston, 1955), p. 87.

(1038) τριον οὐδὲν τῷ δὲ[1] φαύλῳ οὐδὲν οἰκεῖόν[2] ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ κακόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν." πῶς οὖν ἀποκναίει πάλιν ἐν παντὶ βιβλίῳ φυσικῷ νὴ Δία[3] καὶ ἠθικῷ γράφων ὡς οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὑτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα τὰ ἑαυτῶν; ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τὰ θηρία φησὶ συμμέτρως τῇ χρείᾳ τῶν ἐκγόνων ᾠκειῶσθαι[4] πρὸς αὐτά,[5] πλὴν τῶν ἰχθύων· αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ κυήματα τρέφεται δι' αὑτῶν. ἀλλ' οὔτ' C αἴσθησίς ἐστιν οἷς μηδὲν αἰσθητὸν οὔτ' οἰκείωσις οἷς μηδὲν οἰκεῖον· ἡ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἴσθησις ἔοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι.

13. Καί⟨τοι⟩[6] τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο τοῖς κυριωτάτοις ἑπόμενόν ἐστι, καὶ Χρύσιππος, εἰ καὶ πολλὰ πρὸς τοὐναντίον γέγραφε, δῆλός ἐστι προστιθέμενος τῷ μήτε κακίαν κακίας ἢ ἁμαρτίαν ἁμαρτίας ὑπερέχουσαν εἶναι μήτ' ἀρετὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ κατόρθωσιν κατορθώσεως· ὅς[7] γέ φησιν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως· "ὥσπερ τῷ Διὶ προσήκει σεμνύνεσθαι ἐφ' αὑτῷ[8] τε καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ[9] μέγα φρονεῖν καί, εἰ

[1] δὲ -omitted by g (the preceding μὲν superscript above ἀστείῳ). [2] οἰκεῖον οὐδέν -g.

[3] νὴ Δία -Reiske; ἰδίῳ -d, v, z; ἰδία -all other MSS. (φυσικῷ καὶ ἠθικῷ ἰδία -g); ⟨τὰ⟩ ἴδια -R. G. Bury (*cf.* R. Westman, *Acta Acad. Aboensis Hum.*, xxiv, 2 [1959], pp. 3-4; but for ἀποκναίειν without object see 1043 E *infra* and *Moralia* 628 C and 961 C).

[4] ὠκειώσασθαι -g; ὠκειῶσαι -d, v, z.

[5] αὐτοὺς -d, v. [6] Pohlenz; καὶ -MSS.

[7] ὅς -d, v, z; ὅς . . . Φύσεως -omitted by g; ὡς -all other MSS.

[8] Meziriac; ἐπ' αὐτῷ -MSS.

[9] καὶ -omitted by g, B.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 179.

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 724; *cf.* Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* ii, 129.

decent man, in the same way nothing is congenial to the base, since the latter property is good and the former bad." Why then again in every book of physics, yes and of morals too, does he keep writing ad nauseam that from the moment of birth we have a natural congeniality to ourselves, to our members, and to our own offspring?[a] In the first book concerning Justice he says[b] that even the beasts have been endowed with congeniality to their offspring in proportion to its need, except in the case of fishes, for their spawn is nourished of itself. Yet there is neither sensation in subjects for which no object is sensible nor congeniality in those to which nothing is congenial, for congeniality seems to be sensation or perception of what is congenial.[c]

13. This doctrine is a consequence, however, of their fundamental principles; and Chrysippus, though he has written much to the contrary, clearly adheres to the proposition that there is no greater and less either in vice and wrong-doing or in virtue and right action.[d] In fact, he says in the third book concerning Nature[e]: "As it befits Zeus to glory in himself and in his way of life and to be haughty and,

[c] *Cf.* Porphyry, *De Abstinentia* iii, 19 (p. 209, 2-5 [Nauck]): τοῖς δὲ οὐθέν ἐστιν αἰσθητόν, οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀλλότριον . . . καὶ γὰρ οἰκειώσεως πάσης καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. See also S. G. Pembroke in *Problems in Stoicism*, p. 118; and for the term ἀντίληψις *cf.* O. Luschnat, *Prolegomena* ii (1953), pp. 32-33.

[d] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 525, 527-529, and 531-533. From this it follows that there can be nothing bad about the good man (and so nothing repugnant) and nothing good about the base (and so nothing congenial).

[e] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 526. *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1076 A-B; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, pp. 98, 14–99, 2 (Wachsmuth); *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 764.

(1038) δεῖ οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὑψαυχενεῖν[1] καὶ κομᾶν καὶ μεγαλη-
γορεῖν, ἀξίως βιοῦντι μεγαληγορίας, οὕτω τοῖς
D ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσι ταῦτα προσήκει, κατ' οὐδὲν προ-
εχομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός." ἀλλ' αὐτός γε πάλιν ἐν
τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης φησὶν ὅτι τὴν[2] δικαιο-
σύνην ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τέλος ὑποτιθέμενοι τὴν ἡδονὴν
οἱ δὲ μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναιροῦσιν·
ἔστι δὲ ταυτὶ τὰ[3] κατὰ λέξιν· "τάχα γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ
αὐτῆς[4] ἀπολειπομένης τέλους[5] δὲ μὴ τῶν δὲ δι'
αὑτῶν[6] αἱρετῶν ὄντος[7] καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ[8] σῴζοιμεν ἂν
τὴν δικαιοσύνην, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπόντες τὸ
καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἡδονῆς." ἀλλ' εἴπερ
μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν[9] ἐστιν, ἁμαρτάνει μὲν ὁ τὴν
ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν[10] ἀποφαίνων ἧττον δὲ ἁμαρτάνει τοῦ
E καὶ τέλος αὐτὴν[11] ποιοῦντος· ἀναιρεῖ γὰρ οὗτος τὴν
δικαιοσύνην ἐκεῖνος δὲ[12] σῴζει, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἡ
κοινωνία φροῦδός ἐστι καὶ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ δὲ[13] χρη-
στότητι καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ χώραν δίδωσιν. ἔτι τὸ
μὲν λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ[14] περὶ τοῦ Διός "αὔξεσθαι

[1] ὑψαυχεῖν -α, A, β, γ, E, B ; ὑψαυχεῖν τε -n.
[2] τὴν -omitted by α, A, β, γ, E.
[3] ταυτὶ τὰ -X, g, B ; ταὐτὰ τὰ -d, v ; ταῦτα -z ; ταυτὶ -α, A, γ, E ; ταυτὸ -β.
[4] αὐτῆς -X[3](ς added in erasure), g, d, v, z ; αὐτῇ -all other MSS.
[5] τέλος -γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5.
[6] αὑτῶν -X, z, E (*cf.* 1040 c *infra*) ; αὐτῶν -α, A, β, γ, B ; αὐτὸ -g, d, v ; αὐτὰ -Stephanus (*cf.* 1043 B *infra*: ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν Δι' αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν).
[7] Reiske (*cf.* 1040 c *infra*) ; ὄντως -X ; ὄντων -all other MSS.
[8] καὶ καλῶν -g.
[9] καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν -X, g.
[10] ἀγαθὸν -omitted by g.
[11] αὐτὴν -X[3], g, z, E ; αὐτῇ (or αὐτῇ) -all other MSS.

if it must be said, to carry his head high and plume himself and boast, since he lives in a way worth boasting about, so does this befit all good men, since they are in no wise surpassed by Zeus." Yet again in the third book concerning Justice he says himself [a] that justice is annulled by those who set up pleasure as a goal but not by those who call it only a good. Here is his statement verbatim : " For, if it is held to be a good but not a goal and if the fair too is among the things that are of themselves objects of choice, we could perhaps preserve justice by maintaining that the fair and just is a greater good than pleasure." If, however, only the fair is good,[b] the man who declares pleasure to be good errs, to be sure, but errs less than the one who makes it a goal as well, for the latter annuls justice but the former preserves it and by the doctrine of the latter society is over and done for but the former leaves room for goodness and humaneness.[c] Further, while I pass over his remark in the treatise on Zeus that " the

[a] What follows is repeated in 1040 c *infra* ; and the words of Chrysippus are paraphrased in *De Comm. Not.* 1070 D. The three passages are given by von Arnim as *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 23 (p. 8, 10-21).
[b] As the Stoics maintained : *cf.* 1039 c and *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 30-32.
[c] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Officiis* iii, 118 (" Iustitia vacillat vel iacet potius omnesque eae virtutes quae in communitate cernuntur et in societate generis humani . . .") and *Acad. Prior.* ii, 140 (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 7, 37 ff.). According to the Stoics χρηστότης and εὐκοινωνησία are subdivisions of δικαιοσύνη (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 264) and so would be involved in its annulment.

[12] δὲ -omitted by α, A.
[13] Wyttenbach ; ὁ δὴ -X, g, d, v, z ; ᾧ δὴ -α, A, β, γ, E ; ἃ δὴ -B.
[14] ἐν τῷ -omitted by E.

(1038) τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ διαβαίνειν" ἀφίημι μὴ δόξω τῶν ὀνομάτων[1] ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, καίτοι πικρῶς[2] ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοῦ Χρυσίππου δάκνοντος, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ μὴ πᾶν τὸ πραττόμενον κατ' ἀρετὴν κελεύων ἐμφαίνει τινὰ τῶν κατορθωμάτων διαφοράν. λέγει δὲ οὕτως ἐν τῷ[3]
F περὶ τοῦ Διός· "ἔργων γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὄντων οἰκείων[4] ἔστι τὰ ⟨μὴ⟩ προενεχθέντα[5] καὶ τούτων οἷον[6] ἀνδρείως τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκτεῖναι καὶ ἐγκρατῶς ἀποσχέσθαι δυσθανατώσης γραὸς καὶ ἀπροπτώτως[7] ἀκοῦσαι τοῦ τὰ τρία τέσσαρα [μὴ][8] εἶναι τελέως[9]· —τινὰ[10] ἐμφαίνει ψυχρίαν ὁ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπ-
1039 αινεῖν τινας ἐγχειρῶν καὶ ἐγκωμιάζειν."[11] ὅμοια δ' εἴρηται τούτοις ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν· "ἔτι γὰρ οἶμαι" φησὶ "τοὺς ἐπαίνους[12] ἀλλοτριώσεσθαι κατὰ[13]

[1] ὀμμάτων -g.
[2] πικρὸς -a.
[3] ἐν τῷ -omitted by B.
[4] Wyttenbach; οἰκεῖον -MSS.
[5] ἔστι τὰ ⟨μὴ⟩ . . . -H. C.; ἐστὶ τὰ προενεχθέντα (προσνεχθέντα -g) -MSS.; ἐστί τιν' ἀποπροαχθέντα -Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 10, n. 1); but the examples given are actions κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς and so cannot be ἀποπροαχθέντα (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 29, 31-38). For the meaning of προενεχθέντα here see Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 289 A and Aristotle, *Categories* 4 a 12.
[6] οἷον -omitted by γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5.
[7] ἀ vac. 4 ώπτως -d, v, z.
[8] [. . .] -deleted by Wyttenbach.
[9] λέγοντος -Wilamowitz; τελέως ⟨τε⟩ -Pohlenz.
[10] τίνα -X, g; τινὰ (or τινα) -all other MSS.
[11] ἐγκωμιάζειν -X[3](ει over erasure), g, B; ἐγκωμιάζων -all other MSS.
[12] ἐπαίνους . . . συμβαινόντων -omitted by γ and added at foot of column but with omission of κατὰ.
[13] κατὰ -omitted by γ (see preceding note on ἐπαίνους), n, E, Tolet. 51, 5.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 226. *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 48 (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 142, 19-20); and for the sense in which this

virtues wax and expand"[a]—for I would not give the impression of cavilling at words, although Chrysippus attacks Plato and the rest tooth and nail in this way—, yet by his injunction not to praise every act performed in accordance with virtue he indicates that there is some difference in right actions. This is what he says in the treatise on Zeus[b]: "For, although deeds done in accordance with the virtues are congenial, even among these there are those that are ⟨not⟩ cited as examples, such as courageously extending one's finger and continently abstaining from an old crone with one foot in the grave and hearing without precipitate assent that three is exactly four[c];—one who undertakes to praise and eulogize people by means of such examples gives evidence of a kind of insipidity." A similar statement is made in the third book on the Gods. "For furthermore I think," he says,[d] "that there would be

was meant *cf.* Seneca, *Epistle* lxxiv, 28. For the metaphorical use of διαβαίνω see Plutarch's reference to another statement by Chrysippus (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 32, 14-15) and Plutarch himself, *De Vitando Aere Alieno* 829 E.

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 211.

[c] ἀπροπτωσία is the disposition of withholding assent until a clear apprehension is present but only so long (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 130 and 131 [p. 39, 22-23 and p. 40, 9-16]). The present example must be a case of withholding assent which, though right, requires no more exertion of this virtue than the abstention from an old crone requires of ἐγκράτεια. Such would be deliberate reserve of assent when presented with a statement so obviously false that in *De Comm. Not.* 1078 A it is given as an extreme example of the inconceivable.

[d] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 212. In *De Comm. Not.* 1061 A this quotation and that immediately preceding it are conflated and paraphrased. Since it is a paraphrase, there is no justification for the many attempts to emend the language of the present passage to conform to it.

(1039) τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, οἷον δυσθανατώσης γραὸς ἀποσχέσθαι καὶ καρτερῆσαι[1] μυίας δηγμόν." τίν' οὖν οὗτος ἄλλον κατήγορον[2] περιμένει τῶν αὑτοῦ δογμάτων; εἰ γὰρ ψυχρός ἐστιν ὁ ταῦτ' ἐπαινῶν, πολλῷ δήπου ψυχρότερος ὁ τούτων ἕκαστον ἂν[3] κατόρθωμα καὶ μέγα καὶ μέγιστον[4] εἶναι τιθέμενος· εἰ γὰρ ἴσον[5] ἐστὶ τῷ ⟨ἀνδρείως τεμνόμενον καὶ καιόμενον διακαρτερεῖν καὶ τῷ σωφρόνως Λαΐδος ἢ Φρύνης ἀποσχέσθαι τὸ⟩ ἀνδρείως[6] δῆγμα μυίας ἐνεγκεῖν καὶ τὸ σωφρόνως ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς γραός, οὐδὲν οἶμαι διαφέρει τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀπὸ τούτων ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἐπαινεῖσθαι.

B ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν[7] τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Φιλίας διδάσκων ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ πᾶσι δεῖ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τὰς φιλίας διαλύεσθαι ταύταις κέχρηται ταῖς λέξεσι· "προσήκει γὰρ τὰ μὲν ὅλως παραπέμπεσθαι τὰ δὲ μικρᾶς ἐπιστροφῆς τυγχάνειν τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ[8] μεῖζον τὰ δὲ ὅλως διαλύσεως ἀξιοῦσθαι." ὃ δὲ τούτου μεῖζόν ἐστιν, ἐν ταὐτῷ φησιν ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ πλεῖον τοῖς δ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον συμβαλοῦμεν, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον τοὺς δὲ ἧττον φίλους εἶναι,[9] ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης παραλλαγῆς γιγνομένης (οἱ μὲν

[1] α, A, β, γ, E ; καρτερῶς ὑπομεῖναι -X, g, d, v, z, B (probably a gloss in the common archetype).
[2] κατήγορον ἄλλον -g.
[3] ἄν -deleted by Meziriac ; ἕκαστον vac. 2 -E.
[4] καὶ μέγα μέγιστον -d, z ; καὶ μέγιστον (μέγα καὶ omitted) -g.
[5] ὅσον -n.
[6] τῷ <. . .> ἀνδρείως -Castiglioni (*Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 81) after Pohlenz (*cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 153-154) ; τῷ ἀνδρείως -d, v, z, α, A, β, γ, E, Tolet. 51, 5 ; τὸ ἀνδρείως -X[3](ο and ς over erasures), g, B, n ; lacuna first indicated by Wyttenbach ; *cf.* Madvig, *Adversaria Critica* i, pp. 667-668. Similar lacuna in *De Comm. Not.* 1060 F.
[7] ἐν -omitted by d, v, z.
[8] ἐπὶ τὸ -B.
[9] εἶναι φίλους -d, v, z.

repugnance in praising what comes about in such ways as incidental results of virtue, for example abstaining from an old crone with one foot in the grave and enduring the bite of a fly." Whom else does he wait for, then, to denounce his own doctrines? If one who praises these actions is insipid, surely he would be far more insipid who supposes each of them to be right action in a high, nay the highest degree.[a] For, if to bear the bite of a fly courageously and soberly to abstain from the old crone is equal to the ⟨courageous endurance of scalpel and cautery and the sober abstention from Lais or Phryne⟩, it makes no difference, I think, whether the good man is praised for those actions or for these. Furthermore, in the second book on Friendship in explaining that not all wrong actions should be taken as grounds for dissolving friendships he has used these words[b] : " For it is fitting that some be passed over entirely, that some receive slight attention and others still more, and that some be judged to merit complete dissolution of friendship." What is more than this, he says in the same work that we shall have converse with some men to a greater extent and with others to a lesser with the result that some are more our friends and others less so and that as this kind of variation has a wide range (for some deserve friend-

[a] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1060 E-F and with this *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 528 and 529 (p. 142, 1-6 and 10-12).
[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 724.

(1039) γὰρ[1] τοσαύτης[2] οἱ δὲ τοσαύτης[3] γίγνονται φιλίας ἄξιοι) καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ⟨οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον⟩[4]
C πίστεως καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων καταξιωθήσονται. τί γὰρ ἄλλο πεποίηκεν ἐν τούτοις[5] ἢ[6] καὶ τούτων μεγάλας διαφορὰς ἀπολέλοιπε; καὶ μὴν ἐν τῷ περὶ Καλοῦ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ μόνον τὸ καλὸν[7] ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοιούτοις λόγοις κέχρηται· "τἀγαθὸν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ αἱρετὸν[8] ἀρεστόν, τὸ δ' ἀρεστὸν ἐπαινετόν, τὸ δ' ἐπαινετὸν καλὸν" καὶ πάλιν "τἀγαθὸν χαρτόν, τὸ δὲ χαρτὸν σεμνόν, τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν καλόν." οὗτοι δὲ οἱ λόγοι μάχονται πρὸς ἐκεῖνον· εἴτε γὰρ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινετόν[9] ἐστι, καὶ τὸ σωφρόνως ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς γραὸς ἐπαινετὸν ἂν εἴη· εἴτε ⟨μὴ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπαινετόν, οὐδὲ καλὸν ἂν εἴη⟩ πᾶν[10] ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σεμνὸν οὔτε χαρτόν, ἀλλ'[11] οἴχεται ὁ λόγος. πῶς[12] γὰρ οἷόν
D τε[13] τὸ μὲν[14] ἄλλους ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινεῖν ψυχρὸν εἶναι τὸ δ' αὐτὸν[15] ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ σεμνύνεσθαι μὴ καταγέλαστον;

14. Πολλαχοῦ μὲν[16] τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀντιλογίαις ἥκιστα φροντίζει[17] τοῦ

[1] γὰρ -omitted by B.
[2] Meziriac ; τοιαύτης -mss.
[3] τοιαύτης -d, v, z ; τοσαύτοις -a.
[4] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by Meziriac.
[5] ἐν τούτῳ -g.
[6] ἢ -omitted by d, v, z.
[7] τοῦ καλοῦ -X[1](corrected by erasure), a, A[1](corrected by A[2]).
[8] ἀγαθὸν -d, v, z.
[9] ἐπαινετέον -a, A, β, γ, n.
[10] εἴτε ⟨. . .⟩ πᾶν -H. C. after Pohlenz : εἴτε ⟨τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐπαινετόν, οὐκέτι⟩ πᾶν (*cf.* Xylander's version : "sive non meretur [*scil.* laudem], non omne bonum honorabile . . .") ; εἴη εἴτε πᾶν -X[3](εἴτε added in margin), g ; εἴη πᾶν -all other mss.

ship of one degree and others of another) some will also be held to merit one degree of confidence and the like ⟨and others another⟩. This is important, for what has he done here but maintain that in these things too there are great differences? Moreover, in the treatise on the Fair to demonstrate that only the fair is good he has employed arguments like this [a] : "What is good is chosen, what is chosen is approved, what is approved is admired, what is admired is fair" and again "what is good is gratifying, what is gratifying is grand, what is grand is fair." These arguments, however, are in conflict with that other,[b] for either everything good is admired, in which case sober abstention from the old crone would be admired as well, or ⟨this is not admired as well, in which case it would not be true either that⟩ everything good ⟨is fair⟩ or grand or gratifying and nothing is left of the argument. How, in fact, can it be insipid to praise others for such things and yet not ridiculous to make them reason for one's own gratification and glorification?

14. There are many places where he acts this way, but it is when disputing others that he is least con-

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 29 (p. 9, 24-28) ; *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 37 (p. 11, 5-22).
[b] *i.e.* the one reported in 1038 F—1039 A *supra.*

[11] In F the text of this essay begins here (*cf.* Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2, p. iii).
[12] πῶς -Wyttenbach and Kaltwasser ; ἴσως -mss.
[13] οἷονται -d, v, z (conjectured by Meziriac).
[14] μὲν οὖν -X[3](οὖν added superscript), g.
[15] αὐτὸν -X[3](ν over erasure), g, a[2](ν added superscript), A, β, γ, E, B ; αὐτὸ -F, d, v, z.
[16] μὲν ⟨οὖν⟩ -Meziriac.
[17] φροντίζειν -F, X[1](final ν erased -X[3]), a.

(1039) μηδὲν εἰπεῖν ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ καὶ διάφωνον. ἐν γοῦν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπιλαμβανόμενος λέγοντος ὅτι τῷ μηδὲ[1] μαθόντι μηδ' ἐπισταμένῳ ζῆν λυσιτελεῖ μὴ ζῆν ταῦτ' εἴρηκε κατὰ λέξιν· "ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος λόγος καὶ ἑαυτῷ μάχεται[2] καὶ ἥκιστ' ἐστὶ προτρεπτικός. πρῶτον γὰρ παραδεικνύων ὅτι κράτιστον ἡμῖν ἐστι τὸ μὴ[3] ζῆν καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀποθνήσκειν ἀξιῶν πρὸς ἕτερά
E τινα μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς προτρέψεται[4] ἢ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν· οὐ[5] γὰρ ἔστι μὴ ζῶντα φιλοσοφεῖν οὐδὲ μὴ[6] πολὺν χρόνον ἐπιζήσαντα κακῶς καὶ ἀπείρως[7] φρόνιμον γενέσθαι." καὶ προελθὼν δέ φησιν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις καθήκει μένειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν· εἶτα κατὰ λέξιν· "πρῶτον γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ψιλῶς οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἡμᾶς, οὕτως δ' οὐδὲ ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι." καὶ μὴν οὐχ ἕτερα δεῖ βιβλία διελεῖν τοῦ Χρυσίππου τὴν πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐνδεικνυμένους[8] μάχην, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς[9] τούτοις ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ Ἀντισθένους ἐπαινῶν προφέρεται[10] τὸ δεῖν κτᾶσθαι νοῦν ἢ βρόχον καὶ τοῦ Τυρταίου τὸ

πρὶν ἀρετῆς πελάσαι τέρμασιν ἢ θανάτου

[1] μὴ -d, z.
[2] μάχεσθαι -A, γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5.
[3] μὴ -omitted by F[1] but added superscript by F[2].
[4] προὔτρεψεν -X[3](ὔ added superscript in ligature and εψεν over erasure), g; προτρέψεται -F[2](ετ added superscript) and all other MSS.
[5] οὐ γὰρ . . . φιλοσοφεῖν -omitted by g.
[6] μὴ -d, v, z; μὴν -all other MSS.
[7] ῥαθύμως -g.
[8] ἐνδεικνυμένου -d, v, z.
[9] ἑαυτοῖς -F, a, A[1](erasure before αὐτοῖς -A[2]).
[10] προσφέρεται -v, z, γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5; φαίνεται -g.

[a] *Clitophon* 408 A 4-7.

cerned to avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency. Anyway, in the books on Exhortation where he attacks Plato for saying that one who has not learned or does not know how to live had better not be alive [a] he has the following statement word for word [b]: "Such an assertion is self-contradictory and also least effective as exhortation. For in the first place by indicating that it is best for us not to be alive and in a sense requiring us to die it would exhort us to do something other than philosophize, for it is not possible to philosophize without being alive nor possible either to have become prudent without having survived a long time in vice and ignorance." Further on he also says that even the base ought to remain alive, and then in so many words: "For in the first place virtue all by itself is no reason for our living, and so neither is vice any reason why we need to depart this life." And now for an exhibition of Chrysippus in conflict with himself there is no need to go through other books; here in these books themselves [c] he now quotes with approval the saying of Antisthenes that one needs to get intelligence or a halter [d] and that of Tyrtaeus,

Ere reaching the narrow divide 'twixt virtuous living and dying [e]

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 761; *cf.* R. Westman, *Eranos*, lix (1961), pp. 89-100.
[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 167.
[d] Antisthenes, frag. 121 (Mullach, *Frag. Philos. Graec.* ii, p. 292)=67 (Caizzi). Substantially the same remark is ascribed to Diogenes of Sinope (Diogenes Laertius, vi, 24 and *Epistle* xxviii, 6) and to Crates the Cynic (*Gnomologium Vaticanum* 386).
[e] Tyrtaeus, frag. 11 (Diehl, *Anth. Lyr. Graec.*, fasc. 1[3], p. 18)=frag. 14 (Bergk, *Poetae Lyr. Graec.*, ii[4], p. 20).

(1039) F (καίτοι τί[1] ταῦτα βούλεται δηλοῦν[2] ἄλλο πλὴν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ζῆν λυσιτελέστερόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν τοῖς κακοῖς καὶ ἀνοήτοις;) ποτὲ δὲ τὸν Θέογνιν ἐπανορθούμενος "οὐκ ἔδει" φησὶν "εἰπεῖν 'χρὴ πενίην φεύγοντα' μᾶλλον[3] δὲ

χρὴ κακίαν φεύγοντα καὶ ἐς βαθυκήτεα πόντον
ῥιπτεῖν καὶ πετρῶν, Κύρνε, κατ' ἠλιβάτων."

1040 τί οὖν ἄλλο δόξειεν ἂν[4] ποιεῖν ἢ ταὐτὰ προστάγματα[5] καὶ δόγματα παρεγγράφειν αὐτὸς ἑτέρων δὲ γραφόντων ἐξαλείφειν, Πλάτωνι μὲν[6] ἐγκαλῶν ὅτι τοῦ κακῶς ζῆν καὶ ἀμαθῶς τὸ μὴ ζῆν ἀποδείκνυσι λυσιτελέστερον Θεόγνιδι δὲ συμβουλεύων κατακρημνίζειν καὶ καταποντίζειν ἑαυτὸν[7] ὑπὲρ τοῦ φυγεῖν[8] τὴν κακίαν; Ἀντισθένη[9] μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινῶν ὅτι τοὺς μὴ νοῦν ἔχοντας εἰς βρόχον συνήλαυνεν, ⟨αὐτὸν⟩[10] αὐτὸς ἔψεγεν εἰπόντα μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν πρὸς τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν.

15. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα περὶ Δικαιοσύνης εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνάλλεται[11] τῷ περὶ θεῶν

[1] τί -omitted by g.

[2] βούλεται ἢ τί δηλοῖ -X[3](ται over erasure and ἢ τί added at end of line), g ; βούλεται δῆλοι -F[1](corrected to δηλοῦν -F[2]).

[3] μᾶλλον . . . φεύγοντα καὶ -omitted by B.

[4] ἂν -omitted by g ; δείξειεν ἂν -γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5.

[5] Reiske (*cf.* Hartman, *De Plutarcho*, p. 605) ; πράγματα -MSS.

[6] μὲν -omitted by d, v, z.

[7] κατακρημνίζειν ἑαυτὸν καὶ καταποντίζειν -E.

[8] ὑπερφυγεῖν -X[1](τοῦ -added by X[3] superscript before erasure over φυ) ; ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποφυγεῖν -g.

[9] Ἀντισθένην -X[1](? [Ἀντισθένη with η over erasure -X[3]]), g, β, B ; Ἀντισθένει -v.

[10] ⟨αὐτὸν⟩ -Bernardakis after Reiske (αὐτὸς ⟨αὐτὸν⟩).

[11] ἐναλλάττεται -g ; ἐνάλλαται -A, γ, Tolet. 51, 5 ; ἐνάλλαττε -n.

[a] Theognis, 175-176 (*Theognis* . . . iterum ed. D. Young [1971], p. 12 = Bergk, *Poetae Lyr. Graec.*, ii[4], pp. 134-135). In the MSS. of Theognis line 175 begins ἦν δὴ χρὴ instead of χρὴ πενίην, as it does in all the *testimonia*, and line 176 has the form πετρέων instead of πετρῶν. Plutarch quotes the couplet again in *De Comm. Not.* 1069 D (but with μεγακήτεα instead of βαθυκήτεα) and refers to it in *De Virtute Morali* 450 A and possibly in *De Superstitione* 164 F—165 A. For the Stoic technique of ἐπανόρθωσις of which the "correction" here is an example, *cf.* Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, pp. 305-307.

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 313. For reference to the same title see *De Comm. Not.* 1070 E-F (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 455). In 1040 D *infra* the work is referred to succinctly by the phrase, ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Πλάτωνα (so also in 1041 c), and there is certainly distinguished from τὰ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης (1040 c), of which von Arnim (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 195, 34) thought it may have been a part.

(though what do these intend to show except that not being alive is for the vicious and stupid more advantageous than living?), and again he says in correction of Theognis[a]: "he ought not to have said 'From want you must flee' but rather

From vice you must flee, oh my friend, though headlong you plunge in the motion
Down cliffs sharp and sheer or below the yawning abyss of the ocean."

So what would he apparently be doing but himself writing in the same prescriptions and doctrines that he erases when others write them, objecting to Plato for showing that not to be alive is more advantageous than to be living viciously and ignorantly but advising Theognis to plunge over a precipice or to drown himself in order to flee vice? In fact, by praising Antisthenes for trying to force to the halter those who have no intelligence he was censuring ⟨himself⟩ for saying that vice is no reason for us to take leave of life.

15. At the very beginning of the books concerning Justice directed against Plato himself[b] he pounces

(1040) B λόγῳ καί φησιν οὔτ' ὀρθῶς ἀποτρέπειν τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ[1] τῆς ἀδικίας τὸν Κέφαλον εὐδιάβλητόν τ' εἶναι[2] καὶ[3] πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐξάγ⟨ειν παρέχ⟩οντα[4] πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς[5] καὶ πιθανότητας ἀντιπιπτούσας τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ[6] θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν[7] αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσιν. οὕτω δὲ διασύρας τὰ[8] τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπαινεῖ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ προφέρεται τὰ τοῦ[9] Εὐριπίδου ταυτὶ πολλάκις

ἀλλ' ἔστιν, κεἴ[10] τις ἐγγελᾷ λόγῳ,
Ζεὺς καὶ θεοὶ βρότεια λεύσσοντες[11] πάθη·

καὶ ὁμοίως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης τὰ Ἡσιόδεια ταυτὶ[12] προενεγκάμενος[13]

C τοῖσιν[14] δ' οὐρανόθεν μέγ' ἐπήλασε πῆμα Κρονίων,
λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν· ἀποφθινύθουσι[15] δὲ λαοί·

ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν, ὅπως τῶν πονηρῶν κολαζομένων[16] οἱ λοιποὶ[17] παραδείγμασι τούτοις

[1] τῶν θεοφόβῳ -X[1], F, a[1] ; θεῶν φόβω -B.
[2] εὐδιάβλητόν ἐστι -X ; ἀδιάβλητόν ἐστι -g.
[3] καὶ -omitted by d, z.
[4] ἐξάγειν -Dübner ; ⟨παρέχοντα⟩ -Reiske (but after ἀντιπιπτούσας) ; ἐξάγοντι -d, z ; ἐξάγοντα -all other MSS. ; ἐξάγ⟨ειν ἔχ⟩οντα -Bernardakis.
[5] περισπάσομεν -X[3](σο over erasure), g.
[6] τοῦ -X, F, E ; omitted by all other MSS.
[7] κακοσχολογεῖν -d, z.
[8] τὰ -X[3], g, B ; omitted by all other MSS.
[9] τοῦ -omitted by A, β, γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5, E.
[10] ἔστιν κεἴ X[1](ν erased -X[3]), F ; ἔστιν εἴ -v, B ; ἔστι κεἴ all other MSS.
[11] λεύσοντες -X, g, F[1], a[1](second σ added superscript -F[2], a[2]), d, v, z, B.
[12] τουτὶ -d, v, z.

upon the argument about the gods and says that Cephalus was wrong in trying to make fear of the gods a deterrent from injustice [a] and that the argument about divine chastisements is easily discredited and, ⟨as it produces⟩ many distractions and conflicting plausibilities,[b] is an inducement in the opposite direction, being in fact no different from the Bogy and Hobgoblin with which women try to keep little children from mischief. Yet, having thus disparaged Plato's words, in other places again he praises and frequently quotes these lines of Euripides [c] :

> In fact there are, though one deride the words,
> Zeus and the gods, who mark our mortal woes ;

and similarly in the first book concerning Justice [d] he quotes these verses of Hesiod's,[e]

> Zeus from the heavens inflicted a grievous calamity on them,
> Plague and famine at once ; and the populace utterly perished,

and then says that the gods do these things in order that from the chastisement of the wicked the rest of

[a] Plato, *Republic* 330 D—331 B. *Cf.* Shorey's note *ad loc.*, *Republic* (*L.C.L.*) i, p. 16, n. *a*.
[b] *Cf.* 1036 D *supra* . . . οὐδὲ ⟨τὰ⟩ πρὸς τἀναντία πιθανὰ ἀλλ' εὐλαβουμένους μὴ καὶ περισπασθέντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. . . .
[c] Frag. 991 (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 679).
[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1175.
[e] *Works and Days* 242-243. The MSS. of Hesiod have ἐπήγαγε instead of ἐπήλασε in line 242.

[13] προενεγκάμενος -E, Tolet. 51, 5 ; προσενεγκάμενος -all other MSS.
[14] τοῖσιν -a[2](ν added superscript), A, γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5 ; τοῖσι -all other MSS.
[15] ἀποφθινούθουσι -X[1](ο after ν erased -X[3]), F ; ἀποφθίνουσι -A, β, γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5.
[16] κολαζομένων τῶν πονηρῶν -g.
[17] οἱ πολλοὶ -B.

(1040) χρώμενοι ἧττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν. πάλιν ἐν μὲν τοῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης ὑπειπὼν[1] ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθὸν[2] ἀλλὰ μὴ τέλος τιθεμένους τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται σῴζειν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, θεὶς τοῦτο κατὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε[3]· "τάχα γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ[4] αὐτῆς ἀπολειπομένης[5] τέλους δὲ μὴ τῶν δὲ δι' αὑτῶν αἱρετῶν ὄντος[6] καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, σῴζοιμεν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπόντες τὸ καλὸν
D καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἡδονῆς." ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τούτοις[7] περὶ τῆς[8] ἡδονῆς. ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς Πλάτωνα,[9] κατηγορῶν αὐτοῦ δοκοῦντος ἀγαθὸν[10] ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν ὑγίειαν, οὐ[11] μόνον τὴν δικαιοσύνην φησὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἁπάσας, ἂν ἢ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὃ[12] μὴ καλόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ἀπολίπωμεν. ἃ μὲν οὖν ῥητέον ὑπὲρ Πλάτωνος ἐν ἄλλοις γέγραπται πρὸς αὐτόν· ἐν-

[1] ἐπειπὼν -g.
[2] ἀγαθὸν -d(conjectured by Wyttenbach and implied by the versions of Xylander and Amyot); τἀγαθὸν -all other MSS.
[3] εἴρηκεν -X[1](ν erased -X[3]), F.
[4] ἀγαθοῦ -A[2], β, γ, n, E, B; ἀγαθοὺς -X, g, F, d, v, α, A[1]; ἀγαθῆς -z.
[5] ἀπολειπομένης -g; ἀπολειπομένους -X, F, d, v, z, α, A[1]; ἀπολειπομένου -A[2], β, γ, n, E, B.
[6] ὄντος -d, v, z(conjectured by Reiske, *cf.* 1038 D *supra*); ὄντων -n; ὄντως -all other MSS.
[7] τοῖς -d, v, z.
[8] περὶ τῆς -X[3], g, d, v, z, E, B; περί τε -X[1], F, α; περί τε τῆς -A, β, γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5.
[9] πρὸς Πλάτωνα -d, v, z; περὶ Πλάτωνος -X[3](ος over erasure), g; περὶ Πλάτωνα -F, α, A, β, γ, n, E, B.
[10] ἀγαθὸν δοκοῦντος -g.
[11] οὐ μόνον . . . ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν -omitted by g.
[12] ἄλλων ἤ -n.

mankind may take warning and be less inclined to attempt any similar misdeed. Again in the books concerning Justice [a] after suggesting that for those who regard pleasure as a good but not a goal it is possible to preserve justice as well he has affirmed this position [b] and said in so many words: "For, if it is held to be a good and not a goal and if the fair too is among the things that are of themselves objects of choice, we could perhaps preserve justice by maintaining that the fair and just is a greater good than pleasure." This is what he says there about pleasure; but in the books against Plato [c] he denounces him for appearing to hold that health is good [d] and says that not only justice but magnanimity too and sobriety and all the other virtues are annulled if we hold that pleasure or health or anything else that is not fair is good. Now, for what is to be said in Plato's defence, that rejoinder has been given elsewhere [e]; but here is manifest the

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 23 (p. 8, 10-16). *Cf.* 1038 D *supra* and note *a* there.
[b] Plutarch's argument here requires him to maintain that Chrysippus took the position himself and did not merely suggest it as a possibility for others. So the phrase, *θεὶς τοῦτο*, must not be excised as Westman has suggested it might be (Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2, p. 230).
[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 157. For the books referred to see note *b* on 1040 A *supra*.
[d] *Cf. Lysis* 218 E—219 A, *Gorgias* 452 A-B and 504 C, *Republic* 357 C, *Laws* 631 C and 661 A-D (where Plato's position is fully stated).
[e] Presumably in a work now lost, which Pohlenz suggests may have been the essay *τί κατὰ Πλάτωνα τέλος* or the *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης πρὸς Χρύσιππον*, numbers 221 and 59 respectively in the *Catalogue of Lamprias*. Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 33) holds that the reference must be to number 59; *cf.* also Sandbach, *Class. Quart.*, xxxiv (1940), p. 22.

(1040) ταῦθα δὲ ἡ[1] μάχη καταφανής ἐστιν, ὅπου μέν, ἂν μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ τις ὑποθῆται[2] καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, σῴζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην λέγοντος ὅπου δὲ πάλιν τοὺς[3] μὴ μόνον τὸ[4] καλὸν ⟨ἀγαθὸν⟩[5] ἀπο-
E λιπόντας[6] αἰτιωμένου τὰς ἀρετὰς ἁπάσας ἀναιρεῖν. ἵνα δὲ μηδ' ἀπολογίαν ὑπολίπῃ[7] τοῖς ἐναντιώμασιν, Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ Δικαιοσύνης ἀντιγράφων οὗ φησιν αὐτὸν[8] ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔσης τέλους[9] ἀναιρεῖται μὲν ἡ δικαιοσύνη συναναιρεῖται δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἑκάστη· τὴν μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὰς δ' ἄλλας ἀρετὰς οὐδὲν κωλύειν[10] ὑπάρχειν, εἰ καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὰς αἱρετὰς[11] ἀλλ' ἀγαθὰς γοῦν καὶ ἀρεστὰς[12] ἐσομένας· εἶθ' ἑκάστην ἐξ ὀνόματος προσαγορεύει. βέλτιον δὲ τὰς ἐκείνου λέξεις

[1] ἐνταῦθ' ἡ -F[1](α superscript and δ' inserted by F[2]).
[2] ὑποθεῖται -a, A(?).
[3] τοὺς -A[2], β, Vat. Reg. 80 ; τὸ -E ; τοῦ -all other MSS.
[4] τὸν -d, v, z.
[5] ⟨ἀγαθὸν⟩ -added by Reiske (before τὸ καλὸν) and transferred here by Bernardakis (*cf.* 1041 A *infra*).
[6] ἀπολιπόντος -X[3](το over erasure), g, B.
[7] ἀπολίπῃ -g, E.
[8] αὐτὸς -d.
[9] τέλος (not -ους) οὔσης -g.
[10] κωλύει -X[3](erasure after ει), g, A[2](final ν hardly erased), β, γ, E, B.
[11] ἀρετὰς -g.
[12] ἀρεστὰς -X[3](εστ over erasure), B ; ἀρετὰς -all other MSS.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 24 (p. 8, 22-37). Pohlenz is mistaken in saying (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 10, n. 2) that in what follows Plutarch only gives with greater exactness what in 1040 c *supra* he said with reference to the περὶ Δικαιοσύνης of Chrysippus ; but he is nevertheless right in denying that

inconsistency of his accuser, who in one place asserts that justice is preserved if it be assumed that along with the fair pleasure too is good but elsewhere again charges with annihilation of all the virtues those who do not hold that only the fair is ⟨good⟩. In order to leave his self-contradictions not even a plea of defence, when writing against Aristotle concerning Justice he declares[a] him to be wrong in asserting that, if pleasure is a goal, justice is annulled and along with justice each of the other virtues also.[b] This is wrong according to him because, while justice is in truth annulled by them (who so treat pleasure[c]), nothing prevents the other virtues from existing, since they would at any rate be good and approved[d] even though not *per se* objects of choice ; and then he gives each of them by name. It is better, however, to repeat his own words : from this passage the existence of a separate monograph, περὶ Δικαιοσύνης πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην, can be inferred.

[b] Aristotle, frag. 86 (Rose). Rose took the sentence to be a " fragment " of Aristotle's *De Justitia*. So it is assumed to be by W. D. Ross (*Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta* [Oxford, 1955], pp. 98-99) and by P. Moraux (*Le Dialogue " Sur la Justice "* [Louvain/Paris, 1957], p. 58), although E. Bignone had argued for the *Protrepticus* (*L'Aristotele Perduto* [Firenze, 1936], i, p. 373) and R. Walzer had printed the sentence as frag. 17 of that work (*Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta* [Firenze, 1934], pp. 61-62). With the notion that along with justice each of the other virtues also is annulled *cf. Eth. Nic.* 1130 a 8-9 (αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν . . .) and P. Moraux, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[c] *i.e.*, the αὐτῶν, which Reiske wished to " emend " because it has no antecedent, refers to those who hold pleasure to be a goal. *Cf.* κατ' αὐτούς in the quotation from Chrysippus immediately below (1040 F).

[d] For the term ἀρεστός *cf.* 1039 c *supra* and *S.V.F.* iii, p. 22, 13-16 and p. 49, 42-44.

(1040) ἀναλαβεῖν· "τῆς γὰρ ἡδονῆς" φησὶν "ἐμφαινο-
F μένης τέλους κατὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον, τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτο[1] πᾶν μοι δοκεῖ οὐκ ἐμπεριλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ ῥητέον μήτε τῶν ἀρετῶν τινα δι' αὐτὴν αἱρετὴν εἶναι μήτε τῶν κακιῶν φευκτήν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ταῦτα[2] δεῖν ἀναφέρεσθαι[3] πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον σκοπόν· οὐδὲν μέντοι κωλύσει κατ' αὐτοὺς τὴν ἀνδρείαν μὲν[4] καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν καὶ τὰς ὁμοίας ταύταις[5] ἀρετὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰς δ' ἐναντίας ⟨κακίας⟩[6] ὑπάρχειν φευκ-
1041 τάς." τίς οὖν τούτου πρὸς λόγους ἰταμώτερος γέγονεν, ὃς δυεῖν τῶν ἀρίστων[7] φιλοσόφων[8] ἐγκέκληκε τῷ μὲν ὅτι πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἀναιρεῖ μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπὼν τῷ δὲ ὅτι τῆς ἡδονῆς τέλους οὔσης οὐ[9] πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἄνευ τῆς δικαιοσύνης σῴζεσθαι νομίζει; θαυμαστὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐξουσία περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων διαλεγόμενον ἃ τίθησιν αὐτὸς ἐγκαλῶν Ἀριστοτέλει ταῦτ' ἀναιρεῖν πάλιν Πλάτωνος κατηγοροῦντα. καὶ μὴν ἐν ταῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης Ἀποδείξεσι λέγει ῥητῶς[10] ὅτι "πᾶν κατόρθωμα καὶ εὐνόμημα καὶ δικαιοπράγημά ἐστι· τὸ δέ γε κατ' ἐγκράτειαν ἢ καρτερίαν ἢ φρόνησιν
B ἢ ἀνδρείαν πραττόμενον κατόρθωμά ἐστιν· ὥστε καὶ δικαιοπράγημα." πῶς οὖν οἷς ἀπολείπει[11] φρόνησιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν οὐκ ἀπολείπει

[1] τοιοῦτον -g, z.
[2] ταῦτα πάντα -d, v, z ; ταῦτα -omitted by g.
[3] ἀναφέρεσθαι -Basil. ; ἀναφαίνεσθαι (—φάνεσθαι -E) -MSS., Aldine.
[4] τὴν μὲν ἀνδρείαν -d, v, z.
[5] ταύταις X^3(ι inserted), g, E, B ; ταύτας -all other MSS.
[6] ⟨κακίας⟩ -added by Meziriac.
[7] τῶν ἀρίστων -F^2(ιστ made from ετ), d, v, z, a^2)ιστ over erasure), A, β, γ, E, B ; περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν -X^3(περὶ added superscript, ω and ετω over erasures), g.
[8] φιλοσόφοιν -X^3(οι over erasure), g.
[9] οὐ πᾶσαν . . δικαιοσύνης -omitted by X and g.
[10] λέγ vac. 4 οητῶς -g^1 ; λέγοντος οητῳς -g^2.
[11] ἀπολείποι -d.

" For, while pleasure is indicated as a goal in such a theory, that does not, I think, have all this kind of implication. That is why it must be stated that neither is any of the virtues an object of choice *per se* nor any of the vices an object of avoidance but all these must be referred to the aim one has assumed. Nothing in their theory, however, would prevent courage, prudence, continence, endurance, and the virtues similar to these from being classified as goods and the contrary ⟨vices⟩ from being objects of avoidance." Now, who has ever been more reckless in argument than this man? He has lodged complaints against two of the best philosophers, against the one for annulling all virtue by not maintaining that only the fair is good and against the other for not believing that all virtue save justice is preserved if pleasure is a goal. The arrogance he displays is in fact amazing when, the same subject being under discussion, what he affirms himself in objecting to Aristotle he in turn denies in denouncing Plato. Moreover, in the Demonstrations concerning Justice he says expressly [a] : " Every right action is a lawful act and an act of justice ; but what is done in accordance with continence or endurance or prudence or courage is right action ; consequently it is also an act of justice." How, then, can he deny justice to those to whom he grants prudence and courage and

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 297. For the terminology *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 502.

(1041) δικαιοσύνην, εὐθὺς αὐτῶν ὅσα[1] κατορθοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς εἰρημέναις[2] ἀρεταῖς καὶ δικαιοπραγούντων;

16. Τοῦ δὲ Πλάτωνος εἰπόντος τὴν ἀδικίαν ὡς διαφορὰ[3] ψυχῆς οὖσα καὶ στάσις οὐδ' ἐν[4] αὐτοῖς τοῖς[5] ἔχουσιν ἀποβάλλει τὴν δύναμιν ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ συμβάλλει [καὶ κρούει καὶ ταράττει][6] τὸν πονηρόν, ἐγκαλῶν Χρύσιππος ἀτόπως φησὶ λέγεσθαι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτόν· εἶναι γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἀδικίαν· ἐπιλαθόμενος δὲ[7] τούτων
C αὖθις ἐν ταῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης Ἀποδείξεσιν ἀδικεῖσθαί φησιν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα καὶ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν ὅταν ἄλλον[8] ἀδικῇ, γενόμενον[9] ἑαυτῷ τοῦ παρανομεῖν αἴτιον καὶ βλάπτοντα παρ' ἀξίαν ἑαυτόν. ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρὸς Πλάτωνα ταῦτ' εἴρηκε περὶ τοῦ τὴν ἀδικίαν λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· "οἱ γὰρ κατ' ἰδίαν ⟨ἄδικοι οὔκ εἰσιν οὐδὲ οἱ⟩ ἄδικοι[10] συνεστήκασιν ἐκ πλειόνων τοιούτων τἀναντία λεγόντων, καὶ ἄλλως τῆς ἀδικίας λαμβανομένης ὡς ἂν ἐν πλείοσι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς[11] οὖ-

[1] αὐτῶν ὅσα -F²(αὐτῶν in margin), Basil.; αὐτῶν ὅσοι -X³(ω made from o [?], οι over erasure), g; αὐτὸν ὅσα -d, v, z; ἃ τῶν ὅσα -F¹, a, A, β, γ, n, B, Aldine; τῶν ὅσοι -E.

[2] εἰρημέναις -omitted by g.

[3] Dyroff (Programm Würzburg, 1896, p. 51); διαφθορὰ -MSS. (mistakenly defended by Gossage, *J.H.S.*, lxxvi [1956], p. 118 against Pohlenz).

[4] οὐδὲν ἐν -n.

[5] τοῖς -omitted by X¹(added by X³ in margin).

[6] [. . .] -omitted by g; καὶ κρούει· ταράττει -X¹, F; καὶ κρούει καὶ ταράττει -X³ and all other MSS.; καὶ ⟨συγ⟩κρούει καὶ ταράττει -Reiske; καὶ ⟨συγ⟩κρούει [ταράττει] -Pohlenz.

[7] δὲ -E; γὰρ -all other MSS.

[8] ἄλλο -γ, n.

[9] γινόμενον -g, B.

[10] ⟨. . .⟩ added by H. C.; οὐ (Wyttenbach) γὰρ κατ' ἰδίαν ἄδικοι ⟨οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐδ' οἱ ἄδικοι⟩ -Pohlenz (revising his conjecture in *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 14-15).

[11] αὐτὰς -d; αὐτοὺς -v, z.

continence, when whatever right actions they perform with the virtues just mentioned they *ipso facto* perform justly as well?

16. Since Plato had said of injustice that, being discord of the soul and intestine strife, it does not lose its force within those who themselves harbour it either but sets the wicked man at variance with himself,[a] Chrysippus objects and says that to speak of doing oneself injustice is absurd, for injustice exists in relation to another and not to oneself[b]; but this he forgot, and later in the Demonstrations concerning Justice he says that the wrong-doer is wronged by himself and does himself injustice whenever he wrongs another, for he has become a cause of transgression for himself and is injuring himself undeservedly.[c] In the books against Plato this is what he has said concerning injustice as a term used in relation not to oneself but to another[d]: "For isolated individuals ⟨are not unjust nor are⟩ unjust men composites of several such individuals contradicting one another, injustice being understood anyhow as obtaining in the case of several persons so

[a] *Republic* 351 D—352 A (. . . ἐὰν . . . ἐν ἑνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μῶν μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν . . .; . . . διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι . . . καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ . . . ἐνοῦσα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιήσει . . . στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ . . .); and, on the contrary, for justice in the soul *cf. Republic* 441 D—443 B and 586 E.

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 288 (p. 70, 30-36). *Cf.* Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1129 b 25-27, 1130 a 10-13 and a 32–b 5, 1138 a 4–b 13.

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 289 (p. 71, 5-9).

[d] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 288 (pp. 70, 37–71, 4). *Cf.* Plutarch, *De Defectu Orac.* 423 D (οὐ γὰρ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐδὲ μέρος αὑτοῦ χρῆσίς ἐστι δικαιοσύνης . . . ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλους) and Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1138 a 19-20 (ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον).

(1041) τως ἔχουσιν[1] εἰς δὲ τὸν ἕνα μηδενὸς διατείνοντος[2] τοιούτου καθ' ὅσον δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον ἔχει[3] οὕτως." ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀποδείξεσι τοιούτους ἠρώτηκε
D λόγους[4] περὶ τοῦ τὸν ἄδικον καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν· "παραίτιον γενέσθαι παρανομήματος ἀπαγορεύει ὁ νόμος· καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστι[5] παρανόμημα· ὁ τοίνυν παραίτιος γενόμενος αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν παρανομεῖ εἰς ἑαυτόν· ὁ δὲ παρανομῶν εἰς ἕνα καὶ ἀδικεῖ ἐκεῖνον[6]· ὁ ἄρα[7] καὶ ὁντινοῦν ἀδικῶν καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ." πάλιν "τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν βλαμμάτων ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς[8] ἁμαρτάνων παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἁμαρτάνει· πᾶς ἄρ' ὁ ἁμαρτάνων βλάπτει ἑαυτὸν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτόν."[9] ἔτι καὶ οὕτως "ὁ βλαπτόμενος ὑφ' ἑτέρου ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει[10]· τοῦτο

[1] ἔχωσιν -g, β, E, B (omitting the preceding οὕτως).
[2] ἀντιτείνοντος -B.
[3] τὸν πλησίον ἔχη -E.
[4] τοιούτους . . . λόγους -d, v, z; τοιούτοις . . . λόγοις -all other MSS.
[5] ἐστι -d, v, z; ἔσται -all other MSS.
[6] ἐκεῖνος -d.
[7] ὁ ἄρα -g, d, v, z; ὃν ἄρα -all other MSS.
[8] πᾶς ὁ -B.
[9] πᾶς ἁμαρτάνων . . . ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτόν (omitting παρ' ἑαυτὸν . . . ὁ ἁμαρτάνων) -g but with βλάπτει . . . ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτόν dotted and the whole text from παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἁμαρτάνει repeated without omission.
[10] καὶ παρὰ . . . βλάπτει -omitted by E and B.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 289 (p. 71, 10-21).
[b] The argument assumes that one can aid or abet one's own wrong-doing (by "giving assent" to it [?]), and the

disposed to one another and no such condition pertaining to the individual save in so far as he stands in such relation to his neighbours." In the Demonstrations, however, he has propounded arguments like the following concerning the unjust man's doing injustice to himself as well[a]: "The law prohibits one from becoming accessory to a trangression; and to do injustice is a trangression. Now, he who has become his own accessory in doing injustice transgresses in regard to himself; and he who transgresses in regard to an individual also does that individual injustice. Therefore, he who does anyone at all injustice does himself injustice too."[b] Again he argues: "Wrong action is a kind of injury, and everyone in doing wrong does wrong in violation of himself. Therefore, every wrong-doer injures himself undeservedly; and, if so, he also does himself injustice."[c] Furthermore he argues as follows: "He who is injured by another injures himself and injures himself undeservedly. This, however, is to

conclusion, ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ, depends upon the ambiguity of εἰς ("in regard to" and "against"); but, whatever the context in which Chrysippus used the argument, nothing in its formulation justifies Pohlenz's assertion (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 15) that it has to do with the Stoic theory of man as a member of a social organism, injury to any member of which is injury to all, including the member doing the injury.

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 626 (. . . κοινὰ . . . τῶν φαυλῶν τὰ κακά. δι' ὃ . . . τὸν βλάπτοντα καὶ ἑαυτὸν βλάπτειν) and with this Marcus Aurelius, vii, 13; but the argument of Chrysippus here quoted seems rather to be that by the very act of doing wrong one makes oneself worse and so injures oneself: *cf.* Musonius Rufus, xii (p. 65, 7-10 [Hense]) and Clement, *Paedagogus* ii, 10, 100 (p. 217, 5-8 [Stählin]); Epictetus, *Diss.* iv, v, 10; Marcus Aurelius, ix, 4 with viii, 55.

(1041) E δ' ἦν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὁ ἄρ' ἀδικούμενος[1] καὶ ὑφ' ὁτουοῦν πᾶς ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ."

17. Τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, ὃν αὐτὸς εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει, συμφωνότατον εἶναί φησι τῷ βίῳ καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἅπτεσθαι προλήψεων. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Προτρεπτικῶν εἴρηκεν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φησὶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀφέλκειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ συνεργούντων πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδέν. ὅρα[2] τοίνυν πῶς αὐτῷ σύμφωνός[3] ἐστι, τὸν ἀφέλκοντα τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τῆς ἀπονίας[4] καὶ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ὁλοκληρίας καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι ταῦτα φάσκοντα[5] F πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἃ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν αἰτούμεθα, μάλιστα[6] συμφωνεῖν τῷ βίῳ καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς[7] προλήψεσιν ἀποφαινόμενος.[8] ἀλλὰ ἵνα μηδ'[9] ἄρνησις ᾖ τοῦ τὰν-

[1] Xylander ; ἄρα δικαιούμενος -MSS.
[2] ὅρα -X[3], g ; ὁρῶ -all other MSS.
[3] σύμφωνόν -A, β, γ, n, E, B.
[4] ἀπονοίας -g, d, v, z, B[2].
[5] φάσκοντι -d ; φάσκοντι τὰ -v, z.
[6] μάλιστα -omitted by g.
[7] κοιναῖς -omitted by E.
[8] ἀποφαινόμενον -E.
[9] μηδ' -X, g, d, v, z, B ; μὴ -all other MSS.

[a] Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 15) thought this an Academic parody which Plutarch found in his source and mistakenly took for Chrysippus' own reasoning. Nevertheless, since the Stoics held that the sage is not subject to unjust treatment or injury (1044 A *infra* = *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 579 ; *cf. ibid.* frags. 578, 567, 587, and 588), Chrysippus may have argued that anyone who is injured or unjustly treated is always accessory to that treatment if only because his nature invites it or makes it possible.

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 69 (p. 17, 12-15). On the ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις, inbred (not " innate ") preconceptions, see H. von

do injustice. Therefore, everyone who is done injustice by anyone at all does himself injustice." [a]

17. He says that the doctrine of goods and evils proposed and approved by himself is most consistent with life and most closely coincides with the inbred preconceptions. This is what he has said in the third book of his Exhortations [b] ; but in the first he says that this doctrine abstracts a man from all else as being of no concern to us and contributing nothing to happiness.[c] So consider the way in which he is consistent with himself, declaring most consistent with life and the common preconceptions the doctrine that abstracts us from living and health and painlessness and soundness of the senses and asserts that these things which we beg of the gods are of no concern to us.[d] Lest there be any denying that he

Arnim, *R.-E.* iii (1899), cols. 2507-2508 ; F. H. Sandbach, *Class. Quart.*, xxiv (1930), pp. 44-51 ; Pohlenz, *Grundfragen*, pp. 82-99 (especially pp. 88-93 on this passage) and *Stoa* i, pp. 56-59 and ii, pp. 33-35 ; Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 159-162. The interpretation of these preconceptions as a priori knowledge, which Grumach tried to revive (*Physis und Agathon*, pp. 72-76 ; *cf.* Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, pp. 187-190), has been defended again with no more success by C. Tibiletti (*Atti della Accademia . . . di Torino, Cl. di Scienze Morali*, lxxxviii [1953/54], pp. 104-115).

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 139 (pp. 33, 36–34, 2) ; *cf.* 1048 A-B *infra* and *De Comm. Not.* 1060 D-E. Dyroff maintained (*Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, p. 114, n. 3) that what in these passages is ascribed to Chrysippus is proved by comparison with Cicero's *De Finibus* iv, 68 (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 27 [p. 9, 12-17]) to have been the doctrine of Ariston which Chrysippus did not accept but in his work on Exhortations merely cited along with others as effective protreptic themes. See the next note *infra*.

[d] See the precisely contrary statement of Chrysippus cited 1047 E *infra* (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 138).

(1041) *αντία*[1] *λέγειν, ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης ταῦτ' εἴρηκε· "διὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ τε μεγέθους καὶ τοῦ κάλλους πλάσμασι δοκοῦμεν ὅμοια λέγειν καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρω-*
1042 *πίνην φύσιν." ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἄν τις ἐξομολογήσαιτο σαφέστερον τἀναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἢ οὗτος,*[2] *ἃ διὰ ὑπερβολήν φησι πλάσματα*[3] *δοκεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν λέγεσθαι, ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν τῷ βίῳ φάσκων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἅπτεσθαι προλήψεων;*

18. *Οὐσίαν κακοδαιμονίας ἀποφαίνει*[4] *τὴν κακίαν, ἐν παντὶ βιβλίῳ φυσικῷ καὶ ἠθικῷ γράφων καὶ διατεινόμενος ὅτι τὸ κατὰ κακίαν ζῆν τῷ*[5] *κακοδαιμόνως ζῆν ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως ὑπειπὼν ὅτι λυσιτελεῖ ζῆν*[6] *ἄφρονα μᾶλλον ἢ ⟨μὴ⟩ βιοῦν*[7] *κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν ἐπιλέγει· "τοιαῦτα γὰρ τἀγαθά ἐστι τοῖς ἀν-*
B *θρώποις, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ ⟨καὶ⟩*[8] *τὰ κακὰ τῶν*[9] *ἀνὰ μέσον προτερεῖν." ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰρηκὼς ἐν ἑτέροις μηδὲν εἶναι τοῖς ἄφροσι λυσιτελὲς*[10] *ἐνταῦθά*

[1] *τοὐναντία* -d, v, z.
[2] *οὕτως* -Vat. Reg. 80.
[3] *πλάσμα* -d, v, z.
[4] *ἀποφαίνειν* -d, z.
[5] *τὸ* -a, A, β, γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5.
[6] *ὅτι λ. ζ. ὑπειπὼν* -d, v, z.
[7] *μᾶλλον ἢ ⟨μὴ⟩ βιοῦν* -Wyttenbach (implied in versions of Xylander and Amyot); *μᾶλλον ἢ βοῦν* -MSS. (*ἢ βιοῦν* [lacking *μᾶλλον* and *μὴ*] -*De Comm. Not.* 1064 E); *μᾶλλον ἢ βιοῦν* -Stephanus (1620).
[8] *⟨καὶ⟩* -added by H. C. from *De Comm. Not.* 1064 E.
[9] *τῶν* -X[3], g, A[2]; omitted by all other MSS. (*τῶν ἄλλων* -*De Comm. Not.* 1064 E).
[10] *λυσιτελὲς τοῖς ἄφροσιν* -g.

contradicts himself, however, here is what he has said in the third book concerning Justice[a]: "That is why also because of its exceeding sublimity and beauty what we say seems like fiction and not on the level of man and human nature." Is there, then, any way for one to acknowledge more clearly that one is contradicting oneself than this man's assertion that that is consistent with life and most closely coincides with the inbred preconceptions which because of its excess he says seems to be fiction and a formulation transcending man and human nature?

18. He declares that vice is the essence of unhappiness, stoutly maintaining in every book of physics and of morals the proposition that to live viciously is the same as to live unhappily[b]; but in the third book concerning Nature,[c] after having remarked that to live a fool is better than ⟨not⟩ to be alive even if one is never going to be sensible, he adds the statement, "for to human beings goods are of such a nature that in a way ⟨even⟩ evils have the advantage over intermediates." Now, though he has elsewhere said that for fools nothing is advantageous,[d] he here says that there is advantage in

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 545.
[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 55 (p. 14, 17-20).
[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 760 (p. 188, 21-25). The passage recurs in *De Comm. Not.* 1064 E. For a defence of Chrysippus against Plutarch's charge of self-contradiction there and in the present chapter see Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik . . .*, pp. 190-192 and pp. 227-228; and *cf.* Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, pp. 112-113, and O. Luschnat, *Philologus*, cii (1958), pp. 187-188 and p. 210.
[d] Not in *S.V.F.* *Cf.*, however, 1038 A *supra* (*τοῖς φαύλοις οὐδὲν εἶναι χρήσιμον*) with page 453, note *c*; *De Comm. Not.* 1068 D; Seneca, *De Beneficiis* v, xii, 3 and 5-7; and *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 587.

(1042) φησι λυσιτελεῖν τὸ ἀφρόνως ζῆν, ἀφίημι. τῶν δ' ἀνὰ μέσον λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς[1] μήτε κακῶν ὄντων μήτ' ἀγαθῶν, τὰ κακὰ προτερεῖν λέγων οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγει πλὴν τῶν μὴ κακῶν[2] τὰ κακὰ προτερεῖν καὶ τὸ κακοδαιμονεῖν λυσιτελέστερον εἶναι τοῦ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν, καὶ τοῦ κακοδαιμονεῖν[3] ἀλυσιτελέστερον ἡγεῖται[4] τὸ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν· εἰ δ' ἀλυσιτελέστερον, καὶ βλαβερώτερον[5]· τὸ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν ἄρα βλαβερώτερον τοῦ κακοδαιμονεῖν.[6] βουλόμενος οὖν ταύτην ἐπιλεαίνειν τὴν
C ἀτοπίαν ἐπιλέγει περὶ τῶν κακῶν· "ἔστι δ' οὐ[7] ταῦτα προτεροῦντα ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος, μεθ' οὗ βιοῦν ἐπιβάλλει μᾶλλον καὶ εἰ ἄφρονες ἐσόμεθα." πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ κακὰ κακίαν λέγει[8] καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα κακίας ἄλλο δ' οὐδέν· ἡ δὲ κακία λογικόν[9] ἐστι μᾶλλον δὲ λόγος ἡμαρτημένος· οὐδὲν οὖν ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ μετὰ λόγου βιοῦν ἄφρονας ὄντας ἢ τὸ μετὰ κακίας βιοῦν. ἔπειτα[10] τὸ βιοῦν ἄφρονας ὄντας βιοῦν ἐστι κακοδαίμονας ὄντας.[11] πρὸς τί οὖν προτερεῖ[12] τοῦτο τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον; οὐ γὰρ πρός

[1] Στωικοῖς -X[3](added in margin), g ; omitted by all other MSS. (παρὰ τοῖς <vac. 4> -B ; παρ' αὐτοῖς -A[2], Vat. Reg. 80 ; παρὰ τῶν -E).

[2] τῶν κακῶν μὴ -X[1](corrected by X[3]) ; τῶν μὴ καλῶν -a.

[3] καὶ τοῦ κακοδαιμονεῖν -E ; καὶ -B ; omitted by all other MSS. (X and g omit καὶ τοῦ κακ. ἀλ. ἡγ. τὸ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν).

[4] ἡγεῖτο -d, v, z.

[5] ἀβλαβερώτερον -B.

[6] τὸ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν ἄρα βλαβερώτερον τοῦ κακοδαιμονεῖν -E ; omitted by B ; καὶ κακοδαιμονεῖν -all other MSS. (*cf.* Castiglioni, *Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 83).

[7] ἔστιν οὐ -g.

[8] λέγειν -F, X[1](final ν erased -X[3]), a, A, β, γ, n (τοῦ τὰ κακὰ κακίαν λέγειν), E, B.

[9] λογική -g.

living foolishly ; but I let that pass. Since, however, what the Stoics call intermediates are neither evil nor good,[a] in saying that evils have the advantage he says nothing else than that evils have the advantage over what are not evils and to be unhappy is more advantageous than not to be unhappy, that is he holds that not to be unhappy is more disadvantageous than to be unhappy and, if more disadvantageous, more injurious also and therefore that not to be unhappy is more injurious than to be unhappy.[b] In his desire, then, to mitigate this absurdity he adds this statement on the subject of evils[c] : " It is not these that have the advantage but reason, and it is incumbent upon us rather to be alive with reason even if we are to be fools." Now in the first place he asserts that evils are vice and what partakes of vice and are nothing else[d] ; but vice is rational or rather is reason gone astray,[e] and consequently to be alive with reason as fools is nothing else than to be alive with vice. In the next place to be alive as fools is to be alive as unhappy wretches. In what respect, then, does this have the advantage over intermediates ? For surely it is not in respect of being

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 760 (p. 188, 26-27).

[b] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1064 F.

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 760 (p. 188, 28-33).

[d] For this and the corresponding definition of goods *cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 70 (p. 17, 17-20) and 76 (p. 19, 23-24 and 30-32) with iii, p. 154, 6 and p. 165, 21.

[e] *Cf.* Plutarch, *De Virtute Morali* 441 C-D and 446 F—447 A (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 459).

[10] ἐπεὶ -d, v, z.

[11] βιοῦν ἐστι κακοδαίμονας ὄντας -omitted in text but added in margin -X.

[12] προτερεῖν -g.

(1042) γε τὸ[1] εὐδαιμονεῖν φήσει[2] προτερεῖν τὸ[3] κακοδαιμονεῖν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅλως, φασίν, οἴεται δεῖν Χρύ-
D σιππος οὔτε μονὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὔτ' ἐξαγωγὴν τοῖς κακοῖς παραμετρεῖν ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι γίγνεταί ποτε καθῆκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μένειν αὖθις ἐν τῷ ζῆν τοῖς κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. εἶτα τί τούτου[4] μεῖζόν ἐστιν ὑπεναντίωμα πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγήν, εἰ τοῖς ἐπ'[5] ἄκρον εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἀπουσίᾳ[6] τῶν ἀδιαφόρων[7] ἀφίστασθαι[8] τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων καθήκει; καίτοι[9] τῶν ἀδιαφόρων οὐδὲν αἱρετὸν οὐδὲ φευκτόν, ἀλλὰ μόνον αἱρετὸν τἀγαθὸν[10] καὶ μόνον φευκτὸν ἡγοῦνται[11] τὸ κακόν. ὥστε συμβαίνει[12] κατ' αὐτοὺς μὴ[13] πρὸς τὰ αἱρετὰ μηδὲ πρὸς τὰ φευκτὰ
E τοὺς τῶν πράξεων τίθεσθαι[14] λογισμούς, ἀλλ' ἑτέρων στοχαζομένους ἃ μήτε φεύγουσι μήθ' αἱροῦνται, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν.

[1] πρός γε τὸ -Meziriac ; προσίετο -F, d, v, z, α, A, β, γ, n, B ; προσήκει τὸ -X[3](ήκει τὸ -over erasure), g ; πρὸς τί τὸ -E.
[2] φήσει -Emperius (*Op. Philol.*, p. 340) ; φησὶ -MSS. (φασὶ -Vat. Reg. 80).
[3] τὸ -Meziriac ; τοῦ -MSS.
[4] τούτου τί -g.
[5] πρὸς -d, v, z.
[6] ἀπουσίαν -X[3], g.
[7] τῶν ἀδιαφόρων -X[3], g ; τοῦ (τῶν -d, v, z) ἀδιαφόρως -all other MSS.
[8] ἀφίστασθαι -Meziriac (implied in versions of Xylander and Amyot) ; ἐπίστασθαι -MSS.
[9] καίτοι -X[3], g, B ; καὶ τὸ -all other MSS.
[10] ἀγαθὸν τὸ αἱρετὸν -α, A, β, γ, n, E.
[11] ἡγοῦντο -d, v, z.
[12] συμβαίνει -F, X, g, d, v, z ; συμβαίνειν -all other MSS.
[13] μηδὲ -d, v, z (καθ' αὐτοὺς μηδὲ -d).
[14] γίνεσθαι -g.

[a] *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 759 (where this statement of Chrysippus

happy that he would say being unhappy has the advantage. But Chrysippus, they say, thinks[a] that the standard of measurement for remaining alive or taking leave of life should be not at all goods for the former and evils for the latter but for both the intermediates conforming with nature,[b] which is why it sometimes becomes proper both for the happy to commit suicide and for the unhappy again to continue living. Why then, what self-contradiction in respect of choice and avoidance is greater than this, that for those who are in the highest degree happy it is proper to withdraw from the goods they have because they lack things that are indifferent ? Yet they (the Stoics) hold that of indifferent things none is an object of choice or of avoidance but that good is alone an object of choice and evil alone an object of avoidance. Consequently it turns out that by their own assertions they make their practical calculations not with regard to the objects of choice nor yet with regard to the objects of avoidance but the aim of their endeavour in living and in dying is other things, which they neither avoid nor choose.

as given in *De Comm. Not.* 1063 D is printed also). With what follows here *cf.* the whole of *De Comm. Not.*, chap. 11 (1063 c—1064 c) and Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 60-61 (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 763).

[b] With τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν here *cf.* in *De Comm. Not.* 1063 D τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν and in 1060 E and 1068 A τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. In the similar passage of Stobaeus (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 758 [p. 188, 4]) the phrase used is τοῖς καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. On τὰ ἀδιάφορα κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φύσιν *cf. De Comm. Not.* 1060 B-D (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 146) and *S.V.F.* i, frag. 191 and iii, frags. 140-143. They are in the technical Stoic terminology the προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα respectively, for which see page 529, note a *infra*.

(1042) 19. Τἀγαθὰ πρὸς τὰ κακὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχειν διαφορὰν ὁμολογεῖ Χρύσιππος. καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν εἰ τὰ[1] μὲν ἐσχάτως ποιεῖ κακοδαίμονας εὐθὺς[2] οἷς ἂν παρῇ τὰ δ' ἐπ' ἄκρον εὐδαίμονας. αἰσθητὰ δ' εἶναι τἀγαθὰ καὶ[3] τὰ κακά φησιν, ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ περὶ Τέλους ταῦτα γράφων· "ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητά ἐστι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τούτοις ἐκποιεῖ[4] λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ[5] πάθη ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ σὺν τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οἷον λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια,
F ἀλλὰ καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθέσθαι καὶ καθόλου[6] ἀφροσύνης καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἄλλων οὐκ ὀλίγων κακιῶν[7] οὐδὲ μόνον χαρᾶς καὶ εὐεργεσιῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν κατορθώσεων[8] ἀλλὰ καὶ[9] φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν." τούτων τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ἀτοπίαν ἀφῶμεν,[10] ὅτι δὲ μάχεται τοῖς περὶ τὸν διαλεληθότα[11] σοφὸν
1043 τίς οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν; αἰσθητοῦ γὰρ ὄντος[12] τἀγαθοῦ καὶ μεγάλην πρὸς τὸ κακὸν διαφορὰν[13] ἔχοντος, τὸν ἐκ φαύλου γενόμενον[14] σπουδαῖον ἀγνοεῖν τοῦτο καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι παρούσης

[1] εἰ μὲν τὰ -F, X, g, d, v, z, α, A[1].
[2] εὐθὺς -omitted by g.
[3] τἀγαθὰ καὶ -omitted by g.
[4] εἰσποιεῖ -β.
[5] τὰ -B ; ὄντα -all other MSS.
[6] καθόλου -Reiske ; γὰρ ὅλον -MSS.
[7] κακῶν -g.
[8] κατορθώσεων -X, g, B ; κατορθώσεως -all other MSS.
[9] καὶ -A[2] (?), β, γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5, E ; omitted by all other MSS.
[10] φῶμεν -n.
[11] διεληλυθότα -g, d, v, z.
[12] γὰρ ὄντος -Meziriac (implied by Xylander's version) ; παρόντος -MSS.
[13] διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ κακὸν -d, v, z.
[14] γενόμενον -X[3](first ε made from ι), g ; γινόμενον -all other MSS. (σπουδαῖον γινόμενον -B).

19. Chrysippus admits that good things are entirely different from evil, and it must be so if by the presence of the latter men are straightway made utterly unhappy and by that of the former happy in the highest degree [a] ; but good and evil things are perceptible, he says, writing as follows in the first book of the two concerning the Goal [b] : "For even with the following one has enough to assert that good and evil things are perceptible. For not only are the affections along with their species, that is to say grief and fear and the like, perceptible but also it is possible to perceive theft and adultery and similar things and, in general, folly and cowardice and not a few other vices and not only joy and benefactions and many other right activities but also prudence and courage and the rest of the virtues." Let us pass over whatever else is absurd in this statement ; but who would not admit that it is in conflict with the assertions made about the man who is a sage without being aware of it ? [c] For, if good is perceptible and far different from evil, how is it not the utmost absurdity that one have changed from being base to being good without knowing it and without per-

[a] For the Stoic formulation of the causal relation of good and evil to happiness and unhappiness respectively *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 106, 107, and 113.

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 85 (p. 21, 27-37) ; *cf. De Comm. Not.* 1062 c.

[c] From the maximum of ethical "progress," which being still not good is therefore evil, to the virtue and wisdom of the sage the change is instantaneous (*cf.* Plutarch, *Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere* 1058 B) and so may be unperceived by the subject of it (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 540 and 541). For the objection to this Stoic doctrine raised by Plutarch in what follows here see also his *Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus* 75 C-E and *De Comm. Not.* 1062 B-E.

(1043) ἀλλ' οἴεσθαι τὴν κακίαν αὐτῷ[1] παρεῖναι, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀτοπώτατον; ἢ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖν ἢ ἀπιστεῖν δύναται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχων ἁπάσας, ἢ μικρά τίς ἐστι καὶ παντάπασι δυσθεώρητος ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὴν κακίαν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πρὸς τὴν κακοδαιμονίαν καὶ τοῦ καλλίστου βίου πρὸς τὸν αἴσχιστον εἰ ταῦτά τις ἀντ' ἐκείνων κτησάμενος ἑαυτὸν λέληθε.

20. Μία σύνταξις ἡ περὶ[2] Βίων τέτταρα βιβλία· τούτων ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ λέγει τὸν σοφὸν ἀπράγμονά τ' εἶναι καὶ ἰδιοπράγμονα[3] καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ[4] πράττειν.
B ἔστι[5] δὲ ἡ λέξις αὕτη· "οἶμαι γὰρ ἔγωγε τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀπράγμονα εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα[6] καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, ὁμοίως τῆς τ' αὐτοπραγίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνης ἀστείων ὄντων." τὰ δὲ ὅμοια σχεδὸν ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν Δι' αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν εἴρηκε ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσι· "τῷ γὰρ ὄντι φαίνεται ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἡσυχίαν βίος ἀκίνδυνόν τι καὶ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχειν, οὐ πάνυ τῶν πολλῶν δυναμένων τοῦτο συνιδεῖν." ὅτι μὲν τῷ[7] Ἐπικούρῳ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιροῦντι διὰ τῆς ἀπραγμοσύνης τῆς περὶ τὸν θεὸν

[1] αὑτῷ -Sandbach ; αὐτῷ -MSS.
[2] παρὰ -d.
[3] διοπράγμονα -v ; ὀλιγοπράγμονα -Reiske.
[4] καὶ ταῦτα αὐτοῦ -F[1] (ταῦ cancelled), d, v, z.
[5] ἔστι δὲ ἡ λέξις . . . καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν -omitted by g and E.
[6] λιγοπράγμονα -d ; ἰδιοπράγμονα -Pohlenz.
[7] μὲν ⟨οὖν⟩ τῷ -Meziriac (but *cf.* 1039 D *supra*).

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 703.
[b] For ἰδιοπράγμονα *cf.* Hesychius, *s.v.* ἰδιοπραγεῖ ; *Schol. in Euripidis Medeam* 217 (ii, p. 157, 21 [Schwartz]) ; *S.V.F.* iii, p. 245, 31-32. There is no more reason to change this to ὀλιγοπράγμονα as Reiske did or ὀλιγοπράγμονα in the direct quotation to ἰδιοπράγμονα as Pohlenz does than there is to change σοφόν in Plutarch's paraphrase to φρόνιμον or the latter in the direct quotation to σοφόν.

ceiving the presence of virtue but thinking that vice is residing in him? Either no one who has all the virtues can be ignorant of the fact or disbelieve it, or else the difference between virtue and vice, between happiness and unhappiness, and between the fairest life and the ugliest is minute and scarcely discernible at all if anyone has acquired the former in place of the latter without noticing it.

20. The work on Ways of Living is a single treatise in four books. In the fourth of these he says [a] that the sage is unmeddlesome and retiring [b] and minds his own business. These are his words: "For *I* think that the prudent man is unmeddlesome and unofficious and that he minds his own business, minding one's own business [c] and unofficiousness being alike matters of decency." In the work concerning Objects of Choice *Per Se*, he has said very nearly the same thing in these words [d]: "For in fact there seems to be something secure and certain about the life of tranquillity, though most men are not really able to perceive this." For Epicurus this is clearly not out of keeping, since he by the doctrine that god does not meddle does away with provi-

[c] *Cf.* οἰκειοπραγία in Plato's *Republic* 434 c, where in contrast to πολυπραγμοσύνη (434 B 9) it defines δικαιοσύνη. This by Proclus (*In Rempublicam* i, p. 23, 3-8 and p. 220, 5-8) is called τὸ αὐτοπραγεῖν and αὐτοπραγία (*cf.* Iamblichus, *De Mysteriis*, p. 187, 13-14 [Parthey]). In the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* (411 E) σωφροσύνη = αὐτοπραγία κατὰ φύσιν.
[d] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 704.

(1043) οὐκ ἀπάδει[1] δῆλόν ἐστιν· ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Βίων βασιλείαν[2] τε τὸν σοφὸν
C ἑκουσίως[3] ἀναδέξεσθαι[4] λέγει χρηματιζόμενον ἀπ' αὐτῆς· κἂν αὐτὸς βασιλεύειν μὴ δύνηται, συμβιώσεται βασιλεῖ καὶ στρατεύσεται μετὰ[5] βασιλέως, οἷος ἦν Ἰδάνθυρσος[6] ὁ Σκύθης ἢ[7] Λεύκων ὁ Ποντικός. παραθήσομαι δὲ[8] καὶ ταύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὅπως εἰδῶμεν εἰ καθάπερ ἐκ νήτης καὶ ὑπάτης γίγνεται σύμφωνον οὕτως ὁμολογεῖ βίος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀπραγμοσύνην αἱρουμένου καὶ ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνην[9] εἶτα συνιππαζομένου Σκύθαις καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ τυράννων πράττοντος ἐξ οἱασδήτινος ἀνάγκης· "ὅτι γάρ" φησι "καὶ στρατεύσεται

[1] ἀπάδει -X[3](second α made from ο), g, Vat. Reg. 80[2]; ἀποδεῖ -all other MSS.; ἀπῳδεῖ -Basil.
[2] βασιλέως -d; βασιλαν -v.
[3] ἑκουσίως -omitted by g.
[4] Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], p. 104) and implied in the versions of Xylander and Amyot; ἀναδέχεσθαι -X, g, B; ἀνέχεσθαι -all other MSS.
[5] μετὰ -omitted by A[1](added superscript -A[2]); κατὰ -d, z.
[6] Ἰδάνθυρσος -Xylander (*cf. C.I.G.* ii, pp. 111a and 113a); ἐανθύρσος -F[1](ύδαν superscript -F[2]); ὑδάνθηρσος -g, d (υ changed to ϊ), v; ὑδάθυρσος -B; ὑδάνθυρσος -X[3] (ὑδά over erasure) and all other MSS. (*cf.* 1043 D *infra*, *De Comm. Not.* 1061 D, and *Reg. et Imp. Apophthegmata* 174 E).
[7] ἢ -omitted by g.
[8] δὲ -omitted by F, d, v, z (παραθήσομεν -d, v, z), α, A, β, γ, n, E.
[9] πολυπραγμοσύνην -E, n.

[a] *i.e.* Chrysippus cannot consistently identify tranquillity with the good life as Epicurus can (*cf.* 1033 c *supra*), for the latter, unlike the former, ascribing it in its most perfect form to the gods sees and asserts that this precludes the possibility of providence and of all divine intervention in human affairs and natural processes (Epicurus, K. Δ. i and *Epistles*

dence [a]; but Chrysippus himself in the first book on Ways of Living says [b] that the sage will voluntarily assume kingship and make a profit from it and, if he cannot reign himself, will dwell with a king and go campaigning with a king of the kind that Idanthyrsus the Scythian was or Leuco of Pontus.[c] I shall cite this too in his own language, in order that we may know whether as the highest and lowest tones produce concord so there is consistency [d] in the life of a man who chooses to be unmeddlesome and unofficious and then from some necessity or other goes riding with Scythians and minding the business of the tyrants in the Bosporus: "For," says he, "holding fast to this let us again consider the proposition that

i, 76-77 and ii, 97; Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* i, 51-56; [Plutarch], *De Placitis* 881 A-B=*Dox. Graeci*, p. 300, 4-16). This Epicurean doctrine and the Stoic opposition to it are played off against each other in chap. 38 *infra* (1051 D-E and 1052 B) and in *De Comm. Not.*, chap. 32 (1075 E-F). See also Plutarch's references to the Epicurean doctrine in *Pyrrhus*, chap. 20 (395 E-F); *De Defectu Orac.* 420 B; *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1100 E—1101 C, 1103 D; *Adv. Colotem* 1108 C, 1111 B, 1123 A, 1124 E, 1125 E.

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 691 (p. 173, 23-36); *cf. De Comm. Not.* 1061 D.

[c] For Idanthyrsus, king of the Scythians when they were attacked by Darius (514 B.C.), see Herodotus, iv, 76, 120, 126-127 and F. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* I A, p. 102 (3 F 174) and III C, p. 616 (715 F 11); for Leuco, ruler of Bosporus and Theodosia and many neighbouring Scythian tribes and friend of the Athenians (*ca.* 393–348 B.C.), see E. H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks* (Cambridge, 1913), pp. 556-557 and 574-576; Geyer, *R.-E.* xii, 2 (1925), cols. 2279-2282; and H. Volkmann, *Der Kleine Pauly*, iii (1969), p. 599, col. 1, 7-32. The two appear together among the examples of good kings named by Dio Chrysostom, *Oratio* ii, 77.

[d] For the intended irony of ὁμολογεῖ here *cf.* the notes on 1033 A and 1033 c *supra*.

(1043) μετὰ δυναστῶν[1] καὶ βιώσεται, πάλιν ἐπισκεψώ-
D μεθα[2] τούτων ἐχόμενοι, τινῶν μὲν οὐδὲ ταῦτα ὑπο-
νοούντων διὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους ὑπολογισμοὺς ἡμῶν δὲ
καὶ ταῦτ' ἀπολιπόντων διὰ τοὺς παραπλησίους[3]
λόγους." καὶ μετὰ μικρόν· "οὐ μόνον δὲ μετὰ
τῶν προκεκοφότων ἐπὶ ποσὸν καὶ ἐν ἀγωγαῖς καὶ
ἐν ἔθεσι[4] ποιοῖς γεγονότων, οἷον παρὰ Λεύκωνι καὶ
Ἰδανθύρσῳ."[5] Καλλισθένει τινὲς ἐγκαλοῦσιν ὅτι
πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἔπλευσεν ἐλπίζων ἀναστήσειν
Ὄλυνθον ὡς Στάγειρα[6] Ἀριστοτέλης[7] Ἔφορον δὲ[8]
καὶ Ξενοκράτη[9] καὶ Μενέδημον ἐπαινοῦσι παραιτη-
σαμένους τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον· ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἕνεκα
χρηματισμοῦ τὸν σοφὸν ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ἐς Παντικά-

[1] δυνατῶν -g, v, z.
[2] ἐπισκεψόμεθα -g, a^1(o changed to ω -a^2), Tolet. 51, 5; ἐπισκεψέμεθα -d.
[3] παραπλήσιον -β, n, Vat. Reg. 80.
[4] ἤθεσι -d, v, z.
[5] *Cf.* 1043 c *supra*; ὑδαθήρσω -g; ὑδαθύρσω -B; ὑδανθύρσῳ -all other MSS.
[6] ὡστάγειρα -X^1; ἐν στάγειρα -a, A, β, γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5.
[7] ἀριστοτέλην -g; after ἀριστοτέλης half a line left blank in E.
[8] δὲ -omitted by a, A, β, γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5.
[9] ξενοκράτην -X^1(final ν erased -X^3), g, d, v, z, β, n.

[a] καὶ . . . γεγονότων is explicative; for the significance of the phrase in explaining the Stoic theory of ethical progress *cf.* O. Luschnat, *Philologus*, cii (1958), pp. 202-203.

[b] Concerning the motive here alleged *cf.* W. Kroll, *R.-E.* x (1919), col. 1675, 62 ff. in his article (*ibid.*, cols. 1674, 67–1726, 7) on Callisthenes (*ca.* 370–327), Aristotle's grandnephew, who was executed by Alexander and whose story is told by Plutarch in his *Alexander*, chaps. 52-55 (694 E—696 E). See further L. Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (New York, 1960), pp. 22-49. Olynthus had been taken and utterly destroyed by Philip II of Macedon in 348 B.C. (*cf* Demosthenes, *Oratio* ix, 26; Diodorus Siculus, xvi, 53, 2-3; Dionysius Hal., *Ad Ammaeum* i, 10=p. 269, 8-11 [Usener-Radermacher]; and [Plutarch], *Vitae X Oratorum* 845 D-E).

[c] *Cf.* Plutarch's *Alexander*, chap. 7 (668 A), *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1097 B, and *Adv. Colotem* 1126 F; Diogenes Laertius, v, 4; I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg, 1957), pp. 290-294; and O. Gigon, *Vita Aristotelis Marciana* (Berlin, 1962), pp. 56-57, where the evidence for the destruction of Stagira by Philip II in 349 B.C. and for Aristotle's rôle in the restoration of his native city is discussed.

[d] Similar stories are told of Xenocrates by Plutarch in his *Alexander*, chap. 8 (668 E), *De Alexandri . . . Virtute*, 331 E and 333 B, *Reg. et Imp. Apophthegmata* 181 D-E, *Adv. Colotem* 1126 D (*cf.* also Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v, 91; Diogenes Laertius, iv, 8-9; Stobaeus, *Anth.* iii, 5, 10 [p. 258, 6-9, Hense]). The Menedemus mentioned here is not the Eretrian (1036 F *supra*) but Plato's associate from Pyrrha, mentioned again by Plutarch in *Adv. Colotem* 1126 C-D (*cf.* K. von Fritz, *R.-E.* xv/1 [1931], col. 788, 19-53). On the inclusion here of Ephorus of Cyme, the historian (*ca.* 405–330 B.C.), *cf.* F. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* II C, p. 36, 9-16.

he will go campaigning and dwell with princes, since we have maintained this too for reasons much like the very considerations which have caused some not even to suspect it." After a bit he adds: "and not only with those who have made some progress by having been engaged in certain kinds of discipline and habituation,[a] for example at the courts of Leuco and Idanthyrsus." Some arraign Callisthenes for having sailed to Alexander in the hope of restoring Olynthus [b] as Aristotle restored Stagira [c] and praise Ephorus and Xenocrates and Menedemus for having declined Alexander's invitation [d]; but Chrysippus thrusts the sage headlong into Panticapaeum and the

(1043) E παιον ὠθεῖ καὶ τὴν Σκυθῶν ἐρημίαν. ὅτι γὰρ ἐργασίας[1] ἕνεκα καὶ χρηματισμοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖ καὶ προδεδήλωκε τρεῖς ὑποθέμενος ἁρμόζοντας μάλιστα[2] τῷ σοφῷ χρηματισμούς, τὸν ἀπὸ βασιλείας καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ φίλων καὶ τρίτον ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν ἀπὸ σοφιστείας. καίτοι πολλαχοῦ μὲν ἀποκναίει[3] ταῦτ' ἐπαινῶν

ἐπεὶ τί ⟨δεῖ⟩[4] βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυεῖν μόνον,[5]
Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πώματός θ' ὑδρηχόου;[6]

ἐν[7] δὲ τοῖς περὶ Φύσεως λέγει τὸν σοφόν, εἰ[8] τὴν μεγίστην οὐσίαν ἀποβάλοι,[9] δραχμὴν μίαν ἐκβεβληκέναι δόξειν. οὕτω δ' αὐτὸν ἄρας ἐκεῖ καὶ ὀγκώσας ἐνταῦθα πάλιν εἰς μισθαρνίαν καταβάλλει καὶ σοφιστείαν[10]· καὶ γὰρ αἰτήσειν καὶ προλήψεσθαι τὸ μὲν εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου τὸ δὲ χρόνου τῷ F μαθητῇ διελθόντος, ὅπερ εὐγνωμονέστερον εἶναι,

[1] γὰρ ἐργασίας -Reiske (implied in the versions of Xylander and Amyot); παρ' ἐργασίας -F[1], X[1]; περ ἐργασίας -X[3], g, B; παρεργασίας -F[2] and all other MSS.

[2] ὡς μάλιστα -g.

[3] ἀποκναίει -X[3](αίει over erasure), g, A[2], β, γ, E, B; ἀποκνίσαι -F, d, v, z, α, A[1].

[4] ⟨δεῖ⟩ added by Leonicus (*cf.* 1044 B *infra* and *Quomodo Adulescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 36 F).

[5] μόνων -d, v, z, B.

[6] Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πόματος (πώματος -Dübner) θ' ὑδρηχόου (ὑδροχόου -g) -X[3] (added in margin), g, B; omitted by all other MSS. here (*cf.* 1044 B and F *infra* and *Quomodo Adulescens* . . . 36 F).

[7] ἐν -F[2](superscript over σῶ cancelled), X[3](over erasure), and all other MSS.

[8] εἰ -omitted by d, v, z.

[9] ἀποβάλοι -X[3](λ over erasure), g, α[2](λ over erasure), A, β, γ, n, E; ἀποβάλλοι -F, d, v, z; ἀποβάλλει -B.

[10] εἰς -omitted by B; εἰς μ. καὶ σ. κατάγει -d, v, z.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 691 (p. 174, 1-2), *cf. De Comm. Not.* 1061 D (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 174, 3-9); but neither of these passages is a "fragment" of Chrysippus (*cf.* Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 16). Panticapaeum, at the N.E. corner of the Taurian Chersonese, had been founded by Miletus and conquered by the Bosporian rulers, who made it their "European capital" (*cf.* Strabo, vii, 4, 4-5 [309-311] and xi, 2, 5 and 10 [494, 495]). For the phrases, ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ and τὴν Σκυθῶν ἐρημίαν, see Leutsch, *Corpus Paroem. Graec.* ii, p. 412 (no. 64 [add Plato, *Republic* 553 B 8]) and p. 208 (no. 66 [add Aeschylus, *Prom. Vinct.* 1-2]).

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 693; *cf.* 1047 F *infra* and *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 686.

[c] The first two of five lines by Euripides (frag. 892 [Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 646]), the second and third of which are freely reproduced at 1044 F *infra*. Aulus Gellius (VI, xvi, 6-7) says of the lines "quibus saepissime Chrysippus philosophus usus" (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 177, 19-28).

[d] καίτοι πολλαχοῦ μὲν . . . δόξειν = *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 153; *cf.* 1048 B *infra* (ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως . . .).

Scythian wilderness [a] in order to make a profit, for that the purpose intended is trade and profit he has made clear even before this [b] by prescribing three sources of profit particularly appropriate to the sage: kingship, friends, and, third after these, lecturing. Yet in place after place he praises ad nauseam the verses:

> For what need mortals save two things alone,
> Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear? [c]

and in the books concerning Nature he says [d] that the sage, if he should lose the greatest fortune, would reckon his loss at a single drachma. After having thus exalted and inflated him there, however, he here reduces him again to wage-earning and schoolmastering, for he says that the sage will both demand a fee and collect it in advance, in some cases at the beginning of the pupil's term and in others after some time has elapsed, the latter being the

(1043) φησίν, ἀσφαλέστερον δὲ τὸ προλαμβάνειν, ὡς ἀδικήματα τοῦ τόπου[1] ἐπιδεχομένου. λέγει δὲ οὕτως· "εἰσπράττονται[2] δὲ τὸν μισθὸν οὐ πάντας[3] οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ὡσαύτως ἀλλ' ἄλλως ⟨ἢ τὸ⟩ πλῆθος[4] ὡς ἂν ὁ καιρὸς φέρῃ, οὐκ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι[5] ποιήσειν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ ὅσον[6] δὲ παρ' ἑαυτοὺς[7] ταῦτα ποιήσειν πρὸς τὸν συμφωνηθέντα
1044 χρόνον." καὶ πάλιν προελθών· "τόν τε καιρὸν εἴσεται, πότερον εὐθὺς δεῖ τὸν μισθὸν λαμβάνειν ἅμα τῇ προσόδῳ[8] καθάπερ πλείους πεποιήκασιν ἢ καὶ χρόνον αὐτοῖς διδόναι, τοῦ τόπου[9] τούτου μᾶλλον καὶ ἀδικήματα[10] ἐπιδεχομένου δόξαντος δ' ἂν[11] εἶναι εὐγνωμονεστέρου."[12] καὶ πῶς ἢ[13] χρημάτων καταφρονητὴς[14] ὁ σοφός, ὑπὸ συγγραφὴν ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν παραδιδοὺς κἂν μὴ παραδῷ τὸ μισθάριον[15] εἰσπράττων ὡς πεποιηκὼς[16] τὰ παρ' αὐτόν,[17] ἢ βλάβης κρείττων, φυλαττόμενος μὴ ἀδικηθῇ

[1] τρόπου -g²(ρ added superscript).
[2] ἐκπράττονται -F, X, g, d, v, z, a.
[3] Emperius (*Op. Philol.*, p. 340); πάντες -MSS.
[4] ἄλλως ⟨ἢ τὸ⟩ πλῆθος -R. G. Bury; ἄλως πλῆθος -g¹, d, v, z; ἄλλως vac. 6 -E; ἄλλως πλῆθος -all other MSS.
[5] ἐπαγγελλόμενοι -E; ἐπαγγελλομένων (ἐπαγε -F; ἀπαγγε -d, v, z) -all other MSS.
[6] ὅσα -E.
[7] Shorey (*Class. Phil.*, xi [1916], p. 465 and xiii [1918], p. 413); πρὸς ἑαυτούς -MSS.
[8] προόδῳ -X³(erasure after προ), g.
[9] τρόπου -g²(ρ added superscript).
[10] ἀδικήματος -g, v, z.
[11] ἂν -omitted by g.
[12] ἀγνωμονεστέρου -d, v, z.
[13] πῶς ἂν εἴη -X³, g, B.
[14] καταφρονητὴν -d, v, z.
[15] τὸ μισθάρνιον -F¹(so also at the end of this sentence); τὸν μισθάριον -a.

more courteous procedure but collection in advance the more certain, since the situation admits of fraudulent practices. His statement runs as follows[a]: "Those who are intelligent do not exact their fee of all in the same manner but, otherwise ⟨than the⟩ majority, as occasion requires, promising not to produce virtuous men and that too within a year[b] but so far as in them lies to produce these results at the time agreed upon." Further on he says again: "He will know what is the appropriate time, whether he should take his fee straightway upon the entrance of his pupils, as has been the practice of a majority, or should also grant them time, the latter being a situation which is more open to fraudulent practices, to be sure, but which would seem to be more courteous." How is the sage, then, either disdainful of wealth, contracting as he does to transmit virtue for money and, even if he does not transmit it, exacting his pittance on the ground that he has done what in him lies, or superior to injury, taking pre-

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 701. See Headlam's note in *Herodas, The Mimes and Fragments* ed. A. D. Knox (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 123-124. The injunctions of Chrysippus are compared by L. Edelstein (*Bull. Hist. Medicine*, xxx [1956], p. 402, n. 20=*Ancient Medicine* [Baltimore, 1967], p. 330, n. 20) with the recommendations for physicians in the Hippocratic *Precepts* 4 and 6 (ix, pp. 254-258 [Littré]).

[b] Such professions are ridiculed or castigated by Isocrates, *Adv. Sophistas* 3-6 and by Plato in *Euthydemus* 273 D-E, *Protagoras* 319 A, *Laches* 186 C, *Republic* 518 B.

[16] ὡς πεποιηκὼς -omitted by d, v, z; ὡς πεποιηκὼς . . . κρείττων -omitted by γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5.
[17] παρ' αὐτόν -Reiske; περὶ αὐτόν -MSS. (περὶ defended by Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, p. 56; but *cf.* 1043 F *supra* [πρὸς for παρ'] and *De Comm. Not.* 1071 A: τὰ παρ' ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν).

(1044) περὶ τὸ μισθάριον; ἀδικεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς μὴ βλαπτόμενος· ὅθεν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἐν ἄλλοις
B ἀποφηνάμενος ἐνταῦθά φησιν ἀδικήματα τὸν τόπον[1] ἐπιδέχεσθαι.

21. Ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ Πολιτείας οὐδὲν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα πράξειν οὐδὲ παρασκευάσεσθαί[2] φησι τοὺς πολίτας· καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἐπαινεῖ ταῦτα προφερόμενος[3]

ἐπεὶ τί δεῖ[4] βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυεῖν μόνον,[5]
Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πώματός θ' ὑδρηχόου;[6]

εἶτα μικρὸν[7] ἀπὸ τούτων προελθὼν[8] ἐπαινεῖ τὸν Διογένη[9] τὸ αἰδοῖον ἀποτριβόμενον ἐν φανερῷ[10] καὶ λέγοντα πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας· "εἴθε καὶ τὸν λιμὸν[11] οὕτως ἀποτρίψασθαι τῆς γαστρὸς ἠδυνάμην." τίν' οὖν ἔχει λόγον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἐκβάλλοντα[12] τὴν ἡδονὴν ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα τοιαῦτα πράττοντα καὶ τοιαύτης ἁπτόμενον αἰ-
C σχρουργίας; γράψας τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Φύσεως ὅτι[13] πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκα κάλλους ἡ φύσις ἐνήνοχε φιλοκαλοῦσα καὶ χαίρουσα τῇ ποικιλίᾳ καὶ λόγον

[1] ἀδικήματα τὸν τόπον -Wyttenbach ; ἀδίκημά τι (or ἀδικήματι) ἄτοπον -F[1], X, g, d, v, z, B ; ἀδίκημά τι (or ἀδικήματι) τὸν τόπον -F[2], α, A, β, γ, n, E(α superscript between τι and τὸν).
[2] παρασκευάσασθαι -g, β, n, B.
[3] προφερόμενον -E.
[4] δεῖ -X[3](superscript), g, B ; omitted by all other MSS. (*cf.* 1043 E *supra*).
[5] μόνων -d, v, z.
[6] πόματος θ' ὑδρηχόου (ὑδροχόου -g) -X[3](in margin), g, B ; omitted by all other MSS. (*cf.* 1043 E *supra*).
[7] εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν -g.
[8] περιελθὼν -d ; διελθὼν -B[1](προ superscript over δι).
[9] διογένην -X[1](final ν erased -X[3]), g, d, v, z, β.
[10] ἐν τῷ φανερῷ -E.
[11] λοιμὸν -α.
[12] ἐκβαλόντα -d, v, z.
[13] ὅτι -z, B ; ὡς ὅτι -all other MSS.

cautions as he does against being defrauded of his pittance? No one is defrauded without being injured. Chrysippus, who on that ground elsewhere declared the sage not to be subject to fraud,[a] here says that the situation admits of fraudulent practices.

21. In his work on Commonwealth he says[b] that the citizens will not do or contrive anything for the purpose of pleasure; and he praises Euripides, quoting these verses of his:

For what need mortals save two things alone,
Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear?[c]

Then a little further on he praises Diogenes for saying to the bystanders as he masturbated in public, "Would that I could thus rub the hunger too out of my belly."[d] Now, what sense does it make to praise in the same work at once the man who repudiates pleasure and the man who for the sake of pleasure does things like this and engages in such obscenity? Furthermore, after he had written in the books concerning Nature[e] that beauty is the purpose for which many of the animals have been produced by nature, since she loves the beautiful and delights in

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 579; *cf. ibid.* frag. 578 and note *a* on 1041 E *supra*.
[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 706 (p. 177, 9-18).
[c] See 1043 E *supra* and note *c* there.
[d] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vi, 46 and 69. Diogenes of Sinope, the Cynic (*ca.* 400–325 B.C.), used "shamelessness" for didactic purposes (*cf.* K. von Fritz, *Philologus*, Suppl. xviii/2 [1926], pp. 45-49); and Plutarch here misinterprets both the lesson intended by the anecdote and the motive of Chrysippus in citing it (*cf.* Elorduy, *Sozialphilosophie*, p. 148, n. 263).
[e] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1163 (p. 334, 19-23). *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 18 (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1166).

(1044) ἐπειπὼν παραλογώτατον[1] ὡς ὁ ταὼς ἕνεκα τῆς οὐρᾶς[2] γέγονε διὰ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῆς, αὖθις ἐν τῷ περὶ Πολιτείας νεανικῶς[3] ἐπιτετίμηκε τοῖς ταὼς τρέφουσι καὶ ἀηδόνας, ὥσπερ[4] ἀντινομοθετῶν τῷ τοῦ κόσμου νομοθέτῃ καὶ τῆς φύσεως καταγελῶν φιλοκαλούσης περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων οἷς[5] ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῇ πόλει τόπον οὐ δίδωσι. πῶς[6] γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἐγκαλεῖν τοῖς τρέφουσιν[7] ἃ γεννῶσαν ἐπαινεῖ[8]
D τὴν πρόνοιαν; ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πέμπτῳ περὶ Φύσεως, εἰπὼν ὅτι οἱ κόρεις εὐχρήστως ἐξυπνίζουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ οἱ μύες ἐπιστρέφουσιν ἡμᾶς μὴ ἀμελῶς ἕκαστα τιθέναι φιλοκαλεῖν δὲ τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι, ταῦτα κατὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε· "γένοιτο δ' ἂν μάλιστα τούτου[9] ἔμφασις ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ ταώ.[10] ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιφαίνει τὸ ζῷον γεγονέναι ἕνεκα τῆς κέρκου καὶ οὐκ ἀνάπαλιν,[11] τῷ ⟨δ'⟩[12] ἄρρενι γενομένῳ[13] οὕτως ἡ θῆλυς συνηκολού-

[1] παραλογώτατα -g. [2] ἱερᾶς -d.
[3] τυρανικῶς -g (τυρ over erasure).
[4] ὥσπερ . . . ἀκωλύτως (1050 c *infra*) written in d by a different hand.
[5] οἷς . . . ἀκωλύτως (1050 c *infra*) missing from v and z (in z a large part of f. 175v and all of f. 176 have been left blank).
[6] πῶς . . . μηδὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου (1045 B *infra*) missing from F, where the words filled one folio now lost (*cf.* Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2, p. III).
[7] ἐγκαλεῖν . . . vac. 11 (apparently erased at end of line) . . . φουσιν -g.
[8] ἃ γεννῶσαν ἐπαινεῖ -$a^{corr.}$, Xylander ; ἀγεννῶς (ἀγενῶς -n, Vat. Reg. 80) ἂν ἐπαινῇ (ἐπαινεῖ -Tolet. 51, 5^1, Vat. Reg. 80) -all other MSS. [9] τοῦτο -B.
[10] ταῶ (followed by erasure in next line) -X ; ταῶς (with ς erased) -a ; ταώ (followed by erasure) -A ; ταώ -all other MSS. [11] οὐκαναπ vac. 3 -g.
[12] ⟨δ'⟩ -added by Wyttenbach.

diversity, and had appended a most irrational argument, namely that the peacock's tail on account of its beauty is the purpose for which the peacock has come to be, in his work on Commonwealth [a] again he has vehemently censured people who keep peacocks and nightingales. It is as if he were legislating in competition with the lawgiver of the universe and deriding nature for bestowing her love of the beautiful upon animals of a kind to which the sage denies room in his city. Is it not clearly absurd to object to those who keep the creatures that he praises providence for creating? Well, in the fifth book concerning Nature [b] after having said that bugs are useful in waking us up and mice in making us attentive about putting things away carefully [c] and that nature probably loves the beautiful as she delights in diversity he has stated the following in so many words: "The tail of the peacock would be an especially impressive example of this, for here nature makes it evident that the creature has come to be for the sake of the tail and not contrariwise, ⟨and⟩ the existence of the male, which had this origin,

[a] This passage is missing from *S.V.F.*, but see 1044 D-E *infra* (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 714).
[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1163 (p. 334, 24-31).
[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1152 from Porphyry's *De Abstinentia* iii, 20 (pp. 209, 15–210, 2 [Nauck]) and the following criticism of such teleology (pp. 210, 4–211, 7 [Nauck]), all drawn by Porphyry from Plutarch (frag. 145 = *Moralia* vii, pp. 171, 20–173, 18 [Bernardakis] = frag. 193, 59-101 [Sandbach]), who had at least part of the critique from Carneades (*cf.* p. 210, 2-4 [Nauck] = p. 172, 9-11 [Bernardakis] = frag. 193, 71-73 [Sandbach]).

[13] γενομένῳ -a^1(γεν changed to γϊν) ; γινόμενον -g ; γινομένῳ -all other MSS.

(1044) θηκεν."[1] ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ Πολιτείας, εἰπὼν ὅτι ἐγγύς ἐσμεν τοῦ καὶ τοὺς κοπρῶνας ζωγραφεῖν, μετ' ὀλίγον τὰ γεωργικά φησι καλλωπίζειν[2] τινὰς ἀνα-
δενδράσι[3] καὶ μυρρίναις " καὶ ταὼς καὶ περιστερὰς
E τρέφουσι καὶ πέρδικας ἵνα κακκαβίζωσιν[4] αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀηδόνας." ἡδέως δ' ἂν αὐτοῦ πυθοίμην τί φρονεῖ περὶ μελιττῶν καὶ μέλιτος· ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἀκόλουθον τῷ[5] τοὺς κόρεις εὐχρήστως τὸ τὰς μελίττας ἀχρήστως φάναι γεγονέναι· εἰ δὲ ταύταις τόπον ἐν τῇ[6] πόλει δίδωσι, διὰ τί τῶν πρὸς ἀκοὴν καὶ ὄψιν[7] ἐπιτερπῶν ἀπείργει τοὺς πολίτας; καθόλου δὲ ὥσπερ ὁ[8] τοὺς συνδείπνους μεμφόμενος ὅτι χρῶνται τραγήμασι καὶ οἴνῳ καὶ ὄψοις τὸν δ' ἐπὶ ταῦτα κε-
κληκότα καὶ ταῦτα παρεσκευασμένον[9] ἐπαινῶν ἄτο-
πός ἐστιν οὕτως ὁ τὴν μὲν[10] πρόνοιαν ἐγκωμιάζων
F ἰχθῦς καὶ ὄρνιθας καὶ μέλι καὶ οἶνον παρασκευάσα-
σαν ἐγκαλῶν δὲ τοῖς μὴ παραπέμπουσι ταῦτα μηδ' ἀρκουμένοις Δήμητρος ἀκτῇ[11] πώμασί θ' ὑδρηχόοις,[12] ἅπερ πάρεστι καὶ πέφυκεν ἡμᾶς τρέφειν οὐδένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον ἔοικε τοῦ τἀναντία λέγειν ἑαυτῷ.

[1] ἡ θῆλυς συνηκολούθηκεν -Pohlenz; ἡ θήλεια συνηκολούθηκεν -Emperius (*Op. Philol.*, p. 340); ἢ (ἡ -X) θηλυδοῦν (θῆλυ γοῦν -B) ἠκολούθηκεν (ἠκολούθησαν -g) -MSS.
[2] καλλωπίζει -a^1(final ν added superscript).
[3] ἀνανδενδράσι -a, A, γ.
[4] κακκαβάζωσιν -γ^1, n, E; κακκαβάζουσιν -Tolet. 51, 5^1.
[5] τὸ -X^1(corrected to τῶ -X^3), g.
[6] τῇ -g; omitted by all other MSS.
[7] ὄψιν -E^2(over erasure); τέρψιν -all other MSS.
[8] ὁ -omitted by β.
[9] . . . ένον -X^3(over erasure); παρασκευασάμενον -g.
[10] μὲν -omitted by g and Tolet. 51, 5.
[11] ἀκτῆς X^1(s erased -X^3).
[12] πόμασί τε ὑδρηχόοις (ὑδροχόοις -g) -MSS. (*cf.* 1043 E and 1044 B *supra*).

implied the existence of the female." [a] Yet in his work on Commonwealth [b] he says that we are almost at the point of painting pictures on the privies too and a little later that some people embellish their farm-lands with tree-climbing vines and myrtles " and they keep peacocks and doves and partridges for their cackling and nightingales." I should like to have asked him what he thinks about bees and honey, for it would have been consistent with the assertion that the existence of bugs is useful to say that that of bees is useless; and, if he gives room in his city to the latter, for what reason does he debar the citizens from the things that are pleasing to eye and ear? To put it generally: as the man is absurd who rebukes his table-companions for taking desserts and wine and relishes but praises the host who has had these things prepared and has invited guests to share them just so does he seem to have no scruple about contradicting himself who extols providence for having provided fishes and birds and honey and wine [c] but objects to those who do not forgo these things and content themselves with Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear, things ready to hand and our natural sustenance.[d]

[a] The last clause is meant to forestall the objection that, since the hen does not have the beautiful tail, the tail cannot be the purpose for which the fowl exists: the existence of the female being necessarily involved in the existence of the male, the final cause of the cock's existence would be that of the hen's as well.
[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 714.
[c] ὁ τὴν πρόνοιαν . . . παρασκευάσασαν = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1160.
[d] Plutarch here adapts to his prose sentence the second and third lines of Euripides, frag. 892. See 1043 E (with note *c* there) and 1044 B *supra*.

(1044) 22. Καὶ μὴν ἐν τῷ ⟨. . .⟩[1] τῶν Προτρεπτικῶν, εἰπὼν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μητράσιν ἢ θυγατράσιν ἢ ἀδελφαῖς[2] συγγενέσθαι καὶ τὸ φαγεῖν τι[3] καὶ προελθεῖν ἀπὸ λεχοῦς[4] ἢ θανάτου πρὸς ἱερὸν ἀλόγως διαβέ-
1045 βληται, καὶ πρὸς τὰ[5] θηρία φησὶ δεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων γιγνομένοις τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸ μηδὲν ἄτοπον μηδὲ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων· εὐκαίρως γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων παραθέσεις εἰς τὸ μήτε συγγιγνόμενα μήτε γεννῶντα μήτ' ἐναποθνήσκοντα[6] ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς μιαίνειν τὸ θεῖον. ἐν δὲ τῷ πέμπτῳ πάλιν περὶ Φύσεως λέγει καλῶς μὲν ἀπαγορεύειν τὸν Ἡσίοδον εἰς ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας οὐρεῖν ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀφεκτέον[7] εἶναι τοῦ πρὸς βωμὸν οὐρεῖν ἢ ἀφίδρυμα θεοῦ· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι[8] πρὸς λόγον, εἰ κύνες καὶ ὄνοι τοῦτο
B ποιοῦσι καὶ παιδάρια νήπια, μηδεμίαν ἐπιστροφὴν μηδ' ἐπιλογισμὸν ἔχοντα περὶ τῶν[9] τοιούτων. ἄτοπον μὲν[10] οὖν τὸ ἐκεῖ μὲν εὔκαιρον εἰπεῖν τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων[11] ζῴων ἀποθεώρησιν[12] ἐνταῦθα δ' ἀπὸ λόγου.[13]

[1] Lacuna indicated by Xylander; ⟨τρίτῳ⟩ -added by Rasmus (Prog. 1880, p. 8). [2] ἀδελφαῖς ἢ θυγατράσιν -g.
[3] τι ⟨τῶν ἀπειρημένων⟩ -Xylander; but *cf.* Thucydides, ii, 74 (. . . ἤν τι ποιῶμεν . . .) and Theopompus in Athenaeus, xii, 517 e (. . . οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τι ποιοῦντας ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πάσχοντας).
[4] Emperius (*Op. Philol.*, p. 340), *cf.* Wyttenbach, *Index*, *s.v.* λεχώ; λέχους -MSS.
[5] καὶ πρὸς τὰ -X[3](πρὸς added superscript), g, B; καὶ τὰ -all other MSS., Aldine; ἐπὶ τὰ -Basil. [6] ἀποθνήσκοντα -g.
[7] ἀφεκτέον -A corr.(in margin), E, Vat. Reg. 80; ἀνακτέον -X, g; ἀνεκτέον -all other MSS.
[8] γὰρ εἶναι -Reiske; παρεῖναι -MSS.
[9] τῶν . . . ὁρί -(1047 A *infra*) -missing in X[1] (=ff. 148-149) and supplied by another hand (X[4]).

22. Moreover, in the ⟨. . .⟩ book of his Exhortations [a] after stating that cohabitation with mothers or daughters or sisters, eating certain things, and going directly from childbed or death-bed to a holy place have been condemned without reason he says that we must look to the beasts and from their behaviour infer that no such act is extraordinary or unnatural, since here it is apposite to cite the case of the other animals as evidence against the divinity's being polluted by their coupling, giving birth, or dying in holy places.[b] On the other hand, in the fifth book concerning Nature [c] he states that Hesiod's prohibition [d] against urinating into rivers and fountains is good but all the more must one refrain from urinating against an altar or the shrine of a god, for, if dogs and asses and little children do it, that is not relevant, since they are without any regard or understanding for such things. It is extraordinary then [e] to say in the former case that it is apposite to consider the example of the irrational animals but in the latter that it is irrelevant.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 753; *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 743-752 and i, frags. 253-256.
[b] *Cf.* Herodotus, ii, 64. For the irrational animals as the criterion of "natural" behaviour *cf.* Plutarch, *De Amore Prolis* 493 B-E. The notion was satirized by Aristophanes in *Clouds* 1427-1429 and *Birds* 757-768.
[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 754. [d] *Works and Days* 757-758.
[e] The μὲν οὖν here is "corrective," the ἄτοπον being echoed from ἄτοπον in the assertion of Chrysippus (1045 A *supra*). The inconsistency here criticized is "resolved" by A. Dyroff (*Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, p. 373) but not so satisfactorily as he appears to believe.

[10] μὲν -omitted by g. [11] ἄλλων -g.
[12] ἀποθεώρησιν -g; ἀποθηρίωσιν -all other MSS.
[13] ἀπὸ λόγου -Hutten; ἀπόλογον -MSS.

(1045) 23. Τοῦ κατηναγκάσθαι δοκοῦντες[1] ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰτιῶν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀπόλυσιν πορίζειν ἔνιοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπελευστικήν τινα κίνησιν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ κατασκευάζουσιν, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπαραλλάκτων[2] μάλιστα γιγνομένην ἔκδηλον· ὅταν γὰρ δυεῖν ἴσον δυναμένων καὶ ὁμοίως ἐχόντων θάτερον ᾖ λαβεῖν ἀνάγκη, μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἀγούσης τῷ μηδὲν[3] τοῦ ἑτέρου διαφέρειν,[4] ἡ ἐπελευστικὴ δύ-
C ναμις αὕτη[5] τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπίκλισιν[6] ἐξ αὐτῆς λαβοῦσα διέκοψε τὴν ἀπορίαν. πρὸς τούτους[7] ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀντιλέγων, ὡς βιαζομένους[8] τῷ ἀναιτίῳ[9] τὴν[10] φύσιν, ἐν πολλοῖς παρατίθησι τὸν ἀστράγαλον καὶ τὸν ζυγὸν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ δυναμένων ἄλλοτ' ἄλλας λαμβάνειν πτώσεις καὶ ῥοπὰς ἄνευ τινὸς αἰτίας καὶ διαφορᾶς ἢ περὶ αὐτὰ πάντως ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν γιγνομένης· τὸ γὰρ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλαττομέναις ὑπ' ἐνίων καὶ λεγομέναις ταύταις ἐπελεύσεσιν αἰτίας

[1] δοκοῦντες -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 668); δοκοῦντος -MSS.
[2] ἀπαραλλάκτων -A[corr.](in margin); παραλλακτῶν -all other MSS.
[3] μηδὲν -Stegmann (Prog. Geestemünde, 1882); μηδενὶ -MSS.
[4] With διαφέρειν the text in F begins again (see 1044 C *supra*: πῶς).
[5] αὕτη δύναμις -g.
[6] ἐπίκλισιν -B; ἐπίκλησιν -all other MSS.
[7] τούτοις -X[4], g, γ, n, E.
[8] βιβαζομένους -X[4]; βιαζομένους (ις subscript under υς -g) -all other MSS.
[9] ἀναιτίῳ -g; ἐναντίῳ -all other MSS.
[10] τὴν φύσιν . . . πολλὰ τῶν μὴ -omitted by g.

[a] τοῦ κατηναγκάσθαι . . . τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πολλάκις εἰρημένων (1045 D *infra*) = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 973. It is not Ariston (Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, pp. 105-108; Elorduy, *Sozialphilosophie*, p. 30) but the Epicureans against whom Chrysippus

23. Some philosophers,[a] thinking to provide the impulses with release from the constraint of external causes, contrive within the ruling faculty a kind of adventitious motion which becomes manifest especially in the case of indistinguishable alternatives. They argue that, when it is necessary to accept one of two things that are alike and of equal import, there being no cause directing us to one of the two, since it is no different at all from the other, this adventitious force in the soul takes a swerve of itself and resolves the perplexity. Disputing them as men who constrain nature with no cause,[b] Chrysippus in many places cites as evidence dice and scales and many of the things that cannot fall or incline now one way and now another without the occurrence of some cause, that is of some variation either entirely in the things themselves or in their environment, it being his contention that the uncaused is altogether non-existent and so is the spontaneous and that in these movements which some people imagine and call adventitious obscure causes[c] insinuate themselves

here polemized: *cf.* 1050 B-C *infra*, *De Sollertia Animalium* 964 C, *De An. Proc. in Timaeo* 1015 B-C; Lucretius, ii, 251-293; Cicero, *De Fato* 18, 22-23, and 46 and *De Nat. Deorum* i, 69; Philodemus, Περὶ σημειώσεων xxxvi, 11-17; Diogenes of Oenoanda, frag. 33, col. iii (William) = frag. 30, col. iii (Grilli) = frag. 32, col. iii (Chilton); Galen, *De Placitis Hippoc. et Plat.* iv, 4 (p. 361, 14-16 [Mueller]); Plotinus, *Enn.* III, i, 1, lines 15-16. See also Plutarch, *De Genio Socratis* 580 F—581 A with M. Pohlenz, *Gnomon*, xxi (1949), pp. 351-352 and Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, pp. 56 and 64-65.

[b] Apparently a pun was intended: (1) forcing upon nature the state of causelessness and thereby (2) violating nature without cause.

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 965, 966, 967, 970, and 971.

(1045) ἀδήλους ὑποτρέχειν[1] καὶ λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ θάτερα
τὴν ὁρμὴν ἀγούσας. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς γνωρι-
D μωτάτοις[2] ἐστὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πολλάκις εἰρημένων.
ἃ δὲ τούτοις πάλιν[3] αὐτὸς ἐξ ἐναντίας εἴρηκεν,
οὐχ ὁμοίως οὕτως ἐν μέσῳ κείμενα, δι' αὐτῶν
παραθήσομαι τῶν ἐκείνου λέξεων. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ
περὶ τοῦ Δικάζειν ὑποθέμενος δύο δρομεῖς ὁμοῦ
συνεκπίπτειν ἀλλήλοις διαπορεῖ τί τῷ βραβευτῇ
καθήκει ποιῆσαι. "πότερον" φησὶν[4] "ἔξεστι τὸν
βραβευτὴν[5] τὸν φοίνικα ὁποτέρῳ βούλεται ἀπο-
δοῦναι καθ' ἃν[6] τύχωσιν αὐτῷ συνηθέστεροι ὄντες
ὡς ἂν ἐνταῦθα τῶν αὑτοῦ[7] τι χαρισόμενον[8] ⟨ἢ⟩[9]
τρόπον τινὰ μᾶλλον ὡς κοινοῦ τοῦ φοίνικος γεγο-
νότος ἀμφοτέρων οἱονεί τινος κλήρου γιγνομένου
E [ἐν ἄλλῳ][10] κατὰ τὴν ἐπίκλισιν[11] ὡς ἔτυχε δοῦναι[12]
αὐτόν; λέγω δὲ ἣν ἔτυχεν ἐπίκλισιν[13] οἷα[14] γίγνεται
ὅταν, δυεῖν προκειμένων δραχμῶν ὁμοίων κατὰ τὰ
λοιπά, ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐπικλίναντες λαμβάνωμεν
αὐτήν." ἐν δὲ τῷ ἕκτῳ[15] περὶ Καθήκοντος, εἶναί
τινα φήσας πράγματα μὴ πάνυ πολλῆς ἄξια [εἶ-
ναι][16] πραγματείας μηδὲ προσοχῆς, ἀφιέναι περὶ

[1] ὑποτρέφειν -n ; ὑπάρχειν -Vat. Reg. 80.
[2] γνωριμωτέροις -X[4], B.
[3] ἃ δὲ πολλάκις πάλιν τούτοις -X[4], B.
[4] φησὶν -omitted by g.
[5] τῷ βραβευτῇ -F, g.
[6] καθ' ἂν -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 668) ; κἂν -mss.
[7] τῶν αὑτοῦ -Wyttenbach ; τοῦ αὐτοῦ -g ; τῶν αὐτοῦ -all other mss.
[8] χαρισάμενον -g, E ; χαριούμενον -B.
[9] ⟨ἢ⟩ -added here by Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], pp. 114-115), after τρόπον τινὰ by Wyttenbach ; ⟨ἢ καθήκει⟩ τρόπον τινὰ Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 11, n. 2).
[10] [ἐν ἄλλῳ] -deleted by Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, *ibid.* ;

and without our notice direct our impulse in one way or the other. Now, these are among the most familiar of the assertions that he has frequently made ; but he has himself again made statements contrary to these, and, since they are not similarly accessible to everyone, I shall quote them in his very words. So, for one, in his work concerning Decision [a] he supposes that two racers have run a dead heat and raises the question what the umpire ought to do. "Is it permissible," he says, "that the umpire award the palm to whichever he pleases depending upon their comparative intimacy with him considering it in this case to be one of his own possessions which he would be giving away ⟨or⟩ that in a way rather considering the palm to have become the common property of both he give it, as if by casting a lot, according to his chance inclination? By 'chance inclination' I mean the kind that occurs when two drachmas that are for the rest alike have been set before us and we incline to one of them and take it." Again, in the sixth book concerning Duty he says [b] that some matters are not worth much trouble or attention at all, and he holds that in

[a] *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 699.
[b] *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 174.

κλήρου γενομένου ⟨κατὰ τὴν ἐπίκλισιν⟩ [ἐν ἄλλῳ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίκλησιν]) ; κληρουμένου ἐν ἄλλω -g ; κλήρου γιγνομένου ἐνάλλως (ἐνἄλλως -Vat. Reg. 80) -all other mss. ; κλήρου γινομένου ἀδήλως -Pohlenz.
[11] ἐπίκλησιν -F[1], g, d, γ[1], n, B.
[12] δοῦναι δοῦναι -a.
[13] ἐπίκλησιν -F, g, d, n, B.
[14] οἷα -B ; οἷα -all other mss.
[15] ἑκάτῳ -a, A[1](a erased), Aldine.
[16] [. . .] -omitted by Basil. ; ὄντα -E ; εἶναι -all other mss.

(1045) ταῦτα τῇ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐπικλίσει[1] τῆς διανοίας οἴεται δεῖν τὴν αἵρεσιν ἀποκληρώσαντας· "οἷον" φησὶν "εἰ τῶν[2] δοκιμαζόντων τάσδε τινὰς δραχμὰς δύο ἐπὶ τοσόνδε οἱ μὲν τήνδε οἱ δὲ τήνδε φαῖεν εἶναι καλὴν δέοι δὲ μίαν[3] αὐτῶν λαβεῖν, τηνικαῦτ' ἀφ-
F ἑντες[4] τὸ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐπιζητεῖν ἣν ἔτυχε ληψόμεθα, κατ' ἄλλον[5] τινὰ ἀποκληρώσαντες αὐτὰς λόγον,[6] καὶ εἰ[7] μάλιστα τὴν μοχθηρὰν ληψόμεθα αὐτῶν." ἐν τούτοις ἄρ'[8] "ἀποκλήρωσις" καὶ "⟨τὸ⟩[9] ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐπικλῖνον τῆς διανοίας" [τὸ] ἄνευ[10] πάσης αἰτίας εἰσάγει[11] τῶν[12] ἀδιαφόρων[13] λῆψιν.[14]

24. Ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ[15] τῆς Διαλεκτικῆς,[16] ὑπειπὼν ὅτι Πλάτων ἐσπούδασε περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν

[1] ἐπικλήσει -F[1], g.
[2] εἰ τῶν -Emperius (*Op. Philol.*, p. 340); οἱ τῶν -mss.; ἡ τῶν -Aldine, Basil.; εἰ τραπεζιτῶν -Reiske; ἡμῶν -Wyttenbach.
[3] δέοι δὲ μίαν -Wyttenbach; δὲ οὐδεμίαν -mss.
[4] ἀφέντες -Reiske; ἀφέντας -g; ἀφέντα -all other mss.
[5] ἄδηλον -Wyttenbach.
[6] αὐτὰς λόγον -Wyttenbach; αὐτ . . . vac. 3 . . . λόγον -E; αὐτὰ ἔλεγε (or αὐτά· ἔλεγε) -all other mss.
[7] εἰ -Dübner; ἔτι -mss.; εἴγε -Wyttenbach.
[8] ἄρ' -H. C.; γὰρ -mss.
[9] ⟨τὸ⟩ -added by Reiske.
[10] [τὸ] ἄνευ -Wyttenbach; τὸ χωρὶς -g; τὸ ἄνευ -all other mss.; τὴν ἄνευ -Reiske.
[11] εἰσάγειν -g.
[12] τὴν -X[4corr.](τη superscript over ω), B.
[13] ἀδιαφόρων -Meziriac; διαφορῶν -mss.
[14] τὴν λῆψιν -n.
[15] περὶ -omitted by X[4], B.
[16] διαλεκτῆς -F[1](ϊκ superscript over τη -F[2]).

[a] ἐπὶ τοσόνδε . . . καλήν="fine to this extent," *i.e.* to the quantity of a drachma.

these we should make a random cast and leave the choice to the chance inclination of the mind: "for example," he says, "if of those assaying two given drachmas some should say that one is a sound drachma[a] and some that the other is and if we should have to take one of them, we would at that point give over further investigation and choosing from them at random according to some other principle would take whichever we chanced to, even at the risk of taking the bad one." With these notions, then, "random choice" and "the chance inclination of the mind," he introduces acceptance entirely without cause[b] of the things that are indifferent.[c]

24. In his third book concerning Dialectic[d] after remarking that dialectic was treated as a subject of serious concern by Plato and Aristotle and their

[b] If Wyttenbach's emendation in the preceding sentence (κατ' ἄδηλόν τινα) is correct, Chrysippus referred quite clearly to the αἰτίας ἀδήλους (1045 c *supra*) to which he is there said to have ascribed the apparently random impulses; but even with the text of the mss., κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ . . . λόγον, his statement here cannot fairly be called inconsistent with his explanation as there reported.

[c] Chrysippus was here speaking of the "middle class" or "zero grade" of ἀδιάφορα (see note *a* on 1047 E *infra*), matters of absolutely no moment (*n.b.* the use of λῆψις, for in Stoic terminology only the ἀδιάφορα κατὰ φύσιν are λητπά, whereas only the true ἀγαθά are αἱρετά): *cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 191 and iii, frags. 118-122, 131-132, and 142; Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 1068 A, 1070 A, 1071 A.

[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 126. The work here referred to is thought by von Arnim to be identical with that entitled περὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς πρὸς Ἀριστοκρέοντα (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 194, 35-37). For the importance attached to "dialectic" by Zeno and Chrysippus see 1034 E *supra* and *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 45 and 130.

(1045) καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ ⟨οἱ⟩[1] ἀπὸ τούτων ἄχρι Πολέ-
1046 μωνος καὶ Στράτωνος μάλιστα δὲ Σωκράτης καὶ ἐπιφωνήσας ὅτι καὶ συνεξαμαρτάνειν ἄν τις θελήσειε[2] τούτοις τοσούτοις καὶ τοιούτοις οὖσιν, ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν· " εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ παρέργου περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρήκεσαν, τάχ' ἄν τις διέσυρε τὸν τόπον τοῦτον· οὕτω δ' αὐτῶν[3] ἐπιμελῶς εἰρηκότων ὡς ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις δυνάμεσι καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάταις αὐτῆς οὔσης,[4] οὐ πιθανὸν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διαμαρτάνειν αὐτούς, ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις ὄντας οἵους ὑπονοοῦμεν." τί οὖν σύ, φήσαι τις ἄν, αὐτὸς ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις καὶ τοσούτοις οὐδέποτε παύσῃ μαχόμενος οὐδ' ἐλέγ-
B χων, ὡς νομίζεις, ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις καὶ μεγίστοις διαμαρτάνοντας; οὐ γὰρ δήπου περὶ μὲν διαλεκτικῆς[5] ἐσπουδασμένως ἔγραψαν, περὶ δ' ἀρχῆς καὶ τέλους καὶ θεῶν καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐκ παρέργου καὶ παίζοντες, ἐν οἷς τυφλὸν αὐτῶν ἀποκαλεῖς τὸν λόγον καὶ μαχόμενον αὑτῷ καὶ μυρίας ἄλλας ἁμαρτίας ἔχοντα.

25. Τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν ὅπου μὲν ἀνύπαρκτον[6] εἶναί φησιν, ἐπεὶ τῶν μὲν ἀστείων οὐδεὶς ἐπ' ἀλλο-

[1] ⟨οἱ⟩ -added by Wilamowitz ; καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων ⟨οἱ⟩ -Meziriac.

[2] ἐθελήσειε -g.

[3] αὐτοὺς -g[1](οὺς changed to ὧν -g[2]).

[4] αὐταῖς οὔσαις -g[2](αι superscript over η and η).

[5] περὶ μὲν διαλεκτικῆς -F, g ; μὲν omitted by all other MSS. ; περὶ δὲ ἀλεκτικῆς -a, A[1](?[ϊα of διαλεκτικῆς over erasure -A[2]]).

[6] ἂν ἀνύπαρκτον -γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5.

[a] Polemon of Athens, who in 315/14 succeeded Xenocrates as head of the Academy, died in the archonship of Philocrates (now dated 276/5 by B. D. Meritt) ; and Strato of

successors down to Polemon and Strato [a] and especially by Socrates and after exclaiming that one would be willing even to go wrong with so many men of such stature as these [b] he continues in so many words : " For, if it had been in passing that they spoke of the matter, one might perhaps have disparaged this subject [c] ; but, since they have taken such care to speak as if dialectic is among the greatest and most indispensable of capacities, it is not plausible that they, being on the whole such men as we surmise, are so utterly mistaken." Why then, one might say, will you never yourself stop quarreling [d] with so many men of such stature and convicting them, as you believe, of being utterly mistaken in the greatest and most important matters ? It is not the case, I presume, that, while they wrote of dialectic with serious concern, they wrote in passing and in jest of principle and goal and gods and justice, matters in which you stigmatize their discourse as being obscure, self-contradictory, and full of countless other faults.

25. In one place he says [e] that spiteful joy is nonexistent since no decent man has joy in another's

Lampsacus, who upon the death of Theophrastus (288/7 or 287/6) became head of the Peripatetic School, died between 270 and 268.

[b] *Cf.* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i, 39-40 (for a similar remark concerning Aristarchus the grammarian see *Scholia in Homeri Iliadem* IV, 235 = I, p. 182, 6-7 [Dindorf] = I, p. 493, 44-45 [Erbse]) ; and contrast Plato, *Republic* 595 c 2-3 and Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 14-17.

[c] Diogenes Laertius (vii, 39 = *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 37) says that the three parts of philosophy were called τόποι by Apollodorus but εἴδη by Chrysippus.

[d] *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 31.

[e] *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 672 (p. 168, 10-12).

(1046) *τρίοις κακοῖς*[1] *χαίρει* ⟨*τῶν δὲ φαύλων οὐδεὶς χαίρει*⟩[2] *τὸ παράπαν. ἐν δὲ τῷ*[3] *δευτέρῳ περὶ Ἀγαθοῦ*[4] *τὸν φθόνον ἐξηγησάμενος ὅτι λύπη ἐστὶν ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, ὡς δήποτε βουλομένων τα-*
C *πεινοῦν τοὺς πλησίον, ὅπως ὑπερέχωσιν αὐτοί,*[5] *συνάπτει* ⟨*ταύτῃ*⟩ *τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν*[6]*· "ταύτῃ*[7] *δὲ συνεχὴς ἡ ἐπιχαιρεκακία γίγνεται, ταπεινοὺς βουλομένων εἶναι τοὺς πλησίον διὰ τὰς ὁμοίας αἰτίας· καθ' ἑτέρας δὲ*[8] *φυσικὰς φορὰς*[9] *ἐκτρεπομένων, ὁ ἔλεος γίγνεται." δῆλος ἄρ'*[10] *ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν ὑπαρκτὴν ὥσπερ τὸν φθόνον καὶ τὸν ἔλεον*[11] *ἀπολιπών, ἣν*[12] *ἐν ἑτέροις ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναί φησιν ὥσπερ τὴν μισοπονηρίαν καὶ τὴν αἰσχροκέρδειαν.*

26. *Ἐν πολλοῖς εἰρηκὼς ὅτι παρὰ τὸν*[13] *πλείονα χρόνον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἀλλὰ*

[1] *κακοῖς* -omitted by g.
[2] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by Meziriac.
[3] *δὲ τῷ* -omitted by F[1](added superscript -F[2]).
[4] *τἀγαθοῦ* -g.
[5] *ὑπερέχωσι καὶ αὐτοὶ* -X[4].
[6] ⟨*ταύτῃ*⟩ *τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν* -H. C.; *ἐπὶ τῆς χαιρεκακίας* -F[1](*τῇ*[?] superscript over *ἐπὶ*, *τῆς* cancelled, *ν* superscript over final *ς* -F[2]); *τὰ τῆς ἐπιχαιρεκακίας* -g; *τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν* -all other MSS.
[7] *ταύτης* -F, a, A[1](?[erasure after *η*]).
[8] *δὲ* -omitted by g.
[9] *διαφορὰς* -g.
[10] *ἄρ'* -Pohlenz; *γὰρ* -MSS.
[11] *τὸν φθόνον καὶ τὸν ἔλεον* -E[2]; *τὸν ἔλεον καὶ τὸν φθόνον* -g; *φθόνον καὶ τὸν ἔλεον* -all other MSS.
[12] *ὃν* -n.
[13] *ὅτι τὸν παρὰ* -F[1](corrected F[2]).

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 434 (especially pp. 95, 33–96, 3) = Dionysius of Heraclea reported by Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iii, 19.
[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 435 and 671.
[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 418. At 1048 A *infra* and *De Comm.*

ills [a] ⟨and no base man has joy⟩ at all [b]; but in the second book concerning Good [c] he explains envy as grief for another's goods, taking it to be felt by people who desire their neighbours' abasement in order to be superior themselves, and then ⟨with this grief⟩ he connects spiteful joy: "And conjoined with this grief spiteful joy occurs when people through similar causes desire their neighbours to be abased; and, when they are diverted along the line of other natural tendencies, there occurs pity." [d] Here, then, he has clearly admitted that like envy and pity spiteful joy has existence, though in other places he says [e] that like hatred of evil and covetousness it is non-existent.

26. Although in many passages he has said [f] that the happy are no more happy for being longer happy

Not. 1070 D what is presumably the same work is called *περὶ Ἀγαθῶν.*
[d] Pity like *φθόνος* is according to the Stoics a species of *λύπη* (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 412-416). For *φορά* *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 169: *τὴν δὲ ὁρμὴν εἶναι φορὰν ψυχῆς ἐπί τι κατὰ τὸ γένος.*
[e] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 672 (p. 168, 13-14). Different defences of Chrysippus against this charge of self-contradiction are attempted by C. Giesen (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 91) and E. B. Stevens (*A.J.P.*, lxix [1948], p. 186). In fact, Chrysippus by his arguments against the "existence" of *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*, *μισοπονηρία*, and *αἰσχροκέρδεια* probably meant not to deny the existence of the emotions commonly so designated but rather to impugn the designations themselves as self-contradictory and strictly meaningless.
[f] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 54 (p. 14, 5-7). *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1062 A; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, 7, 11g (pp. 98, 17–99, 2 [Wachsmuth]); Themistius, *Oratio* viii, 101 d (these three passages printed as parts of *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 54); Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 45-48; Seneca, *De Beneficiis* v, 17, 6 and *Epistle* lxxxv, 20–23; Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 198-205.

(1046) ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπίσης τοῖς τὸν ἀμερῆ χρόνον[1] εὐδαιμονίας μετασχοῦσιν, ἐν πολλοῖς πάλιν εἴρηκεν ὡς
D οὐδὲ[2] τὸν δάκτυλον καθήκει προτεῖναι χάριν ἀμεριαίας φρονήσεως καθάπερ[3] ἀστραπῆς διιπταμένης.[4] ἀρκέσει δὲ παραθεῖναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν Ζητημάτων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων· ὑπειπὼν γὰρ ὡς οὔτε πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίσης[5] εἰς χαρὰν πίπτει οὔτε πᾶν κατόρθωμα εἰς σεμνολογίαν ἐπενήνοχε ταῦτα· " καὶ γάρ, εἰ μόνον μέλλοι ἀμερῆ χρόνον ἢ τὸν ἔσχατον ἕξειν φρόνησιν, οὐδ' ἂν τὸν δάκτυλον καθήκοι[6] ἐκτεῖναι ἕνεκα τῆς οὕτω παρεσομένης φρονήσεως," καίπερ παρὰ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονούντων οὐδὲ τῆς ἀιδίου εὐδαιμονίας αἱρετωτέρας γιγνομένης[7]
E παρὰ τὴν ἀμεριαίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν φρόνησιν ἡγεῖτο[8] ποιητικὸν εἶναι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀγαθὸν[9] ὥσπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, αὐτῆς ἔδει μόνον τῆς ἀτοπίας καὶ παραδοξολογίας ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ δόγματος· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κατ' αὐτὸν[10] ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονία, πῶς οὐ μάχεται τὸ λέγειν ἐπίσης μὲν αἱρετὴν[11] εἶναι τὴν ἀμεριαίαν

[1] After χρόνον g has οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονοῦσι repeated from the previous line but dotted for deletion.
[2] οὐδὲ -F, g ; οὐδὲν -all other MSS. ; οὐδ' ἄν with καθήκοι -Wyttenbach.
[3] φρονήσεως καὶ καθάπερ -F, g.
[4] διερχομένης -g.
[5] ἐπίσης -omitted by g.
[6] καθήκει -B.
[7] γενομένης -A, β, γ, E, n.
[8] ἡγοῖτο -g.
[9] ἀγαθὸν -g ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν -all other MSS. ; τὸ deleted by Reiske ; τι ἀγαθὸν -Usener.
[10] κατ' αὐτὸν -g ; καθ' αὐτὸν -F[1](ν erased -F[2]), n ; καθ' αὐτὸ -all other MSS.

but are happy in the same manner and degree as those who have had happiness for an instant, yet again in many places he has said [a] that one ought not even to extend a finger for the sake of prudence that is momentary like a fleeting flash of lightning. It will suffice to cite what he has written on this matter in the sixth book of the Moral Questions, for after remarking that neither does joy apply to every good in the same degree nor glorification to every right action [b] he has proceeded as follows : " For in fact, if it should be that a man would get prudence for only an instant or for his final moment, it would not behoove him even to stretch out his finger on account of such possession of prudence," —and yet the happy are supposedly no more happy for being longer happy and everlasting happiness when compared with that which is momentary turns out not to be more an object of choice. Now, if he had held prudence to be a good productive of happiness, as Epicurus did,[c] only the mere absurdity and paradoxicality of the doctrine would have had to be attacked ; but, since prudence according to him [d] is not different from happiness but is happiness, how is it other than inconsistent to say that momentary happiness is an object of choice in the same degree

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 210 (p. 50, 18-26). *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1062 A (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 50, 27-30) ; Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, p. 201, n. 7.
[b] *Cf.* 1038 E—1039 D *supra.*
[c] Frag. 515 (Usener, *Epicurea*, pp. 316-317, where *Alexandri Libri De Anima Mantissa*, p. 160, 4 [Bruns] is also given) ; *cf.* Epicurus, *Epistle* iii, 132 and K. Δ. v.
[d] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 53.

[11] αἱρετὴν -g[2](in margin and ι superscript over α in text) ; ἀρετὴν -all other MSS.

(1046) εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἀίδιον, μηδενὸς δ'[1] ἀξίαν τὴν ἀμεριαίαν;

27. Τὰς ἀρετάς φασιν[2] ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα[3] πάσας ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τὸν κατὰ μίαν[4] ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ[5] πάσας ἐνεργεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ[6] ἄνδρα φασὶ[7] τέλειον
F εἶναι[8] τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετὰς οὔτε πρᾶξιν τελείαν ἥτις οὐ κατὰ πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετάς. ἀλλὰ μὴν[9] ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν Ζητημάτων ὁ Χρύσιππος οὐκ ἀεί φησιν[10] ἀνδρίζεσθαι τὸν ἀστεῖον οὐδὲ δειλαίνειν τὸν φαῦλον, ὡς δέον
1047 ἐν[11] φαντασίαις ἐπιφερομένων τινῶν τὸν[12] μὲν ἐμμένειν τοῖς κρίμασι τὸν δ' ἀφίστασθαι, πιθανὸν δέ φησι μηδ'[13] ἀκολασταίνειν ἀεὶ τὸν φαῦλον. εἴπερ οὖν τὸ ἀνδρίζεσθαι τοιοῦτόν[14] ἐστιν οἷον[15] ἀνδρείᾳ χρῆσθαι καὶ[16] τὸ δειλαίνειν οἷον δειλίᾳ χρῆσθαι, μαχόμενα λέγουσι λέγοντες κατὰ πάσας μὲν ἅμα

[1] δ' -omitted by g.
[2] φασιν -F, g, E ; φησιν -all other MSS.
[3] τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα -g ; τὴν μίαν ἔχοντα -B, Tolet. 51, 5, Basil. ; τὴν μίαν ἔχοντι -all other MSS., Aldine.
[4] τὸν βίον -g. [5] τὰς -X[4].
[6] γὰρ -g, omitted by all other MSS.
[7] φησὶ -d.
[8] εἶναι -omitted by g. [9] καὶ -g.
[10] φησιν -F, g, E ; φασιν -all other MSS.
[11] ὡς δὲ ἐν -Wyttenbach ; ὡς δεινῶν -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 668) ; ὡς δεῶν ἐν -Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, XXXV [1941], p. 115) ; ὡς δὲ ‹ὄντα τοιοῦτ›ον ἐν . . . δεινῶν (instead of τινῶν) -Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 11, n. 3) ; ὡς δέον δεινῶν -R. G. Bury.
[12] τῶν -g (corrected in margin).
[13] μὴ -g.
[14] τοιοῦτον -F, g, *a* ; τοῦτο -all other MSS.
[15] οἷα -X[4].
[16] καὶ τὸ . . . δειλίᾳ χρῆσθαι -omitted by g.

as that which is everlasting and yet that momentary happiness is worthless?

27. They say [a] that the virtues imply one another not only in the sense that he who has one has all but also in the sense that he who performs any act in accordance with one does so in accordance with all, for they say that neither is a man perfect if he have not all the virtues nor a deed perfect which is not done in accordance with all the virtues. But now in the sixth book of the Moral Questions Chrysippus says [b] that the decent man is not always being courageous or the base man cowardly, the necessary condition being that when there are certain presentations in mental images the former abide by his resolutions and the latter recoil [c]; and it is plausible, he says, that the base man is not always being intemperate either. If then being courageous amounts to exerting courage and being cowardly to exerting cowardice, they make conflicting statements when they say that he who has virtues or

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 299. For the doctrine *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 557 ; Diogenes Laertius, vii, 125-126 (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 295) ; Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i, 68 ; *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 349 and iii, frag. 275. With *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 302 and 310 (from Olympiodorus and Proclus) *cf.* Albinus, *Epitome* xxix, 3-4 (pp. 143-145 [Louis]=pp. 182, 30–183, 14 [Hermann]). Plutarch has already raised difficulties (1034 C-D and 1041 A-B) about the Stoic theories concerning the unity of virtue and the interrelation of the virtues, which like the vices are according to the Stoics' real entities (1042 E-F *supra*, *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 305-307 [with all of Seneca, *Epistle* cxiii]).

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 243.

[c] *Cf.* Aulus Gellius, XIX, i, 15-20=Epictetus, frag. 9 (*L.C.L.* ii, pp. 448-452) ; *S.V.F* ii, frag. 988 (p. 288, 7-35) and iii, frags. 63 (p. 16, 1-12), 64 (p. 16, 13-24), 229 a (p. 55, 7-11), 394 (p. 95, 38-41), and 473 (p. 123, 9-12 and 28-33).

(1047) τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἔχοντα,[1] μὴ ἀεὶ δὲ τὸν ἀστεῖον[2] ἀνδρίζεσθαι μηδὲ δειλαίνειν τὸν φαῦλον.

28. Τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὁρίζεται[3] τέχνην περὶ κόσμον[4] εἰρομένου λόγου καὶ[5] τάξιν· ἔτι δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ[6] ταῦτα γέγραφεν· "οὐ μόνον δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου καὶ ἀφελοῦς κόσμου δεῖν οἴομαι ἐπιστρέφεσθαι ⟨ἀλλὰ⟩ κἀπὶ τῷ λόγῳ[7] καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὑποκρίσεων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβαλλούσας τάσεις[8]
B τῆς φωνῆς καὶ σχηματισμοὺς τοῦ τε προσώπου καὶ τῶν χειρῶν." οὕτω δέ τις φιλότιμος ἐνταῦθα περὶ τὸν λόγον[9] γενόμενος πάλιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ βιβλίῳ, περὶ τῆς τῶν φωνηέντων συγκρούσεως ὑπειπών,[10] οὐ

[1] τὸν ἔχοντα ⟨μίαν⟩ -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], pp. 104-105).
[2] ἀστεῖον -F, g ; ἀνδρεῖον -all other MSS.
[3] With ζεται the first hand of X begins again (f. 150 recto). See 1045 B *supra*.
[4] κόσμον -Xylander ; κόσμου -g (υ made from ν [?]) and all other MSS.
[5] εἰρομένου λόγου καὶ -Wyttenbach (καὶ εἰρομένου λόγου -Meziriac) ; καὶ εἰρημένου (καὶ . . . vac. 2 . . . ρημένου -E) λόγου -MSS.
[6] καὶ -X, g ; omitted by all other MSS.
[7] ⟨ἀλλὰ⟩ κἀπὶ τῷ λόγῳ -Sandbach (privately communicated, 1955) ; κἀπὶ (κἀπὸ -γ, E, n) τῶν λόγων ᾧ -MSS. ; κἀπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀλλὰ -Xylander.
[8] τάσεις -X, g, B ; στάσεις -all other MSS.
[9] περὶ τὸν (λόγον omitted) -α, A[1] ; καὶ περιττὸς -A[2], β, γ, E, n.
[10] ἐπειπὼν -X, g, B.

[a] τὴν ῥητορικὴν . . . καὶ τῶν χειρῶν (1047 B) = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 297. In 1034 B *supra* Plutarch cited the περὶ Ῥητορικῆς of Chrysippus, which is assumed to be identical with his περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς πρὸς Διοσκουρίδην in 4 books (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 9, 36 and iii, p. 203, 29-37).

vices acts in accordance with all of them at once and yet that the decent man is not always being courageous and the base man cowardly.

28. Rhetoric, he defines[a] as an art concerned with the order or arrangement of continuous speech[b] ; and in his first book, moreover, he has even written as follows : "I think that attention must be given not only to unconstrained and smooth order ⟨but⟩ also besides the speech even to the kinds of delivery suitable according to the appropriate modulations of the voice and expressions or gestures of the countenance and hands."[c] Yet, after having thus been a zealot for speech in this passage, in the same book again,[d] when he has mentioned the matter of

[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* i, p. 22, 2-3 and 8-9 ; *S.V.F.* ii, p. 18, 24 and p. 95, 33-34 ; Alexander, *Topics*, p. 5, 7-13 ; and especially Seneca, *Epistle* lxxxix, 17. For κόσμος *cf.* Philodemus, *Rhetorica* ii, p. 274, 7-9 (Sudhaus) : οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν συντάξεων ἔμφασις κόσμου τις ἦν.

[c] For delivery, recognized by the Stoics as a part of rhetoric (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 295), see besides Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1403 b 21—1404 a 19) especially Theophrastus as cited by Athanasius (*Prolegomenon Sylloge*, p. 177, 3-8 [Rabe]), Longinus (*Rhetores Graeci* i/2, pp. 194, 21–197, 12 [Spengel-Hammer]), and [Cicero], *Ad Herennium* i, 3 and iii, 19-27 (with the notes of H. Caplan, *L.C.L.*, pp. 6 and 188-204) ; *cf.* also W. Kroll, *R.-E.*, Suppl. vii (1940), col. 1075, 23-61. τάσεις τῆς φωνῆς, which sometimes means specifically the "pitch," *i.e.* the "accents" (*cf.* Dionysius Hal., *De Comp. Verb.* xix, 133 = p. 86, 18 [Usener-Radermacher]), may include also the quantities and aspirations (*cf. Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam*, p. 131, 25-30 [Hilgard] ; Philo Judaeus, *Legum Alleg.* i, §§ 14-15). For σχηματισμούς *cf.* Dionysius Hal., *De Vi Dic. in Demosthene* liv, 1120 (p. 246, 3 [Usener-Radermacher]) and Plutarch, *Demosthenes* ix, 2 (850 A).

[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 298.

(1047) μόνον φησὶ ταῦτα παρετέον τοῦ βελτίονος ἐχομένους ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιὰς ἀσαφείας καὶ ἐλλείψεις καὶ νὴ Δία σολοικισμούς, ἐφ' οἷς ἄλλοι ἂν αἰσχυνθείησαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι. τὸ δὴ ποτὲ μὲν ἄχρι χειρῶν καὶ στόματος εὐπρεπείας ἐπιχωρεῖν τοῖς λέγουσιν ἐν κόσμῳ τὸν λόγον[1] διατίθεσθαι ποτὲ δὲ μήτ' ἐλλείψεων ἐπιστρέφεσθαι καὶ ἀσαφειῶν μήτε σολοικίζοντας αἰσχύνεσθαι[2] τελέως ὅ τι ἂν ἐπίῃ[3] λέγοντός ἐστιν.

C 29. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Φυσικαῖς Θέσεσι περὶ τῶν ἐμπειρίας καὶ ἱστορίας δεομένων διακελευσάμενος τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν ἂν[4] μή τι κρεῖττον καὶ ἐναργέστερον ἔχωμεν λέγειν, "ἵνα" φησὶ "μήτε Πλάτωνι παραπλησίως ὑπονοήσωμεν τὴν μὲν ὑγρὰν τροφὴν εἰς τὸν πλεύμονα[5] φέρεσθαι τὴν δὲ ξηρὰν εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν μήθ' ἕτερα παραπλήσια γεγονότα τούτοις

[1] τὸν λόγον -omitted by E.
[2] σολοικίζοντος (αἰσχύνεσθαι omitted) -g.
[3] ἐπίῃ -Reiske; εἴποι (with τύχι superscript) -B; εἴπῃ -all other MSS.
[4] ἂν . . . ἵνα -omitted by F, α, A, β, γ, E, n.
[5] πλεύμονα -F, X[1]; πνεύμονα -X[3] and all other MSS.

[a] *Cf.* Plutarch, *De Gloria Atheniensium* 350 E and *De Vitioso Pudore* 534 F; Demetrius, *De Elocutione* 68-74 (Theophrastus, Περὶ Λέξεως *Libri Fragmenta* coll. A. Mayer, pp. 122-124); F. Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, ii (1892), pp. 139-144.

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 763.

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 548 (p. 147, 20-21): οὐδ' ὑπονοεῖν δέ φασι τὸν σοφόν· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἀκαταλήπτῳ εἶναι τῷ γένει συγκατάθεσιν. Observe that in the present passage "surmise" is contrasted to that conception which because of its "clarity" (ἐναργέστερον) is according to Chrysippus worth maintaining. For the Stoic "advocacy" of ἐνάργεια and its relation to their theory of κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι see *De Comm. Not.* 1083 C and 1074 B *infra*; and *cf.* Sandbach in *Cl. Quart.*, xxiv (1930), pp. 50-51, who argues that the Stoics adopted the term from the Epicureans.

hiatus,[a] he says that we must hold fast to what is better and disregard not only this matter but also certain kinds of obscurities and ellipses and—yes, by heaven—solecisms, of which not a few other people would be ashamed. Now really, at one time to concede to speakers the orderly disposition of their speech even as far as the decorum of hands and mouth and at another to concede neither attention to ellipses and obscurities nor shame for the commission of solecisms, this is the mark of a man who says absolutely anything that may come into his head.

29. In the Physical Propositions [b] he has exhorted us to be quiet about matters requiring scientific experience and research if we have not something of greater force and clarity to say, "in order," he says, "not to make surmises [c] either like Plato's that the liquid nourishment goes to the lungs [d] and the dry to the belly or other errors that there have been like

[d] *Timaeus* 70 C-D and 91 A. The theory is refuted by Aristotle (*Part. Animal.* 664 b 6-19) and by the author of chap. 56 of the Hippocratic Περὶ νούσων iv (vii, pp. 604-608 [Littré]); it is discussed at length and Plato is defended in Plutarch's *Quaest. Conviv.* 698 A—700 B (*cf.* Aulus Gellius, XVII, xi and Macrobius, *Sat.* VII, xv). Galen observes (*De Placitis Hippoc. et Plat.* viii, 9 = pp. 721-728 [Mueller]) that elsewhere in the *Timaeus* (70 D-E, 72 E, 78 A-B, 78 E—79 A) drink as well as food is said to go to the belly; and so he would take Plato to mean that only a small part of the liquid drunk goes to the lungs, the theory which is found in the Hippocratic Περὶ καρδίης § 2 (ix, pp. 81-82 [Littré]; *cf.* G. Leboucq, *Rev. Ét. Grecques* lvii, [1944], pp. 23-25) and Περὶ ὀστέων φύσιος, § 13 (ix, pp. 184-186 [Littré]) and which Galen himself here defends (*cf.* Galeni *In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii Fragmenta* ed. H. O. Schröder [Teubner, 1934], p. 17, 31 ff.). See also M. Wellmann, *Die Fragmente der Sikelischen Ärzte* (Berlin, 1901), pp. 98-102 and pp. 112-113 (= Philistion, frag. 7).

(1047) διαπτώματα." δοκῶ δὴ τὸ ἐγκαλεῖν ἑτέροις εἶτα περιπίπτειν αὐτὸν οἷς ἐγκαλεῖ καὶ[1] μὴ φυλάττεσθαι τῶν ἐναντιωμάτων μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ τῶν διαπτωμάτων αἴσχιστον. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸς τὰς διὰ δέκα ἀξιωμάτων συμπλοκὰς πλήθει φησὶν ὑπερβάλλειν ἑκατὸν μυριάδας οὔτε δι' αὐτοῦ ζητήσας
D ἐπιμελῶς οὔτε διὰ τῶν ἐμπείρων τἀληθὲς ἱστορήσας. καίτοι Πλάτων μὲν ἔχει τῶν ἰατρῶν τοὺς ἐνδοξοτάτους μαρτυροῦντας, Ἱπποκράτην Φιλιστίωνα Διώξιππον τὸν Ἱπποκράτειον,[2] καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Εὐριπίδην Ἀλκαῖον Εὔπολιν Ἐρατοσθένην, λέγοντας ὅτι τὸ[3] ποτὸν διὰ τοῦ πλεύμονος[4] διέξεισι· Χρύσιππον δὲ πάντες ἐλέγχουσιν οἱ ἀριθμητικοί, ὧν καὶ Ἵππαρχός ἐστιν ἀποδεικνύων τὸ διάπτωμα τοῦ λογισμοῦ παμμέγεθες αὐτῷ γεγονός,[5] εἴγε τὸ μὲν καταφατικὸν ποιεῖ συμπεπλεγμένων ἀξιωμάτων μυριάδας δέκα καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τρισχίλια τεσσαράκοντα ἐννέα τὸ δ' ἀποφατικὸν �εναE κόσια[6] πεντήκοντα δύο πρὸς τριάκοντα καὶ μιᾷ μυριάσι.

[1] καὶ defended by Castiglioni (*Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 83) against deletion by Pohlenz.

[2] ἱπποκράτιον -F^1 and X^1 (ι changed to ει in both).

[3] τὸ -F, X, g, a, B ; τὸν -all other MSS.

[4] πλεύμονος -H. C. (*cf.* 1047 c *supra*) ; πνεύμονος -MSS.

[5] γεγονός -X^3(erasure of 2 letters between ο and ς), g, B ; γεγονότος -all other MSS.

[6] Corrected by Pohlenz ; ἐννακόσια -MSS.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 210 ; *cf. Quaest. Conviv.* 732 F.

[b] Quotations from these four poets and from Homer are given, and the physicians Philistion, Hippocrates, and Dioxippus are cited in *Quaest. Conviv.* 698 A—700 B to support Plato's statement in the *Timaeus*. The MSS. there (except T^1: καὶ ὠξιππον) like those here all read διώξιππον (so

this." Well really I think that to lodge complaints against others and then to fall oneself into the errors of which one complains and not to be on one's guard is the height of self-contradiction and the most shameful of errors. But now he says himself[a] that the number of conjunctions produced by means of ten propositions exceeds a million, though he had neither investigated the matter carefully by himself nor sought out the truth with the help of experts. Yet, while Plato has testifying for him the most renowned of physicians—Hippocrates, Philistion, Dioxippus the Hippocratic—and among the poets Euripides, Alcaeus, Eupolis, Eratosthenes,[b] who say that what is drunk passes through the lungs, Chrysippus is refuted by all the arithmeticians, among them Hipparchus himself who proves that his error in calculation is enormous if in fact affirmation gives 103,049 conjoined propositions and negation 310,952.[c]

also Aulus Gellius, XVII, xi, 6) ; but this is changed to Δέξιππον by M. Wellmann (*Die Fragmente der Sikelischen Ärzte*, p. 112, no. 7 and *R.-E.* v [1903], col. 294, 6 ff.).

[c] *Scil.* " as Hipparchus says they do " ; *i.e.* εἴγε . . . expresses Plutarch's own cautious reservation about the results of the calculations, which—with the variant χίλια for τρισχίλια here (*i.e.* 101,049 instead of 103,049)—he says in *Quaest. Conviv.* 732 F Hipparchus " demonstrated." In Stoic logic a proposition (ἀξίωμα) is either " atomic " (ἁπλοῦν) or " molecular " (οὐχ ἁπλοῦν) and a " conjunction " (συμπλοκή or συμπεπλεγμένον <ἀξίωμα>) is a molecular proposition produced by joining atomic propositions by means of the connective καί, while " negation " (ἀποφατικόν) is a proposition to which the negative οὐκ has been prefixed and " affirmation " (καταφατικόν) is a proposition without the prefix οὐκ (*cf.* Mates, *Stoic Logic*, pp. 27-33 and the Glossary, pp. 132-136). These technical Stoic definitions should have been assumed by Hipparchus if his calculations were supposed to refute Chrysippus (though the latter may himself have

(1047) 30. Τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τινὲς ἃ τῷ τὸν ὀξίνην ἔχοντι συνέβαινε μήθ' ὡς ὄξος ἀποδόσθαι δυναμένῳ[1] μήθ' ὡς οἶνον ἔφασαν τῷ Ζήνωνι συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ προηγμένον[2] αὐτῷ μήθ' ὡς ἀγαθὸν μήθ' ὡς ἀδιάφορον[3] ἔχειν διάθεσιν. ἀλλ' ὁ[4] Χρύσιππος ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ πρᾶγμα δυσδιάθετον πεποίηκεν· ὁτὲ μὲν γάρ φησι[5] μαίνεσθαι τοὺς τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν ἀπονίαν καὶ τὴν ὁλοκληρίαν τοῦ σώματος ἐν[6] μηδενὶ ποιουμένους μηδ' ἀντεχομένους τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ[7] παραθέμενος[8] τὰ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου " ἐργάζευ, Πέρση, δῖον γένος " ἐπι-

[1] δυναμένων -F[1], X[1](final ν erased in both).
[2] προηγούμενον -B. After τὸ both F and X have an asterisk and in the margin in the first hand of each a scholium which is out of place, referring as it does to τὴν μὲν ὑγρὰν τροφὴν κτλ. in 1047 c *supra* (*cf.* Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 4 and Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2, p. iv).
[3] ἀδιάφορον -X[3](first α added superscript), g; διάφορον -all other MSS.
[4] ὁ -omitted by g.
[5] φασι -F, X[1], α, A, β, γ, n.
[6] ἐν -omitted by X[1], F, α, A[1].
[7] ὁτὲ δὲ -B; καὶ -all other MSS.
[8] παραθεμένους -n.

used συμπλοκή non-technically in the context criticized); but, whether they were or not, his calculations must themselves have been methodical and serious, for this Hipparchus is certainly Hipparchus of Nicaea in Bithynia (*ca.* 194–120 B.C.), the astronomer whom Plutarch mentions in several other places (*De Pythiae Oraculis* 402 F, *De Facie* 921 D, *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1094 c) and who was celebrated for his industry and accuracy. Nevertheless, how he could have obtained the results which Plutarch records or any approximation to them remains, so far as I know, an unsolved mystery (*cf.* A. Rome, *Annales de la Société Scientifique de Bruxelles*, 1 [1930], *Série A, Sciences Mathématiques*, pp. 101-104; K. R. Biermann and J. Mau, *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, xxiii [1958], pp. 129-132).

30. It was said by some in earlier times that Zeno was in the predicament of the man with wine gone sour which he could sell neither as vinegar nor as wine, for there is no disposing of Zeno's " promoted " either as good or as indifferent.[a] Chrysippus, however, has made the disposition of the matter still more difficult. For at one time he says[b] that they are raving mad who set at nought wealth and health and painlessness and soundness of body and do not hold on to[c] such things and, quoting the words of Hesiod, " Perses, noble of race, keep labouring,"[d]

[a] Among the ἀδιάφορα Zeno and after him Chrysippus distinguished from what is of absolutely no moment (*cf.* 1045 E-F *supra*) two classes, τὰ μέσα κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φύσιν (*cf.* 1042 D *supra*), which were called respectively προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα (*cf. S.V.F.* i, frags. 191-196 and iii, frags. 127-139 and especially Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 50-54 and Diogenes Laertius, vii, 104-107). These terms, which Cicero found impossible to translate adequately, are often rendered in English by " preferred " and " unpreferred " (or " rejected "); but such words are likely to be misleading, for the προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα are incommensurable with good and evil and so are not objects of choice and avoidance (*cf.* Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, pp. 108-126; Kilb, *Ethische Grundbegriffe*, pp. 64-91; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 121-123 and ii, pp. 69-70). Ariston of Chios (see 1034 D *supra*) rejected the distinction made among ἀδιάφορα (*S.V.F.* i, frags. 351 and 360-362). To him, therefore, Dyroff (*op. cit.*, p. 115) ascribed the bon mot at Zeno's expense which Plutarch here reproduces; but Pohlenz suggests that Arcesilaus was its author, and Festa (*Stoici Antichi* i, p. 65) calls it " probably Academic." The phrase ἔχειν διάθεσιν is a pun, of course, meaning " to be marketable " and " to be in a (certain) condition."

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 138. With τὸν πλοῦτον . . . τὴν ὁλοκληρίαν here *cf.* τοῦ ζῆν . . . ὁλοκληρίας in 1041 E *supra*.

[c] *Cf.* ἀντέχεσθαι (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 34, 36) and Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik* . . ., pp. 170 and 234.

[d] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 299.

(1047) πεφώνηκεν ὅτι τἀναντία παραινεῖν μανικόν[1] ἐστι,
F τὸ "μὴ ἐργάζου,[2] Πέρση, δῖον γένος." καὶ τὸν
μὲν σοφὸν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Βίων καὶ βασιλεῦσι συν-
έσεσθαι[3] φησιν ἕνεκα χρηματισμοῦ καὶ σοφιστεύ-
σειν[4] ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ, παρ' ὧν μὲν προλαμβάνοντα
πρὸς οὓς δὲ συντιθέμενον τῶν μαθητῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ
ἑβδόμῳ τοῦ[5] Καθήκοντος καὶ κυβιστήσειν[6] τρὶς ἐπὶ
1048 τούτῳ[7] λαβόντα τάλαντον.[8] ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ
Ἀγαθῶν τρόπον τινὰ συγχωρεῖ καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς
βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα[9] καλεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ
τἀναντία ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσιν· "εἴ τις[10] βούλεται
κατὰ[11] τὰς τοιαύτας παραλλαγὰς τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐ-
τῶν[12] λέγειν τὸ δὲ κακόν,[13] ἐπὶ ταῦτα[14] φερόμενος τὰ
πράγματα καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ἀποπλανώμενος,[15] ⟨ἀπο-
δεκτέον ὡς⟩[16] ἐν μὲν τοῖς σημαινομένοις οὐ δια-
πίπτοντος[17] αὐτοῦ τὰ δ' ἄλλα[18] στοχαζομένου τῆς
κατὰ τὰς ὀνομασίας συνηθείας." οὕτω δὲ τὸ προ-

[1] ἀνάγκη -g. [2] ἐργάζευ -g.
[3] συνέσθαι -g ; συνέθεσθαι -Vat. Reg. 80.
[4] σοφιστεύειν -X, g, B, Vat. Reg. 80. [5] ⟨περὶ⟩ τοῦ -Pohlenz.
[6] κυβίστειν -B. [7] τοῦτο -F, α, A, β, γ, n, E.
[8] τάλαντα -X[1](? [—ον over erasure -X[3]]), g.
[9] προηγούμενα -B ; προειρημένα -Vat. Reg. 80.
[10] ⟨ἔξεστιν⟩ εἴ τις -Wyttenbach ; ⟨ἔστιν⟩ εἴ τις -Dübner.
[11] κατὰ -F, X, g, α, B; κακὰ -all other MSS.
[12] αὐτῶν -X[3](ῶν over erasure), g, B, Marc. 248 ; αὐτῶ(ι) -all other MSS.
[13] τὸ δὲ κακὸν -X[3](after erasure of 10 letters), g, B ; τὸ δὲ κακὸν (κακὰ -F[1]) τὸ δὲ κακὸν -F[2], α, A, β, γ, n, E.
[14] ἐπ' αὐτὰ -Reiske; ἐπί γ' αὐτὰ -Wyttenbach; ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ φερόμενος [τὰ] -A. Rüstow (*Der Lügner*, p. 80).
[15] καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ἀποπλανώμενος -omitted by g.
[16] ⟨ἀποδεκτέον ὡς⟩ -added by Sandbach ; ⟨ἀποδεχόμεθ' ὡς⟩ -von Arnim ; ⟨οὐ καταγνωστέον⟩ -Pohlenz.
[17] διαπίπτοντος -X, g, A[corr.], B ; διαπίπτοντα -all other MSS.
[18] ἄλλα -X[3](α over erasure), g, B ; ἄλλως -all other MSS.

he has exclaimed that it is mad to recommend the contrary, "Labour not, Perses, noble of race"; in the books on Ways of Living he says [a] that the sage will both live with kings for the sake of profit and give lectures for money, from some of his pupils collecting his fee in advance and with others making a contract for it, and in the seventh book of Duty [b] that the sage will even turn three somersaults if he gets a talent for it; and in the first book concerning Goods he gives way in a sense to those who wish to call the "promoted" things goods and their contraries evils and grants the point in these words [c]: "If one in conformity with such distinctions wishes to use the designation 'good' for the one class of them and the designation 'evil' for the other, provided that these are the objects intended by his reference and it is not a random aberration, ⟨it must be accepted on the ground that⟩ in the matter of the significates he is not in error and for the rest is aiming at the customary linguistic usage." [d] Yet,

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 693 (p. 174, 21-24); *cf.* 1043 c-E and 1043 F—1044 A *supra*. [b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 688.

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 137; *cf.* I. G. Kidd, *Class. Quart.*, N.S. v (1955), 188-189.

[d] In this sentence κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας παραλλαγάς has usually been taken to mean "by such a change of terminology"; but Chrysippus here permits the use of ἀγαθόν and κακόν instead of προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον only on condition that the distinctions signified by the latter pair are not thereby obscured, and this is clearly expressed only if παραλλαγάς refers not to the terminological variation but to the distinctions in the significates that Ariston denied (. . . μηδὲ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα [*S.V.F.* i, p. 79, 8]). ταῦτα τὰ πράγματα does not mean external entities or events but is identical with τὰ σημαινόμενα, the significates, which the Stoics also called λεκτά and which, being incorporeal (whereas τὰ σημαίνοντα, the signs such as vocal

(1048) ηγμένον[1] τἀγαθῷ[2] συναγαγὼν ἐγγὺς ἐνταῦθα καὶ συμμίξας, ἐν ἑτέροις πάλιν οὐδὲν εἶναί φησι τούτων καθόλου πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ἀποσπᾶν τὸν λόγον
B ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀποστρέφειν ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ[3] περὶ τοῦ Προτρέπεσθαι γέγραφεν, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως μακαρίζεσθαί φησιν ἐνίους βασιλεύοντας καὶ πλουτοῦντας ὅμοιον εἰ χρυσαῖς ἀμίσι χρώμενοι καὶ χρυσοῖς κρασπέδοις ἐμακαρίζοντο τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ τὸ[4] τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν οἱονεὶ δραχμὴν[5] ἀποβαλεῖν καὶ τὸ νοσῆσαι[6] οἷον προσκόψαι. διὸ τῶν ἐναντιωμάτων τούτων οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ[7] καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναπέπληκεν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ μικρολόγος ἐσχάτως[8] φανεῖται καὶ ἀνόητος περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευομένη καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα πλεῖν εἰς Βόσπορον
C κελεύουσα καὶ κυβιστᾶν τὸν σοφόν, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς γελοῖος εἰ Κτήσιος χαίρει καὶ Ἐπικάρπιος καὶ

[1] προηγούμενον -B ; προειρημένον -Vat. Reg. 80.
[2] τὸ ἀγαθὸν -a, A[1].
[3] τῷ -omitted by Tolet. 51, 5 ; τῷ πρώτῳ τῷ -E.
[4] τὸ -X[3](ὸ over erasure), B ; τῷ -all other MSS.
[5] δραγμὴν -F[1], X[1].
[6] νοῆσαι -a, A[1], E, Tolet. 51, 5, Vat. Reg. 80.
[7] ἀλλὰ -X[3](in margin), g, B ; omitted by all other MSS.
[8] ἐσχάτω -F[1] ; omitted by g.

expressions, and τὰ τυγχάνοντα, the external entities, are corporeal), are according to the Stoics not ὄντα (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 329-335) ; and I have therefore translated πράγματα not by " entities " but by " objects," using that word in the sense of " what is presented to the mind " (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 48, 19-20). With the phrase, μὴ ἄλλως ἀποπλανώμενος, *cf.*

after having thus in this passage closely united and combined with the good the class of " promoted," elsewhere again he says [a] that none of these is of any concern to us at all but reason [b] pulls us back and turns us aside from all such matters. This, in fact, is what he has written in the first book on Exhortation ; and in the third book concerning Nature he says [c] that some men are felicitated upon their royal position and their wealth much as if they were being felicitated for using golden chamber-pots and wearing golden tassels [d] but that to the virtuous man the loss of his fortune is like the loss of a drachma [e] and falling ill is like having stumbled. Consequently he has infected with these self-contradictions not only virtue but providence as well. For, while virtue will look utterly petty and stupid busying herself about these matters and bidding the sage for their sake sail to the Bosporus [f] and turn somersaults, Zeus will look ridiculous if he delights in being addressed as Steward of the Household and Guardian of Harvests

S.V.F. ii, p. 107, 1-2 : . . . τοῦ σημαινομένου τελέως ἀποπλανῶνται.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 139 (p. 34, 3-8) ; *cf.* 1041 E *supra* and *De Comm. Not.* 1060 D-E.

[b] In the version of this statement given in 1041 E *supra* τοῦτον τὸν λόγον means " the doctrine " propounded (*cf.* τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον at the beginning of the preceding sentence there) ; but here whether purposely or by inadvertence Plutarch has interpreted the original differently, for the simple τὸν λόγον in this context can be taken and could have been meant to be understood only as " reason."

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 153 (p. 36, 36-41).

[d] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1069 C.

[e] *Cf.* 1043 E *supra.*

[f] *Cf.* 1043 C-D *supra.*

(1048) Χαριδότης προσαγορευόμενος, ὅτι δηλαδὴ χρυσᾶς ἀμίδας καὶ χρυσᾶ κράσπεδα χαρίζεται τοῖς φαύλοις τοῖς δ' ἀγαθοῖς ἄξια δραχμῆς[1] ὅταν πλούσιοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ[2] Διὸς πρόνοιαν· ἔτι δὲ γελοιότερος ὁ Ἀπόλλων εἰ περὶ χρυσῶν κρασπέδων καὶ ἀμίδων κάθηται θεμιστεύων καὶ περὶ προσκομμάτων ἀπολύσεως.

31. Ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τῇ ἀποδείξει τὸ ἐναντίωμα ποιοῦσι φανερώτερον. ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ χρήσασθαι καὶ κακῶς, τοῦτό φασι μήτ' ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μήτε κακόν. πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ καὶ ῥώμῃ σώματος
D κακῶς χρῶνται πάντες οἱ ἀνόητοι· διόπερ οὐδέν ἐστι τούτων ἀγαθόν. εἴπερ οὖν ὁ θεὸς ἀρετὴν μὲν οὐ δίδωσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν αὐθαίρετόν ἐστι[3] πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὑγίειαν χωρὶς ἀρετῆς δίδωσιν, οὐκ εὖ χρησομένοις δίδωσιν ἀλλὰ κακῶς, τουτέστι βλαβερῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς καὶ ὀλεθρίως. καίτοι εἰ μὲν δύνανται τὴν ἀρετὴν παρέχειν οἱ θεοί, οὔκ εἰσι χρηστοὶ μὴ παρέχοντες· εἰ δὲ μὴ δύνανται ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς, οὐδ' ὠφελεῖν δύνανται, μηδενός γε[4] τῶν

[1] δραγμῆς -F[1], X[1].
[2] τοῦ -omitted by A, β, γ, n, E.
[3] ἐστιν ἀνοις (but with ν ἀνοις cancelled) -g.
[4] γε -Reiske ; τε -MSS. (omitted by B).

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1177 (p. 338, 22-23). For Κτήσιος *cf.* *De Vitando Aere Alieno* 828 A-B and Cornutus, ix (p. 9, 16 [Lang]); for Ἐπικάρπιος *cf.* Cornutus, ix (p. 9, 12-13 [Lang]) and [Aristotle], *De Mundo* 401 a 19. Χαριδότης is an epithet of Dionysus in *Sept. Sap. Conviv.* 158 E and *Quaest. Conviv.* 613 D and of Hermes in *Quaest. Graecae* 303 D (*cf.* W. R.

and Giver of Joy [a] for the reason, no doubt, that he bestows golden chamber-pots and golden tassels upon the base and upon the virtuous things worth a drachma when in the course of his providence they get rich ; and Apollo will look still more ridiculous if he sits giving oracles about golden tassels and chamber-pots and about deliverance from bruises on the shin.

31. Moreover, by the demonstration they give they make their self-contradiction still more manifest. For what can be put to good use and to bad, this, they say,[b] is neither good nor bad ; but wealth and health and bodily strength are put to bad use by all who are stupid ; consequently none of these things is good. If, then, god does not give men virtue but what is fair is an object of free choice [c] and does give wealth and health without virtue, he gives these to men who will put them not to good use but to bad, that is to injurious, shameful, and pernicious use. Yet,[d] if the gods are able to grant virtue, they are not benignant if they do not grant it ; and, if they are not able to make men virtuous, they are not able to benefit them either, if in fact

Halliday, *Plutarch : Greek Questions*, pp. 206-207). See further A. B. Cook, *Zeus* ii, pp. 1065-1067 and iii, pp. 912 and 964 ; and for lists of cult-names and epithets of Zeus and their Stoic connexions see J. Amann, *Die Zeusrede des Ailios Aristeides* (Stuttgart, 1931), pp. 100-109.

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 123 (p. 29, 40-44) ; *cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, p. 28, 14-16 and p. 29, 28-31.

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 215 (p. 51, 24-26) ; *cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, p. 10, 2-5. The dilemma developed from this (*cf.* *S.V.F.* ii, p. 324, 31-34) is answered by Marcus Aurelius, ix, 40 (*cf.* W. Theiler, *Phyllobolia für Peter Von der Mühll*, p. 83, n. 3).

[d] καίτοι . . . ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων = *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 215 (p. 51, 26-31).

(1048) ἄλλων ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ μηδ' ὠφελίμου. τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλως γενομένους ἀγαθοὺς κρίνειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ἰσχὺν οὐδέν ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς θεοὺς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ[1]
E κρίνουσι κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἰσχύν[2]· ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον[3] ὠφελεῖν ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς[4] ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ μὴν οὔθ' αὐτὸν[5] ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπουδαῖον οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων. τί οὖν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων φρονοῦσιν; ἢ ταῦτα ἅπερ λέγουσι· μαίνεσθαι πάντας, ἀφραίνειν, ἀνοσίους εἶναι, παρανόμους, ἐπ' ἄκρον ἥκειν δυστυχίας, κακοδαιμονίας ἀπάσης; εἶτα προνοίᾳ θεῶν διοικεῖσθαι τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἀθλίως[6] πράττοντας; εἰ γοῦν οἱ θεοὶ μεταβαλόμενοι[7] βλάπτειν ἐθέλοιεν ἡμᾶς καὶ κακοῦν καὶ διαστρέφειν καὶ προσεπιτρίβειν, οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο διαθεῖναι[8] χεῖρον ἢ νῦν ἔχομεν,[9] ὡς Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει μήτε κακίας
F ὑπερβολὴν ἀπολείπειν μήτε κακοδαιμονίας τὸν βίον·

[1] ἀγαθοὶ -X[3](αθοι over erasure) and all other MSS.; ἄνοι (*i.e.* ἄνθρωποι)? -Westman.
[2] ἰσχύουσιν -F[1], X[1].
[3] μᾶλλον μᾶλλον (second μᾶλλον erased) -a.
[4] τοὺς θεοὺς -F, X, g, B; τοὺς -a, A[1]; αὐτοὺς -A[2], β, γ, n, E.
[5] αὐτὸς -g.
[6] ἀθλίως -omitted by X, g.
[7] μεταβαλλόμενοι -F[1], X[1], g, B.
[8] διαθεῖναι δύναιντο -E.
[9] ἔχομεν -omitted by B.

[a] *Scil.* except virtue, as the Stoics maintained: *cf. S.V.F.* i, frags. 188 and 190 (*cf.* i, frag. 362); *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 30, 75, 76, and 658 (p. 165, 21). See, however, *S.V.F.* iii, p. 23, 22-26, p. 24, 3-8 and 13-17, pp. 24, 41–25, 3, p. 26, 27-37 with Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, pp. 29-35; and for the formulation, "only the fair is good," see 1038 D and 1039 C *supra*.

[b] There is no justification for the many attempts to emend

nothing else is good or beneficial.[a] Their judging by the criterion of virtue or of strength men who have become virtuous otherwise (than by their aid) amounts to nothing, for virtuous men judge the gods too by the criteria of virtue and strength, the result being that the gods confer benefit no more than they receive it from men.[b] What is more,[c] Chrysippus does not represent as a good man either himself or any of his own acquaintances or teachers. What, then, do they think of the rest of mankind? Or do they think just what they say, that all are madmen and fools, impious and lawless, at the extremity of misfortune and utter unhappiness?[d] And yet that our state, thus wretched as it is, is ordered by the providence of the gods?[e] At any rate, if the gods should change and wish to injure, maltreat, torment, and finally crush us, they could not make our condition worse than now it is,[f] as Chrysippus declares that life admits no higher degree either of vice or of

the first part of this sentence. As Madvig saw (*Adversaria Critica*, pp. 668-669), Plutarch here rebuts the suggestion that the beneficence of the gods consists in their favourable judgment of human virtue. For the sense of *ἰσχύς* see 1034 D *supra* and *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 278 and 473; and for the criteria according to which the gods are revered *cf.* Plutarch, *De Facie* 935 C (. . . *τὸ κρεῖττον ἀρετῇ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τιμιώτερον*).

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 662 and 668 (p. 167, 14-28); *cf. De Comm. Not.* 1076 B-C.

[d] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 657-676.

[e] For the rôle of providence in the Stoic system *cf.* 1050 A-B and 1051 D-E *infra*, *De Comm. Not.* 1075 E and 1077 D; *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 634, 933, and 1107; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 98-101 and ii, pp. 55-58; Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 79-111.

[f] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* iii, 71 (in reply to the Stoic defence given in iii, 70 [*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1186]).

(1048) ὥστ', εἰ λάβοι φωνήν, εἰπεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν[1] τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους

γέμω κακῶν δή, καὶ οὐκ[2] ἔσθ' ὅπου[3] τεθῇ.

τίνας οὖν ἄν τις εὕροι μαχομένας μᾶλλον ἀλλήλαις ἀποφάσεις τῆς περὶ θεῶν Χρυσίππου καὶ τῆς περὶ[4] 1049 ἀνθρώπων, τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἔνι βέλτιστα[5] προνοεῖν τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἔνι χείριστα πράττειν λέγοντος;

32. Ἐγκαλοῦσιν αὐτῷ τινὲς τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν[6] ἐν τοῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης γράφοντι περὶ τῶν ἀλεκτρυόνων ὅτι "χρησίμως γεγόνασιν· ἐπεγείρουσι γὰρ ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς σκορπίους ἐκλέγουσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς μάχας ἐπιστρέφουσι, ζῆλόν τινα πρὸς ἀλκὴν ἐμποιοῦντες· ὅμως δὲ[7] δεῖ κατεσθίειν καὶ τούτους, ἵνα μὴ τὴν χρείαν ὑπερβάλῃ[8] τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεοττῶν." ὁ δὲ οὕτως καταγελᾷ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγ-

[1] αὐτὸν -omitted by B.
[2] καὶ οὐκ -MSS. here and in *De Comm. Not.* 1063 D; κοὐκέτ' -Euripides (*cf.* Sandbach, *Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], pp. 115-116).
[3] ὅπου -MSS. here and E in *De Comm. Not.* 1063 D; ὅπῃ -Euripides (L, P) and B in 1063 D; ὅποι -*De Sublimitate* xl, 3.
[4] τῆς περὶ -omitted by B.
[5] μάλιστα -g.
[6] πυθαρικῶν -a, A^1.
[7] δὲ -omitted by β.
[8] ὑπερβάλλῃ -X^3, E.

[a] Euripides, *Hercules Furens* 1245, quoted again in *De Comm. Not.* 1063 D.
[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 705. For the Pythagorean reverence of the cock and especially of the white cock see Plutarch, *Quaest. Conviv.* 670 C-D; Diogenes Laertius, viii, 34; Aelian, *Var. Hist.* iv, 17; Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 84 and

unhappiness, so that, if it should get the power of speech, it would recite the line of Heracles:

I'm now replete with woes, and there's no room.[a]

What more inconsistent assertions, then, could one find than the two about gods and about men made by Chrysippus saying that the former exercise providence in the best possible fashion and that the latter are in the worst plight possible?

32. Some of the Pythagoreans object to him for writing of cocks in the books concerning Justice[b] that "they have come into being for a useful purpose, for they wake us up[c] and pluck out scorpions[d] and arouse us for battle by inducing an eagerness for valour[e]; but all the same they too must be eaten, in order that the number of chicks may not exceed what is useful."[f] Those who make these remarks ground for objection he so far laughs to scorn, how-

147, *Protrepticus* 21 (pp. 107, 18-19 and 116, 11-12 [Pistelli]); *cf.* A. Delatte, *Études sur la Littérature Pythagoricienne* (Paris, 1915), pp. 289-290 and F. Cumont, *Lux Perpetua* (Paris, 1949), pp. 409-411. Notice that the "Pythagoreans" who object to the statement by Chrysippus are not said to have been contemporaries of his (*contra* R. Philippson, *Philol. Woch.*, lviii [1938], col. 1040, n. 3); Plutarch may mean to refer to such Neo-Pythagoreans as are mentioned in *Quaest. Conviv.* 727 B-C.
[c] Hence, it was supposed, their name: Athenaeus, ix, 374 d; *cf.* Aristophanes, *Birds* 488-492 and Pliny, *N.H.* x, 46.
[d] *Cf. De Capienda ex Inimicis Utilitate* 87 A-B and Aristophanes, *Wasps* 794.
[e] *Cf.* Aelian, *Var. Hist.* ii, 28.
[f] *Cf. Quaest. Conviv.* 729 F—730 A and Porphyry, *De Abstinentia* i, 11 (pp. 93, 23–94, 22 [Nauck])=Hermarchus, frag. 24 (pp. 25, 29–26, 18 [Krohn]); *cf.* M. J. Boyd, *Class. Quart.*, xxx [1936], pp. 188-191 and M. Gigante in *Epicurea in memoriam Hectoris Bignone* [Genova, 1959], pp. 105-112).

(1049) καλούντων, ὥστε περὶ τοῦ Διός, τοῦ Σωτῆρος καὶ Γενέτορος[1] καὶ πατρὸς Δίκης καὶ Εὐνομίας καὶ Εἰρήνης, ταῦτα γράφειν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν·
B " ὡς δὲ αἱ πόλεις πλεονάσασαι εἰς ἀποικίας ἀπαίρουσι[2] τὰ πλήθη καὶ πολέμους ἐνίστανται πρός τινας, οὕτως ὁ θεὸς φθορᾶς ἀρχὰς δίδωσι"· καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην μάρτυρα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους προσάγεται τοὺς λέγοντας ὡς ὁ Τρωικὸς πόλεμος ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀπαντλήσεως ἕνεκα[3] τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀνθρώπων[4] γένοιτο. τούτων δὲ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἀτοπίας ἄφες (οὐ γὰρ[5] εἴ τι μὴ καλῶς ἀλλὰ ὅσα πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς διαφόρως λέγουσιν ἐξετάσαι μόνον πρόκειται[6]) σκόπει δὲ ὅτι τῷ θεῷ καλὰς μὲν ἐπικλήσεις καὶ φιλανθρώπους ἀεὶ[7] ἄγρια δ' ἔργα[8] καὶ βάρβαρα καὶ
C Γαλατικὰ[9] προστίθησιν. οὐ γὰρ ἀποικίαις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τοσαῦται φθοραὶ καὶ πανωλεθρίαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἵας ὁ Τρωικὸς εἰργάσατο πόλεμος καὶ πάλιν ὁ Μηδικὸς καὶ Πελοποννησιακός,[10] εἰ μή

[1] γενετῆρος -X, g, B.
[2] ἀπαρύτουσι -Wyttenbach ; ἀπερῶσι -Bernardakis ; but *cf. Quaest. Conviv.* 673 A (ἐφ' ἡδονὰς . . . τὴν διάνοιαν ἀπαίρουσιν).
[3] χάριν -g.
[4] τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους -g.
[5] ἀλλ' -F, X, g ; οὐ γὰρ -all other MSS.
[6] προσήκει -B.
[7] ἐπικλήσεις ἀεὶ καὶ φιλανθρώπους -g.
[8] ἔργα -omitted by g.
[9] γαλατικὰ καὶ βάρβαρα -B.
[10] ὁ M. καὶ ὁ Π. -g ; ὁ Π. καὶ M. -B.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1177. As observed by W. Burkert (privately) Plutarch means not that Chrysippus wrote the following in reply to a Pythagorean objection but that it shows what scorn he had for any possible objection of the kind (*cf. Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 25 c :

ever, as to write the following[a] in the third book on the Gods about Zeus the Saviour and Sire, the father of Right, of Order, and of Peace[b] : " as states, when they have become too populous, move the masses off into colonies or begin wars against someone, so god gives occasions for destruction to begin " ; and he calls Euripides to witness and the rest who say that the Trojan war was brought about by the gods for the purpose of draining off the surplus population.[c] Never mind the other absurdities in these remarks (for the subject of our examination is not whether the Stoics say anything wrong but only how much they say in disagreement with themselves) ; but observe that, while his epithets for god are always fair and humane, the deeds which he imputes to god are harsh, barbarous, and Galatian.[d] For there is no resemblance to colonization in the destruction and annihilation of human beings to the extent wrought by the Trojan war and again by the Persian and Peloponnesian,[e] unless the Stoics know of some

. . . ἡ Ὁμήρου πολλὰ πάνυ τοῖς Στωικοῖς χαίρειν φράζουσα . . . and 35 c : οὕτως Ὅμηρος καταγελᾷ τῶν αἰσχυνομένων ἐπὶ χωλότησιν . . .).
[b] *Cf.* Hesiod, *Theogony* 901-902 and Cornutus, *Theologia Graeca* 29 (p. 57, 6-12 [Lang]) ; for σωτὴρ καὶ γενέτωρ *cf.* [Aristotle], *De Mundo* 397 b 20-22.
[c] *Cf. Cypria*, frag. i (*Homeri Opera* v, pp. 117-118 [Allen]) ; Euripides, *Electra* 1282-1283, *Helen* 38-40, and *Orestes* 1639-1642.
[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1177 (p. 338, 19-21).
[e] By the Persian war Plutarch means that which was waged from 490 to 449/8 B.C., *i.e.* the " peace of Callias " (*cf.* Plutarch, *Cimon* xiii, 4-5 [486 F—487 B] with W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* II [Oxford, 1928], pp. 188-191 on Herodotus, vii, 151) and by the Peloponnesian that which lasted from 431 to 404 B.C. (*cf.* Plutarch,

(1049) τινας ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς[1] ἴσασιν οὗτοι κτιζομένας πόλεις,[2] ἀλλὰ τῷ Γαλάτῃ Δηιοτάρῳ ποιεῖ Χρύσιππος ὅμοιον τὸν θεόν, ὅς, πλειόνων αὐτῷ παίδων γεγονότων ἑνὶ βουλόμενος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπολιπεῖν[3] καὶ τὸν οἶκον, ἅπαντας ἐκείνους[4] ἀπέσφαξεν, ὥσπερ ἀμπέλου βλαστοὺς ἀποτεμὼν καὶ κολούσας ἵνα εἷς ὁ λειφθεὶς ἰσχυρὸς γένηται καὶ μέγας. καίτοι γε[5] ὁ μὲν ἀμπελουργὸς ἔτι μικρῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀσθενῶν[6] τοῦτο ποιεῖ τῶν κλημάτων,[7] καὶ ἡμεῖς νεογνῶν καὶ τυφλῶν ὄντων τῶν σκυλα-
D κίων ὑφαιροῦμεν τὰ πολλὰ φειδόμενοι τῆς κυνός· ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς οὐ μόνον ἐάσας καὶ περιδὼν[8] ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενομένους ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσας αὐτὸς[9] καὶ αὐξήσας ἀποτυμπανίζει, φθορᾶς καὶ ὀλέθρου μηχανώμενος προφάσεις, δέον αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχὰς γενέσεως μὴ παρασχεῖν.

33. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν[10] ἔλαττόν ἐστι κἀκεῖνο[11] μεῖζον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ φύεται ⟨παρ'⟩[12] ἀνθρώποις πόλε-

[1] γῆν -g, B.
[2] πόλεις κτιζομένας -g.
[3] ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν -B.
[4] ἐκεῖνος -a, Aldine, Basil.
[5] γε -omitted by B.
[6] καὶ ἀσθενῶν ὄντων -X, B.
[7] τῶν κλημάτων τοῦτο ποιεῖ -E.
[8] καίπερ ἰδὼν -E.
[9] αὐτοὺς -g.
[10] οὖν -omitted by A, β, γ, n, E.
[11] ἐστιν κἀκεῖνο -F, α; ἐστι κἀκεῖνο δὲ -E.
[12] ⟨παρ'⟩ -added by Castiglioni (*Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 84).

Pericles xxxiii, 4 [170 B]; *Fabius Maximus* xxix, 3 [190 F]; and *Lysander* xiv, 5—xv, 6 [441 A-F]). For the comparative magnitude of these and of the Trojan war and of the devastation caused by them *cf.* Herodotus, vii, 20-21 and Thucydides, i, 23, 1-3 and with these Plutarch's famous remark that almost all the inhabited world and especially

cities colonized in Hades and beneath the earth. No, it is the Galatian Deiotarus [a] that Chrysippus makes god resemble, Deiotarus who, since he had got many sons and wished to bequeath his realm and household to one, slaughtered all the rest just as if he had pruned and cut back the shoots of a vine in order that one, the one he had spared, might grow large and strong. The vine-dresser, however, does this while the twigs are still small and weak, and we out of consideration for the bitch make away with the majority of her puppies when they are newly born and blind; but Zeus after he has not merely from inadvertence let men grow up but has himself created them and caused them to grow then tortures them to death, contriving pretexts for their ruin and destruction whereas he ought to have disallowed the causes and origins of their coming to be.

33. This is a minor point, to be sure. It is the former that is the more serious,[b] for no war springs

Greece had been depopulated by earlier wars (*De Defectu Orac.* 413 F—414 A).

[a] See B. Niese, *R.-E.* iv (1901), cols. 2401, 18–2403, 67 with Suppl. iii (1918), col. 328, 38-45; F. E. Adcock, *J.R.S.* xxvii (1937), pp. 12-17. Niese questions the identity of the Deiotarus of *Mulierum Virtutes* 258 D with this tetrarch of the Tolistobogii of whom Plutarch speaks in *Pompey* 658 D, *Cato Minor* 764 D and 765 E—766 A, *Antony* 945 B, and *Crassus* 553 B-C. See also P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 107 and 134.

[b] The difficulties that have been made about these words are groundless. τοῦτο refers to the last point in the preceding passage, *i.e.* that Zeus permits men to be born and to grow to maturity before destroying them; and ἐκεῖνο refers to the main point preceding, *i.e.* that the gods instigate wars, the point which is now taken up again and developed in what follows, οὐδεὶς γὰρ . . . , to show that Chrysippus explicitly contradicts himself.

(1049) μος ἄνευ κακίας, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν φιληδονία τὸν δὲ πλεονεξία τὸν δὲ φιλοδοξία τις ἢ φιλαρχία[1] συρρήγνυσιν. οὐκοῦν[2] εἰ πολέμους ὁ[3] θεὸς ἐνεργάζεται,[4] καὶ κακίας, παροξύνων καὶ διαστρέφων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. καίτοι λέγει δ'[5] αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ
E Δικάζειν καὶ[6] πάλιν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Θεῶν ὡς τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίγνεσθαι οὐκ εὔλογόν ἐστιν· ὃν τρόπον γὰρ οὔτε νόμος τοῦ παρανομεῖν παραίτιος ἂν γένοιτ'[7] οὔθ' οἱ θεοὶ τοῦ ἀσεβεῖν, οὕτως εὔλογον μηδ' αἰσχροῦ μηδενὸς εἶναι παραιτίους. τί οὖν αἴσχιον ἀνθρώποις φθορᾶς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων γιγνομένης, ἧς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐνδιδόναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τὸν θεόν; "ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία," φήσει[8] τις, "ἐπαινεῖ[9] πάλιν τοῦ[10] Εὐριπίδου λέγοντος

εἰ θεοί τι δρῶσιν αἰσχρόν, οὔκ εἰσιν[11] θεοί

καὶ

τὸ ῥᾷστον εἶπας, αἰτιάσασθαι θεούς,"

ὥσπερ ἡμῶν ἄλλο τι νῦν πραττόντων ἢ τὰς ἐναντίας αὐτοῦ φωνὰς καὶ ὑπολήψεις παρατιθεμένων.

F 34. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο[12] τὸ νῦν ἐπαινού-

[1] φιλαργυρία -β. [2] οὐκ οὖν -F.
[3] ὁ -omitted by β. [4] ἐργάζεται -g.
[5] γ' -Reiske ; [δ'] -deleted by Wyttenbach.
[6] δικάζειν . . . vac. 11-13 . . . καὶ -B.
[7] γένοιτ' ἄν -g.
[8] φησί -F, X^1, a, A^1.
[9] ἐπαινεῖ -Hartman (*De Plutarcho*, p. 606) ; ἐπαινεῖν -MSS.
[10] πάλιν τὸ -Reiske ; πάλιν ⟨τὸ⟩ τοῦ -Hartman (*loc. cit.*).
[11] εἰσιν -A^2, β, Vat. Reg. 80 ; εἰσι -all other MSS.
[12] τοῦτο -omitted by g.

[a] *Cf.* Plato, *Republic* 373 D-E and *Phaedo* 66 C 5–D 2 (quoted in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 108 A), and the

up ⟨among⟩ men without vice but one breaks out from lust for pleasure, another from greed, and still another from a lust for glory or for power.[a] Well then, if god induces wars, he induces vices too by inciting and perverting human beings. And yet Chrysippus himself states [b] in his work concerning Decision and again in the second book on the Gods that for the divinity to become an accessory to shameful things is not reasonable, for just as law could not become accessory to illegality or the gods to ungodliness so it is reasonable for them not to be accessories to anything shameful either. What, then, is more shameful for human beings than their destruction of one another, for the beginning of which Chrysippus says [c] god presents the occasions? "Yes, but by heaven," someone will say, "he applauds again when Euripides asserts

If gods do something shameful, they're not gods [d]

and

You've made the easiest plea, to blame the gods," [e]

as if we are now engaged in anything else but citing the utterances and notions of his that are contrary to one another.

34. All the same, there would be countless occa-

implication of the remark ascribed by Plutarch to Lycurgus (*Lycurgus* 52 B = *Apophthegmata Laconica* 228 E [27]).
[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1125. [c] 1049 B *supra*.
[d] Frag. 292, 7 (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 447). In *Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 21 A, where Plutarch quotes this verse, the MSS. have φλαῦρον or φαῦλον instead of αἰσχρόν.
[e] Frag. 254, 2 (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 434), quoted with the preceding line, to which it is the reply, in *Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 20 D.

(1049) μενον οὐχ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς οὐδὲ τρὶς ἀλλὰ μυριάκις ἔσται πρὸς Χρύσιππον εἰπεῖν

τὸ ῥᾷστον εἶπας, αἰτιάσασθαι θεούς.

πρῶτον γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ[1] περὶ Φύσεως τὸ ἀίδιον[2] τῆς κινήσεως κυκεῶνι παρεικάσας, ἄλλ' ἄλλως στρέφοντι[3] καὶ ταράττοντι τῶν γιγνομένων, ταῦτ' 1050 εἴρηκεν· " οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας προαγούσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἄν ποτ' ἔχωμεν,[4] ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε παρὰ[5] φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι εἴτε γραμματικοὶ γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοί." καὶ πάλιν μετ' ὀλίγον· " κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτεχνιῶν, ὡς ἔφην." καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον ἅπασαν ἀναιρῶν ἀμφιβολίαν· " οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος[6] γενέσθαι οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ[7] τὸν ἐκείνης[8] λόγον." ὅτι δὲ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις Β καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἐστιν οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας[9] λέληθε·

[1] πρώτῳ -X, g, B ; omitted by all other MSS.
[2] ἀίδιον -E ; αἰδοῖον -all other MSS.
[3] τρέφοντι -F, α, A, β, γ, n.
[4] ἔχομεν -B, Tolet. 51, 5, Vat. Reg. 80.
[5] περὶ -g.
[6] μέρος -X, g, B, E ; μέρους -all other MSS
[7] κατὰ -omitted by g.
[8] ἐκείνου -F[1], X[1].
[9] ἀντίπαιδας -X[3], g, B.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 937 (p. 269, 1-18).

[b] Chrysippus apparently meant the solid bits of the posset to represent matter and the liquid to represent the pervasive and perpetual motion which continually reshapes and rearranges it (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 311, 916, and 919). The

sions and not just one or two or three for addressing to Chrysippus this very remark which is here the object of applause :

You've made the easiest plea, to blame the gods.

In the first place, in the first book concerning Nature,[a] after having likened the perpetuity of motion to a posset turning and jumbling in different ways the different things that come to be,[b] he has made this statement : " Since the organization of the universe as a whole proceeds in this way, it is necessarily in conformity with this organization that we are in whatever state we may be, whether contrary to our individual nature we are ill or are maimed or have become grammarians or musicians." Again a little later : " We shall on this principle make similar statements both about our virtue and about our vice and generally about skills and the lack of them, as I have said." And a little later, removing all ambiguity : " For no particular thing, not even the slightest, can have come about otherwise than in conformity with the universal nature and its reason." [c] Now, that the universal nature and the universal reason of nature are destiny and providence and Zeus, of this not even the Antipodes are unaware,

simile is supposed to have been suggested by a saying of Heraclitus (frag. B 125 [Diels-Kranz] ; *cf.* Philodemus, *De Pietate* c. 14, 12-18 [Gomperz] with Petersen's supplement). Marcus Aurelius (iv, 27 ; vi, 10 ; ix, 39) uses κυκεών in a pejorative sense of the Epicurean world as opposed to the Stoic κόσμος διατεταγμένος. For the composition and uses of the posset *cf.* A. Delatte, *Bull. Acad. R. de Belgique*, Cl. des Lettres, 5 Sér. xl (1954), pp. 690-751.

[c] *Cf.* 1050 c-D and 1056 c *infra* and *De Comm. Not.* 1076 E. For ἡ κοινὴ φύσις, " the universal nature," see note *c* on 1035 c *supra*.

(1050) παντ̣αχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται[1] ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ[2] "Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο[3] βουλή" τὸν Ὅμηρον εἰρηκέναι φησὶν[4] ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην[5] ἀναφέροντα[6] καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν καθ' ἣν πάντα διοικεῖται. πῶς οὖν ἅμα μὲν οὐδενὸς αἰσχροῦ παραίτιος ὁ θεὸς[7] ἅμα δ' οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἐνδέχεται[8] γίγνεσθαι ἄλλως ἢ[9] κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον; ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ δήπουθέν[10] ἐστιν. καίτοι ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀμωσγέπως στρέφεται καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ, τῆς ἀιδίου C κινήσεως μηχανώμενος ἐλευθερῶσαι καὶ ἀπολῦσαι τὸ ἑκούσιον ὑπὲρ τοῦ[11] μὴ καταλιπεῖν ἀνέγκλητον[12] τὴν κακίαν, ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος[13] ἀναπεπταμένην παρ-

[1] θρυλλεῖται -X[3], g, n, E, B (*cf. De Facie* 935 F [*L.C.L.* xii, p. 144, n. 4]). [2] τὸ -X, g, B; omitted by all other MSS.
[3] δι' ἐτελείετο -γ; διετελείετο -Tolet. 51, 5. [4] φασὶν -g.
[5] εἰρημένην -E. [6] ἀναφαίροντα -F[1].
[7] ὁ θεὸς -omitted by β. [8] ἐνδέχεσθαι -B.
[9] ἢ -omitted by g.
[10] δήπουθέν -g; δήπου θεὸς -F[1], X; δήπου θεῶν -F[2] and all other MSS.
[11] ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ -X[3], g, B. [12] ἀνεπίκλητον -g.
[13] ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος -A[3](added in margin), Vat. Reg. 80; omitted by all other MSS.; "sufficeret etiam <ὁ δ'>" -Pohlenz; "cestui-ci" -Amyot.

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 176 and ii, frags. 1024 and 1076 (p. 315, 1-11); Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* ii, 45; W. Theiler in *Phyllobolia für Peter Von der Mühll*, p. 46, n. 2.

[b] *Iliad* i, 5. For the interpretation which follows *cf. Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* ed. Dindorf, i, p. 6, 7; Eustathius, *Ad Iliadem*, 20, 10-13 (i, p. 33, 11-15 [Van der Valk]); and Plutarch himself in *Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 23 D.

[c] Frag. 378 (Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 254). *Cf.* 1045 B-C *supra* and the passages cited in note *a* there, in all of which it is said or implied that the "swerve" of the atoms was introduced for the purpose of avoiding determinism and of

for the Stoics keep harping on this everywhere [a] and Chrysippus declares that Homer was right in his statement, "and Zeus's design was maturing," [b] since he was there referring to destiny and the nature of the universe as a whole, in conformity with which all things are ordered. How, then, can it be that god is not accessory to anything shameful and at the same time that not even the slightest thing can come about otherwise than in conformity with the universal nature and its reason? For among all the things that come about are included, I presume, the shameful also. Yet, while Epicurus, in order not to leave vice free from blame, squirms this way and that and resorts to artifices in devising the liberation of volition and its release from the everlasting motion,[c] Chrysippus gives bare-faced

providing for free choice and moral responsibility. Epicurus opposes determinism without referring to the "swerve," however, in *Epistle* iii, 133-134 and in Περὶ φύσεως *incerti libri . . . reliquiae*, frag. 7 (*Epicuri Ethica* ed. C. Diano, pp. 30-51 = G. Arrighetti, *Epicuro Opere*[2], pp. 335-358 [but see the latter's note, pp. 631 f., on 7, iii, 13 ff.]); and the "swerve" is mentioned without reference to the moral problem in Aëtius i, 12, 15 and 23, 4 (*Dox. Graeci*, pp. 311 and 319-320) and Plutarch, *De Pythiae Oraculis* 398 B. From Lucretius, ii, 216-250 and Cicero, *De Finibus* i, 18-19 it would appear that the device was introduced primarily to explain how atoms falling in the void could intercept and clash with one another; and that its original purpose was to answer this physical problem posed by Aristotle's objection to Democritean atomism appears to be confirmed by a comparison of Epicurus, *Epistle* i, 61+46[b] with Aristotle, *Physics* 215 b 21-22 and 216 a 20 (*cf.* J. Katz, *A.J.P.*, lxiv [1943], pp. 432-435; G. Capone Braga, *Studi su Epicuro* [Milano, 1951], pp. 43-45 and *Sophia*, xxiii [1955], p. 109; D. J. Furley, *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists* [Princeton, 1967], pp. 173-183 and pp. 232-233, and on this M. C. Stokes, *Class. Rev.*, N.S. xix [1969], pp. 288-289).

(1050) ρησίαν αὐτῇ δίδωσιν ὡς οὐ μόνον ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲ καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἀλλὰ καὶ[1] κατὰ λόγον θεοῦ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν πεποιημένῃ τὴν ἀρίστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρᾶται[2] κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως ἔχοντα[3]· "τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης, δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γιγνόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ[4] καὶ τῶν μορίων[5] ὁτῳοῦν[6] κατ' ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον κατὰ τὸ[7] ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως διὰ[8] τὸ μήτ' ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐνστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε
D τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινηθήσεται ἢ σχήσει[9] ἄλλως ⟨ἢ⟩[10] κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν." τίνες οὖν αἱ τῶν μερῶν σχέσεις εἰσὶ καὶ[11] κινήσεις; δῆλον μὲν ὅτι σχέσεις αἱ κακίαι καὶ τὰ νοσήματα, φιλαργυρίαι φιληδονίαι φιλοδοξίαι δειλίαι ἀδικίαι[12]· κινήσεις δὲ μοιχεῖαι κλοπαὶ προδοσίαι[13] ἀνδροφονίαι πατροκτονίαι. τούτων οἴεται Χρύσιππος οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον εἶναι[14] καὶ νόμον καὶ δίκην καὶ πρόνοιαν· ὥστε μὴ γίγνεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον τὸ παρανομεῖν μηδὲ παρὰ τὴν δίκην τὸ ἀδικεῖν[15] μηδὲ[16] παρὰ[17] τὴν πρόνοιαν τὸ κακοποιεῖν.

[1] καὶ -omitted by X, g, B, E.
[2] ὁρᾶτε -Meziriac; ὅρα τὰ -Wyttenbach; εἴρηται R. G. Bury.
[3] ἔχοντι -g.
[4] ὅλῳ -Wyttenbach; λόγῳ -MSS.
[5] τῷ μορίῳ -B.
[6] ὅ τι οὖν -X³; ὁτιοῦν -g, a¹(?), B, E.
[7] τὰ -n.
[8] Here the first hand of d begins again, as does the text in v and z: see 1044 c *supra*.
[9] σχέσει -X, g, B.
[10] ⟨ἢ⟩ -added by Meziriac.
[11] καὶ -X, g, B; omitted by all other MSS.
[12] φιλοδοξία (φιλοδοξίαι -X, g) δειλία ἀδικία -F, X, g, a.
[13] προσοδίαι -F¹, v, z.

licence [a] to vice as having been caused not merely of necessity or according to destiny but also in conformity with god's reason and with the best nature. This too, moreover, is seen put word for word as follows [b]: "For, since the universal nature extends to all things, everything that comes about in any way whatever in the whole universe and in any of its parts will necessarily have come about conformably with that nature and its reason in due and unimpeded sequence, for neither is there anything to obstruct the organization from without nor is any of its parts susceptible of being moved or of assuming any state save in conformity with the universal nature." What, then, are the states and movements of its parts? Obviously the vices and disorders—the lusts for riches, for pleasures, for glories, the forms of cowardice and of injustice—are states; and acts of adultery, thefts, betrayals, homicides, and parricides are movements.[c] Of these Chrysippus thinks that none either great or small is contrary to the reason and law and right and providence of Zeus—with the consequence that illegality does not occur contrary to law or wrongdoing contrary to right or knavery contrary to providence.[d]

[a] This phrase, used also in *Conjugalia Praecepta* 139 E and *Quaest. Conviv.* 712 A, is a reminiscence of Plato, *Phaedrus* 240 E 6.
[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 937 (p. 269, 19-33); *cf.* A. A. Long in *Problems in Stoicism*, p. 196, n. 24 and pp. 178-183.
[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 421-430.
[d] *Cf.* Plotinus, *Enn.* III, ii, 16, lines 1-8.

[14] εἶναι λόγον -E.
[15] μηδὲ . . . ἀδικεῖν -omitted by g.
[16] μηδὲ -X, g, B; μήτε μὴν -d, v, z; μήτε -all other MSS.
[17] κατὰ -E, Vat. Reg. 80.

(1050) 35. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν
E κακίαν καὶ πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν, ὥσπερ[1] ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Θεῶν ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν[2] φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς[3] οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι. καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις· "πρῶτον δὲ τῶν κακῶν παραπλησίως ἐστὶν ἀκουστέον τοῖς προειρημένοις. εἶθ' ὅτι ταῦτ' ἀπονέμεται κατὰ τὸν τοῦ[4] Διὸς λόγον ἤτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατ' ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν." ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ[5] τοῦτο δεινόν, τὸ καὶ[6] γίγνεσθαι τὴν κακίαν καὶ κολάζεσθαι κατὰ τὸν τοῦ[7] Διὸς λόγον. ἐπιτείνει δὲ τὴν ὑπεναντίω-
F σιν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Φύσεως[8] γράφων τάδε· "ἡ δὲ κακία πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ συμπτώματα ἴδιόν τιν' ἔχει ὅρον[9]· γίγνεται μὲν γὰρ καὶ[10] αὐτή πως κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καί, ἵνα οὕτως εἴπω, οὐκ

[1] ὥστε -d, v, z.
[2] συμβαίνειν -X, g, n ; συμβαίνει -all other MSS.
[3] τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς φησὶ -B.
[4] τοῦ -omitted by α, A, β.
[5] καὶ -X, g, B ; omitted by all other MSS.
[6] καὶ -omitted by d, v, z.
[7] τοῦ -omitted by A (⁘ in margin), β, γ.
[8] χρήσεως -β.
[9] ὅρον -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 15) from *De Comm. Not.* 1065 A ; λόγον -MSS. here.
[10] καὶ -X, g, B ; omitted by all other MSS. (αὐτίπως -γ, n).

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1176 ; *cf.* 1040 C *supra* (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1175).

[b] *Cf.* Maximus of Tyre, *Philos.* xli, iv g (p. 480, 4-8 [Hobein]) and the ultimate source, Plato, *Laws* 903 B 4–D 3; so with the example given by Chrysippus of his "incommoda . . . per sequellas quasdam necessarias facta, quod ipse

35. Nevertheless, he says [a] that god chastises vice and does many things with a view to chastisement of the wicked. For instance, in the second book on the Gods he says that inconvenient things do sometimes happen to the virtuous not as they do to the base for their chastisement but in the course of other arrangements, as happens in cities ; and again he puts it in these words : "First, evils are to be understood after the fashion of what has been said before ; and then it must be understood that these things are dispensed according to the reason of Zeus either with a view to chastisement or in the course of other arrangements the nature of which is relative to the universe as a whole." [b] Now, this is itself dreadful, that the origin and the chastisement of vice are both in accord with the reason of Zeus ; but Chrysippus intensifies the contradiction by writing as follows in the second book concerning Nature [c] : "Vice is peculiarly distinguished from dreadful accidents, for even taken in itself it does in a sense come about in accordance with the reason of nature and, if I may put it so, its genesis is not useless in relation to the

appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν" (Aulus Gellius, VII, i, 9-11 = *S.V.F.* ii, p. 336, 15-25) *cf.* Plato, *Timaeus* 75 A 7–C 7.

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1181 (p. 339, 14-19) ; *cf. De Comm. Not.* 1065 A-B, where the quotation begins ἡ δὲ κακία πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ συμπτώματα ἔχει ὅρον. In the present passage λόγον of the MSS. is probably a mistake for ὅρον induced by λόγον in the next line, but otherwise the text here probably reproduces the words of Chrysippus more accurately (*cf.* Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 12, n. 2). The authenticity of δεινὰ is supported by Plutarch's play on the word just above (ἔστι μὲν οὖν . . . δεινόν) ; Chrysippus distinguishes from the dreadful accidents that may befall virtuous men (*cf.* 1050 E *supra* and 1051 C-D *infra*) κακία, which according to him is not a σύμπτωμα.

(1050) ἀχρήστως γίγνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν."[1] καὶ οὗτος[2] ἐπιτιμᾷ τοῖς ἐπίσης πρὸς
1051 τἀναντία διαλεγομένοις, ὃς ὑπὸ τοῦ πάντως τι βούλεσθαι καὶ περὶ παντὸς[3] εἰπεῖν ἴδιον καὶ περιττὸν οὐκ ἀχρήστως λέγει βαλλαντιοτομεῖν συκοφαντεῖν[4] καὶ ἁφραίνειν,[5] οὐκ ἀχρήστως[6] ἀχρήστους εἶναι, βλαβερούς, κακοδαίμονας. εἶτα ποιός τις[7] ὁ Ζεύς, λέγω δὲ τὸν[8] Χρυσίππου, κολάζων πρᾶγμα μήτ' ἀφ' αὑτοῦ μήτ' ἀχρήστως γιγνόμενον; ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία πάντως ἀνέγκλητός ἐστι κατὰ τὸν τοῦ[9] Χρυσίππου λόγον· ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἐγκλητέος εἴτ' ἄχρηστον οὖσαν τὴν κακίαν πεποίηκεν εἴτε ποιήσας οὐκ ἀχρήστως κολάζει.

36. Πάλιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης, εἰπὼν περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὡς ἐνισταμένων ἐνίοις[10] ἀδικήB μασι, "κακίαν δέ" φησι "καθόλου ἆραι οὔτε δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ' ἔχει[11] καλῶς ἀρθῆναι." ⟨ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι⟩[12] τὴν ἀνομίαν τὴν ἀδικίαν τὴν ἀβελτερίαν[13] οὐ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστὶ λόγου τὸ[14] ζητεῖν· αὐτὸς δὲ[15] τὴν κακίαν, ὅσον ἐφ'

[1] οὐδὲ . . . ἦν -*De Comm. Not.* 1065 B (Rasmus, *loc. cit.*, and Emperius, *Op. Philol.*, p. 340); οὔτε γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ἦν -MSS. here.
[2] οὗτος -Meziriac; οὕτως -MSS.
[3] περὶ τοῦ παντὸς -g.
[4] καὶ συκοφαντεῖν -B.
[5] εὐφραίνειν -d, z; εὐφαίνειν -v.
[6] ἀχρήστους -E.
[7] ποιόστι -F[1].
[8] τὸν -F[1], X[1], d, v; ὁ -z; τὸ -all other MSS.
[9] τοῦ -omitted by d, v, z, β.
[10] ἐνισταμένων ἐνίοις -X[3](-ων and -οις over erasures), g, d, v, z, B; ἐνισταμένοις (ων superscript over οις -Λ[corr.]) ἐνίων -F, α, A, β, γ, n, E.
[11] ἔχειν -v, z.

universe as a whole, since otherwise the good would not exist either." [a] And this man censures those who impartially argue the opposite sides of a question,[b] this man who from a desire at all costs and on every subject to say something original and extraordinary asserts that purse-snatching, blackmail, and folly are not useless, that it is not useless for there to be men who are useless, injurious, and wretched. What kind of being, then, is Zeus, I mean the Zeus of Chrysippus, who chastises a thing that comes about neither of itself nor without use? For, while vice according to the reasoning of Chrysippus is entirely free from blame, Zeus must be blamed whether he has created vice which is without use or having created it not without use chastises it.

36. Again, in the first book concerning Justice after having spoken of the gods as opposing some wrongful acts he says [c]: "To abolish vice completely, however, is not possible; nor is its abolition a good thing." The present treatise is not concerned with the investigation ⟨whether the abolition of⟩ lawlessness, injustice, and stupidity ⟨is not a good thing⟩; but, as by philosophizing he is engaged in

[a] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1066 D (=*S.V.F.* ii, p. 340, 1-6); Aulus Gellius, VII, i, 2-6 (where Chrysippus refers to Plato, *Phaedo* 60 B-C) and 13 (=*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1169 and frag. 1170 *sub fin.*); Diogenes Laertius, vii, 91 (from Posidonius = frag. 29 [Edelstein-Kidd]); Plato, *Theaetetus* 176 A 5-8 (*cf. Proc. American Philos. Soc.*, xlviii [1954], p. 24, n. 7).
[b] See 1035 F—1037 C *supra*.
[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1182.

[12] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by Bernardakis after Reiske (ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐ καλῶς ἔχει ἀρθῆναι); omitted by all MSS. without indication of lacuna. [13] ἀβελτηρίαν -MSS., corrected by Dübner.
[14] τὸ -omitted by g. [15] δὲ -omitted by g.

(1051) ἑαυτῷ, διὰ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀναιρῶν, ἣν οὐκ ἔχει καλῶς ἀναιρεῖν, μαχόμενόν τι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ. πρὸς δὲ[1] τούτοις λέγων ἐνίοις ἀδικήμασιν ἐνίστασθαι τὸν θεὸν ἔμφασιν πάλιν τῆς[2] τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων δίδωσιν ἀνισότητος.[3]

37. Ἔτι[4] περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν ⟨ἐν τῷ⟩[5] κόσμῳ, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἁπάντων περαινομένων,[6] πολλάκις[7] γεγραφώς, ἔστιν ὅπου πάλιν ἐγκλητάς τινας ἀμελείας οὐ περὶ μι-
C κρὰ καὶ φαῦλα καταλείπει. ἐν γοῦν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Οὐσίας μνησθεὶς ὅτι συμβαίνει τινὰ τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς τοιαῦτα, "πότερον" φησὶν "ἀμελουμένων τινῶν, καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις[8] μείζοσι παραπίπτει τινὰ πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ[9] πυροί τινες[10] τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων, ἢ διὰ τὸ καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίγνονται καὶ ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι;" φησὶ δὲ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης[11] μεμῖχθαι. τὸ μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα

[1] δὲ -omitted by β.
[2] τῆς -omitted by α (·̣· in margin), A, β, γ, n, E.
[3] H. C. after Amyot (". . . qu'il y a doncques quelque inégalité entre les pechez"); ἀνοσιότητος -MSS.
[4] ἔτι -a[corr.]; ὅτι -all other MSS.
[5] ⟨ἐν τῷ⟩ -added by Wyttenbach and implied by Amyot's "en ce monde"; μεμπτὸν κόσμῳ (κόσμον -Vat. Reg. 80) -MSS.
[6] παραγομένων -X[3](αγ over erasure), g; παραγομένην -B.
[7] πολλάκις -omitted by E.
[8] οἰκείαις -d, v.
[9] ποσοὶ -a[1], γ, n (ποσὶ πυρὶ), E.
[10] τινες -omitted by g (but *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 223, 21: ποσούς τινας χρόνους).
[11] τὸ ἐᾶν καὶ -g.

abolishing so far as it is in his power to do so the vice which it is not a good thing to abolish, he is himself doing something that conflicts both with his doctrine and with god. Besides, in saying that god opposes some wrongful acts, he suggests in turn that there is inequality among wrong actions.[a]

37. Moreover, although he has often written on the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or blameworthy ⟨in the⟩ universe since all things are accomplished in conformity with the best nature,[b] yet again there are places where he does admit instances of reprehensible negligence about matters which are not trivial or paltry. At any rate, in the third book concerning Substance he mentions the fact that things of this kind do happen to upright and virtuous men and then says[c]: "Is it because some things are neglected, just as in larger households some husks get lost and a certain quantity of wheat also though affairs as a whole are well managed, or is it because base spirits have been appointed over matters of the sort in which there really do occur instances of negligence that must in fact be reprehended?" And he says that necessity also is involved in large measure.[d] Now, I say nothing about the

[a] In saying that the gods make such a distinction Chrysippus implicitly contradicts his doctrine that all wrong actions are equally wrong, for which see 1038 C *supra*, *De Virtute Morali* 449 D (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 468), and *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 527-529 and 531-533.

[b] *Cf.* 1050 C *supra*: κατὰ λόγον θεοῦ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν . . . τὴν ἀρίστην.

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1178. *Cf.* Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* ii, 167 and iii, 86 and Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 291-293 and p. 439.

[d] *Cf.* [Plutarch], *De Placitis* 885 A = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 976 with Plato, *Timaeus* 47 E 5—48 A 2.

(1051) *συμπτώματα τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷον ἡ Σωκράτους καταδίκη καὶ ὁ Πυθαγόρου ζῶντος ἐμπρησμὸς ὑπὸ τῶν Κυλωνείων καὶ Ζήνωνος ὑπὸ Δημύλου*[1] *τοῦ τυράννου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος*[2] *ὑπὸ Διο-*
D *νυσίου στρεβλουμένων ἀναιρέσεις, πιτύροις*[3] *παραπίπτουσιν ἀπεικάζειν ὅσης ἐστὶν εὐχερείας ἐῶ· τὸ δὲ φαύλους δαίμονας ἐκ προνοίας ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστασίας καθίστασθαι πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔγκλημα*[4] *τοῦ θεοῦ, καθάπερ βασιλέως κακοῖς καὶ ἐμπλήκτοις σατράπαις καὶ στρατηγοῖς διοικήσεις ἐπιτρέποντος*[5] *καὶ περιορῶντος ὑπὸ τούτων ἀμελουμένους καὶ παροινουμένους τοὺς ἀρίστους; καὶ μὴν εἰ πολὺ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μέμικται τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὔτε κρατεῖ πάντων ὁ θεὸς οὔτε πάντα κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον διοικεῖται.*

38. *Πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον μάλιστα μάχεται καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀναιροῦντας τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀπὸ*[6] *τῶν ἐν-*
E *νοιῶν*[7] *ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ θεῶν εὐεργετικοὺς καὶ φιλ-*

[1] *διμύλου* -X[3](ι over erasure), g, B (so also E, B in *Adv. Colotem* 1126 D).
[2] *Ἀντιφῶντος* -Basil.; *τυφῶνος* -MSS.
[3] *ἀναιρέσεις, πιτύροις* -g; *ἀναιρέσει ἐπὶ πιτύροις* -F, X[1](*ἐπὶ* σ erased -X[3]), a; *ἀναιρέσει πιτύροις* -B; *ἀναιρέσεις* (*-ρε* -d, z; *-ρέαν* -v) *ἐπὶ πιτύροις* (*τυρίοις* -v) -all other MSS.
[4] *ἀνεγκλήματα* -d, v, z.
[5] *ἐπιτραπέντος* -d, v, z.
[6] *ἀπὸ* -X, g, B; *ἐκ* -all other MSS.
[7] *εὐνοιῶν* -a, A[1].

[a] For the term *συμπτώματα* see 1050 F *supra*.
[b] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Nicias* xxiii, 4 (538 F) and *Adv. Colotem* 1126 B; Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* iii, 82; Diogenes Laertius, ii, 38-42.
[c] *Cf. De Genio Socratis* 583 A, where Plutarch does not say explicitly that Pythagoras himself died in the fire set by Cylon's partisans. For references to the various accounts of his death *cf.* Zeller, *Phil. Griech.* I/1, p. 417, n. 2 and A. Delatte, *La Vie de Pythagore de Diogène Laërce* (Brussels, 1922), pp. 136-137 and pp. 241-244.
[d] The Zeno referred to is the Eleatic, the friend and follower of Parmenides. The name of the tyrant, which Plutarch gives here and in *Adv. Colotem* 1126 D-E but omits in *De Garrulitate* 505 D, varies in the various versions of the story (*cf.* Diogenes Laertius, ix, 26-27; Zeno, frags. A 6-9 [D.-K.]; Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* iii, 82 with A. S. Pease's note in his edition, ii, p. 1190).
[e] *Cf. Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur* 68 A-B and Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1385 a 9-13. The Antiphon meant here is the tragic dramatist (*cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], pp. 792-793 and Dieterich, *R.-E.* i [1894], col. 2526, 40-61), who is confused with Antiphon of Rhamnus in the Pseudo-Plutarchean *Vitae Decem Oratorum* 833 B, and by Philostratus in his *Vitae Sophistarum* I, 15, iii.

degree of insensibility manifested in likening to husks that get lost the accidents [a] to upright and virtuous men such as were the sentence passed upon Socrates [b] and the burning alive of Pythagoras by the Cyloneans [c] and the torturing to death of Zeno by the tyrant Demylus [d] and of Antiphon by Dionysius [e]; but to say that base spirits have been providentially appointed to such offices of charge, how can this be anything but an accusation of god as of a king who entrusts provinces to evil and demented governors and generals and pays no attention to their neglect and abuse of the most virtuous men? Moreover, if in events necessity is involved in large measure, then god does not control all things nor are all things ordered in conformity with his reason.

38. He fights especially against Epicurus and against those who do away with providence, basing his attack upon the conceptions that we have of the

(1051) *ανθρώπους ἐπινοοῦντες. καὶ τούτων πολλαχοῦ γραφομένων καὶ λεγομένων*[1] *παρ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔδει λέξεις παρατίθεσθαι.*[2] *καίτοι*[3] *χρηστοὺς οὐ πάντας*[4] *εἰκὸς*[5] *τοὺς θεοὺς προλαμβάνειν.*[6] *ὅρα γὰρ οἷα Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Σύροι περὶ θεῶν φρονοῦσιν, ὅρα τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν πόσης ἐμπέπλησται*[7] *δεισιδαιμονίας.*[8] *φθαρτὸν δὲ καὶ γενητὸν*[9] *οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διανοεῖται θεόν. ὧν ἵνα τοὺς ἄλλους ἀφῶ πάντας, Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Ταρσεὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ Θεῶν γράφει ταῦτα κατὰ λέξιν· " πρὸ*[10] *δὲ τοῦ σύμπαντος λόγου τὴν ἐνάργειαν*[11] *ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ θεοῦ διὰ βραχέων*
F *ἐπιλογιούμεθα. θεὸν τοίνυν νοοῦμεν ζῷον μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ*[12] *εὐποιητικὸν ἀνθρώπων." εἶτα τούτων ἕκαστον*[13] *ὑφηγούμενός*[14] *φησιν οὕτως·*

[1] *γραφομένων καὶ λεγομένων* -X, g, B ; *λεγομένων καὶ λεγομένων* -F ; *λεγομένων καὶ νοουμένων* -d, v, z ; *λεγομένων* (alone) -all other MSS.

[2] *περιτίθεσθαι* -d, v.

[3] *καὶ τὸ* -X[3](over erasure), g, B ; *καίτοι* -all other MSS.

[4] *χρηστοὺς ἅπαντας* -g, E ; *οὐ χρηστοὺς ἅπαντας* -B.

[5] *εἰκὸς* -A. D. Nock (*cf.* Sandbach, *Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 22, n. 2) ; *εἶναι* -MSS.

[6] *προσλαμβάνειν* -F, X, g, B ; *προβαίνειν* -v ; *προλαμβάνειν* -all other MSS. (*cf. Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1092 c).

[7] *ἐμπέπληται* -a^1 ; *ἐμπέπληκται* -Vat. Reg. 80.

[8] *δειδαιμονίας* -g ; *δ ο ιδαιμονίας* -a^2(erasure between δ and ο and between ο and ι) ; *δυσιδαιμονίας* -n.

[9] *γενητὸν* -X[3](γε over erasure), $A^{corr.}$, E ; *γεννητὸν* -g, β, γ, n, B ; *ὠνητὸν* -F, *a*, A^1, d, v, z.

[10] *πρὸ* -X, g, β, B ; *πρὸς* -all other MSS.

[11] *ἐνάργειαν* -Meziriac ; *ἐνέργειαν* -MSS.

[12] *καὶ* -omitted by v, z.

[13] *ἕκαστος* -β.

[14] *ὑφηγούμενος* -H. C. ; *ἀφηγούμενος* -MSS. (defended by Westman in Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2, p. 231 ; but *cf. De Se Ipsum Laudando* 543 A, *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1097 A, and especially *De An. Proc. in Timaeo* 1027 E with *app. crit.*).

gods in thinking of them as beneficent and humane. Since this occurs frequently in what the Stoics write and say, there was no need to give quotations.[a] And yet the likelihood is that not all men have preconceptions of the gods as benignant, for look at the kind of notions Jews and Syrians have about gods [b] and see how full of superstition the notions of the poets are. One may say, however, that no one supposes god to be subject to destruction and generation.[c] Not to mention any of the others, Antipater of Tarsus in his book on the Gods writes word for word as follows [d] : " As a preliminary to the whole discourse we shall take a concise reckoning of the clear apprehension [e] which we have of god. Well then, we conceive god to be an animate being, blessed and indestructible [f] and beneficent towards men." Then, explaining each of these predicates, he

[a] Πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον . . . *παρατίθεσθαι* = *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 1115. *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1075 E (*S. V.F.* ii, frag. 1126), and for Epicurus on providence see 1043 B, page 492, note *a*. In the text here there is no need either to change *ἔδει* to *δεῖ*, as Reiske did, or to suppose with Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 12, n. 2) that it is the apodosis of a condition contrary to fact, the protasis of which has been lost.

[b] *Cf. De Superstitione* 166 A, 169 C, 170 D ; Jones, *Platonism of Plutarch*, pp. 26-27 and Latzarus, *Idées Religieuses*, pp. 161-166.

[c] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1074 E—1075 A.

[d] Antipater, frag. 33 (*S. V.F.* iii, p. 249, 10-15).

[e] Pohlenz adopts Wyttenbach's *ἔννοιαν*, giving as his reason for rejecting *ἐνάργειαν* a reference to Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, p. 220, n. 2 ; but see Sandbach, *Class. Quart.*, xxiv (1930), pp. 50-51 and note *c* on 1047 C *supra*. Besides the passages cited in that note see also *S. V.F.* i, frag. 346 (Ariston of Chios).

[f] *Cf.* Plato, *Phaedrus* 246 D 1-2 ; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1072 b 28-30 and *Eth. Nic.* 1178 b 8-9.

(1051) "καὶ μὴν ἀφθάρτους αὐτοὺς ἡγοῦνται πάντες." οὐδεὶς οὖν ἐστι τῶν πάντων ὁ Χρύσιππος κατ' Ἀντίπατρον· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἴεται πλὴν τοῦ πυρὸς
1052 ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τῶν θεῶν ἀλλὰ πάντας ὁμαλῶς[1] καὶ γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους. ταῦτα δὲ πανταχοῦ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λέγεται. παραθήσομαι δὲ λέξιν ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου περὶ Θεῶν· "καθ' ἕτερον λόγον οἱ μὲν ἄρα[2] γενητοὶ[3] εἶναι καὶ φθαρτοὶ λέγονται[4] οἱ δ' ἀγένητοι.[5] καὶ ταῦτ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς[6] ὑποδείκνυσθαι φυσικώτερον. ἥλιος μὲν γὰρ καὶ σελήνη καὶ οἱ[7] ἄλλοι θεοὶ παραπλήσιον ἔχοντες λόγον γενητοί[8] εἰσιν, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἀίδιός ἐστιν." καὶ πάλιν προελθών· "ὅμοια[9] δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ φθίνειν[10] καὶ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι[11] ῥηθήσεται περί τε τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν καὶ τοῦ[12] Διός· οἱ μὲν γὰρ φθαρτοί εἰσι τοῦ δὲ τὰ μέρη ἄφθαρτα." τούτοις ἔτι βούλομαι παρα-
B βαλεῖν μικρὰ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου λεγομένων· "ὅσοι δὲ περιαιροῦνται τὸ εὐποιητικὸν ἐκ

[1] ὁμαλῶς -omitted by d, v, z.
[2] ἄρα -H. C.; γὰρ -MSS. (deleted by Wyttenbach; retained by Pohlenz, who places a colon after καθ' ἕτερον λόγον, taking this as a formula of transition, which is improbable in view of παραπλήσιον ἔχοντες λόγον *infra*).
[3] X³, d, E; γεννητοὶ -all other MSS.
[4] λέγονται -X³(in margin), g, B; omitted by all other MSS.
[5] X³, E; ἀγέννητοι -all other MSS.
[6] ἀπαρχῆς -F, E.
[7] οἱ -omitted by g; οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ <οἱ> -Pohlenz.
[8] X³, d, E; γεννητοί -all other MSS.
[9] ὅμοιος -g.
[10] φθίνειν -Dübner; φρονεῖν -MSS.; φθαρῆναι -Leonicus.
[11] αἰσθάνεσθαι -X, g, B (F¹ in margin: γρ. αἰσθάνεσθαι).
[12] καὶ περὶ τοῦ -E.

says: "Moreover, all men hold them to be indestructible." In that case, Chrysippus is not one of Antipater's "all men,"[a] for he thinks that in the gods there is nothing indestructible except fire but that all of them alike have come into being and are going to be destroyed. This he states practically everywhere; but I shall give a quotation from his third book on the Gods[b]: "Corresponding to a difference of constituent principle some, therefore, are said to be subject to generation and to destruction and others to be unsubject to generation. An exposition of this from the beginning is rather a topic for physics, for sun and moon and the rest of the gods, since they have a similar principle of constitution, are subject to generation, but Zeus is everlasting." And again further on: "Similar assertions will be made about decaying and having come to be in regard to Zeus and the rest of the gods, for the latter are subject to destruction but the parts of the former are indestructible."[c] Beside these statements I wish to set a few more words by Antipater[d]: "Those who divest the gods of beneficence are in

[a] *Cf.* Plato, *Republic* 398 c 7-8; *Hippias Major* 293 A 9-10.
[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1049 (p. 309, 14-25); *cf. De Comm. Not.* 1075 A-C and *De Defectu Orac.* 420 A (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 309, 26-36 and p. 310, 1-4).
[c] Pohlenz, referring to *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 589 ff., says that one would expect to find here μέρη μὲν φθαρτά, αὐτὸς δὲ ἄφθαρτος. In frags. 589-595, however, the Stoic contention that the κόσμος is φθαρτός is supported by the principle, οὗ τὰ μέρη φθαρτά ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὅλον (ii, p. 181, 1-2); and in the face of this Chrysippus is not likely to have asserted that Zeus is himself ἄφθαρτος though his parts are φθαρτά.
[d] Antipater, frag. 34 (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 249, 16-20); *cf.* Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 461, n. 1.

(1052) τῶν[1] θεῶν ἀπὸ μέρους προσβάλλουσι[2] τῇ τούτων προλήψει κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ οἱ νομίζοντες αὐτοὺς γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς κοινωνεῖν." εἶπερ οὖν ἐπίσης ἄτοπος ὁ φθαρτοὺς ἡγούμενος τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ μὴ νομίζοντι προνοητικοὺς εἶναι καὶ φιλανθρώπους, ἐπίσης διαπέπτωκεν Ἐπικούρῳ Χρύσιππος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὸ εὐποιητικὸν ὁ δὲ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀφαιρεῖται τῶν θεῶν.

39. Καὶ μὴν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν ὁ Χρύσιππος περὶ τοῦ[3] τρέφεσθαι τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς τάδε[4] λέγει· " τροφῇ τε οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι θεοὶ χρῶνται παραπλησίως, συνεχόμενοι δι' αὐτήν[5]· ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ C κόσμος καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον ⟨συνέχονται τῶν κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς εἰς πῦρ⟩[6] ἀναλισκομένων καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς γιγνομένων."[7] ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν[8] ἀποφαίνεται πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους[9] θεοὺς τρέφεσθαι πλὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ Διός, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Προνοίας τὸν Δία φησὶν αὔξεσθαι μέχρι[10] ἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ[11]· " ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος

[1] τῶν -omitted by F.
[2] προσβάλλουσι -g ; προβάλλουσι -all other mss.
[3] τοῦ -X, g, B, E ; τὸ -all other mss.
[4] τάδε -omitted by E.
[5] αὐτὸν -n.
[6] <. . .> -H. C. ; lacuna indicated by Xylander ; <ζῇ τῶν εἰς πῦρ> -Giesen (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 42).
[7] γενομένων -F, z, α, A, β, γ, n, E.
[8] οὖν -X[3], g, B ; omitted by all other mss.
[9] ἄλλους -omitted by B ; τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας -d, v, z.
[10] μέχρι -X, d, v, z ; μέχρις -all other mss.
[11] καταναλώσῃ ἅπαντα -d, v, z.

[a] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1100 E—1101 C

partial conflict with the preconception of them in the same sense as are those who believe them to partake of generation and destruction." If, then, he who holds that the gods are subject to destruction is as absurd as is he who believes that they are not provident and humane, Chrysippus has erred as much as has Epicurus, for the latter eliminates the beneficence of the gods [a] and the former their indestructibility.

39. Moreover, in the third book on the Gods Chrysippus makes the following statement about the nourishment of the rest of the gods [b] : " Nourishment is used in a similar way [c] by the rest of the gods —it is through it that they are sustained, but Zeus and the universe ⟨sustain themselves⟩ in a different way ⟨from those that periodically⟩ are absorbed ⟨into fire⟩ and arise out of fire." [d] Here, then, he declares that there is nourishment of all the gods except the universe and Zeus, but in the first book on Providence he says [e] that Zeus goes on growing until all things have been consumed in his growth : " For, since

and 1103 D ; *Adv. Colotem* 1108 C ; *Pyrrhus*, chap. 20 (395 E-F).

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1068.

[c] For παραπλησίως Pohlenz refers to 1050 E *supra* (παραπλησίως ἐστὶν ἀκουστέον), but *cf.* rather 1052 A *supra* : οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ παραπλήσιον ἔχοντες λόγον.

[d] As the first clause of the next sentence shows, Plutarch did not understand τροφῇ χρῶνται or anything with a similar meaning to be the predicate of ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ κόσμος. Giesen was therefore right in rejecting the conjectures of Reiske and of Rasmus, and the same objection holds against Madvig's emendation and against von Arnim's supplement with or without Pohlenz's variation of it.

[e] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 604 (pp. 185, 43–186, 3). *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1075 B and 1077 D ; *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 526.

(1052) μέν ἐστι ψυχῆς χωρισμὸς[1] ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν αὔξεται δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι[2] ἂν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ[3] τὴν ὕλην, οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον." τίς ἂν οὖν[4] ἐναντιώτερα λέγων ἑαυτῷ[5] φανείη τοῦ τὸν αὐτὸν θεὸν νῦν μὲν αὔξεσθαι νῦν δὲ μὴ τρέφεσθαι λέγοντος;[6] καὶ τοῦτ' οὐ δεῖ συλλογίζεσθαι· σαφῶς γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γέγραφεν· "αὐτάρκης δ' εἶναι
D λέγεται μόνος ὁ κόσμος διὰ τὸ μόνος ἐν αὑτῷ πάντ' ἔχειν ὧν δεῖται, καὶ τρέφεται ἐξ αὑτοῦ καὶ αὔξεται, τῶν ἄλλων μορίων εἰς ἄλληλα καταλλαττομένων."[7] οὐ μόνον οὖν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς ἀποφαίνων[8] τρεφομένους πλὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ Διὸς ἐν τούτοις δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον λέγων τρέφεσθαι μάχεται πρὸς αὑτὸν ἀλλ' ἔτι[9] μᾶλλον ὅτι τὸν κόσμον αὔξεσθαί φησιν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τρεφόμενον. τοὐναντίον δ' εἰκὸς ἦν τοῦτον μόνον μὴ αὔξεσθαι τὴν αὑτοῦ φθίσιν[10] ἔχοντα τροφὴν τοῖς δ'

[1] *χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς* -g.
[2] *μέχρι* X, d, v ; *ἄχρις* -z ; *μέχρις* -all other MSS.
[3] *ἑαυτὴν καταναλώσῃ* -g.
[4] *τίς οὖν ἂν* -B.
[5] *ἑαυτοῦ* -E.
[6] *νῦν μὲν . . . λέγοντος* -X, g, B ; omitted by all other MSS. (one line left vacant by E).
[7] *καταλλαττομένων* -Meziriac ; *κατατετρομένων* -v ; *καταττομένων* -a, A^1 ; *καταταττομένων* (*κατατταται . . .* -d) -all other MSS.
[8] *ἀποφαινομένων* -γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5.
[9] *ἀλλὰ τί* -g ; *ἀλλ' ἐστι* -Vat. Reg. 80.
[10] *φύσιν* -g.

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 790 and 791 and for this definition of death Plato, *Phaedo* 67 D 4-5 and *Gorgias* 524 B 2-4. From it follows the distinction referred to in *De Comm. Not.* 1075 C : *θνητὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐ θνητὸν δὲ τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ φθαρτόν.*

death is the separation of soul from body [a] and the soul of the universe is not separated but goes on growing continually until it has completely absorbed its matter, the universe must not be said to die." Now, who could more plainly contradict himself than the man who says of one and the same god now that he grows and again that he does not take nourishment? And inference is not needed to reach this conclusion,[b] for in the same book he has himself clearly written [c] : "The universe alone is said to be self-sufficient because it alone has within itself everything it needs, and it gets from itself its nourishment and growth by the interchange of its different parts into one another." So he is in conflict with himself not only because in the former passages he declares that except for the universe and Zeus there is nourishment of the rest of the gods and in the latter he states that there is nourishment of the universe also but even more because he says that the universe grows by getting nourishment from itself. The likelihood was just the contrary, that this alone does not grow, since it has its own decay for nourishment,[d]

[b] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1075 B : *ταῦτα δ' οὐχ ὡς ἄλλα πολλὰ . . . συλλογιζόμεθα. . . .*

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 604 (p. 186, 4-7). *Cf.* Plato, *Timaeus* 33 C 8–D 3 and on the imitation of this passage by Chrysippus see Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, p. 148, n. 1. Not recognizing the origin of the notion, Sambursky says (*Physics of the Stoics*, p. 114) : "Here the Stoics hit upon an important physical law which applies to closed systems that are not subject to any interference."

[d] Against the use that Chrysippus made of *Timaeus* 33 C 8–D 3 Plutarch turns the words immediately preceding that passage (*Timaeus* 33 C 7-8) : *αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τροφὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φθίσιν παρέχον.*

(1052) ἄλλοις θεοῖς ἔξωθεν τρεφομένοις ἐπίδοσιν γίγνεσθαι καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ μᾶλλον εἰς τούτους καταναλίσκεσθαι τὸν κόσμον, εἴ γ' ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ
E τούτοις δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνου λαμβάνειν ἀεί τι καὶ τρέφεσθαι συμβέβηκε.

40. Δεύτερον τοίνυν ἡ τῶν θεῶν ἔννοια περιέχει τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον καὶ αὐτοτελές. διὸ καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἐπαινοῦσιν εἰπόντα

δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ' ὀρθῶς[1] θεός,
οὐδενός· ἀοιδῶν οἵδε[2] δύστηνοι λόγοι.

ἀλλὰ ὅ γε Χρύσιππος ἐν οἷς[3] παρεθέμην[4] αὐτάρκη μόνον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον φησὶ διὰ τὸ μόνον ἐν αὑτῷ πάντ' ἔχειν ὧν δεῖται. τί οὖν ἕπεται τῷ μόνον αὐτάρκη τὸν κόσμον[5] εἶναι; τὸ μήτε τὸν ἥλιον αὐτάρκη μήτε τὴν σελήνην εἶναι μήτ' ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν θεῶν. αὐτάρκεις δὲ μὴ ὄντες οὐκ ἂν εἶεν εὐδαίμονες οὐδὲ μακάριοι.

41. Τὸ βρέφος ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ φύσει τρέφεσθαι
F νομίζει καθάπερ φυτόν· ὅταν δὲ τεχθῇ, ψυχόμενον[6] ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ στομούμενον τὸ πνεῦμα μετα-

[1] MSS. and Clement, *Strom.* v, 75, 2; ὄντως -Euripides (L, P).

[2] ἀοιδῶν οἵδε -Clement, *Strom.* v, 75, 2; ἀοιδῶν δ' οἵδε -Euripides (L, P); αὐλῶν οἱ δὲ -F[1], X, g; αὐτῶν οἱ δὲ -F[2] and all other MSS.

[3] The testimony of d, v, z ends here. In all three MSS. the words ἐν οἷς are followed without warning by *De Defectu Orac.* 412 C, τοῦ χρηστηρίου κτλ.

[4] παραθέμην -a, A.

[5] τὸ μόνον τὸν κόσμον αὐτάρκη -g.

[6] ψυχόμενον -X[3], B; ψυχώμενον -g; ψυχούμενον -all other MSS.

[a] *Hercules Furens* 1345-1346. The " wretched tales " are

whereas the rest of the gods, since they get nourishment from without, do have increase and growth and that it is rather the universe that is consumed in their growth if it is a fact that, while it is its own source, they are always drawing upon it for their nourishment.

40. A second factor included in the conception of the gods, moreover, is happiness, blessedness, and independence. That is the reason why they applaud Euripides too for having said :

God wants for nothing if he's truly god ;
It's poets who contrived these wretched tales.[a]

Chrysippus, however, in what I have quoted [b] says that the universe alone is self-sufficient because it alone has within itself everything it needs. What, then, is the consequence of the assertion that the universe alone is self-sufficient ? That neither the sun nor the moon is self-sufficient nor any other of the gods. And, not being self-sufficient, they would not be happy or blessed either.

41. He believes [c] that the foetus in the womb is nourished by nature [d] like a plant but that at birth the vital spirit, being chilled and tempered by the

the stories of the illicit loves and internecine wars of the gods referred to by Theseus in lines 1316-1319 (*cf.* 1341-1344).

[b] 1052 D *supra*.

[c] τὸ βρέφος . . . μαχόμενος αὐτῷ = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 806 (p. 222, 18-24). *Cf.* 1053 C-D *infra*, *De Comm. Not.* 1084 D-E, *De Primo Frigido* 946 C, and Porphyry in Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* xv, 11, 4 (all printed as part of *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 806); *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 804, 805, and 807; and Pseudo-Galen (*i.e.* Porphyry), *Ad Gaurum* xiv, 4 (p. 54, 15-20 [Kalbfleisch]); F. W. Kohnke, *Hermes*, xciii (1965), pp. 383-384.

[d] " Nature " (φύσις) as the Stoics used it technically to designate the " vegetative grade " (φυτικόν) of the vital spirit (πνεῦμα): *cf.* *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 710-712, 714-716, 718, and 787.

(1052) βάλλειν καὶ γίγνεσθαι ζῷον· ὅθεν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τὴν ψυχὴν ὠνομάσθαι παρὰ τὴν ψῦξιν. αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ λεπτομερέστερον ἡγεῖται μαχόμενος αὑτῷ.[1]
1053 πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε λεπτομερὲς ἐκ παχυμεροῦς καὶ[2] ἀραιὸν γενέσθαι κατὰ περίψυξιν καὶ πύκνωσιν; ὃ δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστι, πῶς περιψύξει γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀποφαινόμενος ἔμψυχον ἡγεῖται τὸν ἥλιον, πύρινον ὄντα καὶ γεγενημένον ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως εἰς πῦρ μεταβαλούσης;[3] λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ[4] περὶ Φύσεως· " ἡ δὲ πυρὸς μεταβολή ἐστι τοιαύτη· δι' ἀέρος εἰς[5] ὕδωρ τρέπεται· κἀκ τούτου, γῆς[6] ὑφισταμένης, ἀὴρ ἀναθυμιᾶται· λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὁ αἰθὴρ περιχεῖται[7] κύκλῳ, οἱ δ' ἀστέρες ἐκ θαλάττης μετὰ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνάπτονται." τί οὖν ἀνάψει περιψύξεως ἐναντιώτερον ἢ διαχύσει
B πυκνώσεως; τὰ μὲν[8] ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν[9] ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ

[1] ἑαυτῷ -g.
[2] παχυμεροῦς γενέσθαι καὶ -g.
[3] μεταβαλλούσης -F, X[1](first λ erased -X[3]), g[corr.] (second λ added superscript), a.
[4] πρώτῳ -g ; τρίτῳ -all other MSS. (but *cf.* 1049 F and contrast the topics of the third book in 1038 C, 1042 A-B, 1048 B *supra*).
[5] εἰς -omitted by B.
[6] τῆς -F, X[1].
[7] περιχεῖται -Wyttenbach ; περιέχεται -MSS.
[8] ‹ὧν› τὰ μὲν -Reiske ; τὰ μὲν ‹γὰρ› -Bernardakis ; ‹ὡς› τὰ μὲν -Pohlenz.
[9] τὴν -F.

[a] *i.e.* ψυχή is derived from ψῦξις, " chilling " (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 807 and 808), an etymology which is pre-Stoic (*cf.* Plato, *Cratylus* 399 D 10–E 3 and Aristotle, *De Anima* 405 b 28-29).
[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 715, 780, 785, 787 and i, frag. 484 (p. 108, 28-29).

air, changes and becomes animal and that hence soul has not inappropriately been named after this process.[a] On the other hand, he holds soul to be vital spirit in a more rarefied and subtile state than nature [b] ; and so he contradicts himself, for how can a subtile and rarefied state have been produced from density in the process of chilling and condensation ? What is more, how is it that, while declaring animation to be the result of chilling, he holds the sun to be animate, when it is igneous and the product of vaporous exhalation which has changed to fire ?[c] For he says in the first book concerning Nature [d] : " The transformation of fire is like this : by way of air it turns into water ; and from this, as earth is precipitated, air evaporates ; and, as the air is subtilized, ether [e] is diffused round about, and the stars along with the sun are kindled from the sea." Now, what is more opposed to kindling than chilling or to diffusion than condensation ? The latter produce

[c] ἔμψυχον ἡγεῖται . . . μεταβαλούσης = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 579 (p. 179, 28-30) ; *cf. De Comm. Not.* 1084 E and *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 652, 655, 663, 677, and 690. The self-contradiction is denied by Rieth (*Grundbegriffe*, p. 125), who contends that the " tempering " at birth was supposed to intensify the τόνος of the vital spirit by concentrating the heat within it. Some support for this might be found in *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 446 (p. 147, 13-25) ; but even this would not wholly resolve the difficulty.
[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 579 (p. 179, 30-34) ; *cf.* ii, frag. 581 and frag. 413 with W. Spoerri, *Späthellenistische Berichte über Welt, Kultur und Götter* (Basel, 1959), pp. 40-42.
[e] The Stoic ether was not a " fifth essence " like Aristotle's but a kind of fire : *cf. S.V.F.* i, frags. 120, 134, and 171 ; ii, frags. 527 (p. 168, 17-31), 580 (p. 180, 10-12), 596 (p. 184, 2-5), 601 (p. 185, 11-15), and 1067 (p. 313, 18-20) ; Plutarch, *De Facie* 928 C-D.

(1053) ἀέρος[1] ποιεῖ, τὰ δ' εἰς πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα τρέπει τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ γεώδες. ἀλλ' ὅμως ὅπου μὲν τὴν ἄναψιν[2] ὅπου δὲ τὴν περίψυξιν[3] ἀρχὴν ἐμψυχίας ποιεῖ. καὶ μὴν ὅταν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται διόλου, ⟨τὸν κόσμον διόλου⟩[4] ζῆν καὶ ζῷον εἶναί φησι σβεννύμενον δ' αὖθις καὶ παχυνόμενον εἰς ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τρέπεσθαι. λέγει δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Προνοίας· " διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν[5] ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχή ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν· ὅτε δέ, μεταβαλὼν εἴς τε[6] τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχήν, τρόπον τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν μετέβαλεν[7] ὥστε συνεστάναι[8] ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον C τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον." ἐνταῦθα δήπου σαφῶς τῇ μὲν ἐκπυρώσει καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα τοῦ κόσμου φησὶν εἰς τὸ[9] ἔμψυχον τρέπεσθαι τῇ δὲ σβέσει πάλιν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνίεσθαι καὶ ἀνυγραίνεσθαι μεταβάλλουσαν εἰς τὸ σωματοειδές. ἄτοπος οὖν φαίνεται τῇ περιψύξει νῦν μὲν ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ποιῶν ἔμψυχα νῦν δ' εἰς ἀναίσθητα καὶ ἄψυχα μεταβάλλων τὸ

[1] ἀέρα -B. [2] ἀνάψυξιν -n.
[3] περίψυξιν -X[3], g, B, E; παράψυξιν -X[1] and all other MSS.
[4] ⟨τὸν κόσμον διόλου⟩ -H. C.; ⟨τὸν κόσμον⟩ added after εἶναί φησι by Wyttenbach (*not* Amyot), after ζῷον by Bernardakis; διόλου ζῆν καὶ ζῷον ⟨ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον⟩ -Pohlenz.
[5] ὢν -a[corr.] (ω over erasure), A, β, γ, n, B, E; ἂν -F, X, g (preceding γὰρ omitted), adopted by Pohlenz with ⟨γένηται⟩ after πυρώδης.
[6] [τε] -deleted by Wyttenbach (but *cf. De An. Proc. in Timaeo* 1018 c: ἔκ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ . . .; Gonda, *Mnemosyne*, 4 Ser. vii [1954], pp. 284-285).
[7] μετέβαλεν -Reiske; μεταβάλοι ἄν -X[3], g; μεταβάλλων -all other MSS. (τρόπον . . . μεταβάλλων -omitted in text but added in margin by X[1]).

water and earth from fire and air, and the former turn into fire and air what is liquid and earthy [a]; but nevertheless in one place he makes kindling and in another chilling the origin of animation. Moreover, he says that, when conflagration has become thorough, ⟨the universe is thoroughly⟩ alive and animal but, as it burns out again and condenses, it turns into water and earth and what is corporeal. In the first book on Providence he says [b]: " For the universe, being thoroughly fiery, is *ipso facto* both its own soul and its own ruling faculty; but when, having changed into liquid [c] and the residual soul, it has in a way changed into body and soul so as to be a composite of these, it has got a different constituent principle." Here, surely, he plainly says that even the inanimate parts of the universe are by the conflagration turned into what is animate and that by the burning out again even the soul is slackened and liquefied, changing into what is corporeal. So his absurdity is manifest in that by the process of chilling he now makes animate beings out of insensible objects and now changes into insensible and inanimate objects the largest part of the soul of the

[a] " The latter " = chilling and condensation, " the former " = kindling and diffusion.
[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 605; *cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 606 (*De Comm. Not.* 1067 A), 1052, and (from the point of view of Peripatetic polemic) 1047. For ether as the ἡγεμονικόν of the universe *cf.* also *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 642 and 643 with 644 (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 139).
[c] Pohlenz adds ⟨καὶ τὸ γεῶδες⟩ after τὸ ὑγρὸν, but against this see the following paraphrase in c *infra*, . . . τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνίεσθαι καὶ ἀνυγραίνεσθαι . . ., without mention of γεῶδες or γῆ.

[8] συνιστάναι -F, X[1], a[1]; συνεστᾶναι -X[3].
[9] τὸν -g.

(1053) πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς. ἄνευ δὲ τούτων ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς γενέσεως αὐτῷ λόγος[1] μαχομένην ἔχει πρὸς τὸ δόγμα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. γίγνεσθαι μὲν γάρ φησι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅταν τὸ βρέφος ἀποτεχθῇ καθάπερ στομώσει τῇ περιψύξει τοῦ
D πνεύματος[2] μεταβαλόντος[3] ἀποδείξει δὲ χρῆται τοῦ γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μεταγενεστέραν εἶναι μάλιστα τῷ[4] καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐξομοιοῦσθαι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦσι. βλέπεται δὲ ἡ τούτων ἐναντίωσις· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀποκυήσεως ἠθοποιεῖσθαι, γιγνομένην[5] μετὰ τὴν ἀποκύησιν, ἢ συμβήσεται, πρὶν ἢ γενέσθαι ψυχήν, ὁμοίαν εἶναι ψυχῇ, τουτέστι καὶ εἶναι τῇ ὁμοιότητι καὶ μὴ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μήπω γεγονέναι. εἰ δέ φήσει[6] τις ὅτι, ταῖς κράσεσι τῶν σωμάτων ἐγγιγνομένης[7] τῆς ὁμοιότητος, αἱ ψυχαὶ γενόμεναι[8] μεταβάλλουσι,[9] διαφθείρει τὸ τεκμήριον τοῦ γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ οὕτως καὶ ἀγένητον[10] οὖσαν, ὅταν
E ἐπεισέλθῃ, μεταβάλλειν τῇ κράσει τῆς ὁμοιότητος.

42. Τὸν ἀέρα ποτὲ μὲν ἀνωφερῆ καὶ κοῦφον εἶναί φησι ποτὲ δὲ μήτε βαρὺν μήτε κοῦφον. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Κινήσεως τό τε πῦρ

[1] λόγος αὐτῷ -g, E. [2] πνεύμονος -F, a^1.
[3] μεταβάλλοντος -g, a^1(first λ erased), E.
[4] τοῦ γεγονέναι . . . τῷ -omitted by γ^1 but added in margin by $\gamma^{corr.}$
[5] γινομένην -X^3, g, $B^{corr.}$; γενομένην -E; γενωμένην a^1, Vat. Reg. 80; γεννωμένην -F, X^1, B^1, $a^{corr.}$, A, β, γ, n.
[6] φήσει -g, and note in margin of X: εἰ δὲ φήσει τις ἴσως οἶμαι; φησὶ -all other MSS.
[7] γινομένης -E.
[8] γενόμεναι -X^3, g, E; γεννώμεναι -all other MSS.
[9] μεταβάλουσιν -X^1.
[10] ἀγένητον -X^3, E; ἀγέννητον -all other MSS.

universe. Apart from this, however, in his account of the generation of soul the demonstration is in conflict with the doctrine, for, while he says [a] that the soul comes to be when the foetus has been brought to birth, the vital spirit having changed under chilling as if under tempering, yet as proof that the soul has come to be and is junior to body he uses mainly the argument that the offspring closely resemble their parents both in bent and in character.[b] The discrepancy of these assertions is obvious: it is not possible for the soul, coming to be after the birth, to have its character formed before the birth or else it will turn out that before soul has come to be it is similar to a soul, *i.e.* both exists, in that it has similarity, and, because it has not yet come to be, does not exist; but, if one should say that, the similarity originating in the blends of the bodies, the souls change after they have come to be, the argument for the generation of the soul is ruined, since in this way the soul may also be ungenerated and upon entering the body [c] may change under influence of the blend that constitutes the similarity.

42. Sometimes he says that air has an upward tendency and is light and sometimes that it is neither heavy nor light. Thus in the second book concerning Motion he states [d] that fire, being weight-

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 806 (p. 222, 25-35); *cf.* the beginning of this chapter and note *c* on page 569 *supra*.
[b] For this argument *cf.* *S.V.F.* i, frag. 518 (Cleanthes) and Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i, 79 (=van Straaten, *Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta* [1962], p. 27, 25-27); Verbeke, *Kleanthes*, pp. 152-156; van Straaten, *Panétius*, pp. 116-117.
[c] For the expression *cf.* Aristotle, *De Gen. Animal.* 736 b 28 (θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι).
[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 434. The fact that here and in *S.V.F.*

(1053) ἀβαρὲς ὂν ἀνωφερὲς εἶναι[1] λέγει καὶ τούτῳ[2] παραπλησίως τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος τῇ γῇ μᾶλλον προσνεμομένου[3] τοῦ δ' ἀέρος τῷ πυρί. ἐν δὲ ταῖς Φυσικαῖς Τέχναις ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν ῥέπει δόξαν, ὡς μήτε βάρος ἐξ αὐτοῦ μήτε κουφότητα τοῦ ἀέρος ἔχοντος.

43. Ἔτι τὸν[4] ἀέρα φύσει ζοφερὸν εἶναι[5] λέγει, καὶ τούτῳ τεκμηρίῳ χρῆται τοῦ καὶ ψυχρὸν εἶναι πρώτως· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ[6] τὸ μὲν ζοφερὸν
F πρὸς τὴν λαμπρότητα τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν πρὸς τὴν θερμότητα τοῦ πυρός. ταῦτα κινῶν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν[7] Φυσικῶν Ζητημάτων πάλιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Ἕξεων οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις[8] πλὴν ἀέρας[9] εἶναί φησιν· " ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα· καὶ τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν ἕξει συνεχομένων αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων[10] ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὃν[11] σκληρότητα μὲν ἐν σιδήρῳ πυκνότητα δ' ἐν λίθῳ λευκότητα[12] δ' ἐν

[1] ἀβαρὲς εἶναί φησι εἶτ' ἀνωφερὲς -B.
[2] τοῦτο -n.
[3] τοῦ μὲν . . . προσνεμομένου -omitted by X, g.
[4] ἔτι τὸν -Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 21, n. 3); ἢ τὸν -F[1](ἢ erased -F[2]), X, g, B; τὸν -all other MSS.
[5] εἶναι -omitted by g.
[6] αὐτῷ -E.
[7] περὶ -g.
[8] ταυ (at end of line) ξεις -g.
[9] ἀέρος -E.
[10] ὁ συνέχων αἴτιος -g.
[11] ὃν -F, X, g, B; ὃς -a[corr.] and all other MSS.
[12] σκληρότατον . . . πυκνότατον . . . λευκότατον -g.

i, frag. 99 (especially pp. 27, 31–28, 1) ἀβαρές and not κοῦφον is used is made much of by Sambursky (*Physics of the Stoics*, pp. 6-7 and 111), who insists that the Stoics really

less, has an upward tendency and that the case of air is much the same as this, since water is more closely associated with earth and air with fire; but in the Arts of Physics he leans to the other opinion,[a] assuming that of itself air has neither weight nor lightness.

43. Moreover, he states[b] that air is naturally murky; and this he uses as an argument for its being primarily cold also, saying that its murkiness is opposed to the brilliance and its coldness to the heat of fire. This argument he advances in the first book of the Physical Questions, but in the books on Habitudes again he says[c] that habitudes are nothing but quantities of air: " For it is these that produce the cohesion in bodies; and each of the things that habitude makes cohesive owes its particular quality to the cohibiting air, which in iron is called hardness, in stone solidity, and in silver whiteness."[d] These

regarded fire and air as " gravitationally neutral "; but *cf.* *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 473 (p. 155, 32-36), 555 (p. 175, 19-22 and 31-35), and 571, where these elements are explicitly called κοῦφα. On the other hand, according to the Stoics the primary natural motion of all bodies is to the centre of the universe (1055 A *infra* = *S.V.F.* ii, p. 173, 31-33; *cf.* *S.V.F.* i, p. 27, 25-29), and so all could be said to have weight (*cf.* the doubtful text in *S.V.F.* ii, p. 115, 39-40; Pohlenz, *Stoa*, i, p. 76).

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 435; *cf.* Pseudo-Galen on Stoic matter, *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 327.

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 429 (p. 140, 35-39); *cf.* *ibid.*, pp. 140, 40–141, 4 and frag. 430 (= *De Primo Frigido* 952 C-D and 948 D—949 B) and also *S.V.F.* ii, p. 143, 14-17, p. 178, 6-10, and p. 180, 8-9; O. Gilbert, *Die meteorologischen Theorien des griechischen Altertums* (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 243-244.

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 449 (p. 147, 38-43).

[d] On this passage and what follows *cf.* P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde* i, pp. 302-308 and Sambursky, *Physics*

1054 ἀργύρῳ καλοῦσι,"[1] πολλὴν ἀτοπίαν καὶ μάχην τούτων ἐχόντων· εἰ μὲν γὰρ μένει ὁποῖός[2] ἐστι φύσει, πῶς τὸ μέλαν ἐν τῷ μὴ λευκῷ λευκότης γίγνεται καὶ τὸ μαλθακὸν[3] ἐν τῷ μὴ σκληρῷ[4] σκληρότης καὶ τὸ μανὸν ἐν τῷ[5] μὴ πυκνῷ[6] πυκνότης; εἰ δὲ μιγνύμενος ἐν τούτοις ἐξίσταται καὶ συνομοιοῦται, πῶς ἕξις ἐστὶν ἢ[7] δύναμις ἢ αἰτία τούτων ὑφ' ὧν κρατεῖται; πάσχοντος γάρ ἐστιν, οὐ δρῶντος, οὐδὲ συνέχοντος ἀλλ' ἐξασθενοῦντος ἡ τοιαύτη μεταβολὴ καθ' ἣν ἀπόλλυσι τὰς αὑτοῦ ποιότητας. καίτοι πανταχοῦ τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον[8] ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι τὰς δὲ ποι-
B ότητας, πνεύματα οὔσας[9] καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις, οἷς[10] ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν. ταῦτα δ'[11] οὐκ ἔνεστι λέγειν αὐτοῖς, τὸν ἀέρα φύσει τοιοῦτον ὑποτιθεμένοις· ἕξις γὰρ ὢν καὶ τόνος αὑτῷ συνεξομοιώσει τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον, ὥστε μέλαν[12] εἶναι καὶ μαλθακόν· εἰ δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα κράσει τὰς ἐναντίας λαμβάνει μορφὰς αἷς[13] ἔχειν πέφυκεν, ὕλη τρόπον τινὰ τῆς ὕλης οὐκ αἴτιον οὐδὲ δύναμίς ἐστιν.

[1] καλοῦσι -omitted by E (ἀργύρῳ . . . vac. 1⅓ lines . . . πολλὴν).
[2] ὁποῖός -X³, g, B ; ὁποῖός τ' -all other MSS. ; ὁποῖός γ' -Reiske.
[3] τῷ μαλθακῷ -F¹, X¹.
[4] σκληρὸν -γ.
[5] τῷ -X³(added superscript), g, B, n ; omitted by all other MSS.
[6] μανῷ -g.
[7] ἡ -g ; καὶ -E.
[8] ἀργὴν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐξ ἑαυτῆς -E.
[9] οὔσας -X³(ας over erasure), g, B ; οὖς δὲ -all other MSS.
[10] οἷος -X¹(erasure left vacant between οἷ and ς -X³).
[11] δ' -X, g, B ; omitted by all other MSS.
[12] μέλαν -X, g, B ; μάλα -all other MSS.
[13] ἃς -X³, g, B.

of the Stoics, pp. 1-11. Bodies that are cohesive units

assertions are full of absurdity and inconsistency, for, if air remains such as it naturally is, how does what is dark become whiteness in what is not white and what is soft become hardness in what is not hard and what is subtle become solidity in what is not solid? If, on the other hand, by being mixed in these things, it alters its character and conforms to them, how is it a habitude or a power [a] or a cause of the things that dominate it? Change of a kind that makes anything lose its own qualities is characteristic of a patient, not of an agent, and not of something that cohibits but of something too feeble for resistance. Yet everywhere they declare [b] that matter is of itself the inert and immobile substrate of qualities and that qualities, being vital spirits or aeriform tensions, give character and shape to the various parts of matter in which they come to be. To say this, however, is not possible for them, supposing air to be naturally the kind of thing they do, for as a habitude and tension it would make every several body conform entirely to itself so as to be dark and soft ; but, if by blending with them it acquires characteristics contrary to those which it naturally has, it is in a way the matter's matter and not cause or power.

(ἡνωμένα) and not mere aggregates of discrete units (διεστῶτα) or combinations of separate but contiguous units (συνημμένα) are each held together by the tension of the πνεῦμα which by pervading them constitutes the peculiar, homogeneous character of each, the ἕξις being thus at once the " bond " and the " state " of the cohesive body. *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 368, 391, 458, 473, 474, 716, 989, 1013, and 1132 ; Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, pp. 125-126, 130, and 171-172 ; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, p. 83 and ii, p. 49.

[a] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1085 c-D (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 146, 33-34) ; *S.V.F.* ii, p. 113, 1-7 ; p. 308, 17-18 and 38-42.

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 449 (pp. 147, 44–148, 2).

(1054) 44. Ὅτι τοῦ κόσμου κενὸν ἐκτὸς ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὔτ' ἀρχὴν οὔτε μέσον οὔτε τελευτὴν[1] ἔχει πολλάκις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λέγεται. καὶ τούτῳ[2] μάλιστα τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' Ἐπικούρου τῆς ἀτόμου κάτω φορὰν ἐξ αὑτῆς ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐκ οὔσης C ἐν ἀπείρῳ διαφορᾶς καθ' ἣν τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω νοεῖται γιγνόμενον. ἀλλ' ἔν γε τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Δυνατῶν μέσον τινὰ τόπον καὶ μέσην χώραν ὑποθέμενος ἐνταῦθά φησιν ἱδρῦσθαι[3] τὸν κόσμον· ἔστι δὲ ἡ λέξις αὕτη· " διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου εἰ[4] ῥητέον φθαρτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν[5] λόγου οἶομαι[6] δεῖσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον[7] ἐμοὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἔχειν· [οἱονεὶ δ'] εἰς τὴν οἱονεὶ[8] ἀφθαρσίαν πολύ τι αὐτῷ συνεργεῖ καὶ ἡ τῆς χώρας κατάληψις, οἷον διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι, ἐπεί, εἰ ἀλλαχῆ νοηθείη ὤν, καὶ παντελῶς ἂν αὐτῷ συνάπτοι ἡ φθορά." καὶ μετὰ D μικρὸν αὖθις· " οὕτω γάρ πως καὶ ἡ οὐσία συντέ-

[1] τελευτὴν -X[3], g, B ; τελευταῖον -all other MSS.
[2] τούτῳ -X, g, E ; τούτων -B ; τοῦτο -all other MSS.
[3] ἱδρύσασθαι -A, β, γ, n.
[4] εἰ -F, X, g, B ; omitted by all other MSS.
[5] X, g, B ; αὐτὸν φθαρτὸν εἶναι -all other MSS.
[6] οἶομαι -X, g, B ; οἰόμενον -all other MSS.
[7] ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον -g (not X or X[3], *pace* Pohlenz).
[8] εἰς δὲ τὴν οἱονεὶ -Wyttenbach (*cf. De Defectu Orac.* 425 D-E) ; οἱονεὶ δ' εἰς τὴν ὥσπερ -MSS. ; οἷά τε δ' εἰς τὴν ὥσπερ (with συνεργεῖν for συνεργεῖ) -Pohlenz after Reiske (δοκεῖ δ' . . . συνεργεῖν).

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 539. *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 524, 535, 543, 552, 554 and i, frags. 94-96.

[b] *Cf. De Defectu Orac.* 425 D and *Adv. Colotem* 1111 B, printed with this passage as frag. 299 (Usener, *Epicurea*, pp. 212-213). For the downward motion of the atom *cf.* Epicurus, *Epistle* i, 60-61 and frags. 276 and 281.

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 551 (p. 174, 5-17). *Cf. De Defectu Orac.* 425 D-E (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 174, 20-29) and *De Facie* 925 F—926 A (with my notes in *L.C.L.* xii, pp. 76-77). In what follows here concerning the middle of the infinite void Plutarch has been charged with obvious misinterpretation both by Pohlenz (*Stoa* i, p. 77) and by Sambursky (*Physics of the Stoics*, p. 112) ; but see rather the treatments of the question by Bréhier (*Théorie des Incorporels*, pp. 44-51) and by Goldschmidt (*Le système stoïcien*, pp. 29-30 and p. 43). According to the latter Chrysippus meant that the position of the universe determines the centre of the void ; but, if so, how could he have thought that the position occupied by the universe makes any difference to its indestructibility ?

[d] For the Stoic distinction of place (τόπος) and space (χώρα) and void (κενόν) *cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 95 and ii, frags. 503, 504, 505, 1141 ; see Bréhier, *Théorie des Incorporels*, pp. 52-53 and Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 26-28.

44. It is frequently asserted by Chrysippus [a] that outside of the universe there is infinite void and that what is infinite has no beginning, middle, or end ; and this the Stoics use especially to annihilate the downward motion which Epicurus says [b] the atom has of itself, their contention being that in an infinite there is no difference by which to distinguish one part as being up and the other as down. In the fourth book on Possibilities,[c] however, he assumes that there is some middle place and midmost space [d] and says that here the universe is situated. These are his words : " Consequently, even in the case of the universe the question whether it should be said to be subject to destruction requires deliberation, I think. All the same, to me the case seems rather to be as follows : to its virtual indestructibility a good deal is contributed even by the position that it has occupied in space, that is to say through its being in the middle, since, if it should be imagined to be elsewhere, destruction would most certainly attach to it." And again after a bit : " For it has also in some such

(1054) τευχεν ἀιδίως τὸν μέσον κατειληφυῖα τόπον, εὐθὺς τοιάδε τις οὖσα, ὥστε καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν συντυχίαν μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι αὐτὴν φθορὰν ⟨καὶ⟩ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ'[1] εἶναι ἀίδιον." ταῦτα μίαν μὲν ἔχει καταφανῆ καὶ βλεπομένην ἐναντίωσιν,[2] ἐν ἀπείρῳ μέσον τινὰ τόπον καὶ μέσην χώραν ἀπολείποντος, δευτέραν δ' ἀδηλοτέραν μὲν ἀλογωτέραν δὲ ταύτης. οἰόμενος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄφθαρτον διαμένειν τὸν κόσμον εἰ κατ' ἄλλο μέρος αὐτῷ τοῦ κενοῦ[3] συντέτευχε γενέσθαι τὴν ἵδρυσιν, δῆλός ἐστι δεδιὼς μή, τῶν μερῶν τῆς οὐσίας ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον φερομένων, E διάλυσις καὶ φθορὰ τοῦ κόσμου γένοιτο. ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐφοβεῖτο, μὴ φύσει τὰ σώματα φέρεσθαι πανταχόθεν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἡγούμενος οὐ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ τῆς περιεχούσης τὴν οὐσίαν[4] χώρας. περὶ οὗ καὶ πολλάκις εἴρηκεν ὡς ἀδυνάτου καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κενῷ διαφορὰν[5] ᾗ[6] τὰ σώματα δευρὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δευρὶ προσάγεται, τὴν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου[7] σύνταξιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τῆς[8] κινήσεως ἐπὶ τὸ κέντρον καὶ τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ νευόντων καὶ φερομένων ⟨πάντων τῶν μερῶν⟩[9] πανταχόθεν. ἀρκεῖ δ' εἰς τοῦτο[10] παραθέσθαι λέξιν ἐκ τοῦ[11] δευτέρου

[1] ⟨καὶ⟩ -added by Reiske ; κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' -X³, B ; κατ' αὐτοῦ τ' -F¹, X¹ ; καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ -g ; κατὰ τοῦτ' -F² and all other MSS.

[2] ἐναντίως -F¹, X¹.

[3] νοῦ -g.

[4] αἰτίαν -β.

[5] διαφθορὰν -F¹.

[6] ᾗ -X³, g ; ἢ -F¹, X¹(?), α¹, n ; ᾗ -F², α², A, β, γ, E, B.

[7] κόσμου τούτου -g.

[8] τῆς -omitted by g.

[9] ⟨. . .⟩ -suggested by Pohlenz (*cf.* 1055 A *infra* and *S. V.F.* i, p. 27, 27-28).

[10] τοῦ -F, α, A¹.

way been an accident of substance, from the very fact that it is the kind of thing it is, to have occupied everlastingly the middle place, so that otherwise but also accidentally it does not admit of destruction ⟨and⟩ in this very way is everlasting."[a] There is in these statements one discrepancy which is manifest and glaring, the admission of some middle place and midmost space in an infinite ; but there is a second, which, while less evident, is more irrational than this, for in thinking that the universe could not be remaining indestructible if by accident it has got situated in another part of the void he is evidently afraid[b] lest the universe be dissolved and destroyed because the parts of substance move towards the middle. This he would not fear, however, did he not hold that bodies naturally move from all points towards the middle—the middle not of substance but of space that encompasses substance. Yet of this he has very frequently said[c] that it is impossible and contrary to nature because in the void there exists no difference by which bodies are drawn in one direction rather than another but the structure of the universe is responsible for the motion ⟨of all the parts⟩ moving from all points and tending towards its centre or middle. For this it is sufficient to give a quotation from the second book concerning Motion,

[a] The central position, while sufficient to make substance everlasting, is only incidental to substance, which in its essential nature also—and so καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον—is everlasting (*cf. S. V.F.* i, frag. 87 ; ii, frags. 317 and 599).

[b] δῆλός ἐστι . . . γένοιτο = *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 551 (p. 174, 17-19).

[c] *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 550 (p. 173, 15-33).

[11] τοῦ -over erasure in X ; omitted by g ; δὲ τοῦ -F¹ (δὲ erased -F²).

(1054) περὶ Κινήσεως. ὑπειπὼν γὰρ ὅτι τέλεον μὲν ὁ
F κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν οὐ τέλεα δὲ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου
μέρη τῷ[1] πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχειν[2] καὶ μὴ καθ'
αὑτὰ εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ διελθὼν
ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν συμμονὴν καὶ τὴν συνοχὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
κινεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν μερῶν πάντων πεφυκότος, οὐκ
ἐπὶ τὴν διάλυσιν καὶ τὴν θρύψιν, ταῦτ' ἐπείρηκεν[3]·
" οὕτω δὲ τοῦ[4] ὅλου τεινομένου[5] εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ[6]
κινουμένου καὶ τῶν μορίων[7] ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν
1055 ἐχόντων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως, πιθανὸν πᾶσι
τοῖς σώμασιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν
πρὸς τὸ τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ οὑτωσὶ
κινουμένῳ[8] πρὸς αὐτὸν τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὡς ἂν μέ-
ρεσιν οὖσιν." εἶτα, φήσαι τις ἄν, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τί
παθὼν ἐπελάθου τῶν λόγων τούτων, ὥστε τὸν κόσ-
μον, εἰ μὴ τὴν μέσην χώραν ἐκ τύχης κατειλήφει,[9]
διαλυτὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν ἀποφαίνειν; εἰ γὰρ αὐτός γε
νεύειν ἐπὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ[10] μέσον ἀεὶ πέφυκε καὶ τὰ μέρη
πρὸς τοῦτο κατατείνειν πανταχόθεν, ὅποι[11] ποτ' ἂν
τοῦ κενοῦ[12] μετατεθῇ, συνέχων ἑαυτὸν οὕτως καὶ
B περιστέλλων, ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἄθρυπτος διαμενεῖ[13]· τὰ
γὰρ θρυπτόμενα καὶ σκεδαννύμενα τοῦτο πάσχει

[1] τὸ -α, A, β, γ, n.
[2] ἔχει -F, X[1], α, A[1].
[3] ἐπείρηκεν -X, g, B ; εἴρηκεν -all other MSS.
[4] τοῦ -omitted by g.
[5] γενομένου -g ; omitted by B.
[6] εἰσαυτὸ (εἰς αὐτὸ -X[3]) καὶ -X ; εἰς ἑαυτὸ καὶ -g ; omitted by B.
[7] τοῦ μορίου -F[1], X[1].
[8] κινουμένου -F, X[1](?), α, A[1].
[9] κατ (illegible erasure of 3 spaces) λήφει -X[1].
[10] αὐτοῦ -F, X, g, B ; αὐτὸ -all other MSS.
[11] ὅπη -g.
[12] τοῦ κείνου -F[1], X[1](?) ; ἐκεῖνος -X[3], g.

for after remarking that the universe is a perfect body whereas the parts of the universe are not perfect, since their existence is not independent but is their particular relation to the whole,[a] and after explaining its motion as that of something which by means of all its parts is naturally moving towards its own continuance and cohesion, not its dissolution and dispersion, he has added this statement : " Since the tension and motion of the whole have thus a single direction and its parts have this motion as a result of the nature of body, it is plausible that motion towards the middle of the universe is the primary natural motion for all bodies,[b] for the universe, which thus is in motion towards itself, and for its parts, inasmuch as they are parts." Why then, sir, one might say, what made you so far forget these arguments as to declare the universe subject to dissolution and destruction if it had not by chance occupied the midmost space? If, in fact, it is always natural for it to tend itself towards its own middle and for its parts to strive towards this from all points, then by cohibiting and compressing itself in this way it will remain indestructible and undispersible in any part of the void to which it may be transferred,[c] for what happens to things that are dispersed and dissipated

[a] See Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, p. 87 (but the passage of Cleomedes cited *ibid.*, p. 84, n. 3 is neither parallel nor relevant) ; and for Stoic formulation of the relation of part to whole *cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 336 and xi, 24.

[b] *Cf.* on 1053 E *supra* page 575, note *d sub fin.*

[c] *Cf.* Plutarch's argument in *De Facie* 924 D-F with my notes *ad loc.* in *L.C.L.* xii, pp. 68-71 and especially p. 68, note *c*.

[13] διαμενεῖ -Reiske (implied in the versions of Amyot and Xylander) ; διαμένει -MSS.

(1055) διακρίσει τῶν μερῶν ἑκάστου καὶ διαλύσει πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπορρέοντος. σὺ δ', εἰ[1] κατ' ἄλλο τοῦ κενοῦ τεθείη ὁ κόσμος[2] οἰόμενος οὕτω παντελεῖ συνάπτεσθαι φθορᾷ[3] καὶ λέγων οὕτως καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μέσον ἐν τῷ μηδὲν ἔχειν πεφυκότι μέσον[4] ζητῶν ἀπείρῳ,[5] τὰς μὲν τάσεις καὶ συνοχὰς[6] καὶ νεύσεις ἐκείνας ὡς οὐδὲν ἐχέγγυον εἰς σωτηρίαν ἐχούσας ἀφῆκας τῇ δὲ καταλήψει τοῦ τόπου τὴν σύμπασαν αἰτίαν τῆς διαμονῆς[7] ἀνέθηκας. καίτοι τοῖς προειρημένοις ταυτὶ συνάπτεις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν[8] ἐξελέγξαι φιλοτιμούμενος· " ὃν τρόπον δὲ[9] κινεῖται ἕκαστον τῶν
C μορίων συμφυὲς ὂν τῷ λοιπῷ, εὔλογον οὕτως καὶ[10] καθ' αὑτὸ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ λόγου χάριν νοήσαιμεν αὐτὸ καὶ ὑποθοίμεθα[11] εἶναι ἐν κενῷ τινι τοῦ κόσμου τούτου· ὡς γὰρ ἂν συνεχόμενον πάντοθεν ἐκινεῖτο ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, μενεῖ[12] ἐν τῇ κινήσει ταύτῃ, κἂν λόγου χάριν ἐξαίφνης περὶ αὐτὸ[13] γένηται κενόν." εἶτα μέρος μὲν ὁτιοῦν[14] ὑπὸ κενοῦ περιληφθὲν οὐκ ἀποβάλλει τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ[15] τοῦ κόσμου μέσον[16] ἄγουσαν ῥοπήν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ[17] κόσμος, ἂν μὴ τὴν μέσην[18]

[1] σὺ δ' εἰ -Basil.; ὅδ' εἰ -F, n; ὁ δὴ -X[3](ῆ over erasure), B; ὃ δὴ -g; ὁ δ' εἰ -all other MSS.

[2] τεθείη ὁ κόσμος -F[2], α, A, β, γ, n, E; τεθὲν ὁ κόσμος -F[1], X[1]; τεθέντα τὸν κόσμον -X[3], g, B.

[3] παντελεῖ σ. φθορᾷ -X[3], g, B; παντελῆ σ. φθορὰν -all other MSS.

[4] μέσον . . . ἀπείρῳ -omitted by E (πεφυκότι . . . vac. ½ line . . . τὰς).

[5] ζητῶν ἀπείρῳ -Dübner (ἀπείρῳ -Meziriac); τῇ (τι -B, τῆς -Tolet. 51, 5) τῶν ἀπείρων -MSS.

[6] καὶ τὰς συνοχὰς -g.

[7] διαμονῆς -X, g, B; διανομῆς -all other MSS.

[8] σεαυτὸν -B.

[9] ὃν δὲ τρόπον -B.

[10] καὶ -omitted by B.

[11] πυθοίμεθα -g; ὑποθείμεθα -B.

is the separation and dissolution of their parts, each of which glides away towards its proper place from that which is unnatural to it. But you, in thinking that for the universe to be put anywhere else in the void is tantamount to its being involved in utter destruction and in asserting this [a] and for this reason seeking out a middle in the infinite, which by its nature has no middle, you abandoned, as affording no assurance of preservation, those " tensions " and " cohesions " and " tendencies " of yours and attributed the entire cause of its persisting to its having occupied the place it has. Yet to the aforesaid you subjoin the following [b] like a man ambitious to refute himself: " It is reasonable that the way in which each of the parts moves when cohering with the rest is also the way in which it moves by itself, even if for the sake of argument we should in imagination suppose it to be in a void within this universe, for as it would be moving to the middle when cohibited from all sides so will it continue in this motion even if for the sake of argument all about it suddenly comes to be void." Then in that case, while no part whatever, though encompassed by void, loses the inclination that draws it to the middle of the universe, yet the universe itself, unless accident provide it with

[a] *Cf.* 1054 c *supra.*

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 550 (pp. 173, 34–174, 4).

[12] μενεῖ -Pohlenz (" il demourera " -Amyot); μένει -MSS.

[13] αὐτὸ -X, g, B; αὐτὸν -all other MSS.

[14] ὅτι οὐ νῦν -F[1], X[1]; ὁτιοῦν νῦν -X[3], g.

[15] τὸ -X[3], g, B; omitted by all other MSS.

[16] μέσον -F, X, g, B; μέσου -α; μέσην -all other MSS.

[17] ὁ -omitted by α.

[18] τὸ μέσον -n.

(1055) παρασκευάσῃ χώραν αὐτῷ τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀπολεῖ τὸν συνεκτικὸν τόνον, ἄλλοις ἀλλαχόσε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ μέρεσι φερομένοις.[1]

45. Καὶ[2] ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει μεγάλας ὑπεναντιώσεις
D πρὸς τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἤδη καὶ πρὸς τὸν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ προνοίας, τὸ τὰ μικρότατα τῶν αἰτίων[3] τούτοις ἀνατιθέντα τὸ κυριώτατον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μέγιστον. τί γάρ ἐστι κυριώτερον τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διαμονῆς καὶ τοῦ[4] τὴν οὐσίαν ἡνωμένην τοῖς μέρεσι συνέχεσθαι πρὸς αὑτήν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε συμπέπτωκεν αὐτομάτως κατὰ[5] Χρύσιππον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ τόπου κατάληψις αἰτία τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἐστὶν αὕτη δὲ συντυχίᾳ γέγονε, δῆλον ὅτι συντυχίας ἔργον ἡ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων ἐστίν,[6] οὐχ εἱμαρμένης καὶ προνοίας.

46. Ὁ δὲ τῶν δυνατῶν λόγος πρὸς τὸν τῆς εἱμαρμένης λόγον αὐτῷ πῶς οὐ μαχόμενος[7] ἐστιν;
E εἰ[8] γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δυνατὸν ὅπερ ἢ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ

[1] φαινομένοις -F[1]; φαινομένης -X[3] (η over erasure and erasure before φ), g; φερομένοις -F[2] and all other MSS.
[2] εἰ -F[1], X, g.
[3] αἰτίων -X[3], g; αἰτιῶν -all other MSS.
[4] καὶ τοῦ -B; καὶ (τοῦ omitted) -g; καὶ τὸ -all other MSS.; ἢ τὸ -Basil.
[5] κατὰ τὸν -E.
[6] ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἐστὶ σωτηρία -g; τῶν ὅλων ἡ σωτηρία ἐστὶν -B.
[7] μαχόμενος -F, X, g, B; μαχόμενον -all other MSS.
[8] εἰ γὰρ . . . δυνατόν ἐστιν -omitted by g.

[a] Not that this was his intention but that it is implied by his expressions quoted in 1054 C-D *supra* (*cf.* Giesen, *De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 54).

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 202 and Döring, *Megariker*, frag. 134; *cf.* A. A. Long, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, lii (1970), p. 247, n. 3.

[c] With this Diodorus, nicknamed "Cronus," son of

the midmost space, will lose its cohibiting tension with the various parts of its substance all moving in different directions.

45. Moreover, while his physical theory is involved in serious contradictions by these statements, his theory of god and providence too was already so involved by that in which he attributes to them the most trivial of causes and takes from them the greatest and most important. For what is more important than that the universe persist and that its substance by unification with its parts be cohesive with itself? Yet according to Chrysippus[a] this has happened accidentally, for, if its having occupied the place it has is responsible for its indestructibility and that has come about by accident, the preservation of the universe as a whole is obviously the work of accident, not of destiny and providence.

46. And how does his theory of possibilities[b] not conflict with his theory of destiny? For, if "possible" is not defined in the manner of Diodorus[c] as

Ameinias of Iasus and pupil of Apollonius of the school of Eubulides, Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, is said to have studied dialectic (*cf.* P. Natorp, *R.-E.* v [1903], cols. 705, 29–707, 5 and K. von Fritz, *R.-E.* Supplement v [1931], cols. 719, 19–721, 25 and 723, 54–724, 25). For the definition of "possible" formulated by Diodorus, in support of which he is said to have constructed the argument called ὁ κυριεύων (see note *e* on *De Comm. Not.* 1070 D *infra*), and for the rejection of it by Chrysippus *cf.* Cicero, *De Fato* 12-20 (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 954); Epictetus, *Diss.* II, xix, 1-9 (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 283); Alexander, *Anal. Prior.*, pp. 183, 34–184, 6; Boethius, *In Librum Aristotelis περὶ ἑρμηνείας Secundae Editionis* iii, 9 (pp. 234, 22–236, 4 [Meiser]); Mates, *Stoic Logic*, pp. 36-41; Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, pp. 73-79; Wm. and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 117-128; M. Frede, *Die stoische Logik* (Göttingen, 1974), pp. 110-117.

(1055) ἔσται κατὰ Διόδωρον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν[1] τοῦ γενέσθαι, κἂν μὴ μέλλῃ γενήσεσθαι, δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἔσται δυνατὰ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ καθ' εἱμαρμένην. ⟨ὥστ' ἢ τὴν⟩[2] ἀνίκητον καὶ ἀνεκβίαστον καὶ περιγενητικὴν ἁπάντων ἡ εἱμαρμένη[3] δύναμιν ἀπόλλυσιν ἢ[4] ταύτης οἵαν[5] ἀξιοῖ Χρύσιππος οὔσης τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ γενέσθαι πολλάκις εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἐμπεσεῖται. καὶ πᾶν μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται, τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν ἀνάγκῃ κατειλημμένον, πᾶν δὲ ψεῦδος ἀδύνατον, τὴν μεγίστην ἔχον αἰτίαν ἀντιπίπτουσαν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς γενέσθαι. ᾧ γὰρ ἐν θαλάττῃ πεπρωμένον ἐστὶν ἀποθανεῖν πῶς[6]
F οἷόν τε τοῦτον ἐπιδεκτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν γῇ ἀποθανεῖν, τί δὲ[7] τὸν Μεγαροῖ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἀθήνας ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης κωλυόμενον;

47. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ[8] περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν λεγόμενα νεανικῶς πρὸς τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἐναντιοῦται. τὴν γὰρ φαντασίαν βουλόμενος οὐκ οὖσαν αὐ-

[1] ἐπιδεκτικὸν -X[3](τικ" over erasure), B, E; ἐπιδεκτὸν -all other MSS.

[2] ⟨ὥστ' ἢ τὴν⟩ -added by Pohlenz; ⟨ἢ ἄρα τὴν⟩ -von Arnim (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 64, 44), who conjectured a lacuna here.

[3] ἡ εἱμαρμένη -Reiske; ἢ εἱμαρμένην -MSS.

[4] οἳ -g.

[5] οἵαν -B; οἷον -all other MSS. (added superscript -g).

[6] πῶς ἂν -g.

[7] δὲ -omitted by g.

[8] τὰ -omitted by X[1].

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 201 (p. 64, 17-18 and 27-29) and 959 (p. 279, 15-18); and see the "stricter definition" of τὸ δυνατόν in [Plutarch], *De Fato* 571 A *sub finem.* On the circularity of the Stoic definition see Wm. and Martha Kneale, *op. cit.* (see preceding note), p. 125.

[b] Whereas according to Chrysippus what is true may not be necessary (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 64, 22-23 and p. 279, 31-33).

that which either is or will be true but if everything is possible that is susceptible of coming about, even if it is not going to come about,[a] many of the things that are not in accordance with destiny will be possible. ⟨Consèquently, either⟩ destiny loses her invincible and ineluctable and all-prevailing force; or, if she is what Chrysippus maintains, that which is susceptible of coming about will often fall into the category of the impossible, and everything true will be necessary,[b] being constrained by the most sovereign necessity of all,[c] and everything false impossible, since the mightiest cause is adverse to its becoming true. For how can he whose death at sea has been determined by destiny be susceptible of dying on land, and why is it possible for the man at Megara to go to Athens when he is prevented by destiny from doing so?[d]

47. But furthermore what he says about mental images is in violent contradiction to the doctrine of destiny.[e] For in his desire to prove that the mental

[c] *i.e.* destiny. *Cf.* the thesis of Chrysippus, τὸ πάνθ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης κατειλῆφθαι (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 266, 36-37) and the expression of Plotinus, εἱμαρμένην ταύτην καὶ κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν θέμενοι (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 273, 37).

[d] The same two examples occur in the Stoic reply to Diodorus as given by Boethius, *In Librum Aristotelis* περὶ ἑρμηνείας *Secundae Editionis* iii, 9 (p. 235, 6-26 [Meiser]).

[e] In order to reconcile the Stoic doctrine of destiny as a universally coherent causal nexus and that of individual human responsibility involving a voluntary choice of action Chrysippus denied that in human beings the cause of reaction to a mental image is the image itself. The images presented to the mind, being fully determined and so links in the causal chain of destiny, are a necessary precondition of action; but action or impulsion follows only upon the mind's assent to the image presented, and the mind is free to give or to withhold this assent which is of itself the

(1055) τοτελῆ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως[1] αἰτίαν[2] ἀποδεικνύειν, εἴρηκεν ὅτι βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς[3] τὰς συγκαταθέσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ ψεύδει
1056 χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φαύλους καὶ φαντασίαν παριστᾶσι[4] πιθανήν, οὐ μὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αἰτία τῆς ψευδοῦς ἔσται[5] καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. ταῦτ' οὖν ἄν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ μεταφέρων ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην λέγῃ[6] μὴ διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην γίγνεσθαι τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἔσονται καὶ ψευδεῖς συγκαταθέσεις[7] καὶ ὑπολήψεις καὶ ἀπάται καὶ βλαβήσονται διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ὁ τοῦ βλάπτειν τὸν σοφὸν ἐξαιρούμενος λόγος ἅμα καὶ τὸ μὴ πάντων αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀποδείκνυσιν.[8] εἰ γὰρ[9] μήτε δοξάζουσι μήτε βλάπτονται διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην,
B δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κατορθοῦσιν[10] οὐδὲ φρονοῦσιν οὐδὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι βεβαίως οὐδ' ὠφελοῦνται διὰ τὴν

[1] συγκαλέσεως -n.
[2] αἰτίαν -omitted by B.
[3] πυ . . . vac. 8 (at end of line) . . . αὐτοτελεῖς -g.
[4] παριστῶσι -E, Vat. Reg. 80.
[5] ψ . . . vac. 3. . . ἔσται -g.
[6] λέγει -F[1]; λέγοι -E, B.
[7] ἐπεὶ . . . ψευδεῖς συγκαταθέσεις -omitted by g; in Vat. Reg. 80 misplaced after ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς in 1055 F *supra*.
[8] ἀποδεικνύουσιν -g (ουσ over erasure).
[9] εἰ γὰρ -omitted by F[1] and X[1]; εἰ δὲ -X[3], g, B.
[10] κατορθοῦνται -β.

sufficient and decisive cause, although whether any individual will assent to any image depends upon his own character as it has been formed by nature and by education. For a summary of this theory *cf.* Aulus Gellius, VII, ii, 1-15 (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1000) and XIX, i, 15-20 = Epictetus, frag. 9 (*L.C.L.*

image is not of itself a sufficient cause of assent he has said [a] that, if mental images suffice of themselves to produce acts of assent, sages will be doing injury when they induce false mental images, as in dealing with base men sages do often employ falsehood and suggest a specious mental image, which is not, however, responsible for the assent, since in that case it would be responsible also for the false assumption and the deception.[b] Then, if one transfers to destiny this statement about the sage and says that not because of destiny do acts of assent occur, since in that case erroneous assents and assumptions and deceptions would be due to destiny too and men would be injured because of destiny, the argument that exempts the sage from doing injury proves at the same time that destiny is not cause of all things. For, if it is not because of destiny that men get fancies and suffer injuries, obviously it is not because of destiny either that they perform right actions or are sensible or have steadfast conceptions [c] or are

ii, pp. 448-452) and see Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 104-106 and ii, pp. 60-61; Pohlenz, *Griechische Freiheit* (Heidelberg, 1955), pp. 135-140; and especially W. Theiler, *Phyllobolia für Peter Von der Mühll* (Basel, 1946), pp. 61-66 and A. A. Long in *Problems in Stoicism*, pp, 173-199. See also Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, pp. 61-65.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 994.

[b] The Stoic sage does no injury and cannot be injured (*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 587 and 588); he neither deceives nor is deceived (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 567 [p. 150, 14]); and, though he employs falsehood in certain circumstances, he never "is false" or "a liar" (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 132 [p. 42, 35-39]; *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 554 and 555).

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 548 (p. 147, 2-3): μηδὲν ὑπολαμβάνειν (*scil.* τὸν σοφόν φασι) ἀσθενῶς ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ βεβαίως, διὸ καὶ μηδὲ δοξάζειν τὸν σοφόν.

(1056) εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλ' οἴχεται τὸ πάντων αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην.[1] ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι Χρύσιππος οὐκ αὐτοτελῆ τούτων αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ προκαταρκτικὴν μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἐκεῖ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἀποδείξει μαχόμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅπου τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον ὑπερφυῶς ἐπαινεῖ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς λέγοντα

τὼ[2] ἔχεθ', ὅττι κεν ὔμμι κακὸν πέμπῃσιν ἑκάστῳ
ἢ ἀγαθόν· καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην

ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δῆτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς
φρονεῖν λέγοιμ' ἄν;[3] σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα,
δρῶμέν τε τοιάδ' ἂν σὺ τυγχάνῃς[4] φρονῶν.[5]

C αὐτὸς δὲ πολλὰ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενα γράφει, τέλος δὲ[6] φησι μηδὲν ἴσχεσθαι μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ[7] Διὸς λόγον, ὃν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. ἔτι τοίνυν[8] τὸ μὲν προκαταρκτικὸν[9] αἴτιον ἀσθενέστερόν ἐστι τοῦ αὐτοτελοῦς καὶ οὐκ ἐξικνεῖται κρατούμενον ὑπ' ἄλλων ἐνισταμένων,[10] τὴν δὲ εἱμαρμένην αἰτίαν ἀνί-

[1] ἀλλ' οἴχεται . . . τὴν εἱμαρμένην -omitted by X and g.
[2] τὸ -X[3], g ; omitted by B ; τῷ (or τῶ) -all other MSS.
[3] λέγουσι -Euripides.
[4] τοιαῦθ' ἂν σὺ τυγχάνῃς -Diogenes Laertius, ix, 71 ; τοιάδ' ἃ σὺ τυγχάνεις -MSS. ; τοιαῦθ' ἂν (ἃ -P, corr. p) σὺ τυγχάνῃς -Euripides ; τοιαῦθ' ἃ δὴ τυγχάνεις -Suidas, *s.n.* Πυρρώνειοι.
[5] θέλων -Euripides.
[6] τέλως γὰρ -X[1] ; τέλος γὰρ -X[3], g.
[7] τοῦ -omitted by γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5.
[8] τοίνυν -omitted by g.
[9] προκαταρκτικὸν -X[3], g, B, n ; καταρκτικὸν -all other MSS.
[10] ἐνισταμένων -X, g ; ἐξανισταμένων -all other MSS.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 997.
[b] Against Schmekel's contention that this formulation comes not from Chrysippus himself but from the interpretation of his position by Antipater of Tarsus see W. Theiler, *Phyllobolia für Peter Von der Mühll*, p. 64, n. 1. On αὐτοτελής and προκαταρκτική (usually translated "initiatory" or "antecedent") *cf.* Cicero, *De Fato* 41-44 (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 974) with A. Yon's introduction in his "Budé" edition, *Traité du Destin*, pp. xxvi-xxxii ; Pohlenz, *Grundfragen*, pp. 104-112 ; W. Theiler, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63 ; and A. A. Long, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, lii (1970), pp. 248-254, 257, and 260-262.
[c] *Iliad* xv, 109 ; *cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 925.
[d] Euripides, *Supplices* 734-736.
[e] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 937 (pp. 269, 39–270, 2) ; *cf.* 1050 A-E *supra* and *De Comm. Not.* 1076 E. For the expression ἴσχεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι see Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, pp. 171-172.
[f] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 929 and 931, and see note *a* on 1050 B *supra*.

benefited ; and there is nothing left of the doctrine that destiny is cause of all things. One who says that for these things Chrysippus considered [a] destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause [b] will show him to be again at odds with himself there where he gives Homer extravagant praise for saying of Zeus

> Therefore accept, each and all, whatsoe'er he may send you of evil [c]

or of good and Euripides for saying

> O Zeus, why should I say that wretched men
> Take thought at all ? For from thee we depend
> And act such deeds as thou may'st chance to think.[d]

He writes at length himself in agreement with these sentiments and finally says [e] that nothing at all, not even the slightest, stays or moves otherwise than in conformity with the reason of Zeus, which is identical with destiny.[f] Furthermore, the predisposing cause is feebler than that which is of itself sufficient, and it falls short when dominated by others that obstruct it; but Chrysippus himself, declaring destiny to be an

(1056) κητον καὶ ἀκώλυτον καὶ ἄτρεπτον[1] ἀποφαίνων αὐτὸς Ἄτροπον καλεῖ καὶ Ἀδράστειαν καὶ Ἀνάγκην καὶ Πεπρωμένην ὡς πέρας ἅπασιν ἐπιτιθεῖσαν. πότερον οὖν τὰς συγκαταθέσεις μὴ λέγωμεν[2] ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι μηδὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς μηδὲ τὰς κακίας μηδὲ
D τὸ κατορθοῦν μηδὲ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν, ἢ[3] τὴν εἱμαρμένην λέγωμεν[4] ἐλλείπουσαν[5] εἶναι καὶ τὴν Πεπρωμένην ἀπεράτωτον καὶ τὰς τοῦ Διὸς κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀσυντελέστους; τούτων γὰρ ἕπεται τὰ μὲν[6] τῷ αὐτοτελῆ[7] τὰ δὲ τῷ[8] προκαταρκτικὴν[9] μόνον[10] αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην. αὐτοτελὴς μὲν γὰρ[11] αἰτία πάντων οὖσα τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον ἀναιρεῖ προκαταρκτικὴ δὲ τὸ ἀκώλυτος[12] εἶναι καὶ τελεσιουργὸς ἀπόλλυσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἢ δὶς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Φυσικοῖς γέγραφε

[1] ἄτρεστον -n.
[2] λέγωμεν -A, β, γ, n, E, B, Tolet. 51, 5; λέγομεν -all other mss.
[3] ἢ -A²(ἢ in margin), E; εἰ -all other mss.
[4] λέγωμεν -E; λέγοιμεν -X³, B; λέγομεν -all other mss.
[5] ἐλλείπουσιν -g.
[6] τὰ μὲν γὰρ -F¹, X¹(γὰρ erased -F², X³).
[7] αὐτοτελῆ -X, α², E², Tolet. 51, 5; αὐτοτελεῖν -Vat. Reg. 80, Aldine; αὐτοτελεῖ -all other mss.
[8] τῷ -omitted by F, α, A, β, γ, n.
[9] πρωτοκαταρκτικὴν -F, X¹(?), α¹(?).
[10] μόνην -g.
[11] γὰρ -omitted by F, X, g, α, A¹.
[12] ἀκώλυτον -F, α¹.

[a] For Ἄτροπος etymologized as ἄτρεπτος, Ἀδράστεια as ἀναπόδραστος, and Πεπρωμένη as πέρας ἐπιτιθεῖσα or πεπερασμένη *cf.* Plutarch, frag. xv, 2 (vii, p. 112, 3-8 [Bernardakis] =frag. 21 [Sandbach]=Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i, 5, 19 [p. 81, 21-26, Wachsmuth], where in lines 23-24 read: Καὶ Πεπρωμένη<ν> διὰ τοῦτο . . .); [Aristotle], *De Mundo* 401 B 8-22; Cornutus, *Theologia Graeca* 13 (p. 13, 1-17 [Lang]); *S.V.F.* ii, pp. 169,

invincible and unimpedible and inflexible cause, calls her Swerveless and Inescapable and Indomitable and, as setting a term for all things, Determination.[a] So then, shall we say that we do not have control over acts of assent or over virtues or vices or right action or wrong-doing; or shall we say that destiny is deficient and Determination is indeterminate and the motions and stations of Zeus are frustrate? [b] For the former is the consequence if destiny is a cause sufficient of itself, and the latter if it is only a predisposing cause, since, if it is of itself sufficient cause of all things, it abolishes the sphere of our control and volition and, if a predisposing cause, loses the character of being unimpedible and fully effective. Not once or twice but everywhere, in fact, or rather in all his Physical Works he has written [c] that

34-35 and 265, 8-22 and 319, 25-26; *Etymol. Gudianum*, cols. 9, 57-58 and 460, 57–461, 8 (Sturz). The etymology intended for Ἀνάγκη is uncertain. In the *De Mundo* (*loc. cit.*) it seems to be derived from ἀνίκητος. Cornutus (*loc. cit.*) offers two etymologies: ἢν ἄξαι . . . οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἐφ' ἣν πᾶν ὃ ἂν γένηται τὴν ἀναγωγὴν λαμβάνει. In the *Etymol. Gudianum* (p. 129, 17-22 [De Stefani]) there are three: it is connected with ἀγκάς and ἀγκή, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ταῖς ἀγκάλαις κρατούμενον κατὰ δύναμιν ἀφυκτότερον κρατεῖται, it is derived from ἄκος as that against which no remedy can be found, and as the name of the goddess it is derived from ἀνάσσω. For ἀκώλυτος as descriptive of destiny *cf.* *S.V.F.* ii, pp. 296, 15 and 297, 8 and ἀκωλύτως in 1050 C-D *supra*.

[b] As ἀπεράτωτον and ἀσυντελέστους are sarcastic references to the use made by Chrysippus of the Homeric tag, Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή (*cf.* 1050 B *supra*), and to such formulations as τὴν Πεπρωμένην πεπερασμένην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ συντετελεσμένην διοίκησιν (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 265, 10-11), so is ἐλλείπουσαν to the doctrine that destiny is a universal causal nexus εἱρουσα τὰς ἑκάστων ἀνελλιπῶς καὶ ἀδιαστάτως αἰτίας (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 265, 5-7 and pp. 272, 38–273, 19).

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 935.

(1056) ταῖς μὲν κατὰ μέρος φύσεσι καὶ κινήσεσιν[1] ἐνστή-
ματα πολλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κωλύματα τῇ δὲ τῶν
E ὅλων μηδέν. καὶ πῶς εἰς τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡ τῶν
ὅλων διατείνουσα κίνησις, ἐμποδιζομένων καὶ
κωλυομένων ἐκείνων, ἀνεμπόδιστος αὐτὴ καὶ ἀκώ-
λυτός ἐστιν; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἀνεμ-
πόδιστος εἰ μηδὲ ἡ τοῦ ποδὸς ἢ τῆς χειρός, οὐδὲ ἡ
τῆς νεὼς κίνησις ἀκώλυτος ἂν εἴη ἂν αἱ[2] περὶ τὸ
ἱστίον ἢ τὴν εἰρεσίαν ἐνέργειαι[3] κωλύσεις τινὰς
ἔχωσιν. ἄνευ δὲ τούτων, εἰ μὲν αἱ φαντασίαι μὴ γίγ-
νονται[4] καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ⟨οὐδ' αἰτίαν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν
εἱμαρμένην⟩[5] τῶν συγκαταθέσεων· εἰ δέ, ὅτι ποιεῖ
φαντασίας ἀγωγοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν, καθ'
εἱμαρμένην αἱ συγκαταθέσεις γίγνεσθαι λέγονται,
πῶς οὐ μάχεται πρὸς ἑαυτὴν πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς
F μεγίστοις διαφόρους ποιοῦσα φαντασίας καὶ περι-
σπώσας ἐπὶ τἀναντία τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅτε τοὺς προσ-
τιθεμένους[6] τῇ ἑτέρᾳ καὶ μὴ ἐπέχοντας ἁμαρτάνειν

[1] καὶ κινήσεσιν -omitted by X and g.

[2] ἂν αἱ -X[3](added in margin), g, B; omitted by all other MSS.

[3] εἰρεσίαν ἐνέργειαι -X, g, B; εἰρεσίαν ἐνέργειαν -F, a^1; εἰρεσίας ἐνέργειαν -a^2 and all other MSS. (εἰρεσίας ἐνέργειαν ἂν -E).

[4] γίνωνται -F^1, X, g.

[5] ⟨οὐδ' . . . εἱμαρμένην⟩ -H. C.; lacuna first indicated by Xylander; ⟨πῶς εἰσιν αἰτίαι⟩ -Meziriac; ⟨οὐδ' αἰτία⟩ -Emperius (*Op. Philol.*, p. 340); ⟨πῶς ἐροῦμεν αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην⟩ -Bernardakis.

[6] προστιθεμένους -X^3, g, B, $A^{corr.}$, β, Tolet. 51, 5; προτιθεμένους -F, X^1, a, A^1, γ, n, E.

[a] *Cf.* 1050 c *supra*: τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης . . . (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 269, 22-28).

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 993, of which only ὅτε τοὺς προστι-

to particular natural entities and motions many obstacles and impediments present themselves but none at all to that of the universe as a whole. Now, how does the motion of the universe as a whole, extending as it does to the particular motions,[a] itself remain without hindrance or impediment when those motions are being hindered and impeded? The nature of a man is not free of hindrance if that of his foot or his hand is not unhindered too, nor could the motion of a ship be free of impediment if there be any impediment to the operation of its sails or its oarage. All this apart, however, if it is not in conformity with destiny that the mental images occur, ⟨destiny need not be responsible either⟩ for the acts of assent; but, if because she produces mental images conducive to assent the acts of assent are said to occur in conformity with destiny, how is it that she is not in conflict with herself when often in matters of the greatest moment she produces mental images which differ from one another and drag the mind off in contrary directions? When this happens, the Stoics say[b] that they err who instead of suspending judgment adhere to one of the images, that they are

θεμένους . . . δοξάζοντας (p. 291, 9-12) reproduces Stoic doctrine (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 131 [pp. 40, 9–41, 2 and p. 41, 23-27 with Crönert, *Gnomon*, vi, 1930, p. 143] and iii, frag. 548; for the wise suspense of judgment *cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 275-277 and 763 [=1047 c *supra*] and Epictetus, *Diss.* II, xviii, 23-26 and III, xii, 15). Of what is stated in the previous clause (πολλάκις . . . τὴν διάνοιαν) the Stoics admitted, of course, that the mind is often torn between different mental images; but, while they held that these are "products of destiny," they explicitly denied that therefore the acts of consent to which these are conducive can also be said "to occur in conformity with destiny" (*cf.* Cicero, *De Fato* 42-44=*S.V.F.* ii, p. 283, 12-38).

(1056) λέγουσιν, ἂν μὲν[1] ἀδήλοις εἴκωσι προπίπτοντας,[2] ἂν δὲ ψευδέσι διαψευδομένους, ἂν δὲ κοινῶς ἀκαταλήπτοις[3] δοξάζοντας; καίτοι δεῖ,[4] τριῶν ὄντων, ἢ μὴ πᾶσαν εἶναι φαντασίαν[5] εἱμαρμένης ἔργον ἢ πᾶσαν παραδοχὴν φαντασίας καὶ συγκατάθεσιν[6] ἀναμάρτητον· ἢ[7] μηδ' αὐτὴν τὴν εἱμαρμένην
1057 ἀνεπίληπτον· οὐκ οἶδα γὰρ[8] ὅπως ἀνέγκλητός ἐστι τοιαύτας ποιοῦσα φαντασίας αἷς τὸ μὴ[9] μάχεσθαι μηδ' ἀντιβαίνειν ἀλλὰ ἕπεσθαι καὶ εἴκειν ἐγκλητόν[10] ἐστι. καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς[11] ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος λόγος[12] αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ περὶ τίνος[13] γέγονε; περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήθ' ὁρμᾶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς ὑποθέσεις τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας οἰκείας[14] φαντασίας γενομένης[15] εὐ-

[1] ἂν μὴ -g, E. [2] Salmasius ; προσπίπτοντας -MSS.
[3] κοινοῖς (κολιοῖς -g) ἀκαταλήπτως -X, g, B.
[4] δεῖ -Wyttenbach (implied by the versions of Xylander and Amyot) ; δὴ -MSS. [5] φαντασίας -F, a, A^1(?).
[6] φαντασίας καὶ συγκατάθεσιν -g ; καὶ συγκατάθεσιν φαντασίας -all other MSS.
[7] ἢ -X^3(over erasure), g, B, E ; εἰ -F, a, A^1, β, γ, n, Tolet. 51, 5 ; ἢ εἰ -A^2(ἢ added superscript), Vat. Reg. 80.
[8] γὰρ -omitted by X^3(erased), g, B.
[9] μὴ -omitted by X^1(added superscript -X^3).
[10] ἀνέγκλητόν -E.
[11] Ἀκαδημικοὺς -X ; Ἀκαδημιακοὺς -F, a, A, β, γ, n.
[12] λόγος -X^3, g ; omitted by all other MSS.
[13] περὶ τίνος -X^3, g ; τίνος -X^1, Tolet. 51, 5 ; τόνος -all other MSS. ; πόνος -Stephanus ; ὁ πλεῖστος [λόγος] . . . πόνος περὶ τίνος -Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 7).
[14] τοὺς ἀξιους (or ἀξιῶς [?]) τὰς οἰκείους -F^1 ; τὰς ἀξίως τῆς οἰκείας -X^3(ὰς and ῆ over erasures), g, B ; τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας οἰκείας -F^2 and all other MSS. (τοὺς -omitted by Vat. Reg. 80).
[15] γενομένας -X^3(νας over erasure), g, B.

[a] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vii, 51 (μετ' εἴξεως καὶ συγκατα-

precipitate if the images to which they yield [a] are obscure, deceived if the images are false, and fanciful if the images are commonly inapprehensible. And yet of three things one must be true : it must be that not every mental image is the work of destiny or that every acceptance of a mental image, *i.e.* every act of assent, is faultless or that destiny herself is not inculpable either, for I do not understand how she is free from blame for producing the kind of mental images that it is reprehensible to yield to and follow and not to struggle against and resist. Look you, what is the subject to which Chrysippus himself and Antipater in their contentions with the Academics [b] have devoted the most extensive argument ? The thesis that there is neither action nor impulsion without assent and that they are talking fiction and making idle assumptions who maintain that upon the occurrence of an appropriate mental image impulsion

θέσεως) and Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, pp. 164-165 and 177-178. The opponents of the Stoics treat this moment in the process as if it were a purely passive " yielding " (*e.g.* Alexander, *De Fato*, pp. 183, 21–184, 22 [Bruns]) ; but, as Plutarch knew (*De Virtute Morali* 447 A = *S.V.F.* iii, p. 111, 34-36), the Stoics themselves considered it to be an ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ (*cf.* W. Theiler, *Phyllobolia für Peter Von der Mühll*, p. 61, n. 1).

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 177 (Chrysippus [p. 42, 22-31]) and Antipater, frag. 19 (*S.V.F.* iii, pp. 246, 35–247, 2). The Academics in question are chiefly Arcesilaus and Carneades (see 1036 A-B with the notes *supra*). Chrysippus argued against the former, who had attacked the Stoic doctrine propounded by Zeno ; Carneades later attempted to refute Chrysippus and was attacked in turn by his own contemporary, Antipater of Tarsus (*cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, pp. 244, 12–245, 4). On the course of the controversy see O. Gigon, *Mus. Helveticum*, i (1944), pp. 50-52 and 58-61 ; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, pp. 174-175, 180, 184-185.

(1057) θὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκαταθεμένους. αὖθις δέ φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ τὸν θεὸν[1] ψευδεῖς ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας καὶ[2] τὸν σοφόν, οὐ συγκατατι-
B θεμένων οὐδ' εἰκόντων δεομένους ἡμῶν ἀλλὰ πραττόντων μόνον[3] καὶ ὁρμώντων ἐπὶ[4] τὸ φαινόμενον, ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους ὄντας ὑπ' ἀσθενείας συγκατατίθεσθαι ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις. ἡ δὲ[5] τούτων τῶν λόγων ταραχὴ καὶ διαφορὰ πρὸς αὑτοὺς οὐ πάνυ δυσθεώρητός ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ οὐ δεόμενος συγκατατιθεμένων ἀλλὰ πραττόντων μόνον οἷς ἐνδίδωσι τὰς φαντασίας,[6] εἴτε θεὸς εἴτε σοφός, οἶδεν ὅτι
C πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ἀρκοῦσιν αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ παρέλκουσιν αἱ συγκαταθέσεις· ὡς εἴ[7] γε, γιγνώσκων ὅτι πρακτικὴν ὁρμὴν οὐ παρίστησι φαντασία[8] δίχα συγκαταθέσεως, ψευδεῖς ἐνεργάζεται καὶ πιθανὰς φαντασίας, ἑκὼν αἴτιός ἐστι τοῦ προπίπτειν[9] καὶ[10] ἁμαρτάνειν ἀκαταλήπτοις συγκατατιθεμένους.

[1] τῶν θεῶν -F[1].
[2] κατὰ -γ, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5.
[3] μόνων -F, X[1], a, A[1](?); omitted by E.
[4] εἰς -g.
[5] μὴ δὲ -g.
[6] τὰς φαντασίας -X[3], g, B; ταῖς φαντασίαις -all other MSS.
[7] ὃ -B.
[8] φαντασίαι -F.
[9] προπίπτειν -Passow (*cf.* Rasmus, *Prog.* 1880, p. 12); προσπίπτειν -MSS.
[10] καὶ -omitted by F[1].

follows immediately without any prior yielding or assent.[a] Again Chrysippus says, however, that both god and the sage induce false mental images, wanting of us not assent or yielding but only action and impulsion towards the presentation, but that we because we are base are led by our weakness to assent[b] to such mental images. It is not very difficult to discern the confusion and mutual discord of these statements. He who wants not assent[c] but only action of those to whom he presents mental images knows, be he god or sage, that the mental images suffice for action and that the acts of assent are superfluous, just as, if he knows that an effective impulse is not prompted by a mental image without assent and yet he induces in men false and specious mental images, he is by intention responsible for their precipitate and erroneous behaviour in assenting to images that are inapprehensible.

[a] *Cf. Adv. Colotem* 1122 A-D (especially C-D and the end of the chapter: ὅταν οὖν φανῇ τὸ ἡδὺ οἰκεῖον . . ., ἦλθεν εὐθὺς ἡ ὁρμή . . .); Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 108 (". . . Carneade quod . . . ex animis nostris adsensionem . . . extraxisset"); Helfried Hartmann, *Gewissheit und Wahrheit* (Halle, 1927), pp. 42-47; Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 281-282.

[b] *Cf. Adv. Colotem* 1122 C (εἶξιν οὖσαν ὑπ' ἀσθενείας τῷ φαινομένῳ) and *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 473 (p. 123, 1-13).

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 177 (p. 42, 32-38). The content of this sentence, however, is not Stoic doctrine but argument in support of the charge of self-contradiction brought against that doctrine in the preceding sentence, which von Arnim omits. For the Stoic doctrine itself *cf.* A. A. Long in *Problems in Stoicism*, pp. 100-102.

CONSPECTUS OF THE ESSAY, "THE STOICS TALK MORE PARADOXICALLY THAN THE POETS"

(COMPENDIUM ARGUMENTI STOICOS ABSURDIORA POETIS DICERE)

INTRODUCTION

Among Plutarch's works listed in the *Catalogue of Lamprias* there is one (No. 79) called *Ὅτι παραδοξότερα οἱ Στωικοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν λέγουσι* and another (No. 143) called *Ὅτι παραδοξότερα οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι τῶν ποιητῶν λέγουσι*. Of the latter nothing is preserved. The former has sometimes been identified with the present short piece, though this is entitled a *Σύνοψις* of that essay in the Planudean mss., which alone preserve it [a] and where it is followed by an *Ἐπιτομή*

[a] It is No. 40 in the Planudean corpus. M. Pohlenz maintained that *Σύνοψις τοῦ* was prefixed to the title by Planudes and that Plutarch wrote the piece as it stands for a *παίγνιον* or playful trifle which he may have read to his friends but did not publish (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 2 and *Moralia* vi/2, p. 59). Amyot in his translation had omitted *Σύνοψις τοῦ* from the title and had called the piece "une petite déclamation" ("une vraie déclamation" in the later edition by Brotier). J. J. Hartman argued that the extant piece is complete as Plutarch wrote it, but he called it a "fragment" and suggested that Plutarch may have done so himself just as modern writers often publish their short pieces as "fragments" (*De Plutarcho*, pp. 594-596). Hartman in his earlier work on Plutarch had given a Dutch translation of the piece under the title, "Het fragment van Plutarchus' betoog . . ." (*De Avondzon des Heidendoms*, ii, pp. 285-288). Bruno Snell in his German translation (*Plutarch: Von der Ruhe des Gemütes und andere philosophische Schriften* [Zürich, Artemis, 1948], pp. 75-76) omitted without comment both *Σύνοψις τοῦ* of the title and chapters 5 and 6 of the extant Greek text.

of the lost *'Αριστοφάνους καὶ Μενάνδρου σύγκρισις* (No. 121 in the *Catalogue of Lamprias*) and an *'Επιτομὴ τοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας* (1030 D—1032 F *supra*). The last of these three save for its first two paragraphs, in which the "epitomizer" refers to Plutarch in the third person, is not an epitome or compendium of the original essay, which is extant, but a single continuous excerpt from it. The second as it stands begins with a reference in the third person to the author of what follows,[a] which seems thus to be introduced as an extract or extracts from the original essay. The first of these, the present piece, though it has no such introduction and contains no internal evidence of incompleteness,[b] is probably also a literal extract from the original essay of Plutarch's, for it is thoroughly Plutarchean in language and style and has none of the characteristics of a conspectus or summary but is unlikely to be the whole of No. 79 in the *Catalogue of Lamprias*, since in an essay with such a title Plutarch would hardly have restricted himself to the Stoic statements and doctrines used in the extant piece and have refrained from exploiting others that in his opinion, as is shown by his

[a] *i.e.* 853 A (. . . *προκρίνει . . . ταῦτα προστίθησι· "τὸ φορτικόν," φησιν, "ἐν λόγοις . . .*), *cf.* 853 B (. . . *ἐπαινεῖται γάρ," φησιν, "ὅτι . . .*). The first person singular in 853 D (*οἷον λέγω βασιλεῖ . . .*) and in 854 C (*καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ἐν οἷς . . .*) must be direct quotations from the original essay.

[b] In 1058 A (see note *b* there) something is missing; but this need be no more than a sentence or a clause, which may have been omitted by a copyist rather than by the "epitomizer." Sandbach assumed a lacuna at the beginning of chapter 4 also, a reference to the change of sex in Caeneus; but for what he took to be indications of this in the text see notes *c* and *d* on 1058 B *infra*.

references to them elsewhere, were susceptible of similar treatment.[a] *Σύνοψις* in the inscription is inaccurate, but it is no more likely that Planudes arbitrarily and mistakenly prefixed it to the title of this piece than that the equally inaccurate *Ἐπιτομή* is his arbitrary addition to the titles of the two pieces that follow it.

The relative chronology of the original essay, if this were itself extant, might still be as difficult to determine as is that of the *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* and the *De Communibus Notitiis*. So, for example, even if in that original essay the change of sex in Caeneus, which is not mentioned in the excerpt, was used as it is in *Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus* 75 E, this latter passage would not be demonstrably later, for it contains nothing to suggest that Plutarch here intended [b] to recall or refer to the use of the theme in an earlier passage of his own. There is, however, near the beginning of the *De Communibus Notitiis* a passage thought certainly to be a veiled reference to the essay from which our excerpt was taken,[c] for there (1060 B) everyone is said to have had his fill of arguments against the Stoic paradoxes concerning those who alone are opulent and fair and alone are kings, citizens, and judges and these notions are dismissed as being " stale goods." These paradoxes do appear in our excerpt ; but this does not decisively identify it or the original essay, for what

[a] Such *e.g.* as those in *De Comm. Not.* 1076 C-D and 1083 C-F and *De Facie* 923 B-C.

[b] As Babut thinks he did (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 50, n. 3).

[c] Ziegler, *R.-E.* xxi/1 (1951), cols. 757, 16-23 and 760, 36-54 ; but *cf.* Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 40.

is essentially peculiar to them and not here mentioned at all is that they attempt not to refute the Stoic statements, that of which everyone is said to have had his fill, but, as the title itself indicates, simply to show that they are more paradoxical than those of the poets,[a] whereas even in another extant work of Plutarch's (*Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 25 c) the poets Homer and Euripides are cited in refutation of the Stoic doctrine that is the principle of the paradoxes specifically mentioned in 1060 B.

For the text of the *Σύνοψις* here printed I have collated *a* A *β* *γ* E B n *ε* from photostats but for Toletanus 51, 5 have relied upon G. B. A. Fletcher's report in *Class. Quart.*, xxi (1927), p. 173. The resulting apparatus differs from that of Pohlenz-Westman in several details, the most interesting of which are two in 1058 C-D (D 1-2 = p. 61, 13-14 [Pohlenz-Westman]) : *ε* alone has the correct *ὠνεῖται*, which may have been derived from a^1 (now illegible) ; and *ε* with *a*, B, and n has the correct *μεταιτῶν*, where A^2, *β*, *γ*, E, and Tolet. 51, 5 all have *μετὰ τῶν*.

[a] Ziegler (*loc. cit.*, col. 760, 36-39) may have intended to anticipate this objection by saying : " Da auch in . . . 1059 c Diadumenos die ruhmredigen Behauptungen der Stoiker mit den Erfindungen der Dichter auf eine Stufe stellt und dann 1060 B sagt. . . ." The former passage, 1059 C-D, calls comparably credible the Stoic claim of Chrysippus' providential birth—to turn life upside down, as Diadumenus adds—and the poets' story that the providence of the gods in chastising Tantalus overthrew Sipylus ; but this has no connexion whatever with the later passage about the Stoic paradoxes in 1060 B, where nothing at all is said about poets, poetry, or myth.

(1057)

ΣΥΝΟΨΙΣ ΤΟΥ[1] ΟΤΙ ΠΑΡΑΔΟΞΟΤΕΡΑ ΟΙ ΣΤΩΙΚΟΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΙΗΤΩΝ[2] ΛΕΓΟΥΣΙΝ[3]

1. Ὁ[4] Πινδάρου Καινεὺς εὔθυναν[5] ὑπεῖχεν, ἀπι-
D θάνως ἄρρηκτος σιδήρῳ καὶ ἀπαθὴς τὸ σῶμα πλατ-
τόμενος εἶτα καταδὺς ἄτρωτος ὑπὸ γῆν " σχίσας
ὀρθῷ ποδὶ γᾶν " ὁ δὲ Στωικὸς Λαπίθης, ὥσπερ ἐξ
ἀδαμαντίνης ὕλης ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπαθείας κεχαλ-
κευμένος, οὐκ ἄτρωτός ἐστιν οὐδ' ἄνοσος οὐδ' ἀν-
αλγὴς[6] ἄφοβος δὲ μένει καὶ ἄλυπος καὶ ἀήττητος
καὶ ἀβίαστος, τιτρωσκόμενος ἀλγῶν στρεβλού-
μενος ἐν κατασκαφαῖς πατρίδος ἐν πάθεσι οἰκείοις.[7]

[1] τοῦ omitted by E and B in title ; σύνοψις τοῦ omitted by E in subscription and by *Catalogue of Lamprias* 79.
[2] τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ στωϊκοὶ -β.
[3] λέγουσι -E (title and subscription).
[4] Ὁ -omitted by A. [5] εὐθύνην -B.
[6] ἀνελγὴς -n ; οὐδ' ἀναλγὴς -omitted by B.
[7] οἰκείοις -Pohlenz (*cf.* Plutarch, *Demosthenes* xxii, 5-6 [856 A-B]) ; τοιούτοις -MSS.

[a] Pindar, frag. 167 (Bergk, Schroeder, Snell)=204 (Turyn)=150 (Bowra) ; for ὀρθῷ ποδί *cf.* B. L. Gildersleeve on *Olympian* xiii, 72. Concerning Caeneus, the invulnerable Lapith who was overwhelmed by the Centaurs with tree-trunks and beaten into the ground, see Acusilaus, frag. 22 (F. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* I A, p. 33 and a, p. 379)=frag. 40 a (i, pp. 59-60 [Diels-Kranz]) ; Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica* i, 57-64 ; *Orphei Argonautica* 170-174 ; Ovid,

CONSPECTUS OF THE ESSAY, "THE STOICS TALK MORE PARADOXICALLY THAN THE POETS"

1. The Caeneus of Pindar used to be taken to task for being an implausible fiction with his invulnerability to iron and his physical insensitivity and his having at last sunk down underground unwounded " as erect on his feet he split the earth asunder " [a] ; but the Lapith of the Stoics, whom they have made out of insensitivity [b] as if they had forged him of steel, is not immune from wounds or disease or pain but remains fearless and undistressed and invincible and unconstrained while wounded, in pain, on the rack, in the midst of his country's destruction, in the midst of his own private calamities. And, while the

Metamorphoses xii, 189-209 and 459-535 ; Apollodorus, *Epitome* i, 22 (*L.C.L.* ii, pp. 150-151) ; J. T. Kakridis, *Class. Rev.*, lxi (1947), pp. 77-80. Plutarch in *Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus* 75 E refers to the earlier transformation of Caeneus from a woman and does so there too in comparison with a Stoic paradox. *Cf.* also Servius on Vergil, *Aeneid* vi, 448 (ii, p. 69, 13-18 [Thilo-Hagen]) and E. Kraggerud, *Symbolae Osloenses*, xl (1965), pp. 66-71.

[b] The Stoics in fact distinguished the ἀπάθεια of the sage, which is imperturbability, from the callous insensitivity of base men (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 448). For what follows concerning the sage in this paragraph *cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 363, 381, 438, 567-588, 591 and the story of Persaeus in *S.V.F.* i, frag. 449.

(1057) καὶ ὁ μὲν Πινδάρου Καινεὺς βαλλόμενος οὐ τιτρώσκεται, ὁ δὲ τῶν Στωικῶν σοφὸς ἐγκλειόμενος οὐ
E κωλύεται καὶ κατακρημνιζόμενος οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται[1] καὶ στρεβλούμενος οὐ βασανίζεται καὶ πηρούμενος οὐ βλάπτεται καὶ πίπτων ἐν τῷ παλαίειν ἀήττητός ἐστι καὶ περιτειχιζόμενος ἀπολιόρκητος καὶ πωλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνάλωτος, οὐδὲν τῶν πλοίων διαφέρων οἷς ἐπιγέγραπται μὲν Εὔπλοια καὶ Πρόνοια ⟨καὶ⟩ Σώζουσα[2] καὶ Θεραπεία χειμάζεται δὲ καὶ συντρίβεται καὶ ἀνατρέπεται.

2. Ὁ Εὐριπίδου Ἰόλαος ἐξ ἀδρανοῦς καὶ παρήλικος εὐχῇ τινι νέος καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην ἄφνω γέγονεν, ὁ δὲ τῶν Στωικῶν σοφὸς χθὲς μὲν
F ἦν[3] αἴσχιστος[4] ἅμα καὶ κάκιστος τήμερον δ' ἄφνω μεταβέβληκεν εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ γέγονεν ἐκ ῥυσοῦ[5] καὶ ὠχροῦ καὶ[6] κατ' Αἰσχύλον

ἐξ ὀσφυαλγοῦς κὠδυνοσπάδος[7] λυγροῦ
γέροντος

εὐπρεπὴς θεοειδὴς καλλίμορφος.

[1] καταναγκάζεται -ε.
[2] Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], p. 105); πρόνοια σώζουσα -MSS.
[3] ἦν μὲν -ε.
[4] αἴσχιστος -Wyttenbach; ἔχθιστος -MSS.
[5] ῥυσοῦ -a^1; ῥυσσοῦ -$a^{corr.}$ and all other MSS.
[6] καὶ -omitted by γ and Tolet. 51, 5.
[7] Dübner; καὶ ὀδυνοσπάδος -MSS.

[a] Hartman (*De Plutarcho*, p. 593) thought ἀναγκάζεται inappropriate here; but *cf. S.V.F.* iii, pp. 88, 40–89, 6 and p. 150, 10-11.

[b] The formulation and implication of this sentence are compared with Paul, II *Corinthians* 4, 8-9 and 6, 10 by A. Fridrichsen, *Coniectanea Neotestamentica*, ix (1944), pp. 30-31.

Caeneus of Pindar is not wounded when he is hit, the sage of the Stoics is not impeded when confined and under no compulsion[a] when flung down a precipice and not in torture when on the rack and not injured when mutilated and is invincible when thrown in wrestling and is not blockaded by circumvallation and is uncaptured while his enemies are selling him into slavery[b]; he is just like the boats that are tempest-tossed and shattered and capsized while they bear inscribed upon them the names *Bon Voyage* and *Providence* ⟨and⟩ *Protectress* and *Escort.*[c]

2. The Iolaus of Euripides makes a prayer, and all of a sudden his superannuated impotence has become youthfulness and martial might[d]; but the sage of the Stoics, though yesterday he was most ugly and at the same time most vicious, to-day all of a sudden has been transformed into virtue and from being a wrinkled and sallow and, as Aeschylus says,

Lumbago-ridden, wretched, pain-distraught
Elder[e]

has become a man of comely bearing, divine aspect, and beauteous form.[f]

[c] For these names of ships *cf.* F. Miltner's list in *R.-E.* Supplement v (1931), cols. 947-952, where Θεραπεία does not appear, however.

[d] Euripides, *Heraclidae* 849-863.

[e] Aeschylus, frag. 361 (Nauck²)=frag. 111 (Mette). Plutarch's ascription was charged to an error of memory and the original of which he was thinking was claimed for Hipponax by A. D. Knox, who "restored" it as frag. 58 (*Herodes, Cercidas and the Greek Choliambic Poets* [*L.C.L.*], pp. 40-41).

[f] According to the Stoics only the sage is beautiful (*cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 221 and iii, frags. 591, 592, and 619): for the instantaneous change see 1058 B *infra.*

1058 3. Καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τὴν ῥυσότητα[1] καὶ φαλακρότητα καὶ ἀμορφίαν ἀφῄρηκεν, ὅπως φανείη καλός· ὁ δὲ τούτων σοφός, οὐκ ἀπολιπόντος[2] τὸ σῶμα τοῦ γήρως ἀλλὰ καὶ ⟨κακὰ⟩[3] προσεπιθέντος[4] καὶ προσεπιχώσαντος,[5] μένων κυρτός, ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, νωδὸς ἑτερόφθαλμος οὔτ' αἰσχρὸς οὔτε δύσμορφος οὔτε κακοπρόσωπός ἐστιν. ⟨. . .⟩[6] ὁ γὰρ Στωικὸς ἔρως ὥσπερ οἱ κάνθαροι λέγονται τὸ μὲν μύρον ἀπολείπειν[7] τὰ δὲ δυσώδη διώκειν οὕτως τοῖς αἰσχίστοις καὶ ἀμορφοτάτοις ὁμιλῶν, ὅταν εἰς εὐμορφίαν καὶ κάλλος ὑπὸ σοφίας μεταβάλωσιν,[8] ἀποτρέπεται.

4. Ὁ παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς κάκιστος, ἂν οὕτω
B τύχῃ, πρωῒ δείλης ἄριστος, καὶ καταδαρθὼν ἔμπληκτος καὶ ἀμαθὴς καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία δοῦλος καὶ πένης καὶ ἄπορος αὐθημερὸν ἀνίσταται [καὶ][9] βασιλεὺς καὶ πλούσιος καὶ ὄλβιος

[1] *ῥυσότητα* -a^1 ; *ῥυσσότητα* -$a^{corr.}$ and all other MSS.
[2] *ἀπολιπόντος* -Bernardakis ; *ἀπολείποντος* -MSS.
[3] ⟨*κακὰ*⟩ -added by Pohlenz ; ⟨*τι*⟩ -Bernardakis ; ⟨*ἄλλα*⟩ -Castiglioni (*Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 84).
[4] *προσεπιτιθέντος* -*γ* ; *προεπιτιθέντος* -Tolet. 51, 5.
[5] *προεπιχώσαντος* -Tolet. 51, 5.
[6] Lacuna identified by F. H. Sandbach (*Proc. Cambridge Philological Soc.*, cxlii-cxliv [1929], p. 11).
[7] *ἀπολείπειν* -van Herwerden (*Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinae* [1882], p. 122) ; *ἀπολιπεῖν* -MSS.
[8] *μεταβάλωσιν* -E, B ; *μεταβάλλωσιν* -all other MSS.
[9] [*καὶ*] -deleted by Pohlenz.

[a] Homer, *Odyssey* vi, 229-235 ; xvi, 172-176 ; xxiii, 156-162.

[b] As Sandbach saw, the next sentence has to do not with the immediately preceding paradox, that the sage with all the ravages of age upon him is nevertheless beautiful, but

3. Moreover, that Odysseus might appear handsome, Athena removed his wrinkles and baldness and unshapeliness[a] ; but without the body's having been quitted by old age, which on the contrary has heaped and piled additional ⟨ills⟩ upon it, the sage of these Stoics, though remaining hunchbacked, if so he chance to be, and toothless and one-eyed, is not ugly or misshapen or unhandsome of face. ⟨. . .⟩[b] The reason is that as beetles are said to leave perfume and to pursue foul-smelling things[c] so the Stoic love consorts with the ugliest and most unshapely and turns away when by wisdom these are transformed into shapeliness and beauty.[d]

4. Among the Stoics the man who is most vicious in the morning, if so it chance to be, is in the afternoon most virtuous.[e] Having fallen asleep demented and stupid and unjust and licentious and even, by heaven, a slave and a drudge and a pauper, he gets up the very same day changed into a blessed and

with the additional one to which *De Comm. Not.* 1072 F—1073 B refers, that just because he is beautiful he is according to the Stoics unloved and unworthy of being loved. This must have been expressed at least in a lost sentence or clause, which may have begun with a contrasted and lesser poetic marvel, *e.g.* the love aroused in Nausicaa by the miraculously beautified Odysseus (*Odyssey* vi, 242-245).

[c] *Cf. Quaest. Conviv.* 710 E and *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1096 A.

[d] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1072 F—1073 B and *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 716 and 717.

[e] Contending that in the complete essay this sentence must have been preceded by a poetic parallel to the Stoic paradox, F. H. Sandbach appealed to *οὐ γένεια φύσας οὐδὲ ἤβην infra* and to *Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus* 75 D-E as proof that the poetic parallel was the story of the transformation of Caeneus from female to male (*Proc. Cambridge Philological Soc.*, cxlii-cxliv [1929], p. 11).

(1058) γεγονώς, σώφρων[1] τε καὶ δίκαιος καὶ βέβαιος καὶ ἀδόξαστος, οὐ γένεια φύσας οὐδὲ ἤβην ἐν σώματι νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ἀλλ' ἐν ἀσθενεῖ καὶ ἁπαλῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἀνάνδρῳ καὶ ἀβεβαίῳ νοῦν τέλειον, ἄκραν φρόνησιν, ἰσόθεον διάθεσιν, ἀδόξαστον ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ἕξιν[2] ἐσχηκώς, οὐδὲν ἐνδούσης[3] πρότερον αὐτῷ τῆς μοχθηρίας, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης, ὀλίγου δέω εἰπεῖν, ἥρως τις ἢ δαίμων ἢ θεὸς ἐκ θηρίων
C τοῦ κακίστου γενόμενος. ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς γὰρ λαβόντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν

εὖξαι εἴ τι[4] βούλει· πάντα σοι γενήσεται.

πλοῦτον φέρει, βασιλείαν ἔχει,[5] τύχην δίδωσιν, εὐπότμους ποιεῖ καὶ ἀπροσδεεῖς[6] καὶ αὐτάρκεις, μίαν οἴκοθεν δραχμὴν οὐκ ἔχοντας.

5. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ[7] ποιητικὸς μῦθος τὸ κατὰ λόγον

[1] σώφρον -n. [2] τὴν ἕξιν -B.
[3] εἰδούσης A^1(?), corrected by A^2.
[4] MSS. (εἴ τε -β [?]); εὖξαι τ' εἰ (S, M) or εὖξαιτ' εἰ (A, Tr) -MSS. of Stobaeus (v, p. 743, 8 [Hense]); εὖξαί τι -*Comp. Menandri et Philistionis* 73; εὖξαι τί -Gesner[1]; εὖξ' εἴ τι -Meineke; εὖξαι· τί -H. Jacobi and J. Madvig; *cf.* Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), p. 2, n. 4.
[5] παρέχει -Hartman (*De Plutarcho*, p. 594).
[6] ἀποσδεεῖς -ε. [7] γὰρ -omitted by ε.

[a] *Cf. De Comm. Not.* 1060 B, *De Tranquillitate Animi* 472 A, and *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 617-622.

[b] For ἀδόξαστος here and ἀδόξαστον ἐπιστήμην *infra* see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1056 A-B and F *supra* and *cf. S.V.F.* i, frags. 53, 54, 347, 625 and iii, frags. 548-550.

[c] ἤβη here probably means the pubic hair (Hippocrates, Περὶ ἀρθρῶν 41 = iv, p. 180, 13-14 [Littré]; Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* 544 b 27-29 and *De Coloribus* 797 b 30-34 [*cf.* ἡβᾶν in *De Gen. Animal.* 746 b 23-24]). Even when the word means the hypogastric region itself, it is used of both sexes

opulent king,[a] sober and just and steadfast and undeluded by fancies.[b] He has not sprouted a beard or the token of puberty [c] in a body young and soft but in a soul that is feeble and soft [d] and unmanly and unstable has got perfect intelligence, consummate prudence, a godlike disposition, knowledge free from fancy, and an unalterable habitude and this not by any previous abatement of his depravity but by having changed instantaneously from the most vicious of wild beasts into what may almost be called a kind of hero or spirit or god.[e] For, if one has got virtue from the Stoa, it is possible to say

Ask, if there's aught you wish; all will be yours.[f]

It brings wealth, it comprises kingship, it gives luck, it makes men prosperous and free from all other wants and self-sufficient, though they have not a single drachma of their own.

5. The poetic fable, preserving its consistency, and not of the male alone (*cf.* Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* 493 b 3 and *De Gen. Animal.* 728 b 26-27 and 784 a 9-10). So what Plutarch here contrasts to the sudden transformation of the Stoic sage is not, as Sandbach supposed, a mythical metamorphosis of female to male but the natural change of the youthful body at puberty.

[d] *Cf.* Plato, *Republic* 563 D 5 and *Theaetetus* 173 A 5-7 for ἁπαλὴ ψυχή and *Phaedrus* 239 C 8-9 (ἁπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης). There is no reason, therefore, to question ἁπαλῇ here.

[e] For the Stoic thesis that, all wrong action being equally wrong, the change from viciousness to perfect virtue is instantaneous (1057 E-F *supra*), so that the subject of the change may be unaware of its occurrence, see *Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus* 75 C—76 B, *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 F—1043 A, *De Comm. Not.* 1061 E and 1062 B—1063 C, *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 527-541.

[f] Menander, frag. 614, 6 (Koerte-Thierfelder) = frag. 537 (Kock) = Stobaeus, *Anth.* iv, 31, 30 (v, p. 743, 8 [Hense]); *cf.* Philemon, frag. 65, 3-4 (Kock).

(1058) φυλάττων οὐδαμοῦ προλείπει τὸν[1] Ἡρακλέα τῶν[2] ἀναγκαίων[3] δεόμενον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς ἐπιρρεῖ ⟨τοῦ τῆς Ἀμαλθείας κέρατος πάντ' ἀφθόνως⟩[4] αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς συνοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ τὴν Στωικὴν λαβὼν Ἀμάλθειαν πλούσιος μὲν γέγονεν ἐρανίζεται δὲ τροφὴν παρ' ἑτέρων, καὶ βασιλεὺς μέν ἐστι μισθοῦ δ' ἀναλύει συλλογισμούς, καὶ πάντα μὲν ἔχει μόνος
D ἐνοίκιον δὲ τελεῖ καὶ ἄλφιτ'[5] ὠνεῖται,[6] πολλάκις δανειζόμενος ἢ μεταιτῶν[7] παρὰ τῶν οὐδὲν ἐχόντων.

6. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἰθακησίων βασιλεὺς προσαιτεῖ λανθάνειν ὅς ἐστι βουλόμενος καὶ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν ὡς μάλιστα " πτωχῷ λευγαλέῳ ἐναλίγκιον," ὁ δ' ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς βοῶν μέγα καὶ κεκραγὼς " ἐγὼ μόνος εἰμὶ βασιλεύς,[8] ἐγὼ μόνος εἰμὶ πλούσιος " ὁρᾶται πολλάκις ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίαις θύραις λέγων

δὸς χλαῖναν Ἱππώνακτι· κάρτα γὰρ ῥιγῶ
καὶ βαμβακύζω.[9]

[1] τῶν -a^1 (ον superscript -a^2), A^1(ο over ω erased -A^2).

[2] ἑτ in erasure with α superscript over ε (*i.e.* . . . λέτῶν) -a^2. [3] ἀναγκαίων -Leonicus; ἀναγκῶν -MSS.

[4] ⟨. . .⟩ -H. C. after the supplements, ⟨ταῦτ' *vel* πάντ'⟩ -van Herwerden (*Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinae* [1882], p. 122) and ⟨τοῦ τῆς Ἀμαλθείας κέρατος ἄφθον'⟩ -Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 3); ἐπιρρεῖ αὐτῷ -MSS. (excepting ε, which omits ἐπιρρεῖ). [5] ἄλφῖτα -a^2(φῖ over erasure), n.

[6] ὠνεῖται -ε; ἀνεῖται -a^2 (?), n; ἀνεῖναι -all other MSS.

[7] μεταιτῶν -a, B, n, ε; μετὰ τῶν -A^2(ὰ over erasure) and all other MSS.

[8] ἐγὼ . . . βασιλεύς -omitted by A^1(added in margin by A^2). [9] βαμβακίζω -ε; βαμβαλύζω -Schneidewin.

[a] In the text of the MSS. as it stands the intransitive ἐπιρρεῖ wants a subject, and mention of the mythical horn of Amaltheia in this clause is almost certainly implied by τὴν Στωικὴν Ἀμάλθειαν in the next one. Pohlenz based his supple-

nowhere leaves Heracles in want of the necessities of life, but on him and his companions stream as from a fountain ⟨all things without stint from the Horn of Plenty⟩[a]; but he who has got the Stoic Cornucopia, though he has become opulent, begs his bread from others and, though he is a king, analyses logical arguments for pay and, though he alone has everything,[b] pays rent for his lodgings and buys his bread and cheese, often doing so by borrowing or by asking alms of those who have nothing.

6. Furthermore, whereas the king of the Ithacans sues for alms because he wishes to escape recognition and is trying to make himself as nearly as possible " like in mien to a pitiful mendicant," [c] he who comes from the Stoa loudly shouting and bawling " I alone am king, I alone am opulent " often is seen at other men's doors saying

Oh please, a cloak, for Hipponax is freezing cold.
My teeth are chattering.[d]

ment on the passage in which Apollodorus (*Bibliotheca* ii, 7, 5) after telling how Achelous recovered his horn from Heracles by giving him in place of it the horn of Amaltheia says that according to Pherecydes (frag. 42 [F. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* I A, p. 74]) this horn δύναμιν εἶχε τοιαύτην ὥστε βρωτὸν ἢ πότον, ὅπερ ⟨ἂν⟩ εὔξαιτό τις, παρέχειν ἄφθονον. For Heracles and the Cornucopia see *Scholia in Iliadem* xxi, 194 (Pindar, frag. 249 [Bergk]=71 [Turyn]=70 b [Snell]); Hesychius, *s.v.* Ἀμαλθείας κέρας; and Gruppe, *R.-E.* Supplement iii (1918), col. 1085, 8-46.

[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 590, 591, 596, and 597.

[c] *Odyssey* xvi, 273 and xvii, 337 (for the begging of alms see xvii, 365 ff.).

[d] Hipponax, frag. 17 (Bergk)=24 b (Diehl)=56 (Knox)=33 (Masson). The first line alone is quoted by Plutarch in *De Cupiditate Divitiarum* 523 E and in *De Comm. Not.* 1068 B *infra*; *cf. Iambi et Elegi Graeci* . . . ed. M. L. West, I, pp. 119-120 (frag. 32).

AGAINST THE STOICS ON COMMON CONCEPTIONS

(DE COMMUNIBUS NOTITIIS ADVERSUS STOICOS)

INTRODUCTION

THE authenticity of this work, No. 77 in the *Catalogue of Lamprias* (where τῶν κοινῶν is omitted from the title) and No. 74 in the Planudean order, has been challenged and denied; but the arguments adduced for doubting Plutarch's authorship were feeble and have all been successfully refuted.[a] In rebutting one of them, however, the defenders of authenticity sometimes overreached themselves by professing to find in this work references to the *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* or in that work references to this. There is in neither any certain intentional reference to the other; and that Plutarch in writing either had the other before him cannot be inferred from the fact that in both many of the same Stoic passages are quoted or paraphrased.[b] Since such passages are used differently, in different contexts, and for different purposes in the two works, it is most probable,

[a] They were most fully stated by Weissenberger (*Die Sprache Plutarchs* ii, pp. 51-53) and decisively refuted by Kolfhaus (*Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*). A review of the controversy is given by Ziegler (*R.-E.* xxi, 1 [1951], cols. 758, 35–759, 46).

[b] As both Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 17-18 and p. 32) and Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 23) conclude that such passages were taken by Plutarch from the *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* and made to do duty again in the present work. See *supra* p. 400, n. *a* and p. 401, n. *c* in the Introduction to the *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*.

as has been said before,[a] that Plutarch's source for both was his own note-books or his own compilation, *Selections and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans,* and that this is the reason why neither work refers to the other and why their relative chronology cannot be decisively determined, though from the general impression made by the two the *De Communibus Notitiis* may seem to be the later.[b]

This begins without any indication of time or place as a dialogue between an Academic philosopher called Diadumenus [c] and an unnamed interlocutor, addressed as " comrade " or " companion." [d] The latter says that he comes to Diadumenus to be cured of the feverish perturbation induced in him by some Stoic friends, who have been denouncing the older Academics for subverting philosophy by nullifying

[a] See *supra,* pp. 398-401 in the Introduction to the *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis.*

[b] For the contention that this in 1060 B contains a veiled reference to the original of the excerpt, *Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere,* see *supra* pp. 608 f. in the Introduction to that work.

[c] He is so addressed in the first sentence and again in 1060 A (chap. 3 *init.*). No such person is mentioned by Plutarch in his other extant works ; but the name is frequent in inscriptions from the first to the third centuries (*cf.* also Martial, iii, 65 ; v, 46 ; vi, 34). Assuming, then, that under this name Plutarch is here representing himself as the head of a philosophical entourage whom a younger associate would recognize as authoritative, Babut contends that he could not have done this unless he had been at least forty years old when he wrote the dialogue (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme,* pp. 52-53). Its composition was assigned to Plutarch's thirties by Ziegler (*R.-E.* xxi/1 [1951], cols. 759, 47–760, 19).

[d] *Cf.* ὦ ἑταῖρε in 1063 E and 1066 D. Diadumenus is so addressed by him in 1072 D.

the common conceptions and in whose belief divine providence sent Chrysippus to refute Arcesilaus, the initiator of the outrage against common experience, and to intercept Carneades by succouring sense-perception and eliminating the confusion about pre-conceptions and conceptions (chap. 1). To this appeal Diadumenus responds with the retort that nature should then be believed to have produced Chrysippus providentially in order to turn life upside down, for he was most diligent in overthrowing common experience, that his dialectic by subverting the conception of demonstration and the preconception of proof destroyed its own principles and so left no other conception free of suspicion, and that the fault for which the Stoics blame the Academics is really their own, for they more than anyone else distort the common conceptions. Here Diadumenus checks himself, proposing to stop his denunciation and instead to speak in defence of the Academics on the charge brought against them by the Stoics (chap. 2). To this the interlocutor demurs, however, saying that, though he had come seeking such a defence as Diadumenus proposes to make, he has now changed and gone over to the prosecution instead, wishing to enjoy the revenge of seeing the Stoics themselves convicted on the very same charge that they had brought.[a] This alteration in his attitude had been

[a] This is the plain meaning of 1060 A (chaps. 2 *sub finem* —3). The complication made of it by Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 35-38) is a mare's nest, for the interlocutor certainly does not "approve with enthusiasm," as Babut says he does (*loc. cit.*, p. 35, n. 2), "the decision already taken by Diadumenus" to exchange the rôle of accuser for that of defendant but instead objects to the proposal, much as he later objects to the proposal to turn from the subject in

dramatically prepared by the initial denunciation of the Stoics put into the mouth of Diadumenus (chap. 2), who now without another word about the defence that he proposed to make [a] proceeds to prosecute the charge as formulated by the interlocutor: that the Stoics in their philosophizing are at odds with the common conceptions and preconceptions while yet maintaining that their system is developed from these as from its seed and is alone in agreement with nature.

Now, these "common conceptions" that the Stoics regarded as the seeds of their system they did not simply identify with "common opinion," what men generally assume or believe to be true, for this they held to be often false, the result of distortion or perversion.[b] Some of the former, on the truth of which

hand to another (1066 D [chap. 16 *init.*]); and so there is nothing enigmatic about the exchange between him and Diadumenus, nothing surprising in the fact that the latter, his proposal having been rejected, attempts thereafter not to defend the Academy but to prosecute the Stoics themselves, as he has been asked to do, and no reason to suppose him to mean and the interlocutor to understand him to mean by his proposal that he is provisionally renouncing the rôle of accuser and reserving for another work the direct refutation of the Stoic dialectic and theory of common experience.

[a] Any defence other than an attack of the kind that follows would, as Babut recognizes (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 38), hardly be possible for Diadumenus, who at the very beginning of the dialogue is said to be unconcerned about the charge that his school is at odds with the common conceptions, since he disdains their chief origin, the senses, and lacks the confidence in phenomena, which is their foundation.

[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 228-234; Musonius Rufus, vi (pp. 26, 11–27, 10 [Hense]); Seneca, *Epistle* lxxxii, 23; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i, 30 ("multi de dis prava sentiunt; id vitioso more effici solet"); and on the other hand

they insisted, they themselves called παράδοξα, *i.e.* contrary to common opinion or belief[a]; and to this Diadumenus calls attention when as a preface to the prosecution he gets his interlocutor's consent to exclude from it consideration of these Stoic paradoxes (1060 B [chap. 3]). Plutarch may have had him do this by way of acknowledging the obligation to prove his case by convicting the Stoics of contradicting not just "common opinion" but the common conceptions that they do themselves accept or can be required in consistency with some doctrine of theirs to accept as truly such.[b] At any rate, in the course of his argument he several times expressly asserts that it shows them to be at odds not only with the common conceptions but with their own as well and even often to abandon their own in their eagerness to say something at odds with the former.[c]

Epictetus, *Diss.* III, vi, 8: ἐστί τινα ἃ οἱ μὴ παντάπασιν διεστραμμένοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἀφορμὰς ὁρῶσιν (*cf.* Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, p. 224).

[a] *Cf.* Chrysippus in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1041 F *supra*: . . . πλάσμασι δοκοῦμεν ὅμοια λέγειν. . . .

[b] *Cf.* Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 40 and p. 42, lines 8-17.

[c] *Cf.* 1068 D (chap. 20 *sub finem*); 1070 E (chap. 25); and 1062 A-B (chap. 8 *sub finem*) with 1084 D (chap. 46 *init.*). The last of these passages, occurring as it does in the second part of the prosecution, that which is concerned with the Stoic physical theory, is by itself enough to indicate that between this part and the first there is not the difference of "critical conception" that is found in them by Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 42-45). According to him in the second part the conceptions and preconceptions of the Stoics themselves are no longer shown to be contradicted by the Stoic doctrines, as they were in the first part, but are now confused with the *sensus communis* and it is only with this that the Stoics are here accused of being at odds.

Yet, as he brings the first part of his argument to a close, he says that he is trying to convict the Stoic system of doing violence to " our common conceptions," *i.e.* those held by men generally [a]; and throughout both parts of his attack he frequently cites as examples of conceptions with which the Stoics are at odds those that are held by " all men." [b] To such conceptions held by men generally the Stoics did themselves at times appeal as evidence in support of their own doctrines or in refutation of others,[c] and even those that they rejected as errone-

Such a simple differentiation between the two parts is incompatible with the explicit statements at 1084 B in the second part and 1073 B-C (chap. 28) at the end of the first (see the next note *infra*) as well as with the intention of the arguments in both; and, since the supposed " change of perspective " does not exist, Babut's hypothesis designed to account for it (*loc. cit.*, pp. 44-45) is needless.

[a] In chapter 28 (1073 C): . . . *τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν ἐλέγχομεν . . . τὰς κοινὰς ἐκστρέφουσαν ἡμῶν καὶ παραβιαζομένην ἐννοίας* and later specifically . . . *ὃν πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ πᾶσαι νοοῦσι καὶ ὀνομάζουσι.*

[b] So in the second part besides 1079 A (*ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίστανται καὶ διανοοῦνται πάντες ἂν μὴ Στωικοὶ γένωνται . . .*), cited by Babut (*Plutarque et les Stoïciens*, p. 43, n. 3) as typical of that part and peculiar to it, *cf. e.g.* 1074 B (*ἀτελὲς μὲν οὐδεὶς νοεῖ . . . οὗτοι δὲ . . .*), 1074 F—1075 B (*τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ἢ γέγονεν ὃς οὐκ ἄφθαρτον νοεῖ . . . ; . . . ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης. . .*), 1081 E-F (*οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι . . . τίθενται καὶ νοοῦσι καὶ νομίζουσι. τούτων <δ'> Ἀρχέδημος μὲν . . . Χρύσιππος δὲ . . .*) but likewise in the first part 1061 B-C (*πάντες γὰρ . . . νοοῦμεν . . . . ἀλλὰ οὗτοί γε τοὐναντίον . . .*), 1068 C (*πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι . . . νομίζουσιν . . . οἱ δὲ . . .*), 1069 A-B (*καὶ μὴν πάντες ἄνθρωποι . . . ὑπολαμβάνουσι . . . ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο τῆς Στωικῆς ὁμολογίας . . .*), 1070 B (*ἐπεὶ δὲ καθόλου τἀγαθὸν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι χαρτὸν νοοῦσιν, . . . ὅρα τὸ τούτων παρατιθεὶς ἀγαθόν*).

[c] *Cf.* 1075 E (chap. 32 *init.*) with *De Stoic. Repug.* chap. 38, 1076 C (chap. 34 *init.*), 1082 E (chap. 43 *init.*); Seneca,

ous they regarded as distortions or perversions of the common preconceptions that they accepted themselves.[a] Consequently, to prove that the Stoics are at odds with their own common conceptions Diadumenus besides showing that one of these is contradicted by some Stoic doctrine [b] or that those implied by different Stoic doctrines are incompatible or contradictory [c] may argue that some doctrine of theirs contradicts a conception generally held, a " common opinion " that they elsewhere themselves explicitly or by implication accept as a genuine common conception.[d]

Epistle cxvii, 6; Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 132 (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1018); Alexander, *De Mixtione*, p. 217, 2-9 (Bruns)= *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 473 (p. 154, 28-36).

[a] See page 625, note *b supra.*

[b] As *e.g.* in chapter 14 (1065 D-E) their own conception of god by their explanation of the origin of vice, in chapter 40 (1080 E—1081 A) their own conception of contact by their doctrines of interaction and of blending, and in chapter 47 (1084 F—1085 B) their conception of conception itself by their doctrine of the nature of the soul.

[c] As *e.g.* those implied by the doctrines that the soul is generated by chilling and that the sun becomes animate by the change of liquid to fire (chap. 46 [1084 D-E]) and those implied by the doctrines that matter is without quality and that all qualities are bodies (chap. 50 [1085 E–1086 A]). No genuine common conception or preconception can contradict or be incompatible with any other (*cf.* Epictetus, *Diss.* I, xxii, 1 and IV, i, 44).

[d] So he argues *e.g.* in chapter 25 (1070 D-E) that the common opinion about the nature of the goal, with which statements by Chrysippus concur, is contradicted by the doctrine that no good is more or less good than any other; in chapter 34 (1076 C-D) that the commonly held conception to which the Stoics appeal against a remark of Menander's is contradicted by their own doctrine of the origin of evil; and in chapter 35 (1077 A-C) that the conception generally

Beyond this, however, it may be asked by what right the Stoics use not all but only some of the common conceptions, which according to them are the natural criteria of truth,[a] what justifies them in appealing to those that seem to accord with their doctrines and rejecting as erroneous those that do not. So Diadumenus accuses them of playing fast and loose with the common conceptions, shifting them about like pieces in a game of draughts (1068 c [chap. 20]), and argues that instead of rectifying, as they ought to have done, the supposed confusions and aberrances they have left no conception intact (1074 E [chap. 31 *init.*]), that they reject as illegitimate those common conceptions that by their own canon of " clarity " have a better claim to legitimacy [b] than

held of the relation of seed to its product, though implied by the Stoic etymologies, is contradicted by the Stoic doctrine of fire as the seed of the universe.

[a] So Alexander, *De Mixtione*, p. 218, 10-21 (Bruns).

[b] *e.g.* οὕτως οὐδὲν ἐναργές ἐστι καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐχόμενον ἐννοιῶν ὡς . . . ταύτην οὖν ἀνατρέπουσι τὴν ἐνάργειαν οὗτοι (1074 B [chap. 30]); καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἐναργές ἐστι . . . ἂν μὴ Στωικοὶ γένωνται . . . (1079 A [chap. 38]); τοὐναντίον γὰρ ὁ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ἐναργείας νοεῖν δίδωσι . . . (1079 F [chap. 39]). *Cf.* Epictetus, *Diss.* I, xxvii, 6 (πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων πιθανότητας τὰς προλήψεις ἐναργεῖς . . . ἔχειν δεῖ) with II, xx, 1 and III, iii, 4; and Alexander, *De Mixtione*, pp. 217, 32–218, 1 (Bruns) = *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 473 (p. 155, 24-30) and p. 227, 12-17 (Bruns) = *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 475 (p. 156, 19-23) with Alexander's reply, *ibid.*, p. 227, 20-22 (Bruns). According to Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxiv [1930], p. 50; *cf.* J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* [Cambridge, 1969], p. 141) the word ἐνάργεια does not occur in any fragment of any Stoic earlier than Antipater (*De Stoic. Repug.* 1051 E-F); but in fact it occurs in a fragment of Ariston of Chios (*S. V.F.* i, frag. 346) and from what Plutarch says elsewhere it appears that the adjective had been used of conceptions by Chrysippus (see note *c* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1047 C *supra*).

do the spurious ones that they seek to introduce instead,[a] and that, while making themselves the advocates of " clarity " and the standards of the common conceptions over which they profess to keep watch and ward,[b] they force upon us misconceptions, conceptions that are inconceivable [c] and that involve the ruin of " clarity " and even of sense-perception,[d] the very basis of their own common conceptions supposedly made secure by Chrysippus against Academic assault (1059 B-C [chap. 1]).

The proof of these charges against the Stoics constitutes the whole body of the work (chaps. 4-50). It is in form a continuous speech by Diadumenus, which is interrupted only infrequently by a remark of the interlocutor's or a brief passage of dialogue with him [e] and which ends without any formal résumé or

[a] *Cf.* 1070 C (chap. 24, where *n.b.* also . . . ἃ μᾶλλον ἔδει . . . σαφεστέραν ἔχειν τὴν ἐνάργειαν) and 1084 A (chap. 45 *init.*).

[b] *Cf.* οἱ πρόδικοι τῆς ἐναργείας οὗτοι καὶ κανόνες τῶν ἐννοιῶν (1083 C [chap. 44]), . . . ὅπως συνίδῃς ὃν τρόπον διεφύλαττε τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας (1079 C [chap. 38]), and οὕτως ἐτήρει τὰς ἐννοίας (1079 D [chap. 39]).

[c] *e.g.* . . . οὐδὲ διανοητόν ἐστι. τοῦτο δὲ βιάζονται νοεῖν ἡμᾶς (1081 A [chap. 40]) and . . . ὡς παρανοεῖν ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἢ νοεῖν ἀναγκάζοντας (1083 F [chap. 44]).

[d] *Cf.* 1082 A (. . . τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχει σύγχυσιν τῆς ἐναργείας) and 1082 D (. . . οὐδενὸς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησίς ἐστιν. . . . οὐδὲν ⟨οὖν,⟩ οὔδ' ἂν παρῇ τι, αἰσθητόν ἐστιν . . .) in chapter 42; 1084 B (. . . ὑπερβολή τίς ἐστιν ὀλιγωρίας καὶ παρανομίας εἰς τὴν ἐνάργειαν καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν) in chapter 45, retorting the Stoic charge that Arcesilaus began τῆς εἰς τὴν συνήθειαν ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας of the Academics (1059 B [chap. 1]).

[e] In chapters 4-50 there are only seven such passages: 1066 D-E (chap. 16), 1068 E-F (chap. 22), 1071 B (chap. 26), 1072 B (chap. 27), 1072 D-E (chap. 27), 1073 B (chap. 28), and 1079 B (chap. 38). Against the argument that this paucity of dialogue in the body of the work is a reason for doubting Plutarch's authorship *cf.* C. Kahle, *De Plutarchi Ratione*

conclusion.[a] It is divided into two parts by Diadumenus himself, who in chapter 29 says that, having shown into what troubles the Stoics plunge ethical theory, he will now in what follows show how their physical theory "confounds the common preconceptions no less than does their theory of goals."

In the first place, Diadumenus contends, the Stoics in professing that their doctrine is in agreement with nature are at odds with their conception of what is in conformity with nature, for the latter, the things to which man is by nature congenial, they conceive as being not good or useful but indifferent (chap. 4); and so it contradicts their conception of nature as indifferent to assert, as they do, that to be in agreement with nature is the greatest good, while either this assertion or their conception of nature as attracting us to things that contribute nothing to happiness is contradicted by the statement of Chrysippus that to live happily consists solely in living virtuously (chap. 5).[b]

Moreover, they contradict their own conception of the good, according to which all good things and actions are equally good, for they maintain that not all good actions are equally estimable and not every

Dialogorum Componendorum (Diss. Göttingen, 1912), pp. 109-113.

[a] See *supra* p. 396, n. *a* in the Introduction to the *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*.

[b] The common conception said to be contradicted by the Stoic assertion that life in conformity with nature is a goal but the things in conformity with nature are indifferent, *i.e.* καθάπερ τὰ αἱρετὰ πρὸς τὸ ὠφελίμως οὕτως τὰ κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, is not one accepted as legitimate by the Stoics but one which Plutarch apparently thinks they cannot rationally reject (see *infra* note *c* on 1060 E).

object of choice, *i.e.* every good, is commendable at all (chap. 6), that their sage, *i.e.* the perfectly good man, is indifferent to the presence or absence of some things that to them are great goods but not to that of what they call indifferent (chap. 7) [a] and is unconcerned even about the blessed state of perfect good that he has achieved upon his escape from what they regard as utter wretchedness and depravity, and that, though duration does not augment goodness, *i.e.* virtue and happiness, there is no value at all in goodness and virtue of brief duration (chap. 8). Furthermore, their conception of the good as perceptible and greatly different from what is not good is contradicted by their contention that a man may have acquired perfect goodness without perceiving either its presence or the absence of the evil that has left him, a doctrine which implies besides other absurdities and contradictions of common conceptions that, since according to the Stoics the change from the summit of progress to happiness and virtue is instantaneous, either progress towards virtue is contrary to their conception of it not a state of vice and unhappiness or the difference between evil and good is contrary to their conception so minute as to be imperceptible (chap. 9). As do these conflicting propositions of theirs, so do their actions contradict their own common conceptions, for they conceive

[a] In this the Stoics are said at the beginning of the chapter (1061 B-C) to be at odds also with the conception generally held of what is *αἱρετὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον* and of what is *ἀδιάφορον*, for all men conceive the latter to be that about which one would not be concerned at all and the former to be that the presence of which is accompanied by advantage (*ὄνησις*) and the absence by a kind of want and yearning (*ἔνδεια καὶ ὄρεξις*).

vice to be without difference of degree and insist that all men who are not sages are equally vicious but treat some of them as tolerable and some as men whose words and acts and lives are worthy of their own emulation (chap. 10).

Twice in the foregoing (1060 C-D [chap. 4 *sub finem*] and 1061 D-E [chap. 7 *sub finem*]) Diadumenus has referred to the doctrine of the Stoics that suicide is justified by the absence of some things and the presence of others that they yet insist are neither good nor evil but are indifferent. Now reverting to this, he calls it contrary to the common conception to maintain, as the Stoics do, that the sage, possessing all good and so perfect and secure happiness, ought to renounce life because he lacks something indifferent whereas one who has not and never will have anything good ought to remain alive ; and he argues that the Stoics thus destroy their own conception of virtue as the good, which alone is an object of choice and alone beneficial, since it is by the things in conformity with nature and according to them indifferent that their own philosophy and their lives are governed, the standard by which life must be measured being according to Chrysippus himself not goods and evils but the things in conformity with nature and contrary to it (chap. 11). Having thus argued that the Stoics in fact esteem the indifferent as better than virtue and so contradict their own conception of the good, Diadumenus now adds (chap. 12) that Chrysippus puts the finishing touch to this himself by his argument against the suicide of those who are not sages, for in saying that to live a fool forever is better than not to be alive he says in effect that what the Stoics call indifferent is worse than what

they call evil and so contradicts their conception of evil as being without difference of degree and of folly as being the only object of avoidance.[a]

This leads to the reminder that Chrysippus explicitly declared the genesis of vice useful to the universe because without vice the good would not exist either, a notion that, Diadumenus immediately objects, would imply the absence of good among the gods and in the state of the Stoic ecpyrosis and would require the gods to maintain depravity in the world in order to ensure the existence of virtue (chap. 13). The analogy drawn by Chrysippus between vice and the vulgar lines in comedy ascribes the origin of vice to divine providence, thus contradicting the Stoic conception of the gods as dispensers of good only and of vice as god-detested, and is in accord neither with the Stoic conception of the universe as a concordant commonwealth of gods and men nor with that of human life as entirely disordered and vicious (chap. 14); and, moreover, when one asks for what in the universe is vice useful, one finds the Stoics themselves denying that it is useful either for things celestial and divine or for human affairs, so that the utility of vice is reduced to a name of nothing (chap. 15).

When Diadumenus now proposes to drop this subject and turn to another, the interlocutor objects, saying that he is eager to know how the Stoics give evil and vice precedence of good and virtue,[b] and,

[a] The implication of chapters 11 and 12 together is that the Stoics in esteeming the indifferent as better than virtue and as worse than evil do in fact give evil precedence of good.

[b] *i.e.* the implication of chapters 11 and 12.

himself eliminating as invalid one of the two Stoic arguments that Diadumenus gives in reply, asks for the Academic answer to the other, that prudence, being the knowledge of good and evil, would not exist if evil did not exist (chap. 16). This dialogic exchange is apparently meant to emphasize the importance of the answers now given by Diadumenus. In the first place, prudence is the name given to the means by which are distinguished the good and evil that do exist but do not exist in order that there may be prudence any more than black and white exist in order that there may be sight ; in the second place, the Stoic conception of prudence as necessarily implying the existence of evil is contradicted by the Stoic doctrine that in the ecpyrosis the whole of existence is prudent and sage though there is no evil [a] ; and it is merely a matter of names if the Stoics because of their conception of prudence as knowledge of good and evil refuse to call prudence the equivalent faculty by which good things alone or good and indifferent things would be known if only these and no evils existed (chap. 17). Moreover, even the notion that there could be no knowledge of good and evil, *i.e.* that the conception of evil is inconceivable, if only good existed is inconsistent with the assertion of the Stoics that men, who are all entirely evil and vicious, can yet conceive of prudence and the good and without having virtue can yet induce an apprehension of it, the implication being that according to the common conceptions with which the Stoics profess to be in accord folly by itself

[a] A similar argument was used by Diadumenus in his original objections to the doctrine that without vice good would not exist either (chap. 13 [1065 B]).

can apprehend prudence but prudence by itself can apprehend neither itself nor folly (chap. 18).

This use of the Stoic doctrine that in all men there is nothing of good but only evil suggests the argument that the conception of evil as required by nature for the reason alleged by Chrysippus, even if this be granted, does not justify that doctrine of the viciousness of all men and even of those at the summit of progress (chap. 19); and this brings Diadumenus back to the usefulness of vice according to Chrysippus and specifically to the question in chapter 15 for what it is useful, since, as Chrysippus held that to these men who are not sages nothing is useful, vice cannot be useful for the base who have it (chap. 20 [1068 A]). This leads to the argument that the Stoics wilfully pervert the common conceptions held by all men of " to have use for," " to be in need of," " to be in want of " [a] and in so doing abandon their own as well (chap. 20 [1068 A-D]). Returning to the Stoic assertion that no base man can receive any benefit, Diadumenus argues that from this, itself at odds with the common conceptions generally held, an inference is drawn which is nevertheless contradicted by the Stoics themselves. They infer that the base man, because he can receive no benefit, cannot be gratified and so cannot be ungrateful; but they then extend gratification to the intermediates, admitting that these may gratify though not benefit even the base man, and thereby imply further that contrary to their own conception one can be gratified by that for which one has neither use nor need (chap. 21).

[a] Partially foreshadowed in 1061 B-C (see p. 632, n. *a supra*).

Here the interlocutor intervenes again, ostensibly to cut short a digression by asking Diadumenus what the highly prized benefit is that he has just said the Stoics reserve for sages alone.[a] This question with the brief reply that it is every act of every other sage everywhere serves as a transition and an emphatic introduction[b] to the contradictions now to be revealed in the Stoic conception of the beneficial. Whereas all other men suppose that selection is a beneficial action only if the objects selected are beneficial, the Stoics, while holding that the only good is the selection of what is in conformity with nature, maintain that these objects of the selection are not beneficial but are indifferent, though, if they are not selected and obtained, life is not worth living (chap. 22 [1069 A-E]); and so in their attempt to deny that what is in conformity with nature is beneficial they call the same things unbeneficial but yet useful and of no concern to us but yet principles of our duties, appealing to nature for some of their doctrines and for others rejecting her or rather in their own actions cleaving to the things in conformity with nature as good and objects of choice but in their talk spurning them as indifferent and useless (chap. 23). Since they maintain that for the sake of these indifferent

[a] The interlocutor says (1068 E-F) *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄφες. ἡ δὲ πολυτίμητος ὠφέλεια τίς ἐστιν, ἣν ὡς μέγα τι τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐξαίρετον φυλάττοντες . . .*, referring to the words in the preceding chapter, *τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι σοφῶν ἐστι* (see note *d* on 1068 E *infra*).

[b] This character of the interlocutor's question and the reply to it (*Ἂν εἷς σοφὸς ὁπουδήποτε . . . κἂν μὴ συνῶσι μηδὲ γιγνώσκοντες τυγχάνωσι* [1068 F—1069 A]) is disregarded by Sandbach, who calls the following *καὶ μήν* "the most abrupt" of the "fresh starts" in the first part of the work (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 23, n. 1).

things reason often requires the good to be surrendered and that without them life even with what they call the good is not to be endured, their conception of the good is at odds with that universally held of it as being what is of the highest value and sufficient in itself [a]; and this, Diadumenus adds, is a prime example of the outrage they do to common experience and of their way of substituting spurious for legitimate common conceptions even in matters the clarity of which should be most manifest (chap. 24).

A transition from the beneficial selection of unbeneficial objects to the topic of the goal is provided by the next chapter, where Diadumenus argues that the Stoic conception of goods as not differing in degree is in conflict with the common conception generally held of the goal as a greater good than goods that subserve it and, in effect making what is not the goal equal to the goal, is therewith in conflict with Stoic doctrines too, since according to Chrysippus himself a good that subserves the goal is *eo ipso* not the goal, just as his recognition of evils that injure but do not make us worse, being in agreement with the common conception of these as lesser evils than those that do make us worse, contradicts the Stoic denial of a difference of degree in evil (chap. 25).

The Stoic conception of the goal itself, Diadumenus now argues, requires the Stoics to accept one of the alternatives, both of which are in conflict with the common conceptions accepted by the Stoics themselves, for they deny both that life has more than one

[a] In chapters 11-12 it had been argued that this doctrine of the Stoics contradicts their own conceptions of good and evil (see pp. 633-634 *supra*).

goal and that each particular action is to be referred to something other than this one goal. They say that the primary things conforming with nature are not themselves good and the goal is not the obtaining of them but is the rational selection of these things that are a kind of matter with selective value,[a] and they thus deny both that the attainment and the rational selection are two separate goals and that the former is the goal of the latter; but, since it is absurd to make the latter the goal of the former or its own goal, rational selection must have another and different goal, for according to the Stoics themselves to be rational it must be related to some goal, and so in short the doctrine that the goal itself is rational selection contradicts the Stoic conception of rational selection (chap. 26). Testimony to this contradiction is provided by Chrysippus himself in his argument against Ariston that the conception of indifference to what is not good presupposes a conception of the good unless indifference is to have subsistence prior to itself, for *a fortiori* then the Stoic conception of the good as prudence, this being knowledge of good and evil, requires a prior conception of the good, so that, if the only good is prudence, the conception of either requires the prior conception of the other.[b] The procedure is then applied to the Stoic conception of the essence of good as the rational selection of the things in conformity

[a] At this point (1071 B) the interlocutor applauds the accuracy with which the Stoic position has been reported, but incidentally by the interruption he sets it off from the attack upon it which follows.

[b] Here (1072 B) a brief exchange of question and answer emphasizes the circularity involved.

with nature (1072 B-E) : since rational selection, as was said before (in chap. 26 *sub finem*), is selection that is made relative to some goal and the goal is rational behaviour in the acts of selection, this behaviour proceeding from the habitude rationality so that no conception of good is involved, the conception of rationality presupposes that of the goal and that of the goal implies that of rationality ; and, since the objects of the selection are selected not because they are good but because they have value relative to the goal, the goal turns out to be rational behaviour in the acts of selecting the things that have value for rational behaviour. This argument is repeated and explicated in the form of a brief dialogue between Diadumenus and the interlocutor (1072 E), who professed not to understand from the first formulation of it how the result was reached (chap. 27).

The first part of the work might have been expected to end with this dialogue emphatically restating the argument that even the Stoic doctrine of the goal of life is in conflict with a common conception employed by Chrysippus himself to refute Ariston ; but instead Diadumenus, conceding that his last argument is thought by some to be directed against Antipater rather than the Stoic system (1072 F [chapter 27 *sub finem*]), makes this concession a transition to the charge (chap. 28) that all members of the school hold a doctrine of love that is in conflict with the common conceptions.[a] They hold that none of the fair, *i.e.* the wise and virtuous, is loved or worth loving and that the lovers of the young, who being

[a] *Cf.* the μέν . . . δέ connecting the last sentence of chapter 27 (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν εἰσιν οἱ . . .) and the first sentence of chapter 28 (τῶν δὲ περὶ ἔρωτος . . . πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς . . .).

base and stupid are ugly, stop loving them when they have become fair ; but, Diadumenus maintains, their notion that love is incited by a semblance of beauty in the ugly and vicious is in conflict with their own doctrine that the outward form is defiled by depravity of character, while it is contrary to the common conception for the ugly to be lovable because he will one day have beauty and once he has got it to be loved by no one (1073 A-B). Here the interlocutor intervenes and intervenes for once to defend the Stoics,[a] explaining that by love they mean the pursuit of an undeveloped stripling with a natural aptitude for virtue. Whereupon Diadumenus replies that this is precisely the kind of thing of which he is trying to convict them, for it would have been unobjectionable to call the zeal of sages about young men a " pursuit " or a " making friends " of them but in calling it " love," the common conception of which is entirely different, the Stoics use words in a Pickwickian sense to turn inside out our legitimate common conceptions (1073 B-C), which is to say that with the pretence of replacing spurious conceptions by legitimate ones they in fact substitute the former for the latter (*cf.* 1070 C [chap. 24] *supra*). The particular subject of this chapter, which has been called " an inorganic appendix " to the ἠθικὸς τόπος,[b] was chosen for the sake of the interlocutor's defence of this Stoic doctrine ; and this unique defence was introduced in order that Diadumenus in his reply to it might con-

[a] This seems to have been misunderstood by C. Kahle, *De Plutarchi Ratione Dialogorum Componendorum* (Diss. Göttingen, 1912), p. 112.

[b] *Cf.* M. Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), p. 23 and Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 46.

clude the first part of the work by clearly restating the nature and limits of his accusation.

Dismissing the Stoic dialectic in a formal transition from ethical topics to the principles of Stoic physical theory, Diadumenus now proposes to prove that the latter confounds the common preconceptions no less than the Stoic theory of goals has been shown to do (chap. 29). He begins with what the Stoics call the sum of things (*τὸ πᾶν*), arguing that according to their own conception of the existent it must be non-existent, that their conception of it is identical with the common conception that all men have of nothing, and that in all this they subvert clear apprehension, *i.e.* the guarantee of legitimacy for the common conceptions with which they are at odds (chap. 30). From this, which he says may seem to be too much of a logical difficulty, he proceeds to matters of a more physical nature and of these first to the Stoic conception of divinity (chaps. 31-36).[a]

This, he argues, is in the first place at odds with the conception of the gods held by all men who have or ever have had a conception of god, for according to it divinity is indestructible and everlasting, whereas Chrysippus and Cleanthes hold that none of the gods is so excepting Zeus, in whom all the rest are consumed [b] and who also therefore has destruction as an attribute, so that moreover there is no genuine

[a] For theology as the consummation of Stoic physics *cf.* Chrysippus in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1035 A-B: . . . *τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν ἔσχατος εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος· διὸ καὶ τελετὰς προσηγόρευσαν τὰς τούτου παραδόσεις* (=*S.V.F.* ii, pp. 16, 38–17, 2).

[b] In the ecpyrosis, the doctrine of the Stoics that was used for a different argument against them in chapters 13 and 17 *supra.*

difference between the conception of man and the Stoic conception of god as a rational animal subject to destruction—and in fact according to Cleanthes even contributing to that destruction (chap. 31). Furthermore, the Stoics contradict their own conception of the gods, for they must accept as legitimate the common preconception of god as not only immortal and blessed but also humane, protective, and beneficent, since they denounce the Epicurean denial of providence for violating this preconception, and yet they maintain themselves that what the gods provide is only indifferent and neither good nor beneficial (chap. 32), that the human sage and Zeus himself are equally virtuous and blissful and of equal benefit to each other, and that human affairs are in the worst plight possible though administered by Zeus in the best possible fashion (chap. 33); and this contradiction is aggravated by their appeal to the common conception against Menander's making good the origin of human ills, for they make god, though good, the origin of evil, since according to their physics matter cannot be the cause of it and no part of the world, even the slightest of which is according to them a part of Zeus, can be otherwise than in conformity with the will of Zeus (chap. 34). This refers to the doctrine of Zeus as the differentiated and articulate world in the diacosmesis, as the first chapter of this section (chap. 31 [1075 B-D]) did to the ecpyrosis, when all the other gods are consumed in Zeus; and now it is charged that the Stoics in their more strictly physical statements of this doctrine [a] contradict their own common conceptions,

[a] That this doctrine in chapter 35 has already appeared in chapters 31 and 34 is overlooked by Pohlenz when he

for, whereas their etymologies of the words for " seed " and " nature " commit them to the common conception of the former as smaller and more compact than that which is developed from it, they assert that the seed of the universe, which is fire, is larger and more diffuse than the universe, which is developed from it by shrinkage and dwindling and which by diffusion of its lesser mass turns into its seed again (chap. 35). This fire, moreover, in the ecpyrosis is according to them both Zeus and providence, that is to say a single substance with two individual qualifications, which conflicts with the common conception as the Academic assertion of indistinguishable likenesses does not, though they attack this for confusing everything by requiring that there be several substances with one and the same qualification (chap. 36).[a]

Here Diadumenus formally turns from theology

says (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 27) that what is said of it in 35 " knüpft unmittelbar an 30 an " and that, whereas 30, 35, and 36 treat physical problems, " die religiös-ethische Kritik in 31-34 unterbricht den Zusammenhang." Moreover, the more logical character of the difficulty raised in chapter 30 is admitted at the beginning of chapter 31 ; and it is there that Diadumenus says *ἀψώμεθα τῶν φυσικωτέρων* (see p. 642, n. *a supra*), to which apparently Pohlenz thinks Plutarch expressly returns with the *τῶν φυσικώτερον λεγομένων* here at the beginning of chapter 35.

[a] Here Plutarch does not make as clear as he might have done the argument that the Stoics are in conflict with their own conception. They maintain that two or more different substances cannot have one and the same individual qualification, because substance is differentiated by one such qualification ; but this conception of theirs of the differentiation of substance is contradicted by their doctrine that in the ecpyrosis there is a single substance with two such qualifications (see the notes on 1077 D-E *infra*).

to the Stoic treatment of the elements, beginning with the doctrine of thorough blending, on which all the Stoic physics was held to depend. Whereas according to the common conception a continuous body that is a plenum cannot penetrate another such body and one of these cannot be the place of the other, the Stoics, he says, assume the contrary of this common conception and make a doctrine of it, with the consequence that they must admit propositions such as " three are four " which to other men are expressions of what is inconceivable and must maintain that it is inconceivable for one body to encompass another or to be the receptacle of another, since in the blend the bodies thoroughly interpenetrate each other (chap. 37) ; and, whereas it is contrary to the common conception that body have no extremities or ultimate parts, without which one magnitude could not be conceived to be greater or smaller than another, so that inequality would be inconceivable and therewith unevenness and corporeal roughness also, all these are abolished by the Stoics, for whom bodies have no terminal parts but in number of parts all extend to infinity. For support of the common conception of all men that the parts of a man are more than those of his finger and those of the universe more than those of a man Diadumenus appeals to the canon of clarity, and he maintains that the Stoics must assert the contrary of this clear conception because their division of bodies reduces all to an equally infinite number of parts (chap. 38 [1078—1079 B]).

Here for the last time and the only time in the second part of the work the interlocutor interrupts Diadumenus, asking whether the Stoics do not

grapple with these difficulties and by this question marking the transition from the preceding development of the difficulties to the specific " contradictions " in the Stoic resolutions of them. To the question Diadumenus replies ironically that the Stoics do grapple with them ingeniously and manfully, and therewith he begins his detailed exposure of the way in which by these doctrines of theirs they " keep watch and ward over the common conceptions." First, he quotes Chrysippus on ultimate parts and, interpreting him to mean that the number of constituent parts of any body is " neither infinite nor finite," argues that this implies either a conception of an intermediate between finite and infinite, which Chrysippus does not identify,[a] or the equivalent of a premise neither true nor false, which is itself in conflict with the Stoic conception (chap. 38 [1079 B-D]). Then he argues that Chrysippus involves himself in similar contradictions with regard to the equal and unequal when he tries to resolve the difficulties concerning them caused by the denial of ultimate parts and the doctrine of the continuity of body,[b] for his way of " preserving the common con-

[a] And does not, it is implied, because such a conception is inconceivable ; *cf.* *εἰπόντα τί τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔδει λῦσαι τὴν ἀπορίαν* here (1079 C) with the statement in the next chapter concerning an intermediate between equal and unequal : . . . *καὶ ταῦτ' ἴσου καὶ ἀνίσου μέσον, ὃ μηδέτερόν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔχοντας εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ νοῆσαι δυναμένους* (1080 B).

[b] Since these are the first of the two kinds of difficulties raised in chapter 38 (1078 F), chapter 39, the whole of which is devoted to them, as 1079 B-D had been devoted to the second kind (1079 A-B), is not a " digression " as it is called by Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 46 with n. 1), who cites with approval the suggestion made by Sandbach (see *infra* note *b* on 1078 E).

ceptions " is to say that the inclined faces of a pyramid do not exceed where they are larger, though this implies that what is larger is not larger and what is unequal is equal, and his resolution of the Democritean dilemma about the cone is that of the conic segments the bodies are unequal but the surfaces of those bodies are neither equal nor unequal, though this is contrary to the common conception provided by reason together with clear apprehension (*i.e.* by what according to the Stoics themselves guarantees the legitimacy of a common conception); and, if it be granted that the surfaces of unequal bodies can be neither equal nor unequal, it must be granted that there can be such magnitudes and numbers too, though an intermediate between equal and unequal is inexpressible and inconceivable,[a] while for the Stoics to posit bodies that are neither equal nor unequal, as they must if they posit such surfaces, and to deny that not to be equal to each other is to be unequal is to contradict the conception implied by their censure of the Epicureans for supposing certain indivisible movements to be neither in motion nor at rest. Finally Diadumenus returns to his citation of Chrysippus at the beginning of the chapter, arguing that his " larger without exceeding " is a self-contradiction, since, if of two things neither exceeds the other, the two coincide and therefore neither is larger and, if one of the two is larger, they do not coincide and therefore one does exceed the other—unless according to Chrysippus and contrary to the common conception because neither exceeds the

[a] *Cf.* in 1079 c the statement about an intermediate between finite and infinite (p. 646, n. *a supra*).

other they do *not* coincide and because one is larger than the other they *do* (chap. 39).

From these contradictions of the common conceptions into which the Stoics because of their denial of ultimate parts are supposedly forced by the problems of increments in the faces of the pyramid and of the contiguous surfaces of conic segments Diadumenus goes on to the question of bodily contact as such and argues that this for the same reason forces them into similar contradictions. To the Epicurean indivisibles the Stoics object that there can be no contact of whole with whole, for that is blending and not contact, or of part with part, for indivisibles have no parts (*i.e.* the Epicureans must contradict the common conception of bodily contact), and themselves maintain that bodies are in contact not at a part of themselves but at a limit, which is not body, but then, Diadumenus contends, contrary to the common conception implicit in their refutation of the Epicureans they must admit that, since an incorporeal always intervenes between bodies and according to them only bodies are existent, nothing ever touches anything and that, since bodies always touch each other with an incorporeal, they touch each other with nothing. Moreover, this conception of contact is contradicted by their own doctrine of interaction and blending, for, since it is by contact that bodies affect one another, they would have to do so by incorporeal limits ; but in the blending of bodies these limits must either persist or be destroyed, and either alternative, the persistence of limits of bodies in a blend or the destruction and generation of incorporeals, is contrary to the common conceptions accepted by the Stoics themselves and

inconceivable by anyone, as it is inconceivable also that a body should tinge, heat, or crush another by contact of incorporeal limits, though it is such misconceptions that the Stoics would force upon us in place of the common preconceptions of incorporeals and bodies that they annihilate (chap. 40).

This denial of ultimate parts also entails contradiction of the common conception of time as past, present, and future, for the Stoics must either deny the existence of present time altogether, as does Archedemus, who calls " now " a juncture of past and future and so unwittingly resolves the whole of time into limits, or though asserting its existence must divide it exhaustively into parts that are all either past or future, as does Chrysippus, who maintains that of time only what is present exists and yet that of present time part is past and part is future, so that in fact he leaves no time existing (chap. 41) [a] ; and this involves the utter ruin of clear apprehension, for, since actions and motions are divided in correspondence with time, it abolishes all initiation and termination of them, so that whatever is occurring never began and will never stop occurring and, as every part of it either has occurred or is about to occur but neither what is past nor what is future is an object of sensation, there are no objects of sensation at all (chap. 42), which is to say that this Stoic doctrine of continuity with its denial of ultimate

[a] The pair of " contradictory quotations " from Chrysippus at the end of the chapter, which Sandbach unaccountably says " could be dispensed with " (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 24, last paragraph), provides the evidence for the second alternative (ἢ . . . " ἔστι χρόνος ἐνεστηκώς," οὗ τὸ μὲν ἐνειστήκει τὸ δ' ἐνστήσεται, . . .).

parts destroys what the Stoics themselves hold to be the source and the guarantee of their own common conceptions.

So it does also when applied to locomotion,[a] for it constrains them to contradict the common conception more flagrantly than does Epicurus, whom they castigate for violating this by having his atoms all move with equal velocity, since by making infinitely divisible the space to be traversed they make it inconceivable for one moving body to be overtaken by another or for any effusion of a liquid or locomotion of a solid ever to be completed (chap. 43).

From this Diadumenus passes to the problem of growth, marking the transition with a reminder that he is confining himself to those of the Stoic absurdities " that are at odds with the common conception." [b] The Stoics, he says, accuse the Academics of annihilating the preconceptions and contradicting the common conceptions by concluding that what

[a] It should be observed that Diadumenus reaches this topic after having treated in order the contradictions implied by the doctrine as to number (chap. 38 [1079 B-D]), to geometricals (chap. 39), to corporeal solids (chap. 40), and to time and temporal process (chaps. 41-42).

[b] According to Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 24, n. 2) this is nearly a confession that chapters 40-43 are " not really suitable to Plutarch's purpose " ; but this shows disregard both for Plutarch's way of arguing that the implications of Stoic doctrine contradict common conceptions accepted by the Stoics themselves and for the sequence of his argument, for which in chapters 38-43 see the last preceding note. The connexion of the topic of chapter 37 (also thought by Sandbach [*loc. cit.*] to be unsuitable to Plutarch's purpose) with that of chapters 38-43 and of both with the Stoic doctrine of the elements was recognized by Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 29-30).

is called growth and decay is really generation and destruction because substances are constantly in flux and with the accession and loss of particles are constantly passing from one existing state into another; and yet these Stoics admit the Academic premises about the flux of substance and then invent for each individual as the persistent subject of its growth and diminution a quality that is affected in all ways contrary to the substance but is coalescent with it and not perceptibly distinguishable from it. This assumption of an undiscerned and indiscernible doublet of each individual, however, is contrary to the clear apprehension of which they are the advocates and to the common conceptions of which they profess to be the standards and so by their own canon is a misconception, which they force upon us because they see no other way of saving the phenomena of growth (chap. 44); but there is not even such an excuse for them to abolish the common conceptions and substitute alien ones as they do by making virtues and vices and all mental states and acts corporeal and even living beings and by cramming them into a single point in the heart, where the ruling faculty of the soul is filled with this indistinguishable multitude of bodies (chap. 45).

While they thus contradict the common preconceptions and scornfully outrage clear apprehension and common experience with their conception of states and acts as corporeal and animate and with their invention of an indistinguishable multitude of animate bodies within the soul, their doctrine of the soul itself implies preconceptions that are in open conflict with those implied by other doctrines of their own. So their account of the generation of soul

implies the conception of animation as the product of chilling and condensation ; but, whereas according to this the sun too should be generated by chilling and condensation, they say to the contrary that it has become animate by the change of liquid into intellectual fire, *i.e.* by subtilization and heating, and do not in consistency with their doctrine of the soul generate by heat things that are cold, by diffusion those that are solid, or by rarefaction those that are heavy (chap. 46).[a] Moreover, according to them the soul is a vaporous exhalation perpetually in flux and constantly being altered and transformed and conception is a mental image, which is an impression in the soul ; but, since a substance continually in motion and flux cannot receive and retain an imprint, their conceptions of conception as a conserved notion, of memory as a stable impression, and of the forms of knowledge as unalterable and steadfast are contradicted by their own doctrine of the nature of soul (chap. 47).

The whole attack upon the Stoics might have been made to culminate in this proof that their doctrine contradicts their own conception of conception, and it has been proposed to make it do so by removing the

[a] There is a psychologically natural sequence from the flux of all substance and the indistinguishable doublet of each individual (chap. 44) to the indistinguishable multitude of animate bodies in the soul (chap. 45) to the generation of soul (chap. 46) to the nature of soul as flux in relation to the conception in the soul (chap. 47). Chapter 46 does not interrupt the continuity, as Pohlenz says it does (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 18 and 30 [where " unterbreitet " is a misprint for " unterbricht "]) ; but it would be interrupted if chapters 48-50 were inserted between 44 and 45 as suggested by Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 24).

following chapters to an earlier place in the speech of Diadumenus ; but the modern preference for such a climax need not have been shared by Plutarch and does not justify the proposed transpositions, which would themselves produce other difficulties,[a] while with the text as it stands Diadumenus makes the conclusion of the last part of his attack the specific subject that upon leaving the theology he had declared it his intention to consider, the Stoic treatment of the elements.[b]

Beginning with the common conception generally held of element or principle as simple and incomposite, he argues first that the Stoics contradict this conception in holding god to be a principle and yet to be intellectual body, for this is intelligence in matter and so not simple or incomposite, and then that their own conceptions of matter and of god as

[a] That which would be created by the proposal of Rasmus has been mentioned in the last preceding note. Sandbach suggests that a better place for chapters 48-50 would be between 43 and 44 (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 25, n. 2), saying that 44 would be linked to 50 by the subjects of οὐσία and ποιότης ; but this disregards both the real topic of 44 and the express transition with which it begins, and it would place 43 and 48 in juxtaposition, though there is neither sequence of subject nor express transition from one to the other.

[b] *Cf.* 1077 E (chap. 37 *init.*), and for the relevance of the intervening chapters to this subject see note *d* on 1077 E. Sandbach maintains (*loc. cit.*, p. 24) that chapters 48-50 like chapters 40-43 (see p. 650, n. *b supra*) are " not really suitable to Plutarch's purpose " but are his not very successful adaptation of some book of different aim. Whatever Plutarch's ultimate source may have been, the subsequent résumé should show that he made the material serve the purpose of this essay as successfully as any of the rest that he used in it.

both being principles, the former being without quality and the latter being rational body, are incompatible, for the latter would require rationality and matter to be one and the same, so that matter would not be without quality, and the former would require them to be different, in which case god as rational body would be not simple but something composite participating in both (chap. 48). So also in the case of the corporeal elements, Diadumenus contends, the doctrine of the Stoics contradicts the conception of element that they apparently accept, for, though they call earth, water, air, and fire primary elements, yet according to their doctrine earth and water are not simple, primary, and self-sustaining as are air and fire, by which they are preserved in being and from which they derive their substantiality, but in fact are simply matter condensed and rarefied to different degrees by air (chap. 49). Furthermore, substance itself as the Stoics define it and what they say of quality imply incompatible conceptions. They call the former matter that underlies the qualities and say that qualities are corporeal substances ; but, if the latter is so, substance as defined is superfluous and, if the former is what it is said to be, qualities must be different from what underlies them and so, participating in body, are not bodies. In short, the conception of unqualified matter involved in the Stoic definition of substance implies the conception of quality as incorporeal, and the doctrine of the Stoics that qualities are corporeal makes inconceivable their notion of substance as unqualified matter. This dilemma, Diadumenus adds in conclusion, is not to be evaded, as some try to do, by contradicting the common conception even to the extent of assert-

ing that substance is called " without quality " because it has all qualities, for nobody (and by implication not even a Stoic) conceives as " without x " what is " without part in no x," or by protesting that matter is always involved in the conception of quality, for even so it is conceived as other than quality and different from it (chap. 50).

To comment on the justice and fairness of this attack, which is acknowledged to be a " speech for the prosecution," on the accuracy of Plutarch's quotations and paraphrases of Stoic texts, or on the validity of his own arguments would be merely to repeat what has already been said in the Introduction to the *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* (pp. 401-406 *supra*) or to anticipate the comments on particular passages in the notes to this essay. These will show that Plutarch sometimes clearly misunderstands or misinterprets Stoic doctrines and expressions and sometimes exploits for his own purpose their obscurity or ambiguity ; but it remains true nevertheless that the Stoic doctrine of common conceptions is a dubious one, a precarious base from which to attack the Academics as the Stoics did and itself vulnerable at many points to the kind of counter-attack here made upon it by Plutarch.

The most recent translation of this essay known to me is that into French by E. Bréhier revised and published with introduction and brief notes by V. Goldschmidt in *Les Stoïciens* (Paris, Bibl. de la Pléiade, 1962), pp. 88-92, pp. 135-183, and pp. 1264-1269. The studies of it that I have constantly consulted and to which frequent reference is made in the present introduction and in the notes on the text and translation are the following : E. Rasmus, *De*

Plutarchi Libro qui inscribitur De Communibus Notitiis (Frankfurt a.O., 1872); C. Giesen, *De Plutarchi contra Stoicos Disputationibus* (Monasterii Guestfalorum, 1889); O. Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Communibus Notitiis Librum Genuinum Esse Demonstratur* (Marpurgi Cattorum, 1907); M. Pohlenz, "Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker," *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), pp. 1-33 (=*Kleine Schriften* [Hildesheim, 1965] i, pp. 448-480); F. H. Sandbach, "Plutarch on the Stoics," *Classical Quarterly*, xxxiv (1940), pp. 20-25; and D. Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* (Paris, 1969).

The essay is preserved in two MSS. only, E and B. These I have collated from photostats and have reported fully in the *apparatus*, correcting silently for the most part the occasional errors in Treu's report and in the latest Teubner edition (Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2). In this essay B and E have the same errors in 253 passages including 28 lacunae indicated by spaces left blank in both MSS. Agreement in error does not prove, however, that one MS. depends upon the other, as is strikingly shown by the common omission of the necessary μὴ before βιοῦν in 1064 E (p. 74, 27 [Pohlenz]), for *all* MSS. make this same mistake—and another besides—in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 A (p. 22, 28 [Pohlenz]) where the same passage is quoted. As evidence that B is a copy of E one might adduce the fact that in 1071 A (p. 88, 17 [Pohlenz]), where both have a lacuna of three letter-spaces before αθὰ, the lacuna in E is an erasure. On the other hand, in 1068 F (p. 83, 21 [Pohlenz]) B has αὐτοῖς τοῖς σοφοῖς despite the fact that in E the original οἱ of αὐτοῖς had been correctly changed to ᾗ by the first hand.[a] There are seven passages in

[a] For corrections in B which result in readings of E *cf.*

which the readings of B and E are different but are both wrong. The variant of B in one of these was explicitly rejected by Manton as an erroneous conjecture by B himself (*Class. Quart.*, xliii [1949], p. 103); and such originality or oversight might explain the other cases in this category and most of the 59 cases in which B is in error though E has the correct reading. Original conjecture might also account for most of the twenty cases in which the reading of B is right though that of E is wrong.[a] There are cases, however, for which neither originality nor negligence on the part of B seems to be a plausible explanation. The eleven cases in which for no obvious reason the order of words in B differs from that in E suggest that in the MS. which B copied these words had been inadvertently omitted at first and had then been added above the line and that B mistook the place where they were meant to be incorporated. This might well explain the strange misplacement of a single letter in the curious mistake at 1083 F (p. 117, 10 [Pohlenz]), where B has παρανομεῖν ἡᾶς and E correctly παρανοεῖν ἡμᾶς. If such was the exemplar of B, it might still, of course, have been not independent of E but the copy (η) of E that Manton postulated. Other phenomena remain, however, that are not easily explained by this hypothesis. In 1060 C (p. 66, 1 [Pohlenz]) B has τ̀ (*i.e.* τὸν) whereas the scribe of E seems first to have written τὸν and

ἄλλ$^{o}_{\omega}$ in 1071 A (p. 88, 14 [Pohlenz]), προιὼν with ω changed to o in 1078 D (p. 105, 13 [Pohlenz]), and the miscorrection, ἑτέρ$^{αι}_{ας}$ in 1070 C (p. 86, 29 [Pohlenz]).

[a] Variations merely of spelling, aspiration, or accentuation are not included in this account.

then to have corrected the ὸ to ῶ immediately. Here almost certainly B copied an abbreviation which E also had in his exemplar but which he expanded and then reinterpreted; and there are other mistakes of B also that are most easily explained as erroneous interpretations of abbreviations which E had correctly expanded: *e.g.* καὶ -B, ᾗ -E in 1077 B (p. 102, 19 [Pohlenz]); τοῦ -B, τὸ -E in 1079 B (p. 107, 7 [Pohlenz])[a]; ἔστω -B, ἔσται -E in 1080 A (p. 108, 23 [Pohlenz]); λεπτομερέστερον -B, λεπτομερέστατον -E in 1084 D (p. 118, 27 [Pohlenz]). Furthermore, in 1078 C (p. 105, 5 [Pohlenz]), where E has δεῖ τοῦ and the right reading is certainly either δήπου or δή, anyone correcting E as he copied it would surely have written δήπου; but here B has simply δή, and this he is more likely to have copied from his exemplar than to have substituted for the two words of E. This being so, it is also likely that such readings of his as ἤδη in 1064 D where E has δήπου (a variant not recorded by Pohlenz, p. 74, 12) and ἦν in 1081 E where E has οἷον (p. 112, 20 [Pohlenz]) are neither "emendations" nor oversights of his own. It is well to remember that in essays where E and B can be compared with other MSS. E has many unique readings which are probably his own emendations or errors. There is no good reason to suppose that in this essay E, even when he is right as against B, must always be accurately reproducing his exemplar while the source of variation in B can be only his own ingenuity or negligence. In 1071 A (p. 88, 19 [Pohlenz]), for example, the δέ of B need not be a

[a] I have myself adopted the reading of E here; but this too may be a mistaken expansion, and Wyttenbach's τῷ may be right.

misreading of E's δεῖ but may be the faithful copy of the archetype which was correctly emended to δεῖ by E.

Addendum

Among the publications relevant to Plutarch's treatment of Stoicism which became available to me only after this volume had been set in type I call attention especially to the following:

L. Bloos, *Probleme der stoischen Physik*, Hamburg, Buske Verlag, 1973.

M. Lapidge, "'Ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology," *Phronesis*, xviii (1973), pp. 240-278.

Ruth Schian, *Untersuchungen über das "argumentum e consensu omnium,"* Hildesheim, Olms, 1973, pp. 134-174.

R. B. Todd, "The Stoic Common Notions: A Re-examination and Reinterpretation," *Symbolae Osloenses*, xlviii (1973), pp. 47-75.

R. B. Todd, "Chrysippus on Infinite Divisibility," *Apeiron*, vii, 1 (May, 1973), pp. 21-29.

(1058 E) # ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΩΝ ΕΝΝΟΙΩΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΣΤΩΙΚΟΥΣ[1]

1. ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ.[2] Σοὶ μὲν εἰκός, ὦ Διαδούμενε, μὴ
F πάνυ μέλειν εἴ τινι δοκεῖτε παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐννοίας, ὁμολογοῦντί γε καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων περιφρονεῖν ἀφ' ὧν σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται γεγόνασιν ἔννοιαι, τήν γε[3] περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πίστιν ἕδραν ἔχουσαι καὶ ἀσφάλειαν. ἐμὲ δὲ πολλῆς, ὡς γ' ἐμ-
1059 αυτῷ φαίνομαι, καὶ ἀτόπου μεστὸν ἥκοντα ταραχῆς εἴτε τισὶ λόγοις εἴτ' ἐπῳδαῖς εἴτ' ἄλλον[4] ἐπίστασαι τρόπον παρηγορίας οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἰατρεύων. οὕτω σοι διασέσεισμαι καὶ γέγονα μετέωρος ὑπὸ Στωικῶν ἀνδρῶν, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα βελτίστων καὶ νὴ Δία συνήθων καὶ φίλων πικρῶς δ' ἄγαν ἐγκειμένων τῇ Ἀκαδημείᾳ[5] καὶ ἀπεχθῶς, οἵ γε πρὸς μικρὰ καὶ

[1] E and B in title; *τῶν κοινῶν* omitted in *Catalogue of Lamprias* 77 ; *πρὸς τοὺς στωικοὺς περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν* -E in subscription.

[2] *Cf. ὦ ἑταῖρε* (1063 E *infra*). The interlocutor of Diadumenus is never named in the dialogue (ΛΑΜΠΡΙΑΣ -Amyot without reason), and in the MSS. no name is prefixed to indicate change of speakers.

[3] E, B ; *τε* -Aldine, Basil. ; [*γε*] -deleted by Wilamowitz.

[4] *ἄλλον* <*ὅν*> -Westman (Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2, p. 232).

[5] *ἀκαδημίᾳ* -E, B.

[a] The conceptions which by implication are here excluded

AGAINST THE STOICS ON COMMON CONCEPTIONS

1. COMRADE. You are in all likelihood quite unconcerned, Diadumenus, if anyone thinks that the speculations of your school are at odds with common conceptions. After all, you admit that you disdain the senses themselves ; and from them have come just about most of our conceptions,[a] the secure foundation of which is, of course, confidence in phenomena.[b] But here am I, full of tumult which, as it seems to me, is great and strange. Hurry and treat me either with arguments of some kind or with spells [c] or if you know some other way of assuagement. I have been thrown into such confusion as you see and so distraught by Stoics who, though otherwise excellent gentlemen and intimates, by heaven, and friends of mine, are bitterly and spitefully vehement against the Academy. To my re-

may be those which according to the Stoics are formed *δι' ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας* (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 83 [p. 28, 20-21]) ; or it is possible that Plutarch means to draw the distinction between moral conceptions and others that he draws in 1070 c *infra*.

[b] The unreliability of all sense-perception was the basis of the Academic attack upon the Stoic epistemology (*cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 42 ; Robin, *Pyrrhon*, p. 80 ; O. Gigon, *Mus. Helveticum*, i [1944], pp. 51-53).

[c] *Cf. De Facie* 920 B-C and *De Pythiae Oraculis* 395 F.

(1059) μετ' αἰδοῦς τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ λεχθέντα σεμνῶς (οὐ γὰρ ψεύσομαι) καὶ[1] πράως ἐνίσταντο,[2] τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους μετ' ὀργῆς σοφιστὰς καὶ λυμεῶνας τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ δογμάτων ὁδῷ βαδιζόντων ἀνατροπέας[3] καὶ πολλὰ τούτων ἀτοπώτερα λέγοντες καὶ
B ὀνομάζοντες[4] τέλος ἐπὶ τὰς ἐννοίας ἐρρύησαν, ὡς δή τινα σύγχυσιν καὶ ἀναδασμὸν αὐταῖς ἐπάγοντας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημείας.[5] εἶτά τις εἶπεν αὐτῶν ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλ' ἐκ προνοίας θεῶν νομίζοι μετ' Ἀρκεσίλαον καὶ πρὸ Καρνεάδου γεγονέναι Χρύσιππον, ὧν[6] ὁ μὲν ὑπῆρξε τῆς εἰς τὴν συνήθειαν ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας ὁ δ' ἤνθησε μάλιστα τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν. Χρύσιππος γοῦν[7] ἐν μέσῳ γενόμενος ταῖς πρὸς Ἀρκεσίλαον ἀντιγραφαῖς καὶ τὴν Καρνεάδου δεινότητα ἐνέφραξε, πολλὰ μὲν τῇ αἰσθήσει καταλιπὼν ὥσπερ εἰς πολιορκίαν βοηθήματα τὸν δὲ περὶ τὰς προλήψεις καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας

[1] καὶ -Wyttenbach (*cf.* Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, pp. 49-50); οὐ -E, B.

[2] ἐνίσταντο -H. C.; ἠντιάσαντο -E, B; ἠντιάσαντο -Reiske; ἀπήντησαν -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], p. 105); ἠντίασαν -Pohlenz after Wilamowitz (but *n.b.* πρὸς . . .).

[3] ἀνατροπέας -Leonicus; ἀνατροπαῖς -E, B.

[4] ὀνομάζοντες -Wyttenbach (*cf.* 1073 B *infra*, *Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus* 78 B, and Cobet's correction in *De Herodoti Malignitate* 868 A); νομίζοντες -E, B.

[5] ἀκαδημίας -E, B.

[6] ὧν -Leonicus, Basil.; οἷον -E, B.

[7] γοῦν -E, B; οὖν -Aldine, Basil.

[a] For τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ *cf.* Plato, *Republic* 489 B 4 and Aristotle, *Politics* 1341 b 33.

[b] See *S.V.F.* ii, p. 39, 31 and i, frag. 490 (Cleanthes'

marks, which were few and respectfully made, they kept objecting in a sober (for I will not falsify the facts) and mild manner; but of the older Academics they spoke in anger, calling them sophists and corrupters of philosophers [a] and subverters of methodical doctrines [b] and many things still more monstrous, and finally they swept in a torrent upon the conceptions,[c] talking as if the men of the Academy were moving to nullify and to rescind [d] them. Then one of them gave it as his belief [e] that not by chance but by providence of the gods had Chrysippus come after Arcesilaus and before Carneades, the former of whom had initiated the outrage and transgression against common experience and the latter of whom was the fairest flower of the Academics.[f] At any rate, by coming between the two Chrysippus with his rejoinders to Arcesilaus [g] had intercepted the cleverness of Carneades as well, for he had left to sense-perception many succours, as it were, against siege and had entirely eliminated the confusion about pre-

definition of τέχνη); and for ὁδῷ βαδιζόντων *cf. De Iside* 371 C, *De Genio Socratis* 595 F, *Lycurgus* xxix, 1 (57 D).

[c] Plutarch uses ἡ ἔννοια (αἱ ἔννοιαι) in place of ἡ κοινὴ ἔννοια (αἱ κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) where the context makes his meaning clear, *e.g.* 1060 D, 1061 D and E, 1063 C, 1067 C, 1068 D, 1070 E and F, 1071 A and F, 1073 D, 1076 A, 1077 A and E, 1078 E, 1080 D, 1081 C, 1082 E, 1083 A.

[d] For the metaphor *cf.* D. Ruhnken, *Timaei Sophistae Lexicon Vocum Platonicarum* (Leipzig, 1828), p. 29, col. a.

[e] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 33.

[f] See the notes on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1036 A-B, 1037 A, and 1057 A *supra*; for συνήθεια and the relation of Chrysippus to the Academic attack see also 1036 C *supra* and the note there.

[g] The title of one of these is identifiable in the partially preserved list of the writings of Chrysippus (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 8, 20), Πρὸς τὸ Ἀρκεσιλάου μεθόδιον πρὸς Σφαῖρον α'.

(1059) C τάραχον ἀφελὼν παντάπασι καὶ[1] διαρθρώσας[2] ἑκάστην καὶ θέμενος εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον· ὥστε καὶ τοὺς αὖθις ἐκκρούειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι βουλομένους μηδὲν περαίνειν ἀλλ' ἐλέγχεσθαι [βουλομένους][3] κακουργοῦντας καὶ σοφιζομένους. ὑπὸ τοιούτων ἐγὼ λόγων διακεκαυμένος ἕωθεν σβεστηρίων[4] δέομαι, καθάπερ τινὰ φλεγμονὴν ἀφαιρούντων τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.

2. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ. Ὅμοια πολλοῖς ἴσως πέπονθας. εἰ δὲ οἱ ποιηταί σε πείθουσι λέγοντες ὡς ἐκ θεῶν προνοίας ἀνατροπὴν ἔσχεν ἡ παλαιὰ Σίπυλος τὸν Τάνταλον κολαζόντων, πείθου τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἑταίροις ὅτι καὶ Χρύσιππον οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης D ἀλλ' ἐκ προνοίας ἡ φύσις ἤνεγκεν, ἄνω τὰ κάτω καὶ τοὔμπαλιν ἀνατρέψαι δεομένη τὸν βίον· ὡς οὐ γέγονε πρὸς τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων οὐδεὶς εὐφυέστερος, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ Κάτων ἔλεγε πλὴν[5] Καίσαρος ἐκείνου μηδένα νήφοντα μηδὲ φρονοῦντα ἐπὶ συγχύσει τῆς[6] πολιτείας τοῖς δημοσίοις προσελθεῖν πράγμασιν οὕτως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μετὰ πλείστης ἐπιμελείας καὶ

[1] [καὶ] -deleted by Pohlenz.

[2] διαρθρώσας -Wyttenbach (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 8, 28); διορθώσας -E, B.

[3] [βουλομένους] -deleted by Reiske.

[4] Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 13, comparing *Quaest. Conviv.* 652 F); σβεστήρων -E, B.

[5] πλὴν -Dübner ("neminem alium praeter Caesarem" -Xylander's translation; . . . μηδένα <ἄλλον> νήφοντα -Xylander, *Adnot.*, p. 55); περὶ -E, B; πρὶν -Meziriac; πρὸ -Bernardakis; περὶ Καίσαρος <πλὴν> ἐκείνου -Reiske; περὶ Καίσαρος μηδένα <πρὸ> ἐκείνου -Wyttenbach.

[6] τῆς -B; omitted by E.

[a] That is to say he not only defined each severally but he produced an articulated classification in which each had its own place in relation to all the others. For the implication of διαρθρώσας *cf.* Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, p. 162, n. 3.

conceptions and conceptions both by his differentiation of each one from the rest and by his assignment of each to its proper place[a]; and the result is that even those who thereafter wish to evade the facts or to do violence to them get nowhere but are exposed in their captiousness and sophistry. I have been overheated by such talk since early morning, and I want febrifuges that clear the mind of bewilderment as of an inflammation.

2. DIADUMENUS. What has happened to you is probably like the experience of many. Well, if you are persuaded by the poets when they say that the overthrow of ancient Sipylus proceeded from the providence of the gods in their chastising of Tantalus,[b] believe what your comrades from the Stoa say, that nature brought forth Chrysippus too not by chance but providentially when she wanted to turn life bottom side up and upside down. Certainly there has not arisen any being with greater natural aptitude for this; but, as Cato said that save for the famous Caesar no one while sober and of sound mind had entered upon public affairs for the purpose of ruining the commonwealth,[c] so it seems to me that this man exerts the utmost diligence and

[b] *Cf.* Pherecydes, frag. 38 (F. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* I A, p. 73); Antoninus Liberalis, *Metamorph.* 36 (p. 118, 15-18 [Martini]); Strabo, i, 3, 17 (58) and with this last Pliny, *N.H.* ii, 91: "devoravit . . . Sipylum in Magnesia et prius in eodem loco clarissimam urbem quae Tantalis vocabatur."

[c] *Cf.* Suetonius, *Divus Iulius* 53 and Quintilian, *Instit. Orat.* viii, 2, 9. For Καίσαρος ἐκείνου=Julius Caesar *cf.* Plutarch, *Cato Minor* lxvi, 1 (791 F).

(1059) δεινότητος οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀνατρέπειν καὶ καταβάλλειν τὴν συνήθειαν, ὡς ἔνια γοῦν[1] καὐτοὶ[2] μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ τὸν ἄνδρα σεμνύνοντες ὅταν αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ψευδομένου μάχωνται. τὸ γὰρ ἀορίστως[3] συμπεπλεγμένον τι[4] δὶ ἀντικειμένων μὴ φάναι ψεῦδος εὐ-
E πόρως εἶναι λόγους δὲ πάλιν αὖ φάναι τινὰς ἀληθῆ

[1] ἔνια γοῦν -E, B, Aldine ; ἔνι γοῦν -Basil. ; ἐνιαχοῦ Turnebus (but *cf. Pericles* xv, 1 [161 B] : . . . ὑποθρυπτομένης ἔνια δημαγωγίας and Menander, frag. 354 [Koerte-Thierfelder] = frag. 421 [Kock]).
[2] καὐτοὶ -H. C. (καὶ αὐτοὶ -Wyttenbach) ; καίτοι -E, B.
[3] ἀορίστως -Wyttenbach ; ὦ ἄριστε -E, B.
[4] τι -E ; τοι -B.

[a] This paradox, mentioned again at 1070 c *infra* (see also *De Recta Ratione Audiendi* 43 c), is ascribed to Eubulides, who polemized against Aristotle (Diogenes Laertius, ii, 108-109 ; *cf.* Döring, *Megariker*, pp. 105-114). Aristotle refers to it as the argument that the same man lies and tells the truth at the same time, and he treats it as a sophism depending upon confusion of the qualified and the absolute senses of an expression (*Soph. Elench.* 180 b 2-7 ; see A. Rüstow, *Der Lügner* [Leipzig, 1910], pp. 50-53 and against his criticism S. Ranulf, *Der eleatische Satz vom Widerspruch* [Copenhagen, 1924] and G. Calogero, *Giorn. Crit. Filos. Italiana*, viii [1927], pp. 418-419). It was the subject of a treatise by Theophrastus (Diogenes Laertius, v, 49) and of many books by Chrysippus (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 196-197), who rejected all previous solutions, denying that the difficulty could be solved by impugning the truth of the premises or the validity of the inference from them, but explained the paradox himself, though Cicero seems to deny it (*Acad. Prior.* ii, 96 ; *cf.* Rüstow, *op. cit.*, p. 68), as involving an expression without significance (*S. V.F.* ii, frag. 298 a [pp. 106, 34–107, 2] ; *cf.* Rüstow, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-86 ; I. M. Bochenski, *Formale Logik* [Freiburg/München, 1956],

cleverness in subverting and overthrowing common experience. So on occasion anyway even the man's devotees themselves testify when they quarrel with him about " the liar," [a] for what kind of conception of demonstration or what preconception of proof [b] is not subverted by denying that a conjunction formed of contradictories without qualification [c] is patently false and again by asserting on the contrary that some arguments the premises of which are true [d]

pp. 152-153). The exact formulation that Chrysippus had in mind is not recorded and can only be conjectured on the basis of Plutarch's remarks and Cicero's in *Acad. Prior.* ii, 95-98 (*cf.* Rüstow, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-91 and O. Becker, *Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik* [Wiesbaden, 1957], pp. 52-54) ; but the strongest formulation is that given by Pseudo-Alexander, *Soph. Elench.*, p. 171, 18-19 : " He who says ' I am lying ' both lies and tells the truth at the same time." The position taken by the Stoics who according to Plutarch disagreed with Chrysippus is unknown ; but it has been suggested that on the basis of the definitions of true and false (Sextus, *Adv. Math.* viii, 10 = *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 195) they simply refused to accept the liar's statement as a proposition (E. W. Beth, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, iii [1952/53], p. 80). The modern as well as the ancient controversy about the paradox is reviewed by E. Riverso in *Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche*, xiii (1960), pp. 296-325 ; *cf.* also R. L. Martin, *Paradox of the Liar* (New Haven, 1970).

[b] *Cf. De Defectu Oraculorum* 422 c (. . . μηδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ λόγου μηδὲ πίστιν ἐπιφέροντος) and *S. V.F.* iii, p. 147, 10-11.

[c] For συμπεπλεγμένον τι see note c on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1047 D *supra*. For ἀορίστως *cf.* Ammonius, *De Interp.*, p. 138, 15-17 ; Alexander, *Anal. Prior.*, p. 91, 26-27 ; Galen, *Institutio Logica* xiii, 5 ; and *S. V.F.* ii, p. 277, 8 with p. 66, 16-18 and 38 ff. Notice the titles in *S. V.F.* ii, pp. 7, 39–8, 7 (*cf.* Plutarch, *De Recta Ratione Audiendi* 43 A), on which see Rüstow, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

[d] *Cf. S. V.F.* ii, p. 8, 6.

(1059) τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς ὑγιεῖς[1] ἔχοντας, ἔτι[2] καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τῶν συμπερασμάτων ἔχειν ἀληθῆ, ποίαν ἔννοιαν ἀποδείξεως ἢ τίνα πίστεως οὐκ ἀνατρέπει πρόληψιν; τὸν μέν γε πολύποδά φασι τὰς πλεκτάνας αὐτοῦ περιβιβρώσκειν ὥρᾳ χειμῶνος, ἡ δὲ Χρυσίππου διαλεκτικὴ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῆς ἀναιροῦσα καὶ περικόπτουσα τίνα τῶν ἄλλων ἐννοιῶν ἀπολέλοιπεν ἀνύποπτον; οὐ γὰρ οἴονται[3] δήπου καὶ τὰ ἐποικοδομούμενα δὴ[4] βέβαια κεῖσθαι καὶ πάγια, τῶν πρώτων μὴ μενόντων ἀπορίας δὲ καὶ ταραχὰς ἐχόν-
F των τηλικαύτας. ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ οἱ πηλὸν ἢ κονιορτὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχοντες τὸν ἁπτόμενον αὐτῶν καὶ προσαναχρωννύμενον οὐ κινεῖν ἀλλὰ προσβάλλειν τὸ τραχῦνον δοκοῦσιν, οὕτως ἐκεῖνοι[5] τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς αἰτιῶνται καὶ νομίζουσι τὰς αἰτίας παρέχειν ὧν ἀναπεπλησμένους ἀποδεικνύουσιν αὐτούς· ἐπεὶ τάς γε[6] κοινὰς ἐννοίας τίνες μᾶλλον διαστρέ-

[1] ὑγιεῖς -E, B²(superscript) ; ἀληθεῖς -B¹, Aldine, Basil.
[2] ἔτι -E, B ; ἔστι -Aldine ; εἶτα -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 13).
[3] οἴονται -E, B ; οἰόν τε -Turnebus.
[4] δὴ -H. C. : μὴ -E, B ; [μὴ] -deleted by Reiske.
[5] ἐκεῖνοι -Wyttenbach ; ἔνιοι -E, B.
[6] γε -Reiske ; τε -E, B.

[a] For ἀγωγή in this sense *cf.* Alexander, *Anal. Prior.*, p. 265, 16-17 ; Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 531, 15-16 and p. 759, 14 ; Pseudo-Alexander, *Soph. Elench.*, p. 60, 6-7 and p. 188, 6-7.

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 250. *Cf.* Rüstow, *op. cit.*, p. 67 and pp. 92-93, who is in error, however, in charging Plutarch with saying that Chrysippus held the conclusion of the paradox to be "*uneingeschränkt wahr.*"

[c] *Cf. De Sollertia Animalium* 965 E (with Helmbold's

and the inferences [a] of which are valid still have the contradictories of their conclusions true as well ? [b] The octopus is said to gnaw off its own tentacles in winter-time [c] ; but the dialectic of Chrysippus docks and destroys its own most important parts, its very principles, and what conception among the rest has it then left free of suspicion ? For surely they [d] do not think that what is in fact the superstructure rests steady and solid if the foundations are not stable but are in such great bewilderment and confusion.[e] Yet just as people with mud or dust on their bodies when they are touched or brushed against by someone think that he has struck them with the thing that irritates them and not that he has just disturbed it, so these men blame the Academics in the belief that they are causing what they are proving them to be defiled with,—as they are defiled, since what men distort the common conceptions more than

note [*L.C.L.*]) and 978 F, where the story is called false as it is in frag. xi, 53 (vii, p. 77, 9-12 [Bernardakis]=frag. 72 [Sandbach] on Hesiod, *Works and Days* 524) after Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* 591 a 4-6 (*cf.* Athenaeus, vii, 316 e-f and Pliny, *N.H.* ix, 46) ; Hesiod is vindicated by T. F. Higham, *Class. Rev.*, N.S. vii (1957), pp. 16-17. The comparison with the octopus is used differently against the Epicureans in *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1098 E ; the comparison in the present passage is an adaptation of that made by Carneades (frag. 42 [Wiśniewski]=Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, 2, 20 [pp. 23, 23–24, 3, Wachsmuth]) : . . . καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον (*scil.* πολύποδα) αὐξηθείσας τὰς πλεκτάνας κατεσθίειν, καὶ τούτους (*scil.* διαλεκτικούς) προϊούσης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὰ σφέτερα ἀνατρέπειν (*cf.* Cicero, *Hortensius*, frag. 30 [Müller]=27 [Ruch]). For Carneades on Chrysippus see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1036 B-C *supra.*

[a] *Scil.* the Stoics ; *cf.* ἐκεῖνοι in the next sentence.

[e] For the figure *cf.* Plato, *Laws* 793 C ; Lucretius, iv, 513-521 ; Epictetus, *Diss.* II, xv, 8-9.

1060 φουσιν; εἰ δὲ βούλει, τὸ κατηγορεῖν ἐκείνων ἀφέντες, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἡμῖν ἀπολογησώμεθα.

3. ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ[1] τήμερον, ὦ Διαδούμενε, ποικίλος τις ἄνθρωπος γεγονέναι καὶ παντοδαπός· ἄρτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογίας δεόμενος προσῄειν ταπεινὸς καὶ τεθορυβημένος, νῦν δὲ μεταβάλλομαι πρὸς τὴν κατηγορίαν καὶ βούλομαι ἀπολαῦσαι τῆς ἀμύνης ἐλεγχομένους εἰς ταὐτὸν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιδών, τὸ[2] παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀφ' ὧν μάλιστα τὴν αἵρεσιν ὡς σπερμάτων ἀνα⟨βλαστεῖν⟩[3] δοκοῦσι καὶ μόνην ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν.

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτα καὶ
B περιβόητα βαδιστέον, ἃ δὴ παράδοξα καὶ αὐτοὶ μετ' εὐκολίας δεχόμενοι τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐπονομάζουσι, τοὺς μόνους βασιλεῖς καὶ μόνους πλουσίους[4] καὶ καλοὺς αὐτῶν καὶ πολίτας καὶ δικαστὰς μόνους;[5] ἢ ταυτὶ μὲν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἑώλων καὶ ψυχρῶν ἀγορὰν βούλει παρῶμεν ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα πραγματικοῖς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς λεγομένοις ποιησώμεθα τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἐξετασμόν;

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἥδιον οὕτως· τῶν γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα γενομένων ἐλέγχων τίς οὐκ ἤδη διάπλεώς ἐστιν;

[1] δοκῶ -E ; δοκεῖ -B, Aldine.
[2] τὸ -Reiske ; τῷ -E, B.
[3] H. C. (*cf.* Philo Jud., *De Congressu Eruditionis Gratia*, 146 = iii, p. 102, 16-17 [Wendland]) ; ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνα . . . vac. 4 -E, B ; ὥσπερ ἐπιβαθρῶν ἀνα⟨βαίνειν⟩ -Pohlenz ; alii alia.
[4] πλουσίους -B ; πλουσίας -E.
[5] So both MSS., *pace* Pohlenz and Treu.

[a] *Cf. Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur* 52 B.

they ? But, if you please, let us give over denouncing them and make our defence on the charge that they bring against us.

3. COMRADE. It seems to me, Diadumenus, that I have to-day become a man of protean form and colour.[a] It was just now that cast down and put to rout I came to you in want of a defence ; and here I am going over to the prosecution and wishing to enjoy the revenge of looking on as the gentlemen are convicted of the very same thing, speculation at odds with the common conceptions and preconceptions,[b] the very things whence, they believe, their system ⟨grew⟩ up as from seed and is alone, they maintain, in agreement with nature.

DIADUMENUS. Well then, should the first objects of our proceedings be the common and notorious notions which even they in easy-going admission of the absurdity themselves entitle paradoxes,[c] their notions as to who alone are kings and alone are opulent and fair and alone are citizens and judges,[d] or would you rather have us let these go to the market for stale and wilted goods [e] and direct our examination of their doctrine to the parts that are as material as is possible for them and are earnestly meant ?

COMRADE. For my part, I prefer the latter course. For who has not already had his fill of the arguments in refutation of those paradoxes ?

[b] See 1058 E-F and 1059 B *supra*.
[c] *S.V.F.* i, frags. 281 (Zeno) and 619 (Cleanthes) ; Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum, Prooem.* 4.
[d] *Cf. Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere* 1057 F–1058 D *supra* with the notes there ; *S.V.F.* i, frag. 222 ; Cicero, *De Finibus* iv, 74.
[e] *Cf. De Curiositate* 519 A.

(1060) 4. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἤδη τοίνυν αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκόπει πρῶτον, εἰ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐστιν ἐννοίας ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει τοὺς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάφορα νομί-
C ζοντας καὶ μήθ' ὑγίειαν μήτ' εὐεξίαν μήτε κάλλος μήτ' ἰσχὺν ἡγουμένους αἱρετὰ μηδ' ὠφέλιμα μηδὲ λυσιτελῆ μηδὲ συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τελειότητος μήτε τἀναντία φευκτὰ καὶ βλαβερά, πηρώσεις ἀλγηδόνας αἴσχη νόσους, ὧν αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πρὸς ἃ μὲν ἀλλοτριοῦν πρὸς ἃ δ' οἰκειοῦν ἡμᾶς τὴν φύσιν, εὖ μάλα καὶ τούτου παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ὄντος, οἰκειοῦν πρὸς τὰ μὴ συμφέροντα μηδ' ἀγαθὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ ἀλλοτριοῦν πρὸς τὰ μὴ κακὰ μηδὲ βλάπτοντα καί, ὃ μεῖζόν ἐστιν, οἰκειοῦν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο καὶ ἀλλοτριοῦν ὥστε τῶν[1] μὲν μὴ τυγχάνοντας τοῖς δὲ περιπίπτοντας εὐλόγως
D ἐξάγειν τοῦ ζῆν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν βίον ἀπολέγεσθαι.

5. Νομίζω δ' ἐγὼ κἀκεῖνο[2] παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν λέγεσθαι, τὸ τὴν μὲν φύσιν αὐτὴν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὸν μέγιστον.[3] οὐδὲ

[1] τῶν -E (ω corrected from o immediately ?) ; τ̄ (*i.e.* τὸν) -B.
[2] E ; κἀκεῖνα -B.
[3] μέγιστον -Turnebus ; μέτεστιν -E, B.

[a] *i.e.* whether the doctrine of the Stoics is itself in accord with " the common conceptions . . . whence, they believe, their system ⟨grew⟩ up . . . and is alone, they maintain, in agreement with nature " (1060 A *supra*).

4. DIADUMENUS. Consider straight away, then, this very question [a] first. Is it in accord with the common conceptions to say that [b] they are in agreement with nature [c] who believe indifferent the things that are in conformity with nature and who hold health and vigour and beauty and strength not to be objects of choice or beneficial or advantageous or constitutive of natural perfection and their opposites—mutilations, pains, deformities, diseases—not to be injurious and objects of avoidance ? The Stoics themselves say that nature endows us with repugnance against these latter things and with congeniality to the former ; and this too is sharply at odds with the common conception, to say that nature induces congeniality to the things that are not useful or good and repugnance against the things that are not bad or injurious,[d] congeniality and repugnance so intense, moreover, as to make suicide and the renunciation of life a reasonable course for those who miss the former things and fall in with the latter.[e]

5. This too I believe to be at odds with the common conception,[f] the assertion that, while nature itself is indifferent, to be in agreement with nature is the

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 146.
[c] As the Stoics profess, for whom τὸ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὸν μέγιστον (1060 D *infra* and note *g* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1033 C *supra*). On the charge of inconsistency between this profession and the Stoic attitude towards τὰ κατὰ φύσιν *cf.* Grumach, *Physis und Agathon*, pp. 32-43 ; Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, p. 178 and ii, p. 90 (*ad* S. 178, Z. 22) and p. 68 (*ad* S. 119, Z. 6 v.u.) ; I. G. Kidd, *Class. Quart.*, N.S. v (1955), pp. 181-194, especially pp. 187-188 and 194.
[d] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iv, 78.
[e] *Cf.* 1063 C-F *infra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 C-E *supra*.
[f] For τὴν ἔννοιαν see note *c* on 1059 B *supra*.

(1060) γὰρ τὸ[1] νόμῳ κατακολουθεῖν[2] οὐδὲ τὸ λόγῳ πείθεσθαι σπουδαῖον, εἰ μὴ σπουδαῖος εἴη καὶ ἀστεῖος ὁ νόμος καὶ ὁ λόγος. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἔλαττον· εἰ δέ, ὡς Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τοῦ Προτρέπεσθαι γέγραφεν, ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀρετὴν βιοῦν μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμόνως "τῶν ἄλλων," φησίν, "οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδ' εἰς τοῦτο συνεργούντων," οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιάφορος ἡ φύσις ἀλλ' ἀνόητος
E καὶ ἀπόπληκτος, οἰκειοῦσα ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀνόητοι δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς εὐδαιμονίαν ἡγούμενοι τὸ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν ἀγούσῃ πρὸς τὰ μηδὲν συνεργοῦντα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. καίτοι τί μᾶλλόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ καθάπερ τὰ αἱρετὰ πρὸς τὸ ὠφελίμως οὕτως τὰ κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν; οἱ δ' οὐχ οὕτως λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν τέλος εἶναι τιθέμενοι τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάφορα εἶναι νομίζουσιν.

6. Οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τούτου παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔν-

[1] τὸ . . . τὸ -Meziriac ; τῷ . . . τῷ -E, B.

[2] ⟨ἀστεῖον⟩ -added here by Reiske ; ⟨καὶ ἀστεῖον⟩ -added after σπουδαῖον *infra* by Pohlenz ; but *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 613 : τόν τε νόμον σπουδαῖον εἶναί φασι . . . τοῦ δὲ νόμου ἀστείου ὄντος καὶ ὁ νόμιμος ἀστεῖος. . . .

[a] In saying that the τέλος is "to be in agreement with nature" the Stoics identified nature with the ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 87-88 ; *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 273, 25-28 and p. 305, 33-36), and certainly did not call this "indifferent" (*cf.* Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik . . .*, p. 172, n. 1). Plutarch's intimation that they did is probably just an inference from the fact that they declared τὰ κατὰ φύσιν to be ἀδιάφορα. *Cf.* Cicero's inference : "ergo id est convenienter naturae vivere, a natura discedere" (*De Finibus* iv, 41).

greatest good,[a] for it is not good either to comply with the law or to listen to reason if the law and the reason be not good and decent. This is a minor point ; but, if as Chrysippus has written in the first book on Exhortation [b] living happily consists solely in living virtuously, "all other things," in his words, "being nothing to us and contributing nothing to this end," not only is nature not indifferent, but she is stupid and silly in endowing us with congeniality to things that are nothing to us, and we too are stupid in holding that happiness is to be in agreement with nature which attracts us to the things that contribute nothing to happiness. Yet what is more in accord with the common conception than for the things that are in conformity with nature to be related to living in conformity with nature as the objects of choice are to living beneficially ? The Stoics do not talk this way, however ; but, while making life in conformity with nature a goal, they believe the things that are in conformity with nature to be indifferent.[c]

6. It is not less than this at odds with the common

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 139 (p. 34, 9-12) ; *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1041 E and 1048 A-B *supra*.

[c] Plutarch's point is that, if τὰ αἱρετά in respect of τὸ ὠφελίμως ζῆν are τὰ ὠφέλιμα (as they are for the Stoics), one would reasonably expect τὰ κατὰ φύσιν to be τὰ αἱρετά in respect of τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν. To the Stoics, however, only the good is αἱρετόν (*cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 D *supra*) and all good is both ὠφέλιμον and αἱρετόν (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 98-99), so that τὰ αἱρετά are τὰ ὠφέλιμα inasmuch as both are good ; but τὰ κατὰ φύσιν as such are not good and so are not αἱρετά at all but only ληπτά (*cf.* 1070 A *infra* ; *S.V.F.* i, frag. 191 and iii, frag. 142 ; note *c* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1045 F *supra*). On the inconsistency alleged see the references in note *c* on page 673 *supra*.

(1060) νοιάν ἐστι τὸ ⟨τὸν⟩[1] ἔννουν καὶ φρόνιμον ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰ ἴσα τῶν ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἐπίσης ἔχειν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ τίθεσθαι τῶν δὲ ἕνεκα πᾶν
F ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπομεῖναι καὶ παθεῖν, μηδὲν ἀλλήλων μικρότητι καὶ μεγέθει διαφερόντων. ταὐτὸ δὲ λέγουσιν αὐτοὶ τούτῳ τὸ ⟨σωφρόνως ἀποσχέσθαι Λαΐδος ἢ Φρύνης ἢ τὸ ἀνδρείως τεμνόμενον καὶ καιόμενον διακαρτερεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείως δῆγμα μυίας ἐνεγκεῖν ἢ τὸ⟩[2] σωφρόνως δυσθανατῶσαν ἀποτρίψασθαι πρεσβῦτιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀμφότεροι κατορθοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὡς λαμπρὰ καὶ
1061 μεγάλα κἂν ἀποθάνοιεν, ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ σεμνύνειν ἑαυτὸν αἰσχύνη καὶ γέλως. λέγει δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς συγγράμματι καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν ψυχρὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄτοπον καὶ ἀλλότριον τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς συμβαινόντων ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι δῆγμα μυίας ἀνδρείως ὑπέμεινε καὶ δυσθανατώσης γραὸς ἀπέσχετο σωφρόνως. ἆρ' οὖν παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἔννοιαν, ἃς αἰσχύνονται πράξεις ἐπαινεῖν, μηδὲν τούτων κάλλιον ὁμολογοῦντες; ποῦ γὰρ αἱρετὸν ἢ πῶς ἀποδεκτὸν ὃ μήτ' ἐπαινεῖν μήτε θαυμάζειν ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ

[1] ⟨τὸν⟩ -added by Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 24, n. 3).

[2] ⟨. . .⟩ -H. C. (after Castiglioni, *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1039 A *supra*); αὐτοὶ τούτῳ τὸ σωφρόνως -E, B; lacuna variously located and supplemented by Turnebus, Amyot, Xylander, and others, *e.g.* αὐτοὶ [του] τῷ ⟨ἀνδρείως τυράννων ἐλευθερῶσαι τὴν πατρίδα⟩ τὸ σωφρόνως -Pohlenz after Reiske.

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 92 and, for this and what follows here, *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 C-D and 1038 F—1039 A *supra*.

conception to say that ⟨the⟩ sensible and prudent man is not impartial to equally good things but holds some in no esteem and for the sake of others would endure and suffer anything whatever, though they do not differ from one another in magnitude at all.[a] They say themselves that for this man[b] it is the same ⟨soberly to abstain from Lais or Phryne or courageously to endure scalpel and cautery and courageously to bear the bite of a fly or⟩ soberly to repulse an old woman with one foot in the grave, for they who do either are alike performing right action; but for the former, as being great and illustrious actions, they would even suffer death, whereas to glory in the latter actions is a shame and a mockery. In fact, Chrysippus says[c] in the treatise on Zeus and in the third book on the Gods that it is insipid and absurd and repugnant to praise such incidental results of virtue as the courageous endurance of the bite of a fly and the sober abstention from an old crone with one foot in the grave. Aren't their speculations at odds with the common conception, then, when they acknowledge nothing to be more fair than those actions that they are ashamed to praise? For where or how is that an object of choice or acceptance[d] which deserves neither praise nor

[b] *i.e.* for the sage (*τὸν ἔννουν καὶ φρόνιμον ἄνδρα*), and for him because everything he does is done *κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς* (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 557 and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1046 E-F *supra*).

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 212 (p. 51, 5-9); *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 F—1039 A *supra*.

[d] Had Plutarch observed the niceties of Stoic terminology, he would here have written in referring to *πράξεις* not *αἱρετὸν . . . ἀποδεκτόν* but *αἱρετέον . . . ἀποδεκτέον* (*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 89-91).

(1061) καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας ἢ θαυμάζοντας ἀτόπους καὶ ψυχροὺς νομίζουσιν;

B 7. Ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, οἶμαι, φανεῖταί σοι παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν, εἰ τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ὁ φρόνιμος μήτ' ἀπόντων[1] μήτ' εἰ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ φροντίζοι[2] ἀλλ' οἷός ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις καὶ τῇ περὶ ταῦτα πραγματείᾳ καὶ οἰκονομίᾳ τοιοῦτος ἂν[3] κἂν τούτοις εἴη. πάντες γὰρ δήπουθεν

εὐρυεδοῦς[4] ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα[5] χθονὸς

οὗ μὲν καὶ παρόντος ὄνησίς ἐστι καὶ μὴ παρόντος ὥσπερ ἔνδεια καὶ ὄρεξις αἱρετὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον νοοῦμεν, ἐφ' ᾧ δ' οὐδὲν ἄν τις πραγματεύσαιτο μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκεν μηδὲ ῥᾳστώνης τοῦτ' ἀδιάφορον. ἄλλῳ γὰρ οὐδενὶ τοῦ φιλοπόνου τὸν

C κενόσπουδον ἀφορίζομεν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις[6] ὄντα πολλάκις ἢ τῷ τὸν μὲν εἰς ἀνωφελῆ πονεῖν καὶ ἀδιαφόρως,[7] τὸν δὲ ἕνεκά του τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ λυσιτελῶν. ἀλλὰ οὗτοί γε τοὐναντίον· ὁ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτοῖς καὶ φρόνιμος ἐν πολλαῖς καταλήψεσι καὶ μνήμαις καταλήψεων γεγονὼς ὀλίγας πρὸς αὑτὸν ἡγεῖται τῶν τ' ἄλλων οὐ πεφροντικὼς οὔτ' ἔλαττον

[1] μήτε ἀπόντων μήτε ἀπόντων -E.

[2] Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 669); πάρεισιν αὐτῷ φροντίζων -E, B.

[3] ἄν -deleted by Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 14) but *cf. De Se Ipsum . . . Laudando* 539 F, 544 D.

[4] *Quaest. Conviv.* 743 F, *De Fraterno Amore* 485 C (G[1]), and Plato, *Protagoras* 345 C and 346 D; εὐρυέδους -E, B, *De Tranquillitate Animi* 470 D (Γ exc. J), *De Fraterno Amore* 485 C (G[corr.]); εὐρυόδους -all other MSS. in 470 D and 485 C.

[5] So 470 D, 485 C, and Plato (*cf.* preceding note); καρπὸν . . . vac. 5 -E, 4 -B . . . μεθα.

[6] ἐν τοῖς <αὐτοῖς> ἔργοις -Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, XXXV [1941], p. 115); ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις <ἴσον> -Pohlenz.

admiration and of which the commenders or admirers, moreover, are believed by the Stoics to be absurd and insipid?

7. It will, I think, appear to you to be still more at odds with the common conception for the prudent man to be unconcerned about the presence or absence of the greatest goods but in their case too to be just as he is in that of indifferent matters and their treatment and management. For surely all

Those of us who as men take the fruit of the spacious earth [a]

think that that is beneficial and good and an object of choice the presence of which is accompanied by advantage and the absence by a kind of want and yearning and that that is indifferent which one would take no trouble about, not even for the sake of amusement or recreation. In fact, we use no other criterion than this in distinguishing from the industrious man the frivolous bustler, busily at work as he often is: while the latter labours at useless things and without discrimination, the former labours for the sake of something useful and advantageous. These Stoics, however, think the contrary, for their sage and prudent man holds [b] that few of the many apprehensions and memories of apprehensions which he has experienced have anything to do with him and, unconcerned for the rest, thinks himself to be neither

[a] Simonides, frag. 5, 17 (Bergk)=4, 16-17 (Diehl)=542, 24-25 (Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci*, p. 282). The line is quoted by Plutarch in *De Tranquillitate Animi* 470 D, *De Fraterno Amore* 485 C, and *Quaest. Conviv.* 743 F also; *cf.* Plato, *Protagoras* 345 C 9-10 and 346 D 4-5.

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 213.

[7] ἀδιάφορα -Meziriac.

(1061) ἔχειν οὔτε[1] πλέον οἴεται μνημονεύων ὅτι πέρυσι[2] κατάληψιν ἔλαβε πταρνυμένου Δίωνος ἢ σφαιρίζοντος[3] Θέωνος. καίτοι πᾶσα κατάληψις ἐν τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μνήμη τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχουσα καὶ βέβαιον εὐθύς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα καὶ μέγι-
D στον. ἆρ' οὖν ὁμοίως ὑγιείας ἐπιλειπούσης,[4] αἰσθητηρίου καμόντος, οὐσίας ἀπολλυμένης, ἄφροντίς[5] ἐστι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐδὲν ἡγούμενος τούτων ὁ σοφός; ἢ νοσῶν μὲν ἰατροῖς τελεῖ μισθοὺς χρημάτων δὲ ἕνεκα πρὸς Λεύκωνα πλεῖ τὸν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ δυνάστην καὶ πρὸς Ἰδάνθυρσον[6] ἀποδημεῖ τὸν Σκύθην, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, τῶν δ' αἰσθήσεων ἔστιν ἃς ἀποβαλὼν οὐδὲ ζῆν ὑπομένει; πῶς οὖν οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις τοσαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἀγαθῶν δὲ μεγάλων καὶ παρόντων καὶ μὴ παρόντων ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντες;

E 8. Ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνο παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐστίν, ἄνθρωπον ὄντα μὴ χαίρειν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀγαθοῖς γενόμενον. τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθεν ὁ τούτων σοφός. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄκρας κα-

[1] οὔτ' . . . οὔτε -Pohlenz ; οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ -E, B.
[2] B ; πέρισυ -E.
[3] E ; σφυρίζοντος -B.
[4] E ; ἐπιλιπούσης -B.
[5] E ; ἀφροντιστός -B (*cf.* Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, p. 52).
[6] ἰδάνουρσον -E ; ἰνδάθυρσον -B ; *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1043 C *supra*.

[a] For the use of Δίων and Θέων *cf. Quaest. Romanae* 271 E and 1076 A *infra* ; *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 193 ; Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii, 227-228. With the example, σφαιρίζοντος Θέωνος, *cf.* the remark ascribed to Cleanthes (*S.V.F.* i, frag. 598).

better nor worse off for remembering that last year he had an apprehension of Tom sneezing or of Dick playing ball.[a] Yet in the sage every apprehension or memory, being certain and steadfast as it is, is *ipso facto* knowledge and a great, in fact the greatest, good.[b] Is the sage, then, similarly without concern about failing health, the affliction of a sense-organ, the ruin of his substance and similarly of the belief that none of these has anything to do with him? Or does he pay fees to physicians when he is ill and to make money sail to Leuco, the prince in the Bosporus, and go abroad to Idanthyrsus the Scythian, as Chrysippus says,[c] and even refuse to endure life if certain of his senses be lost? How, then, do they avoid acknowledging that their speculations are at odds with the common conceptions when they give themselves so much trouble and concern about indifferent matters and are indifferent to the presence or absence of great goods?

8. Yet this is also at odds with the common conceptions, that one be human and not rejoice at having got out of the greatest evils into the greatest goods. So it is with the sage of these Stoics, however,

[b] All the apprehensions of the Stoic sage are certain and steadfast (*S.V.F.* i, p. 17, 6-8 and iii, p. 147, 2-3) ; certain and steadfast apprehension is knowledge (*S.V.F.* i, p. 20, 10-16 and ii, frag. 90) ; and this knowledge is a good, pure and *per se* (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 24, 35-36 and p. 26, 38-41). For the contradiction alleged between this doctrine and that in the preceding sentence *cf.* Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, p. 187.

[c] ἆρ' οὖν ὁμοίως . . . οὐδὲ ζῆν ὑπομένει = *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 691 (p. 174, 3-9) ; but this is not a " fragment " of Chrysippus (see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1043 B-D *supra* and note *a* on 1043 E).

(1061) κίας μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν ἀθλιώτατον βίον διαφυγὼν ἅμα καὶ κτησάμενος τὸν[1] μακαριώτατον οὐδὲν ἐπίδηλον εἰς χαρὰν ἔσχεν οὐδ' ἐπῆρεν αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἐκίνησεν ἡ τοσαύτη μεταβολή, κακοδαιμονίας ἀπαλλαγέντα καὶ μοχθηρίας ἀπάσης, εἰς δ' ἀσφαλῆ τινα καὶ βεβαίαν παντέλειαν ἀγαθῶν ἐξικόμενον. παρὰ[2] τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἀγαθῶν μὲν εἶναι μέγιστον τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσι καὶ βέβαιον μὴ δεῖσθαι δὲ τούτου τὸν ἐπ'
F ἄκρον προκόπτοντα μηδὲ φροντίζειν παραγενομένου πολλάκις δὲ μηδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον προτεῖναι ταύτης γε ἕνεκα τῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ βεβαιότητος, ἣν τέλειον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα νομίζουσιν. οὐ μόνον οὖν ταῦτα λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνα πρὸς τούτοις, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος οὐκ αὔξει προσγι-
1062 γνόμενος ἀλλά, κἂν ἀκαρές τις ὥρας γένηται φρόνιμος, οὐδὲν[3] πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπολειφθήσεται τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα χρωμένου τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μακαρίως ἐν

[1] τὸν -E ; τὸ -B.
[2] ⟨ἔτι⟩ παρὰ -Leonicus, but *cf.* the beginning of chap. 11 and of chap. 26 *infra*.
[3] Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 14) ; οὐδενὶ -E, B.

[a] The Stoics, if they said any such thing, were probably referring to the man who was not yet aware of suddenly having become a sage (see the next chapter and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 F—1043 A *supra*), for according to them joy is an εὔλογος ἔπαρσις of the soul which is experienced by the sage and by him alone (*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 431-435 and 671), though not constantly or necessarily even by him (*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 102-103). Since joy arises "cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter" (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 107, 7-8), what Plutarch here ascribes to the Stoics cannot be explained, as Giesen supposed it could (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 100), merely by saying that the Stoics " summam sapientis virtutem in animi constantia ponunt."

for after his change from consummate vice to consummate virtue and after his escape from the most wretched life and simultaneous acquisition of the most blessed one he showed no sign of joy and was not exalted or even stirred by such a great change as this,[a] though he had left utter depravity and unhappiness and had arrived at a sure and steadfast culmination of goods. It is at odds with the common conception to hold [b] that to be unalterable and steadfast in one's judgments is the greatest of goods and yet that the man who is progressing towards the summit doesn't want this [c] and is not concerned about it when it has come to him and in many cases didn't even extend a finger for the sake of this certainty and steadfastness which they believe to be a great and perfect good. Now, it is not only these assertions that the gentlemen make but besides these the following also [d] : a good is not augmented by addition of time ; but, if one be prudent even for a moment, one will not be at all inferior in happiness to him who exercises virtue for ever [e] and blissfully

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 542.
[c] That is because while he is progressing and until the very instant of his achievement he remains base (see 1062 E—1063 A *infra*), and Chrysippus maintained οὐδ' ἔχειν χρείαν τὸν φαῦλον οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δεῖσθαι (1068 A-C *infra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 A *supra*). By this was meant that the base man does not need what he does not know how to use, but Plutarch here purposely takes the δεῖσθαι to mean " to want " in the sense of to desire something of which one feels the lack.
[d] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 54 (pp. 13, 38–14, 4). With this and the rest of the present chapter *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1046 C-E (chap. 26) *supra*.
[e] For τὸν αἰῶνα *cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 163 (". . . αἰῶνα, id ait Chrysippus ἀεὶ ὄν") and Aristotle, *De Caelo* 279 a 23-28.

(1062) αὐτῇ καταβιοῦντος. ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως νεανικῶς ἀπισχυρισάμενοι πάλιν οὐδὲν εἶναί φασιν ἀρετῆς ὄφελος ὀλιγοχρονίου· "τί γάρ, ἂν μέλλοντι ναυαγεῖν εὐθὺς ἡ κατακρημνίζεσθαι φρόνησις ἐπιγένηται; τί δ', ἂν ὁ Λίχας ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἀποσφενδονώμενος εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐκ κακίας μεταβάλῃ;" ταῦτ' οὖν οὐ μόνον παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐστὶ φιλοσοφούντων ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδίας κυκώντων, εἰ τὸ βραχὺν χρόνον κτήσασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐδὲν ἀπο-
B λείπεσθαι τῆς ἄκρας εὐδαιμονίας ἅμα καὶ μηδενὸς ὅλως ἄξιον νομίζουσι.

9. Τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἂν μάλιστα θαυμάσαις αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ ὅτι τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγιγνομένης πολλάκις οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται διαλελῆθέναι δὲ αὐτὸν[1] ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ ἀφρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ μακάριος γέγονεν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἔχοντά τινα τὴν φρόνησιν τοῦτο μόνον μὴ φρονεῖν ὅτι φρονεῖ μηδὲ γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τὸ ἀγνοεῖν διαπέφευγεν εὐτράπελόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καί, ὅλως εἰπεῖν,[2] τἀγαθὸν ἀρρεπὲς ποιοῦσι καὶ ἀμαυρόν, εἰ μηδ' αἴσθησιν αὑτοῦ ποιεῖ παραγενόμενον. φύσει γὰρ ἀν-

[1] Wyttenbach; αὐτὸν -E, B (but *cf.* the last sentence of this chapter and the first of the next).

[2] ὅλως ⟨ὡς⟩ εἰπεῖν -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 14); but *cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, p. 42, 15 and Aristotle, *Physics* 202 b 19.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 210 (p. 50, 27-30).

[b] The herald who had brought to Heracles from Deianeira the robe anointed with the blood of Nessus and whom Heracles in his torment flung into the sea (*cf.* Sophocles, *Trachiniae* 772-782).

[c] With the whole of this chapter *cf.* *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 E—1043 A (chap. 19) and *Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere* 1058 B *supra* with the notes on those passages.

[d] For εὐτράπελον in this sense (despite Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 20, n. 1) *cf.* εὐτραπελίαν . . . καὶ γέλωτα καὶ βωμολοχίαν in 1065 F—1066 A *infra* and Paul, *Ad Ephesios* 5, 4 (μωρολογία ἢ εὐτραπελία); and on the ambiguity of the word see F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik*, pp. 392-393 on *Eth. Nic.* 1128 a 12-15.

lives out his life in it. But then again, after they have so vehemently insisted upon this, they say[a] that there is no use in virtue of brief duration: "For what's the use if prudence come to one who is straightway going to be shipwrecked or flung down a precipice? Or what's the use if Lichas[b] change from vice to virtue while being hurled to his death by Heracles?" These are assertions, then, of men who in their speculations are not only at odds with the common conceptions but are making a muddle of their own as well if they believe that to have got virtue for a little while is nothing short of consummate happiness and at the same time is absolutely worthless.

9. What would most amaze you about them, however, is not this but their belief that frequently the man who has got the virtue and happiness in question does not even perceive their presence but is unaware of having now become both prudent and blissful when a little earlier he was most wretched and most foolish.[c] In fact, not only is it ludicrous[d] to say that the only thing not understood or known by anyone who has prudence is this, that he does understand and has escaped from ignorance; but also, generally speaking, they make a slight and faint thing of the good if it does not even make itself felt when it has come to one, for according to them it

(1062) C ἐπαίσθητον οὐκ ἔστι κατ' αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγει διαρρήδην Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς περὶ Τέλους αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ὡς δ' οἴεται, καὶ ἀποδείκνυσι. λείπεται τοίνυν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ μικρότητι διαφεύγειν αὐτὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὁπόταν παρὸν ἀγνοῆται καὶ διαλανθάνῃ τοὺς ἔχοντας. ἔτι τοίνυν ἄτοπον μέν ἐστι τὴν τῶν ἀτρέμα καὶ μέσως λευκῶν[1] αἰσθανομένην ὄψιν ἐκφεύγειν τὰ ἐπ' ἄκρον λευκὰ καὶ τὴν τὰ μαλακῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως θερμὰ καταλαμβάνουσαν ἁφὴν ἀναισθητεῖν τῶν σφόδρα θερμῶν· ἀτοπώτερον δέ, εἴ τις τὸ[2] κοινῶς κατὰ φύσιν, οἷόν ἐστιν ὑγίεια D καὶ εὐεξία, καταλαμβάνων τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγνοεῖ παροῦσαν, ἣν μάλιστα καὶ ἄκρως κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τίθενται. πῶς γὰρ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου διαφορὰν καταλαμβάνειν ⟨φρονήσεως δὲ μὴ καταλαμβάνειν⟩[3] καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀπηλλαγμένην οἴεσθαι παρεῖναι τὴν δὲ κεκτημένον ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πάρεστιν; ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας προκοπῆς μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀρετήν, δυεῖν ἀνάγκη θάτερον, ἢ τὴν προκοπὴν κακίαν μὴ εἶναι μηδὲ κακοδαιμονίαν ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς κακίας μὴ πολλῷ παραλλάττειν μηδὲ τῆς κακο-

[1] Kolfhaus (*Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, p. 52); λευκῶν καὶ μέσως -Dübner; ἀτρέμα καὶ μέσων λευκῶν -E; ἀτρέμα (*not* ἀτρέμας) λευκῶν καὶ μέσων -B.

[2] τὰ -Bernardakis.

[3] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by Bernardakis after Meziriac (⟨φρονήσεως δὲ⟩ καὶ ἀφροσύνης ⟨μὴ καταλαμβάνειν⟩) and Reiske (⟨μὴ καταλαμβάνειν δὲ φρονήσεως⟩).

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 85 (p. 21, 38-41).

[b] *Cf.* the Aristotelian doctrine that αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναίσθητοι: *De Anima* 422 a 20-26, 424 a 28-32, 426 a 30–b 8, and 429 a 29–b 3; Theophrastus, *De Sensibus* 32 (*Dox. Graeci*, p. 508, 18-21).

[c] With τὸ κοινῶς κατὰ φύσιν *cf.* κοινῶς ἀκαταλήπτοις in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1056 F *supra*; and for health and vigour as examples of what is κατὰ φύσιν on this level *cf.* 1060 B-C *supra.*

is not by nature imperceptible to sense. To the contrary, Chrysippus in the books concerning the Goal even states[a] expressly that the good is perceptible and, as he thinks, also proves it to be so. The only way left, then, is to suppose that its weakness and minuteness cause it to elude sense-perception whenever those who have it are ignorant of its presence and unaware of it. Furthermore, absurd as is the notion that the sense of sight which perceives slightly or moderately white things is eluded by things white in the highest degree and the sense of touch which apprehends tepid or mildly hot things is insensible to those that are extremely hot,[b] yet it is more absurd if one, while apprehending what is in the usual way in conformity with nature,[c] such as health is and vigour, does not recognize the presence of virtue, which they suppose to be especially and supremely in conformity with nature. For how is it not at odds with the common conception for one to apprehend a difference between health and disease ⟨and not to apprehend any between prudence⟩ and folly but to think that the latter is present after it has been removed and not to recognize that the former is present after one has got it? And, since it is from the summit of progress that men change to happiness and virtue, one of two things must be true: either progress is not a state of vice and unhappiness or else virtue is not far removed from vice nor is happiness from unhappiness but the difference

(1062) δαιμονίας τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀλλὰ μικρὰν καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητον εἶναι τὴν πρὸς τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
E διαφοράν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτοὺς διελάνθανον ἀντ' ἐκείνων ταῦτ' ἔχοντες.

10. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς ἐκστῆναι τῶν μαχομένων ἀλλὰ πάνθ' ὁμοῦ λέγειν[1] καὶ τιθέναι θέλωσι, τὸ τοὺς προκόπτοντας ἀνοήτους καὶ κακοὺς εἶναι, τὸ φρονίμους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς γενομένους διαλανθάνειν ἑαυτούς, τὸ μεγάλην διαφορὰν τῆς φρονήσεως πρὸς τὴν ἀφροσύνην ὑπάρχειν, ἦ πού σοι δοκοῦσι θαυμασίως ἐν τοῖς δόγμασι τὴν ὁμολογίαν βεβαιοῦν; ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὅταν πάντας ἐπίσης κακοὺς καὶ ἀδίκους καὶ ἀπίστους καὶ ἄφρονας τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς ἀποφαίνοντες εἶτα πάλιν τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν
F ἐκτρέπωνται καὶ βδελύττωνται τοὺς δ'[2] ἁπαντῶντες μηδὲ προσαγορεύωσι τοῖς δὲ χρήματα πιστεύωσιν, ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζωσιν, ἐκδιδῶσι θυγατέρας; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ μὲν παίζοντες λέγουσι, καθείσθωσαν[3] τὰς ὀφρῦς· εἰ δ' ἀπὸ σπουδῆς καὶ φιλοσοφοῦντες, παρὰ
1063 τὰς κοινὰς ἐστιν ἐννοίας ψέγειν μὲν ὁμοίως καὶ κακίζειν πάντας ἀνθρώπους χρῆσθαι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ὡς μετρίοις τοῖς δὲ ὡς κακίστοις καὶ Χρύσιππον μὲν ὑπερεκπεπλῆχθαι καταγελᾶν δ' Ἀλεξίνου μηδὲν δὲ μᾶλλον οἴεσθαι μηδὲ ἧττον ἀλλήλων ἁφραίνειν τοὺς

[1] ὁμοῦ λέγειν -Pohlenz ; ὁμολογεῖν -E, B.
[2] *Cf.* Castiglioni (*Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 84).
[3] καθείσθωσαν -Bernardakis (καθέσθωσαν -Wyttenbach) ; καταθέσθωσαν -E, B ; *cf. Amatorius* 753 B and *S.V.F.* i, frag. 246 (ὀφρὺς μὴ καθειμένη).

[a] For the emphasis which the Stoics placed upon the internal consistency of their system and Plutarch's contention that their actions were inconsistent with their doctrines see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1033 A-F *supra.*

between the evil things and the good is minute and imperceptible, for otherwise men would not have the latter instead of the former without noticing it.

10. Well then, when the Stoics refuse to abandon any of the conflicting propositions but wish to assert and maintain all of them together—that men who are making progress are stupid and vicious, that when they have become prudent and virtuous they do not notice it, that there is a great difference between prudence and folly—, does it perhaps seem to you that they are in an amazing way confirming the consistency [a] in their doctrines ? And still more so in their deeds, when declaring [b] that those who are not sages are all in the same degree vicious and unjust and unreliable and foolish they then again, while avoiding and abominating some and to some not even speaking when they meet, to others entrust money, hand over offices, and give daughters in marriage ? If it is in jest that they say these things, let them unbend their solemn brows ; but, if it is in earnest and by way of philosophizing, it is at odds with the common conceptions to deal with some men as tolerable and with others as extremely vicious while subjecting all alike to blame and reproach and, while marvelling at Chrysippus and deriding Alexinus,[c] to think that the men are not a bit more

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 668 (p. 167, 29-31) ; *cf.* 1076 C *infra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 E *supra.*

[c] Döring, *Megariker*, frag. 79. See Plutarch, *De Vitioso Pudore* 536 A-B and *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 720 for anecdotes concerning this Alexinus of Elis, one of the Megarian School, nicknamed Ἐλεγξῖνος because of his contentiousness (*cf.* Döring, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-123). He made Zeno the Stoic a special object of attack (Diogenes Laertius, ii, 109 ; *cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 108-109). The title of a rejoinder to

(1063) ἄνδρας. "ναί," φασίν, "ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυιὰς πεντακοσίας οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἧττόν εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ· καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοί εἰσι κἂν ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες, ἄχρι οὗ[1] τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλά-
B βωσιν, ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν." ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τυφλοῖς ἐοίκασιν οἱ προκόπτοντες ἀλλὰ ἧττον ὀξυδορκοῦσιν οὔτε πνιγομένοις ἀλλὰ νηχομένοις, καὶ ταῦτα πλησίον λιμένος, αὐτοὶ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων μαρτυροῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐχρῶντο συμβούλοις καὶ στρατηγοῖς καὶ νομοθέταις ὥσπερ τυφλοῖς[2] χειραγωγοῖς, οὐδ' ἂν ἐζήλουν ἔργα καὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους καὶ βίους ἐνίων εἰ πάντας ὡσαύτως πνιγομένους ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφροσύνης καὶ μοχθηρίας ἑώρων. ἀφεὶς[3] δὲ τοῦτο θαύμασον ἐκείνῃ τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἰ μηδὲ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδάσκονται παραδείγμασι προέσθαι ⟨τοὺς⟩[4] διαλελῃθότας ἐκείνους

[1] ἄχρις οὗ -E, B (but see *Moralia* vii [*L.C.L.*], p. vii); ἄχρις ἂν οὗ -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 14) but *cf.* B. Weissenberger, *Die Sprache Plutarchs* i, p. 37.

[2] τυφλοῖς -Meziriac; τυφλοὶ -E, B.

[3] ἀφεὶ -B. [4] ⟨τοὺς⟩ -added by Reiske.

his attacks is preserved in the list of the writings of Ariston of Chios (*S.V.F.* i, p. 75, 23). Other writings by Alexinus are mentioned by Eusebius (*Praep. Evang.* xv, 2, 4) and Athenaeus (xv, 696 e-f and possibly x, 418 e); and a fragment of one is preserved in the *De Rhetorica* of Philodemus (cols. XLIV-XLVI = i, pp. 79-81 and Supplementum, pp. 39-42 [Sudhaus]).

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 539 (pp. 143, 39–144, 2). *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 527 and 530; the unnumbered fragment of a papyrus in Milan published by Anna Maria Colombo, *Parola del Passato*, ix (1954), pp. 376-381; and St. Augus-

or less foolish one than the other. "Yes," they say,[a] "but just as in the sea the man a cubit from the surface is drowning no less than the one who has sunk 500 fathoms, so neither are they any the less in vice who are approaching virtue than they who are a long way from it; and just as the blind are blind even if they are going to recover their sight [b] a little later, so those who are making progress continue to be stupid and depraved until they have attained virtue." That those who are making progress resemble neither blind nor drowning men, however, but men whose sight is less than clear or men who are swimming and near to haven too, to this the Stoics by their deeds testify themselves. For they would not be using councillors and generals and legislators as blind leaders [c] and they would not be emulating the works and actions and words and lives of some men either if in their eyes all men were in the same way drowning in folly and depravity. But let this pass, and be amazed at the former point that the gentlemen are not taught even by their own examples to give up these men who are sages with-

tine, *Epistle* 167, 12-13. The comparison of the puppy given by Cicero (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 530) justifies neither the emendation of Plutarch's text nor the assumption that Plutarch changed the comparison used by Chrysippus (Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 20, n. 2), for Chrysippus probably used both comparisons: *cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 178 and, for the significance of this fragment and the comparisons with blindness, O. Luschnat, *Philologus*, cii (1958), p. 210.

[b] For ἀναβλέπειν in this sense *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 52, 21 and Plato, *Phaedrus* 243 B.

[c] *Cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1033 F *supra*, and for the proverbial phrase τυφλὸς χειραγωγός *De Fortuna* 98 B with Wyttenbach's note *ad loc.* in his *Animadversiones in Plutarchi Opera Moralia.*

(1063) C σοφοὺς καὶ μὴ συνιέντας μηδ' αἰσθανομένους ὅτι πνιγόμενοι πέπαυνται καὶ φῶς ὁρῶσι καὶ τῆς κακίας ἐπάνω γεγονότες ἀναπεπνεύκασι.

11. Παρὰ[1] τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπον, ᾧ πάντα τἀγαθὰ πάρεστι καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον, τούτῳ καθήκειν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ᾧ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔστι μηδ' ἔσται τὰ δεινὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κακὰ πάρεστι καὶ παρέσται διὰ τέλους, τούτῳ μὴ καθήκειν ἀπολέγεσθαι τὸν βίον, ἂν μή τι νὴ Δία[2] τῶν ἀδιαφόρων αὐτῷ προσγένηται. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐν τῇ Στοᾷ νομοθετεῖται, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐξάγουσι τῶν σοφῶν ὡς ἄμεινον[3] εὐδαιμονοῦντας πεπαῦσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ κατέχουσι τῶν φαύλων ὡς καθήκοντος[4] αὐτοῖς ζῆν D κακοδαιμονοῦντας. καίτοι ὁ μὲν σοφὸς ὄλβιος μακάριος πανευδαίμων ἀσφαλὴς ἀκίνδυνος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ἀνόητος οἷος εἰπεῖν

γέμω[5] κακῶν δὴ καὶ οὐκ[6] ἔσθ' ὅπου[7] τεθῇ·

ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτοις μονὴν[8] οἴονται καθήκουσαν εἶναι κἀκείνοις ἐξαγωγήν. "εἰκότως δέ," φησὶ Χρύσιππος, "οὐ γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς δεῖ παραμε-

[1] Καὶ παρὰ -Basil.; Ἔτι παρὰ -Bernardakis; but *cf.* the beginning of chap. 26 (1070 F) *infra*.

[2] τι νὴ Δία -Turnebus; τινι διὰ -E, B; τι διὰ -Basil.; τι [διὰ] -Wyttenbach.

[3] ἄμεινον <ὄν> -van Herwerden (*Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinae* [1882], p. 123), Hartman (*De Plutarcho*, p. 607).

[4] καθῆκον -van Herwerden (*ibid.*).

[5] γέμω -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 14); γέμων -E, B (*cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 F *supra*).

[6] E, B (δὴ -omitted by B); δὴ κοὐκέτ' -Dübner (*cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 F *supra*).

[7] ὅπου -E; ὅπη -B (*cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 F *supra*).

[8] μονὴν -Basil.; μόνην -E, B, Aldine.

out being aware of it and who do not understand or even perceive that they have stopped drowning and are seeing daylight and, risen above vice, have drawn breath again.

11. It is at odds with the common conception to hold that, unless there befall a man to boot some one of the things that are—yes, by heaven—indifferent, he who is attended by all the goods and lacks nothing that makes for happiness and bliss ought to commit suicide but—and this is still more at odds with it—he who has not and will not have anything good but is attended and will be perpetually attended by all things dreadful and vexatious and evil ought not to renounce his life. These, then, are the laws enacted in the Stoa[a]; and the Stoics speed many sages from life on the ground that it is better for them to have done being happy and restrain many base men from dying on the ground that they ought to live on in unhappiness. Although for them the sage is blessed, blissful, supremely happy, unliable to lapse or peril and the base and stupid man one fit to say

I'm now replete with woes, and there's no room,[b]

nevertheless they think that it behooves the latter to abide and the former to take leave of life. "And this is reasonable," says Chrysippus, "for the standard by which life must be measured is not

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 759 (p. 188, 11-20). See 1060 C-D and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 C-E *supra*; and for the Stoic dogma of the complete happiness of the sage and the complete unhappiness of all others *cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 26 and *S.V.F.* i, frag. 216.

[b] Euripides, *Hercules Furens* 1245 (*cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 F *supra*).

(1063) τρεῖσθαι τὸν βίον ἀλλὰ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν." οὕτως ἀνθρώποις[1] σῴζουσι τὴν συνήθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφοῦσι. τί λέγεις; οὐ δεῖ σκοπεῖν

ὅττι[2] τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν ⟨τ'⟩[3] ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται

τὸν περὶ βίου καὶ θανάτου σκοπούμενον οὐδὲ ὥσπερ
E ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν ἐξετάζειν ἐπίσημα μᾶλλον ὠφελ⟨οῦντα⟩[4] ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν μήτ' ὠφελούντων μήτε βλαπτόντων τοὺς ⟨πότερον⟩[5] βιωτέον ἢ μὴ ποιεῖσθαι λογισμούς; οὐ μέλλει πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποθέσεις καὶ ἀρχὰς καθηκόντως αἱρεῖσθαί τε τὸν βίον ᾧ τῶν φευκτῶν οὐδὲν ἄπεστι καὶ φεύγειν ᾧ πάντα τὰ αἱρετὰ πάρεστι; καίτοι παράλογον μέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ τὸ φεύγειν τὸν βίον ἐν μηδενὶ κακῷ γενομένους παραλογώτερον δὲ εἰ μὴ τυγχάνων τις τοῦ ἀδιαφόρου
F τἀγαθὸν ἀφίησιν, ὅπερ οὗτοι ποιοῦσι, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν προϊέμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν παροῦσαν ἀνθ' ὑγιείας καὶ ὁλοκληρίας ὧν οὐ τυγχάνουσιν.

[1] E, B ; ἄνθρωποι -Basil. ; ἄνθρωποι -Pohlenz, Bury.
[2] Reiske ; ὅτι -E, B.
[3] ⟨τ'⟩ -supplied by Reiske ; omitted by E, B.
[4] H. C. ; ὠφελ . . . vac. 5 -E, vac. 6 -B ; ἐπίσημα μᾶλλον ὠφελούντων καὶ βλαπτόντων -Turnebus, Vulcobius ; εἴ τι ἐπιζήμιον μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφέλιμον -Reiske ; ἐπιζήμια μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφέλιμα -Bernardakis (*cf. contra* Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, p. 54) ; ἐπίσημα μᾶλλον ὤφειλεν -Pohlenz.
[5] Pohlenz ; τοὺς . . . vac. 8 -E, B.

[a] On συνήθεια see 1059 B and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1036 C—1037 A *supra* ; σῴζουσι is used as in the phrases τὰ φαινόμενα σῴζειν (*De Facie* 923 A) and σῶσαι καὶ διαφυλάξαι τὰς αὐξήσεις (1084 A *infra*, *cf. De Primo Frigido* 947 E-F).

[b] πρός here as in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 D-E *supra* (. . . μὴ

goods and evils but the things in conformity with nature and contrary to it." This is the way in which they save common experience [a] for men and philosophize with a view to [b] the common conceptions. What do you say ? The man who deliberates about life and death must not consider

Whatsoe'er hath been wrought both evil and good in the palace [c]

and must not as it were test in the balance the minted coins [d] that are of greater use in respect to happiness and unhappiness but must take the things that are neither beneficial nor injurious as the basis of his calculations about the necessity of living or not living ? On such premises and principles will one not properly choose the life from which is absent none of the objects of avoidance and avoid that in which are present all the objects of choice ? Yet, irrational as it is, comrade, for men to flee life when nothing evil has befallen them, it is more irrational if one resigns the good because he misses that which is indifferent ; and that is precisely what these men do in giving up the happiness and the virtue which they have for the sake of physical health and soundness which they miss.

πρὸς τὰ αἱρετὰ . . . τίθεσθαι λογισμούς, ἀλλ' . . . πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν).

[c] *Odyssey* iv, 392, quoted also in *De Tuenda Sanitate* 122 D and [Plutarch], *Stromat.* 9 (VII, p. 41, 5 [Bernardakis]= *Dox. Graeci*, p. 582, 3) ; *cf.* the purpose for which Diogenes the Cynic is said to have quoted the line (Diogenes Laertius, vi, 103).

[d] *Cf.* Pollux, iii, 86 *sub finem* and Philo, *Quis Rerum Div. Heres* 180 (iii, p. 41, 13-17 [Wendland]) ; for comparing minted coins by weight and the simile based on this *cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 81.

(1063) ἔνθ' αὖτε Γλαύκῳ Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς,
ὅτι[1] χρύσεια χαλκείων ἑκατόμβοια ἐννεαβοίων ἔ-
μελλε διαμείψεσθαι.[2] καίτοι τὰ μὲν χάλκεα τῶν
ὅπλων οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὰ χρυσᾶ παρεῖχε χρείαν μαχο-
μένοις, εὐπρέπεια δὲ σώματος καὶ ὑγίεια τοῖς
Στωικοῖς οὔτε χρείαν οὔτ' ὄνησίν τινα φέρει πρὸς
1064 εὐδαιμονίαν· ἀλλὰ ὅμως οὗτοι τῆς φρονήσεως ἀντι-
καταλλάττονται τὴν ὑγίειαν. καὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτῳ
φασὶ καὶ Φερεκύδῃ καθήκειν ἄν, εἴπερ ἠδύναντο,
τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀφεῖναι καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ὥστε παύσα-
σθαι φθειριῶντας καὶ ὑδρωπιῶντας καὶ τῆς Κίρκης
ἐγχεούσης δύο φάρμακα, τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν ἄφρονας
ἐκ φρονίμων τὸ δ' ὄ⟨νους ἐξ ἀνθρώπων φρόνησιν
δ' ἔχοντας, ὀρθῶς ἂν⟩[3] τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πιεῖν τὸ τῆς
ἀφροσύνης μᾶλλον ἢ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς θηρίου μορφὴν
τὸ εἶδος, ἔχοντα τὴν φρόνησιν—καὶ μετὰ τῆς φρο-
νήσεως δηλονότι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν—, καὶ ταῦτά φα-
σιν[4] αὐτὴν ὑφηγεῖσθαι καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι τὴν
B φρόνησιν " ἄφες με καὶ καταφρόνησον ἀπολλυμέ-

[1] ὅτε -Reiske. [2] B ; διαμείψασθαι -E.
[3] H. C. ; τὸ δὲ ο . . . vac. 22 + 19 (in two lines) -E, vac. 32 (at bottom of page) -B . . . τὸν ; τὸ δ' ὄ⟨νους φρονίμους ἐξ ἀφρόνων ἀνθρώπων, οὐκ ἂν⟩ τὸν -Bernardakis after Wyttenbach (*cf. contra* Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, pp. 54-55) ; τὸ δ' ὄ⟨νους ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐλέσθαι⟩ τὸν -Pohlenz. [4] E ; φησὶν -B.

[a] *Iliad* vi, 234.
[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 762.
[c] In *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1089 F Plutarch speaks of Heraclitus and Pherecydes as victims of severe diseases which he does not specify, but in *Sulla* xxxvi, 5 (474 F) he names Pherecydes " the theologian " (*cf.* Diels-Kranz, *Frag. Vorsok.*[6] i, pp. 43-51) among those who succumbed to pediculosis (*cf.* Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* 557 a 1-3 and

Then was Glaucus bereft by Cronian Zeus of his reason,[a]
in that he was about to exchange golden arms worth a hundred oxen for brazen arms worth nine. Yet for men in combat brazen arms were no less useful than golden ones, whereas the Stoics find bodily comeliness and health neither useful nor advantageous for happiness at all ; but nevertheless these Stoics accept health in exchange for prudence. That is clear from their statements [b] that it would have behooved Heraclitus and Pherecydes, if they could have done so, to resign their virtue and prudence so as to be quit of their pediculosis and dropsy [c] and that, if the philtres poured by Circe were two, one making fools of prudent men and the other ⟨asses of human beings [d] but asses with prudence, it would be right⟩ for Odysseus to have drunk the philtre of folly rather than to have changed his form to the shape of a beast though thereby keeping his prudence—and with his prudence obviously his happiness [e]— ; and this, they say, is the precept and prescription of prudence herself : " Let me go and

W. Nestle, *Griechische Studien* [Stuttgart, 1948], pp. 577-578). For the fatal dropsy of Heraclitus and its embellishments (Diogenes Laertius, ix, 3-5) *cf.* H. Fränkel, *A.J.P.*, lix (1938), pp. 309-314 and p. 325 and R. Muth, *Anzeiger für die Altertumswissenschaft*, vii (1954), cols. 250-253 and viii (1955), cols. 251-252.

[d] Although in *Odyssey* x, 210-243 only wolves, lions, and swine are mentioned, in *Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti* 986 B Plutarch expressly includes asses among the beasts into which Circe has transformed men (*cf.* also Apollodorus, *Epitome* vii, 15 [*L.C.L.* ii, pp. 286-287] ; Bethe, *R.-E.* xi [1921], col. 502, 21-29).

[e] The interjection is Plutarch's ironical reminder that for the Stoics φρόνησις and εὐδαιμονία are identical (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 53 = *De Stoic. Repug.* 1046 E *supra*).

(1064) *νης ἐμοῦ καὶ διαφθειρομένης εἰς ὄνου πρόσωπον.*" *ἀλλ' ὄνου γε, φήσει τις, ἡ τοιαῦτα παραγγέλλουσα φρόνησίς ἐστιν, εἰ τὸ μὲν φρονεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ ⟨δύσμορφον⟩[1] περιφέρειν πρόσωπον ἀδιάφορον. ἔθνος εἶναί φασιν Αἰθιόπων, ὅπου κύων βασιλεύει καὶ βασιλεὺς προσαγορεύεται καὶ γέρα[2] καὶ τιμὰς ἔχει βασιλέως, ἄνδρες δὲ πράττουσιν ἅπερ ἡγεμόσι πόλεων προσήκει καὶ ἄρχουσιν. ἆρ' οὖν παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ὁμοίως τὸ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τἀγαθοῦ πάρεστι τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μόνην ταύτην αἱρετὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ*
C *συμφέρον καλοῦσι, πράττουσι δὲ πάντα[3] καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ ζῶσι καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσιν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ προστάγματος τῶν ἀδιαφόρων; καίτοι τὸν κύνα μὲν ἐκεῖνον οὐδεὶς Αἰθιόπων ἀποκτίννυσιν,[4] ἀλλὰ σεμνῶς[5] κάθηται προσκυνούμενος· οὗτοι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπολλύουσιν ἑαυτῶν καὶ διαφθείρουσι, τῆς ὑγιείας περιεχόμενοι καὶ τῆς ἀπονίας.*

12. *Ἔοικε δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν τοῦ περὶ τούτων ἔτι πλείονα λέγειν ὁ κολοφὼν αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσιππος τοῖς δόγμασιν ἐπιτέθεικεν. ὄντων γὰρ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τῶν δὲ κακῶν τῶν δὲ καὶ*[6]

[1] ⟨*δύσμορφον*⟩ -H. C.; δὲ . . . vac. 9 -E, vac. 3+4 (in two lines) -B . . . *περιφέρειν*; ⟨*ὄνου*⟩ -Turnebus.

[2] *γέρα* -Reiske; *ἱερὰ* -E, B.

[3] *πάντα* -Hartman (*De Plutarcho*, p. 607), implied by Amyot's version; *ταῦτα* -E, B.

[4] Stephanus; *ἀποκτέννυσιν* -E, B.

[5] *ἀλλὰ σέμνως* (*sic*) -Basil.; *ἀλλὰ ἀσέμνως* -E; *ἀλλ' ἀσέμνως* -B.

[6] *καὶ* -deleted by Wyttenbach; Papabasileios excised as a gloss on *μεταξύ* the following *καὶ καλουμένων ἀδιαφόρων* (*Athena*, x [1898], p. 227).

regard me not, for I am being undone and perverted into an ass's head." [a] But the prudence that gives such orders, one would say, is the prudence of an ass, if in fact to be prudent and happy is good and to wear a ⟨misshapen⟩ face indifferent. There is said [b] to be a tribe of Ethiopians among whom a dog reigns and is addressed as king and has the perquisites and honours of a king, but the functions of political leadership and government are performed by men. Do not the Stoics in like manner give the title and rank of the good to virtue and call virtue alone an object of choice and beneficial and useful but perform all their actions and do their philosophizing and live and die as it were at the command of the things that are indifferent? While that dog, however, is slain by none of the Ethiopians but sits in majesty receiving their obeisance, these Stoics undo their own virtue and destroy it by their attachment to health and painlessness.

12. It seems that the finishing touch which Chrysippus has put to his doctrines itself [c] absolves us from saying still more on this subject. For, there being in nature some things that are good and some that are evil and some also that are intermediate

[a] Crönert (*Symbolae Osloenses*, xiv [1935], pp. 126-133) argued that these words are verses taken by Chrysippus from the *Elpenor* of Timotheus and put into the mouth of his personified *φρόνησις*.

[b] *Cf.* Pliny, *N.H.* vi, 192 and Aelian, *De Natura Animalium* vii, 40 = Hermippus, frag. 76 (C. Müller, *Frag. Hist. Graec.* iii, p. 53 with Heibges, *R.-E.* viii [1912], col. 852, 32-47).

[c] Pohlenz (*Moralia* vi/2) punctuates so as to construe *αὐτός* not with *κολοφών* but with *Χρύσιππος*, as is implied by Amyot's version, "*que Chrysippus mesme adjouste. . . .*"

(1064) μεταξὺ καὶ καλουμένων ἀδιαφόρων, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν
D ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐ βούλεται τἀγαθὸν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδιάφορον ⟨καὶ τὸ ἀδιάφορον⟩[1] ἢ τὸ κακόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δήπου[2] ποιούμεθα μάρτυρας, αἰτούμενοι ταῖς εὐχαῖς παρ' αὐτῶν μάλιστα μὲν κτῆσιν ἀγαθῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, κακῶν ἀποφυγήν, τὸ [δὲ][3] μήτ' ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀντὶ μὲν τἀγαθοῦ μὴ θέλοντες ἔχειν ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ θέλοντες. ὁ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐναλλάττων καὶ τὴν τάξιν ἀναστρέφων ἐκ τῆς μέσης χώρας τὸ μέσον εἰς τὴν ἐσχάτην μετατίθησι τὸ δ' ἔσχατον εἰς τὴν μέσην ἐπανάγει καὶ μετοικίζει, καθάπερ οἱ τύραννοι τοῖς κακοῖς προεδρίαν διδοῦσι, [καὶ][4] νομοθετῶν πρῶτον διώκειν τἀγαθὸν δεύτερον δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἔσχατον δὲ καὶ
E χείριστον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ μήτ' ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις μετὰ τὰ οὐράνια τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου τιθείη τὴν δὲ γῆν καὶ τὰ περὶ γῆν εἰς τὸν τάρταρον ἀπώσειε

τῆλε μάλ', ἦχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἔστι βέρεθρον.

εἰπὼν οὖν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως ὅτι λυσιτελεῖ ζῆν ἄφρονα ἢ ⟨μὴ⟩[5] βιοῦν κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν· " τοιαῦτα γὰρ τἀγαθά

[1] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by Stephanus.
[2] δήπου -E, ἤδη -B.
[3] [δὲ] -deleted by Hartman (*De Plutarcho*, p. 607).
[4] [καὶ] -deleted by Pohlenz ; διδοὺς καὶ -Basil. and Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 669) but *cf. contra* Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 15).
[5] ⟨μὴ⟩ -added by Stephanus (*cf.* μᾶλλον ἢ ⟨μὴ⟩ in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 A *supra*).

[a] This distinction, as Sextus says, was common to the

and are called indifferent,[a] there is no human being who does not wish to have the good rather than the indifferent ⟨and the indifferent⟩ rather than the evil. Nay, of this we make the very gods our witnesses, I take it, as in our prayers we beg them first of all for the possession of good things and, if this may not be, for deliverance from evils, being unwilling to have what is neither good nor evil instead of what is good but willing to have it instead of what is evil. This man, however, by a transposition of nature and an inversion of order transfers the middle from the midmost space to the last and, just as tyrants give evil men precedence, removes what is last and elevates it to the midmost space, making it the law to seek first the good and second the evil and to regard as last and worst what is neither good nor evil, as if one would place after celestial things the infernal realm and expel the earth and earthly things to the nether world

Far and afar, where lies under earth the profoundest of chasms.[b]

So in the third book concerning Nature[c] after he has said that to live a fool is better than ⟨not⟩ to be alive even if one is never going to be sensible he continues in so many words : " for to human beings

Old Academy, the Peripatus, and the Stoa (*Adv. Math.* xi, 3-6 = *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 71 [p. 17, 22-25] and Xenocrates, frag. 76 [Heinze]) : *cf.* Plato, *Gorgias* 467 E 6—468 B 1, *Lysis* 216 D 5-7, *Symposium* 202 B 1-5 ; Aristotle, *Categories* 12 a 13-20 ; *Divisiones Aristoteleae* §§ 24 and 68 (pp. 31, 16 ff. and 65, 26 ff. [Mutschmann]) ; O. Luschnat, *Philologus*, cii (1958), pp. 211-214.

[b] *Iliad* viii, 14 (*cf.* Plato, *Phaedo* 112 A).

[c] For the remainder of this chapter see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 A-C *supra* (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 760) and the notes there.

(1064) ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ τῶν [ἄλλων][1] ἀνὰ μέσον προτερεῖν· ἔστι δ' οὐ ταῦτα προτεροῦντα ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος μεθ' οὗ βιοῦν[2] ἐπιβάλλει μᾶλλον εἰ καὶ[3] ἄφρονες ἐσόμεθα "—δῆλον οὖν, εἰ καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ παράνομοι καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ
F καὶ εἰ[4] κακοδαίμονες· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄπεστι τούτων τοῖς ἀφρόνως βιοῦσιν. ἐπιβάλλει τοίνυν κακοδαιμονεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν καὶ βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ παρανομεῖν ἢ μὴ παρανομεῖν· τουτέστιν ἐπιβάλλει τὰ ⟨μὴ⟩[5] ἐπιβάλλοντα ποιεῖν καὶ καθήκει ζῆν καὶ παρὰ τὸ [μὴ][6] καθῆκον; " ναί· χεῖρον γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι τοῦ ἀφραίνειν." εἶτα ⟨τί⟩[7] παθόντες οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι κακὸν ὃ τοῦ κακοῦ χεῖρόν ἐστι; διὰ ⟨τί⟩[8] φευκτὸν ἀπο-
1065 φαίνουσι μόνον τὴν ἀφροσύνην, εἰ οὐχ ἧττον ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιβάλλον ἐστὶ φεύγειν τὴν μὴ δεχομένην τὸ ἀφραίνειν διάθεσιν;

13. Ἀλλὰ τί ἄν τις ἐπὶ τούτοις δυσχεραίνοι, μεμνημένος ὢν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Φύσεως γέγραφεν, ἀποφαίνων οὐκ ἀχρήστως τὴν κακίαν πρὸς τὰ ὅλα γεγενημένην; ἄξιον δ' ἀναλαβεῖν τὸ δόγμα ταῖς ἐκείνου λέξεσιν, ἵνα καὶ μάθῃς πως οἱ τοῦ[9] Ξενο-

[1] [ἄλλων] -deleted by Reiske (*cf.* ⟨καὶ⟩ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 B *supra*).
[2] βιοῦν -E ; βιουντας (?) -B.
[3] καὶ εἰ in *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 C *supra*.
[4] εἰ -deleted by Reiske but defended by Pohlenz (" consulto Plutarchus κακοδαίμονες extollit ").
[5] ⟨μὴ⟩ -added by Reiske (implied by Xylander's version).
[6] [μὴ] -deleted by Wyttenbach (as by implication from Xylander's version).
[7] ⟨τί⟩ -added by Stephanus.
[8] διὰ ⟨τί⟩ -Meziriac (implied by versions of Xylander and Amyot) ; δι' ἃ -E, B.

goods are of such a nature that in a way even evils have the advantage over intermediates ; but it is not these that have the advantage but reason, and it is incumbent upon us rather to be alive with reason although we are to be fools "—obviously, then, although unjust and lawless and hateful to the gods and although wretched, for those who are foolishly alive are without none of these characteristics. It is incumbent upon us, then, to be wretched rather than not to be wretched and to suffer injuries rather than not to suffer injuries and to do wrong rather than not to do wrong and to transgress the law rather than not to transgress it ; that is it is incumbent upon us to do things incumbent upon us ⟨not⟩ to do, and it is a duty to live even in violation of duty ? " Yes, for to be without rationality and sensibility is worse than to be a fool." Then ⟨what⟩ makes them refuse to admit that there is evil which is worse than evil ? For ⟨what⟩ reason do they declare that only folly is an object of avoidance if it is not less incumbent upon us but even more to avoid the state which does not admit of folly ?

13. But why would this annoy anyone who remembers what he has written in the second book concerning Nature,[a] where he declares that the genesis of vice has not been useless in relation to the universe as a whole ? It's worth repeating the doctrine in his own words, in order that you may in a way understand what position is given to vice

[a] *Cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1050 F (*S. V.F.* ii, frag. 1181 [p. 339, 14-19]) *supra* with the notes there.

[9] Wyttenbach after Leonicus (πῶς οἱ τοῦ) ; πῶς ὅπου -E B ; οἱ τοῦ (without πῶς) -Basil.

(1065) κράτους καὶ Σπευσίππου κατηγοροῦντες ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἀδιάφορον ἡγεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀνωφελὲς ἐν τίνι τόπῳ τὴν κακίαν αὐτοὶ τίθενται καὶ τίνας λόγους περὶ αὐτῆς διεξίασιν· " ἡ δὲ κακία πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ συμπτώματα ⟨ἴδιόν τιν'⟩[1] ἔχει ὅρον·
B γίγνεται γὰρ αὐτή[2] πως κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καί, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίγνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν." οὐκοῦν ἐν θεοῖς ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ κακόν· οὐδέ, ὅταν ὁ Ζεὺς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλύσας[3] τὴν ὕλην ἅπασαν εἷς γένηται καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀνέλῃ διαφοράς, οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν τηνικαῦτα, μηδενός γε κακοῦ παρόντος. ἀλλὰ χοροῦ μὲν ἔστιν ἐμμέλεια μηδενὸς ἀπᾴδοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ σώματος ὑγίεια μηδενὸς μορίου νοσοῦντος, ἀρετὴ δ' ἄνευ κακίας οὐκ ἔχει γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἐνίαις τῶν ἰατρικῶν δυνάμεων ἰὸς ὄφεως καὶ χολὴ ὑαίνης ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν οὕτως[4]
C ἐπιτηδειότης ἑτέρα τῇ Μελήτου[5] μοχθηρίᾳ πρὸς τὴν Σωκράτους δικαιοσύνην καὶ τῇ Κλέωνος ἀνα-

[1] δεινὰ συμπτώματα ⟨ἴδιόν τιν'⟩ -Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 12, n. 2), *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1050 F *supra*; λοιπὰ συμπτώματα -E, B.

[2] γὰρ ⟨καὶ⟩ αὐτή -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 15), *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1050 F *supra* (μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτή).

[3] ἀναλώσας -Meziriac; but *cf.* Kolfhaus (*Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, p. 55).

[4] Wyttenbach; οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν -E, B.

[5] Bernardakis; μελίτου -E, B.

[a] Xenocrates, frag. 92 (Heinze) and Speusippus, frag. 59 (Lang). *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iv, 49; *De Legibus* i, 55; *Tusc. Disp.* v, 29-30; and for the Platonic doctrine that health and wealth may be either goods or evils *cf.* especially Plato, *Laws* 661 A 5–D 4 and 728 D 6—729 B 1. The lists of works by Speusippus and by Xenocrates both contain a title Περὶ πλούτου (Diogenes Laertius, iv, 4 and 11).

and what theories concerning it are developed by the very men who denounce Xenocrates and Speusippus for holding that health is not indifferent and that wealth is not useless.[a] " Vice is ⟨peculiarly⟩ distinguished from dreadful accidents, for in itself it does in a sense come about in accordance with the reason of nature and, if I may put it so, its genesis is not useless in relation to the universe as a whole, since otherwise the good would not exist either." So then, among the gods there is nothing good, since there is nothing evil either; and, whenever Zeus, having reduced all matter to himself, becomes one and abolishes all difference else,[b] then, there being nothing evil present, there is nothing good either. While in a chorus[c] there is harmony if no member of it is out of tune and in a body health if no part of it is ill, for virtue, however, there is no coming to be without vice; but just as snake's venom or hyena's bile is a requisite for some medical prescriptions[d] so the depravity of Meletus is in its way suited to the justice of Socrates[e] and the

[b] That is in the " ecpyrosis," for which see 1067 A, 1075 B-C, and 1077 D *infra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 C and 1053 B-C *supra*.

[c] ἀλλὰ χοροῦ μὲν . . . τὴν ἀδικίαν = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1181 (p. 339, 20-30).

[d] For hyena's bile *cf.* in a similar context Plutarch, *De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 552 F and Steier, *R.-E.* Supplement iv (1924), col. 766, 20-25; for the use of snake's venom *cf.* Gossen-Steier, *R.-E.*, Zweite Reihe ii/1 (1921), col. 506, 11-23.

[e] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1051 C *supra*. For Meletus, who brought the action against Socrates (*cf.* Plato, *Euthyphro* 2 B) and who is mentioned by Plutarch several times in the *Moralia* (76 A, 475 E, 499 F, 580 B-C), *cf.* P. Mazon, *Rev. Études Anciennes*, xliv (1942), pp. 177-190.

(1065) γωγίᾳ πρὸς τὴν Περικλέους καλοκἀγαθίαν. πῶς δ' ἂν εὗρεν ὁ Ζεὺς τὸν Ἡρακλέα φῦσαι καὶ τὸν Λυκοῦργον εἰ μὴ καὶ Σαρδανάπαλον ἡμῖν ἔφυσε καὶ Φάλαριν; ὥρα λέγειν αὐτοῖς ὅτι καὶ φθίσις γέγονεν ἀνθρώπῳ[1] πρὸς εὐεξίαν καὶ ποδάγρα πρὸς ὠκύτητα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἦν Ἀχιλλεὺς κομήτης εἰ μὴ φαλακρὸς Θερσίτης. τί γὰρ διαφέρουσι τῶν ταῦτα ληρούντων καὶ φλυαρούντων οἱ λέγοντες μὴ ἀχρήστως γεγονέναι πρὸς τὴν ἐγκράτειαν τὴν ἀκολασίαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἀδικίαν; ὅπως
D εὐχώμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀεὶ μοχθηρίαν εἶναι

ψεύδεά θ' αἱμυλίους τε λόγους καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος,

[1] Wyttenbach ; ἀνθρώπων -E, B.

[a] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Nicias* ii, 2–iii, 2 (524 C-D) and viii, 5 (528 B-C) ; *Pericles* xxxiii, 8 (170 D-E) ; and for Plutarch's estimates of Cleon and of Pericles respectively see further *Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae* 806 F—807 A and *Pericles* xxxix (173 C-E).

[b] Heracles was a hero of the Stoics (*cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 514 [and *Heracliti Quaestiones Homericae* 33] ; ii, p. 300, 31-37 ; iii, p. 84, 5-7 ; Epictetus, *Diss.* I, vi, 32-36 and III, xxiv, 13-17). Lycurgus, the legendary author of the Spartan constitution (*cf.* Plutarch's *Lycurgus* and especially xxxi [59 A-B]), was with Socrates the subject of a treatise by Sphaerus, the pupil of Zeno and Cleanthes (*S.V.F.* i, p. 140, 2 and p. 142, 3-7) ; and he must have been held in high regard by some Stoics (*cf.* Seneca, *Epistle* xc, 6 ; Epictetus, *Diss.* II, xx, 26 and frag. v) despite the denial that he was a sage and that his enactments were truly law (see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1033 F and *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 599, and *cf.* Dougan and Henry on Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v, 7).

[c] Sardanapalus, king of Assyria, typified for the Greeks the life of luxury and sensuality (*cf.* Plutarch, *De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute* 330 F and 336 D ; Aristophanes, *Birds*

vulgarity of Cleon to the nobility of Pericles.[a] How would Zeus have found the way of creating Heracles and Lycurgus [b] if he had not also created Sardanapalus [c] for us and Phalaris ? [d] Here it is time for them to assert that mankind has been given consumption with a view to his vigour and gout with a view to his fleetness of foot and that Achilles would not have had long hair if Thersites had not been bald.[e] For what is the difference between those who talk this silly nonsense and the Stoics, who say that the genesis of licentiousness has not been without use for continence or that of injustice without use for justice ? Let us take care, then, to pray the gods that there may always be depravity

Falsehoods and blandishing speeches and character tricky and thievish [f]

1021 ; Aristotle, frag. 90 [Rose] and *Eth. Nic.* 1095 b 19-22 ; Athenaeus, xii, 528 e—530 c) and was used for this purpose by Chrysippus in his polemic against the Epicureans (Athenaeus, viii, 335 b—337 a [*cf.* E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele Perduto* ii, pp. 244-247]). Sardanapalus and Heracles are contrasted by Juvenal (x, 360-362), Cleomedes (*De Motu Circulari* II, i, 92=pp. 166, 19–168, 7 [Ziegler]), and Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* I, xxiv, 158, 3–159, 1).

[d] *Cf.* Plutarch, *De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 553 A : τοιοῦτο καὶ Φάλαρις ἦν Ἀκραγαντίνοις φάρμακον. The ferocious cruelty of this tyrant of Acragas (*ca.* 570–544) was notorious as early as Pindar (*Pythian* i, 95-98) ; *cf.* Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1148 b 24 and 1149 b 13-15 and [Plutarch], *Parallela Graeca et Romana* 315 C-D=Stobaeus, *Anth.* iv, 8, 33 (iv, pp. 318, 14–319, 4 [Hense]) with Callimachus, frags. 45-47 (Pfeiffer). For the sage in the bull of Phalaris *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 586 with Epicurus, frag. 601 (Usener, *Epicurea*, pp. 338-339).

[e] *Iliad* ii, 219 ; *cf.* Plutarch, *Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 28 F—29 A and *De Invidia et Odio* 537 D-E.

[f] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 78.

(1065) εἰ τούτων ἀναιρεθέντων οἴχεται φροῦδος ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ συναπόλωλεν.

14. Ἢ βούλει τὸ ἥδιστον αὐτοῦ τῆς γλαφυρίας καὶ πιθανότητος ἱστορῆσαι; "ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ κωμῳδίαι," φησίν, "ἐπιγράμματα γελοῖα φέρουσιν, ἃ καθ' αὑτὰ μέν ἐστι φαῦλα τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ ποιήματι χάριν τινὰ προστίθησιν, οὕτως ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν, τοῖς δὲ ὅλοις[1] οὐκ ἄχρηστός ἐστι." πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὴν κακίαν γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὸ φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα γέγονε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ βούλησιν, πᾶσαν
E ἐπίνοιαν ἀτοπίας ὑπερβάλλει. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν δοτῆρες ἔσονται; πῶς δ' ἔτι θεοῖς ἐχθρὸν ἡ κακία καὶ θεομισές; ἢ τί πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα δυσφημήματα λέγειν ἔξομεν, ὡς

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ[2]

καὶ

τίς τ' ἄρ σφῶε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;

ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ μὲν φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα τὴν κωμῳδίαν

[1] ὅλοις -Meziriac (*cf. infra* chap. 15 *init.*); ἄλλοις -E, B.
[2] θέλῃ -Reiske (MSS. in *Moralia* 17 B); ἐθέλῃ -E, B.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1181 (p. 339, 31-36). *Cf.* Marcus Aurelius, vi, 42 (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 340, 7-8); and for the use of the word ἐπίγραμμα Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, pp. 375-376 and Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), p. 21, n. 2. Plutarch's treatment of the argument in this chapter was criticized by Leibniz in his *Théodicée : Essais sur la Bonté de Dieu* etc., Partie iii, § 334; *cf.* also Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 288-289.

[b] *Cf.* 1075 E *infra* and *Maxime cum Principibus Philosopho Esse Disserendum* 778 F. δωτῆρες ἐάων was a traditional epithet of the gods (*Odyssey* viii, 325 and 335; Hesiod,

if the abolition of these involves the disappearance and destruction of virtue.

14. Or would you like to examine the most delightful specimen of his smoothness and plausibility? "For just as comedies," he says,[a] "contain funny lines which, while vulgar in themselves, add a certain charm to the piece as a whole, so vice all by itself you could censure, but for the universe as a whole it is not useless." Now in the first place, for the origin of vice to have been due to the providence of god as that of the vulgar line was to the purpose of the poet is a notion that exceeds all imaginable absurdity. For then why would the gods be dispensers of good rather than of evil,[b] and how is vice still hateful to the gods and god-detested,[c] or what shall we have to say to such blasphemies as

In men god makes a fault to grow
Whene'er he wills a house's overthrow [d]

and

Which of the gods brought together the twain in contention to quarrel? [e]

In the second place, the vulgar line embellishes the

Theogony 46, 111, 633, and 664), who according to the Stoics themselves can be the cause only of good (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1117 [with Seneca, *De Ira* ii, 27], frag. 1125 [=*De Stoic. Repug.* 1049 E *supra*], frag. 1184; but contrast what is reported of Zeno in *S.V.F.* i, frag. 159 [*cf.* Pearson, *Fragments*, p. 95] and of Chrysippus himself in *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 997 [=*De Stoic. Repug.* 1056 B-C *supra*]).

[c] As the Stoics assert (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 661).

[d] Aeschylus, frag. 156 (Nauck²)=frag. 273, 15-16 (Mette). The lines are quoted by Plutarch, *Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 17 B in a context similar to that in which Plato quoted them (*Republic* 380 A).

[e] *Iliad* i, 8.

(1065) κοσμεῖ καὶ συνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς, ἐφιεμένης τοῦ γελοίου ἢ κεχαρισμένου τοῖς θεαταῖς· ὁ δὲ πατρῷος καὶ ὕπατος καὶ θεμίστιος Ζεὺς καὶ ἀριστοτέχνας, κατὰ Πίνδαρον, οὐ δρᾶμα δήπου μέγα καὶ ποικίλον καὶ πολυπαθὲς[1] δημιουργῶν τὸν
F κόσμον ἀλλὰ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄστυ κοινὸν συννομησομένων[2] μετὰ δίκης καὶ ἀρετῆς ὁμολογουμένως καὶ μακαρίως, τί πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τοῦτο καὶ σεμνότατον τέλος ἐδεῖτο λῃστῶν καὶ ἀνδροφόνων καὶ πατροκτόνων καὶ τυράννων; οὐ γὰρ ἡδὺ τῷ
1066 θείῳ καὶ κομψὸν ἡ κακία γέγονεν ἐπεισόδιον, οὐδὲ δι'[3] εὐτραπελίαν ἡ ἀδικία[4] καὶ γέλωτα καὶ βωμολοχίαν προστέτριπται τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὑφ' ὧν οὐδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῆς ὑμνουμένης ὁμολογίας. ἔτι τὸ μὲν φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα τοῦ ποιήματος πολλοστημόριόν ἐστι καὶ μικρὸν ἐπέχει παντάπασιν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ χωρίον, καὶ οὔτε πλεονάζει τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε τῶν εὖ πεποιῆσθαι[5] δοκούντων ἀπόλλυσι καὶ λυμαίνεται τὴν χάριν· τῆς δὲ κακίας ἀναπέπλησται

[1] πολυπαθὲς -Reiske (*cf.* Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, pp. 55-56); πολυμαθὲς -E, B; πολυμερὲς -Fähse (*cf.* Rasmus, *Prog.* 1872, p. 16).

[2] E, B; συννεμησομένων -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 669); εὐνομησομένων -Haupt (*Hermes*, vi [1872], p. 5); but see *S.V.F.* i, p. 61, 5 (ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ [νομῷ -Pearson] κοινῷ συντρεφομένης); ii, p. 192, 24 (τὸν κόσμον . . . συμπολιτευόμενον θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις); iii, p. 83, 7 ("lege quoque consociati homines cum diis") with ii, p. 169, 28-29.

[3] οὐδὲ δι' -B; οὐδι' E^1 (δὲ superscript -E^2).

[4] ἡ ἀδικία -Reiske; ἢ ἀδικίαν -E, B.

[5] εὖ πεποιῆσθαι -Meziriac; εὖ τι ποιεῖσθαι -E, B.

[a] As an epithet of Zeus θεμίστιος seems to occur only here; but ὕπατος is frequent even in the *Iliad* (v, 756; viii, 22 and 31; xix, 258; xxiii, 43), and for πατρῷος *cf.* Aeschylus,

comedy and contributes to its goal, the aim of comedy being what is funny or pleasing to the spectators; but Zeus the paternal and supreme and righteous[a] and, as Pindar calls him,[b] master-craftsman fashioned the universe not, I take it, as a grand and intricate and sensational drama but as a town common to gods and men who should live lawful partners in right and virtue concordantly and blissfully,[c] and for the attainment of this most fair and most majestic goal what need had he of pirates and murderers and parricides and tyrants? For it is not as a clever interlude pleasant to the divinity that vice has come to be, nor is it by way of drollery[d] and jest and ribaldry that human affairs have been sullied[e] by injustice, vice and injustice having made it impossible to see even a phantom of the concord they harp upon. Moreover, while the vulgar line is a small fraction of the piece and occupies very little room in the comedy and while such lines neither outnumber the rest nor undo and spoil the charm of the passages that are thought to have been well written, human affairs are all defiled by vice, and all

frag. 162 (Nauck²)=frag. 278 A (Mette); Cornutus, *Theologia Graeca* 9 (p. 9, 15 [Lang]); and Maximus of Tyre, *Philos.* xli, ii d (p. 474, 11 [Hobein]).

[b] Pindar, frag. 57 (Bergk, Schroeder, Snell)=66 (Turyn) =48 (Bowra); see Plutarch, *De Facie* 927 B (*L.C.L.* xii, p. 87, n. *a*).

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 528, 636, and 1131; *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 333, 338, and 339; Epictetus, *Diss.* II, v, 26.

[d] See the note on εὐτράπελον in 1062 B *supra*.

[e] For the use of the verb *cf. De Pythiae Oraculis* 395 E and Wyttenbach, *Animadversiones ad* 89 F; and for stain, rust, or incrustation used as an example in connexion with the problem of evil *cf. Corpus Hermeticum* xiv, 7 (ii, pp. 224, 17–225, 4 [Nock-Festugière]).

(1066) πάντα πράγματα, καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εὐθὺς ἐκ παρόδου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι κορωνίδος ἀσχημονῶν καὶ ἐκπίπτων καὶ ταραττόμενος καὶ μηδὲν ἔχων μέρος καθαρὸν μηδ' ἀνεπίληπτον, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν, αἴσχιστόν
B ἐστι δραμάτων ἁπάντων καὶ ἀτερπέστατον.

15. Ὅθεν ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην πρὸς τί γέγονεν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία τοῖς ὅλοις. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τὰ οὐράνια καὶ θεῖα φήσει. γελοῖον γὰρ εἰ, μὴ γενομένης ἐν ἀνθρώποις μηδ' οὔσης κακίας καὶ ἁπληστίας καὶ ψευδολογίας μηδ' ἀλλήλους ἡμῶν ἀγόντων καὶ φερόντων καὶ συκοφαντούντων καὶ φονευόντων, οὐκ ἂν ἐβάδιζεν ὁ ἥλιος τὴν τεταγμένην πορείαν οὐδ' ἂν ὥραις ἐχρῆτο καὶ περιόδοις καιρῶν ὁ κόσμος οὐδ' ⟨ἂν⟩[1] ἡ γῆ, τὴν μέσην χώραν ἔχουσα τοῦ παντός, ἀρχὰς πνευμάτων ἐνεδίδου
C καὶ ὄμβρων. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα τὴν κακίαν εὐχρήστως γεγονέναι· καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσως οἱ ἄνδρες λέγουσιν. ἆρ' οὖν ὑγιαίνομεν μᾶλλον κακοὶ ὄντες ἤ τι δὴ[2] μᾶλλον εὐποροῦμεν τῶν ἀναγκαίων; πρὸς δὲ κάλλος ἡμῖν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχὺν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία γέγονεν; οὔ φασιν. ἤδη[3] ποῦ γῆς ἐστιν ⟨ἡ κακίας εὐχρηστία; ἢ ἔστιν⟩[4] " ὄνομα

[1] ⟨ἂν⟩ -added by Papabasileios (*Athena*, x [1898], p. 227).
[2] ἤ τι δὴ -Pohlenz ; ἔτι δὲ -E, B.
[3] ἤδη -H. C. ; ἡ δὲ -E, B.
[4] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by H. C. (*cf.* ἡ δήπου χρῆσίς ἐστιν -Madvig [*Adversaria Critica*, p. 669] ; *contra* Rasmus [*Prog.* 1872, p. 17]).

[a] *Cf. De Alexandri . . . Virtute* 334 c.
[b] This is probably meant to indicate not any particular Stoic assertion but the implication of the doctrine that save for the sage, who exists rarely if ever (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 165, 1-3 and 23-25 ; iii, p. 167, 34-36 ; iii, p. 216, 39), all men are utterly wretched and depraved (see 1076 B-C *infra* and *supra*

of life, being from the very entrance or beginning to the final flourish [a] indecent and degenerate and disordered and without any part undefiled and irreprehensible, as these Stoics say,[b] is of all dramas whatever most ugly and most unpleasant.

15. Wherefore I should like to inquire what it is for which vice has proved to be useful to the universe as a whole. Surely he would not say that it is for the things that are celestial and divine, for it is a ridiculous notion that, if in human beings there had not been or were not vice and greed and falsehood or we did not ravage and blackmail and murder one another, the sun would not be following his appointed course or the universe keeping its times and seasonal periods or the earth occupying the midmost space of the sum of things [c] and giving rise to winds and rains.[d] What remains, then, is that for us and our affairs the existence of vice has proved to be useful ; and this perhaps is what the gentlemen mean. Are we more healthy, then, for being vicious or any the better provided with the necessities of life ? Has vice proved to be useful to us for beauty or for strength ? They deny it. So finally where in the world is ⟨the utility of vice ? Or is it⟩ " only a name of nothing

1062 E—1063 A and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 E—1049 A [*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 662 and 668]). With the words καθαρὸν μηδ' ἀνεπίληπτον in the present passage *cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 165, 43 and p. 168, 1-2.
[c] This is Stoic terminology : *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1054 B—1055 C *supra* and Plutarch, *De Facie* 924 D-F and 925 F (with my notes *ad loc.*, *L.C.L.* xii, pp. 68, note *c* ; 71, note *b* ; and 76, note *a*).
[d] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 699 and 702 ; Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* v, 4 ; Pliny, *N.H.* ii, 111 and 114 (with Aristotle, *Meteorology* 359 b 27—360 a 13).

(1066) μόνον καὶ δόκημα νυκτερωπὸν ἐννύχων " σοφιστῶν οὐχ ⟨οὕτως ἐναργὲς καὐτοῖς ὄναρ ἰδεῖν⟩[1] ὥσπερ ἡ κακία πᾶσιν ὕπαρ ἔκκειται[2] καὶ πᾶσιν ἐναργής, οὐδενὸς ὡς εὔχρηστος[3] μεταλαβεῖν ἥκιστα δ' ἀρετῆς, ὦ θεοί, διὰ ἣν γεγόναμεν; εἶτ' οὐ δεινόν, εἰ γεωργῷ μὲν καὶ κυβερνήτῃ καὶ ἡνιόχῳ τὰ εὔχρηστα φορὰ καὶ συνεργὰ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τέλος, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς ἀρετὴν γεγονὸς ἀπολώλεκε
D τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ διέφθαρκεν; ἀλλ' ἴσως ἤδη καιρὸς ἐπ' ἄλλο[4] τρέπεσθαι τοῦτο δ' ἀφεῖναι.

16. ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ φίλος, ἐμὴν χάριν· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ πυθέσθαι τίνα δὴ τρόπον οἱ ἄνδρες τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τῆς ἀρετῆς προεισάγουσιν.

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἀμέλει καὶ ἄξιον, ὦ ἑταῖρε. πολὺς μὲν[5] ὁ ψελλισμὸς αὐτῶν, τέλος δὲ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὖσαν ⟨ἀναιρεθέντων τῶν κακῶν⟩[6] καὶ[7] παντάπασιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι λέγουσιν· ὡς δ'[8] ἀληθῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον μὴ[9] καὶ

[1] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by H. C.
[2] ὕπαρ ἔκκειται -Wyttenbach ; ὑπερέκκειται -E, B.
[3] εὔχρηστος -H. C. ; ἀχρήστου -E, B ; εὐχρήστου -Reiske.
[4] ἄλλο -E ; ἄλλω -B.
[5] μὲν ⟨γὰρ⟩ -Bernardakis.
[6] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by Reiske (*cf.* 1067 A *infra*) ; οὖσαν . . . vac. 15 -E, 24 -B . . . καὶ ; ⟨κακῶν μὴ ὄντων ὅλως⟩ -Wyttenbach ; ⟨ἀναιρεθέντων τῶν κακῶν ὅλως⟩ -Dübner.
[7] καὶ ⟨αὐτὴν⟩ -Reiske ; [καὶ] -deleted by Castiglioni (*Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 84), but *cf.* . . . ὑπαρχόντων καὶ κακὰ ὑπάρχειν *infra*.
[8] ὡς γὰρ -Reiske.
[9] μὴ ⟨οὐ⟩ -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 17) ; but *cf.* Weissenberger, *Die Sprache Plutarchs* i, p. 33.

[a] Euripides, *Hercules Furens* 111-112 (ἔπεα μόνον . . . ἐννύχων ὀνείρων).

and a darkling spectre of benighted "[a] sophists not ⟨so clear even for them to see in a dream themselves⟩ as vice stands forth for all awake to see and clear to all as useful for getting a share in nothing and least of all, by heaven, in virtue, to which we owe our origin ?[b] And then is it not awful that, while the things useful to a farmer and a pilot and a charioteer are favourable to the proper goal of each and contribute to it, what god has produced for virtue has undone virtue and ruined it ? But perhaps it is already time to let this subject go and turn to another.

16. COMRADE. By no means, friend, on my account, for I am eager to learn how in the world the gentlemen give evil things precedence of good and vice precedence of virtue.

DIADUMENUS. And worth hearing, comrade, too, no doubt. They stammer at great length, but in the end what they say[c] is that prudence, since it is knowledge of things good and evil,[d] is utterly abolished too ⟨if evils are abolished⟩[e] ; and they think that as it is impossible for there to be truths

[b] The text of this passage (ἤδη ποῦ γῆς . . . γεγόναμεν) is hopelessly corrupt, and no emendation of it yet proposed including that printed here is likely to approximate what Plutarch wrote. For εὐχρηστία in the first supplement see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 A with note *d* there and Epictetus, *Diss.* I, vi, 2 (τὴν εὐχρηστίαν τῶν γεγονότων).

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1181 (pp. 339, 37–340, 6) ; *cf.* 1065 B *supra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1050 F with note *a* on page 555.

[d] The Stoic definition is ordinarily given as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων (or ἀδιαφόρων) : *cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 63, 23-25 ; p. 65, 8-9 and 22 ; p. 67, 30-31 ; p. 156, 1-2.

[e] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 190 and p. 47, 5-6 ; Plato, *Laws* 816 D 9–E 1.

(1066) ψευδῆ τινα εἶναι παραπλησίως οἴονται[1] προσ-
ήκειν[2] ἀγαθῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ κακὰ ὑπάρχειν.

E ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ φαύλως λέλεκται, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον οἶμαι μηδ' ἐμὲ λανθάνειν. ὁρῶ γὰρ διαφοράν, ᾗ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εὐθὺς ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν εὐθὺς κακὸν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν. ὅθεν ἀληθῶν μὲν καὶ ψευδῶν οὐδέν ἐστι μέσον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ καὶ κακῶν τὸ ἀδιάφορον. καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα συνυπάρχειν ἐκείνοις· ἐξήρκει γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν τἀγαθόν, τοῦ κακοῦ μὴ δεομένην[3] ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτ' ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἔχουσαν. πρὸς δὲ τὸν πρότερον λόγον εἴ τι λέγεται παρὰ ὑμῶν, ἀκουστέον.

17. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μὲν λέγεται,[4] τὰ δὲ
νῦν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις χρηστέον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εὔηθες οἴεσθαι φρονήσεως ἕνεκα γένεσιν κακῶν
F ὑποστῆναι καὶ ἀγαθῶν. ὄντων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιγίγνεται φρόνησις, ὥσπερ ἰατρικὴ νοσερῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ ὑγιεινῶν. οὐ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν

[1] οἴονται -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 670) ; οἶον -E, B.
[2] προσήκειν -Wyttenbach ; προσήκει -E, B.
[3] δεομένην -Meziriac ; δεόμενον -E, B.
[4] λέλεκται -Leonicus.

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 336, 1-4 (Aulus Gellius, VII, i, 5).

[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 166, 193, 196, 198, 952 ; Mates, *Stoic Logic*, pp. 28-29. (This applies only to propositions [ἀξιώματα] ; and so dialectic is defined as ἐπιστήμη ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων [*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 48, 122, and 123], where the last term refers to λεκτά that are not propositions.)

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 117 and 1064 c *supra* with note *a* on page 701.

[d] From the fact that "good" entails its contradictory opposite, "not good," it does not follow that its contrary, "evil," must exist (*cf.* Paul Barth, *Die Stoa* [Stuttgart, 1908], pp. 71-73=[Stuttgart, 1922], pp. 55-57) ; and for

without there being also some things which are false similarly it is fitting, if goods exist, for evils to exist also.[a]

COMRADE. Nay, the one part of this statement is not trivial ; but I think that even I am not eluded by the other, for I discern a distinction in that, whereas what is not true is *eo ipso* false,[b] the non-good is not, however, *eo ipso* evil.[c] Hence, while nothing is intermediate between things true and false, the indifferent is intermediate between things good and evil ; and it is not necessary that the latter coexist with the former, for it sufficed that nature have the good without needing the evil but comprising what is neither good nor evil.[d] If to the former argument, however, you people do make any reply, it ought to be heard.

17. DIADUMENUS. Why, many replies are made ; but for the present we must do with the indispensable minimum. Well then, in the first place, it is silly to think that the generation of evil things and good came about for the sake of prudence.[e] In fact, prudence follows upon the existence of goods and evils just as medicine does upon the prior existence of things unhealthy and salubrious, for the good and

Chrysippus to argue as if it did is the more surprising in view of *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 175.

[e] This is an inference not justified by what the Stoics said (*cf.* Giesen, *De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 63), though defended by Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 298, n. 1) ; but *cf.* Philo Jud., *Leg. All.* iii, 73 (i, p. 128, 22-24 [Cohn]) : ἔδει γὰρ εἰς τὴν τῶν βελτιόνων δήλωσιν γένεσιν ὑποστῆναι καὶ τῶν χειρόνων . . ., which suggests that Plutarch's phraseology here, γένεσιν κακῶν ὑποστῆναι, is intentionally Stoic (for the verb ὑφίσταται see 1066 F and 1081 C and F *infra*).

(1066) ὑφίσταται καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἵνα γένηται φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ
ᾗ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὄντα καὶ ὑφεστῶτα κρί-
νομεν ὠνομάσθη φρόνησις· ὥσπερ ὄψις ἡ λευκῶν
καὶ μελάνων αἴσθησις οὐ γενομένων ὅπως ἔχοιμεν
1067 ὄψιν ἡμεῖς ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα
κρίνειν ὄψεως δεηθέντων. δεύτερον, ὅταν ἐκπυ-
ρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδὲ ὁτιοῦν
ἀπολείπεται τὸ δὲ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα
καὶ σοφόν. ἔστι τοίνυν φρόνησις οὐκ ὄντος κακοῦ,
καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη κακὸν ὑπάρχειν εἰ φρόνησις ἔνι.
εἰ δὲ δὴ πάντως δεῖ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι καὶ
κακῶν ἐπιστήμην, τί δεινὸν εἰ τῶν κακῶν ἀναι-
ρεθέντων οὐκ ἔσται φρόνησις ἑτέραν τ'[1] ἀντ' ἐκεί-
νης ἀρετὴν ἕξομεν, οὐκ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἀλλ'
ἀγαθῶν μόνων[2] ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν; ὥσπερ εἰ τῶν
χρωμάτων τὸ μέλαν ἐξαπόλοιτο παντάπασιν εἶτά
B τις βιάζοιτο καὶ τὴν ὄψιν ἀπολωλέναι, λευκῶν γὰρ
οὐκ εἶναι καὶ μελάνων αἴσθησιν, τί κωλύει φάναι
πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι δεινὸν οὐδὲν εἰ τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ σοῦ
λεγομένην ὄψιν οὐκ ἔχομεν ἄλλη δὲ πάρεστιν[3] ἀντ'
ἐκείνης αἴσθησις ἡμῖν καὶ δύναμις, ᾗ λευκῶν
ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα καὶ μὴ λευκῶν χρωμάτων; ἐγὼ
μὲν γὰρ οὔτε γεῦσιν οἶμαι φροῦδον ἂν γενέσθαι
πικρῶν ἐπιλιπόντων οὔθ' ἁφὴν ἀλγηδόνος ἀναιρε-

[1] δ' -Pohlenz; but *cf.* Castiglioni (*Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 83) and Westman (*Acta Acad. Aboensis Humaniora*, xxiv/2 [1959], p. 6).

[2] μόνων -E; μόνον -B, Aldine, Basil.

[3] πάρεστιν -E; παρίστησιν -B, Basil.; ἄλλο δὲ παράστασιν -Aldine.

[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Anima* 422 b 23-24 and 426 b 8-11; Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 145 (εἰ δὲ ὁρᾷ, καὶ λευκὰ ὁρᾷ καὶ μέλανα).

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 606; see 1065 B *supra* and note *b* there.

the evil do not subsist in order that there may be prudence, but prudence is the name given to our means of distinguishing the good and evil which exist and are subsistent. Just so sight is the sense that perceives white and black objects,[a] though these did not come to be in order that we might have sight but it was rather that we needed sight for distinguishing such objects. In the second place, whenever the universe has been turned to fire by these Stoics, no evil whatever remains, but the whole is at that time prudent and sage.[b] So, then, there is prudence though evil does not exist, and it is not necessary that there be evil for prudence to be possible. Even supposing, however, that prudence must be knowledge of things good and evil, what's to dread if because of the abolition of evils prudence would not exist and we should have instead of it another virtue, which is knowledge not of things good and evil but of things good alone? Just so, if black should utterly vanish from among the colours and then someone should insist that the sense of sight had vanished too because sense-perception of things white and black does not exist, what is to prevent one from replying to him that there's nothing dreadful about our not having what you call the sense of sight and having instead of it another sense or faculty with which we perceive white colours and those not white? For my part, I think that the sense of taste would not have disappeared if bitter things had been lacking [c] or the sense of touch if

[c] *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Anima* 422 b 23-25 (. . . οἷον ὄψις λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος . . . καὶ γεῦσις πικροῦ καὶ γλυκέος) and 426 b 8-11; see also Plutarch, *Adv. Colotem* 1110 D (. . . τὸ λευκὸν . . . καὶ τὸ κυανοῦν . . . καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν).

(1067) θείσης οὔτε φρόνησιν κακοῦ μὴ παρόντος ἀλλ' ἐκείνας τε μενεῖν[1] αἰσθήσεις γλυκέων καὶ ἡδέων καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων ἀντιλαμβανομένας ταύτην τε[2] τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην C οὖσαν. οἷς δὲ μὴ δοκεῖ, τοὔνομα λαβόντες ἀπολιπέτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα.

18. Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, τί ἐκώλυε τοῦ μὲν κακοῦ νόησιν εἶναι τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὕπαρξιν; ὥσπερ οἶμαι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑγιείας μὲν ἔστι παρουσία πυρετοῦ δὲ καὶ πλευρίτιδος νόησις. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς, κακῶν μὲν ἀφθόνως πᾶσι παρόντων ἀγαθοῦ δὲ μηδενός, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε νοεῖν[3] οὐκ ἀπολελείμμεθα τὴν φρόνησιν τἀγαθὸν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. ὃ καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν εἰ τῆς μὲν ἀρετῆς μὴ παρούσης εἰσὶν οἱ διδάσκοντες ὁποῖόν ἐστι καὶ κατάληψιν ἐμποιοῦντες τῆς κακίας δὲ μὴ γενο- D μένης οὐ δυνατὸν ἦν κτήσασθαι νόησιν. ὅρα γὰρ οἷα πείθουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφοῦντες, ὅτι τῇ μὲν ἀφροσύνῃ καταλαμβάνομεν τὴν φρόνη-

[1] μενεῖν -Bernardakis ; μένειν -E, B.
[2] τε -Basil. ; δὲ -E, B.
[3] Reiske (after the versions of Amyot and Xylander) ; τοῦ γένεσιν -E, B.

[a] As γλυκέων is to πικρῶν so ἡδέων is to ἀλγηδόνος (*cf.* τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινόν [*De An. Proc. in Timaeo* 1026 D] and τῆς φύσεως ἄχρι τοῦ λῦσαι τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐξούσης τὸ ἡδύ [*Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1088 C]) ; τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ ἀλγεινά had been closely connected with the tactile qualities by Plato (*Timaeus* 64 A), but Aristotle had found no single ἐναντίωσις for the objective correlative of touch such as he had for the other senses (*De Anima* 422 b 23-34, *De Part. Animal.* 647 a 16-19).

pain had been abolished or prudence if evil were not present but that they would remain, the former as senses perceiving sweet things and pleasant[a] and those that are not so and this last as the prudence which is knowledge of things good and not good. As for those who think that this is not so, let them take the name and leave us the thing.

18. Apart from this, what was to prevent there being a conception of evil while the good in addition has real existence? Just so the gods, I think, though they have health as a reality, have yet a conception of fever and pleurisy, since even for us, though all have real ills aplenty and nothing good, as these men say,[b] yet at least to conceive of prudence, of the good, of happiness, is not beyond our capacity. This is amazing too that, whereas there are those who teach what sort of thing virtue is and who induce an apprehension of it although they do not really have it,[c] yet of vice, if it had not come to be, it would not be possible to get a conception. For see what sort of thing we are asked to believe by the men whose speculations are in accord with the common conceptions[d]: that, while by means of

[b] *Cf.* 1076 B-C *infra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 E—1049 A *supra.*

[c] According to the Stoics virtue is teachable (*cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 567 = iii, frag. 223) and yet there is virtue only in the sage (see 1062 E—1063 A *supra* ; *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 103 and 557 [with p. 166, 10-11] and p. 152, 35-36), who has seldom, if ever, existed (see note *b* on page 712 *supra*).

[d] For ἐννοίας alone = κοινὰς ἐννοίας see note *c* on 1059 B *supra.* Xylander and Naber " emended " κατά to παρά, failing to see that Plutarch ironically refers to the Stoics in the terms that they used of their own philosophy (see 1060 B [chap. 4], note *a*), as in 1062 E *supra* he speaks of their confirming τὴν ὁμολογίαν in their doctrines.

(1067) σιν ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄνευ τῆς ἀφροσύνης οὔθ' ἑαυτὴν ⟨οὔτε τὴν⟩[1] ἀφροσύνην καταλαμβάνειν πέφυκεν.

19. Εἰ δὲ δὴ πάντως ἐδεῖτο κακοῦ γενέσεως ἡ φύσις, ἓν ἦν δήπου παράδειγμα κακίας ἱκανὸν ἢ δεύτερον· εἰ δὲ βούλει, δέκα φαύλους ἢ χιλίους ἢ μυρίους ἔδει γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ κακίας μὲν φορὰν τοσαύτην τὸ πλῆθος—

οὐ[2] ψάμμος ἢ κόνις ἢ πτερὰ ποικιλοτρίχων[3] οἰωνῶν τόσσον ἂν χεύαιτ' ἀριθμόν—

E ἀρετῆς δὲ μηδ' ἐνύπνιον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Σπάρτῃ τῶν φιδιτίων[4] ἐπιμελούμενοι δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἐπίτηδες[5] εἴλωτας ἐμπεφορημένους ἀκράτου καὶ μεθύοντας ⟨εἰσάγοντες⟩[6] εἰς κοινὸν ἐπιδείκνυνται τοῖς νέοις ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ μεθύειν, ὅπως φυλάττωνται καὶ σωφρονῶσιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ[7] τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα τῆς κακίας γέγονε παραδείγματα· νήφων γὰρ οὐδὲ εἷς ἐστι πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ ῥεμβόμεθα πάντες ἀσχημονοῦντες καὶ κακοδαιμονοῦντες· οὕτως ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς

[1] οὔθ' ἑαυτὴν ⟨οὔτε τὴν⟩ -Meziriac ; οὔτε αὐτὴν -E, B.

[2] οὐ -Turnebus, Vulcobius ; οὖ -E, B, Aldine, Basil. (*pace* Wyttenbach et al.) ; omitted by MSS. in *De Amore Prolis* 497 A.

[3] E, B ; ποικιλοθρόων -MSS. in *De Amore Prolis* 497 A ; ποικιλότριχ' -Page.

[4] B corr. (δ superscript) ; φιλιτίων -E, B.

[5] ἐπίτηδες -E ; omitted by B.

[6] ⟨εἰσάγοντες⟩ -added by Wyttenbach (*cf.* εἰσῆγον [*Demetrius* 889 A] and παρεισῆγον [*Lycurgus* 57 A]).

[7] βίῳ ⟨μάτην⟩ -Pohlenz ; βίῳ ⟨πρὸς τί⟩ . . . παραδείγματα; νήφων . . . ἐστι. πρὸς ἀρετήν; ἀλλὰ . . . -Cobet, Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, 3 Ser. x [1942], p. 43).

[a] Fragmenta Adespota 15 (Diehl, *Anth. Lyr. Graec.* ii, p. 162) = 79 (Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca* iii, pp. 452-454) = 1007 (Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci*, p. 532), quoted by Plutarch also in *De Amore Prolis* 497 A.

folly we apprehend prudence, prudence without folly naturally apprehends neither itself ⟨nor⟩ folly.

19. Even supposing, however, that generation of evil was required by nature, one example of vice was surely enough, or two ; or, if you will, there had to be brought forth ten base men or a thousand or ten thousand and not such a multitudinous crop of vice

Not sand or dust or the plumage of birds with their down parti-coloured
Could be heaped in such profusion [a]

with not even a phantom of virtue. The curators of the common messes in Sparta, for example, by purposely ⟨bringing in⟩ two or three helots gorged with neat wine and drunk give the young men a public demonstration of the nature of drunkenness, in order that they may beware and keep sober [b] ; but most of the things here in our life have turned out to be examples of vice, for in respect of virtue not a single man is sober but all of us are staggering about in an indecent and unhappy condition.[c] Thus the rea-

[b] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Lycurgus* xxviii, 8 (57 A) ; *Demetrius* i, 5 (889 A) ; *De Cohibenda Ira* 455 E ; *Instituta Laconica* 239 A ; Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus* III, viii, 41, 5 ; Athenaeus, xiv, 657 c ; Diogenes Laertius, i, 103 ; Plato, *Laws* 816 E.

[c] *Cf.* Philo Jud., *De Ebrietate* 95 and 154 (ii, p. 188, 10-13 and p. 199, 21-24 [Wendland]) ; *Corpus Hermeticum* i, 27 and vii, 1 (i, p. 16, 21-23 and p. 81, 3-4 [Nock-Festugière]) ; Porphyry, *De Abstinentia* iv, 20 (p. 266, 11-13 [Nauck]). The figure goes back to Plato (*Phaedo* 79 c 6-8 ; *cf.* Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* I, xii, 7-8) and possibly to Heraclitus (frag. B 117 [D.-K.] ; *cf.* H. Fränkel, *A.J.P.*, lix [1938], p. 318, n. 18 = *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* [München, 1955], p. 262, n. 1).

(1067) μεθύσκει καὶ τοσαύτης καταπίμπλησι ταραχῆς καὶ παραφροσύνης, οὐδὲν ἀπολείποντας τῶν κυνῶν, ἃς φησιν Αἴσωπος δερμάτων τινῶν ἐμπλεόντων ἐφιε-
F μένας ὁρμῆσαι μὲν ἐκπίνειν τὴν θάλατταν ῥαγῆναι δὲ πρότερον ἢ τῶν δερμάτων λαβέσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος ἐλπίζοντας εὐδαιμονήσειν[1] δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ προσοίσεσθαι πρὶν ἐπ' ἐκείνην ἀφικέσθαι διέφθαρκε καὶ ἀπολώλεκε,[2] πολλῆς ἀκράτου καὶ πικρᾶς κακίας προσεμφορηθέντας,[3] εἴ γε δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἐπ' ἄκρον προκόπτουσιν, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν, οὔτε κουφισμὸς οὔτ' ἄνεσις ἔστιν οὔτ' ἀναπνοὴ τῆς
1068 ἀβελτερίας[4] καὶ κακοδαιμονίας.

20. Ὁ τοίνυν λέγων οὐκ ἀχρήστως γεγονέναι τὴν κακίαν ὅρα πάλιν οἷον αὐτὴν ἀποδείκνυσι χρῆμα καὶ κτῆμα τοῖς ἔχουσι, γράφων ἐν τοῖς περὶ Κατορθωμάτων ὡς ὁ φαῦλος οὐδενὸς δεῖται, οὐδενὸς ἔχει χρείαν· οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῷ χρήσιμον, οὐδὲν οἰκεῖον, οὐδὲν ἁρμόττον. πῶς οὖν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία, μεθ' ἧς οὐδὲ ὑγίεια χρήσιμον οὐδὲ πλῆθος χρημάτων οὐδὲ προκοπή; οὐ δεῖται δέ τις ὢν τὰ μὲν προηγμένα καὶ ληπτὰ καὶ νὴ Δί' εὔχρηστα τὰ

[1] εὐδαιμονήσειν -Xylander ; εὐδοκιμήσειν -E, B.
[2] ἀπολώλεκε -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 17) ; ἀπόλωλε -E, B.
[3] προσεμφορηθέντας -E (*cf.* 168 A, 547 C, 1104 B) ; προεμφορηθέντας -B. [4] ἀβελτερίας -Dübner ; ἀβελτηρίας -E, B.

[a] As the last clause of the paragraph shows and as Wyttenbach seems to have understood ("*ita ratio Stoica* . . ."), ὁ λόγος here is "reason" according to the "doctrine" of the Stoics.

[b] Aesop, *Fabula* 138 (Hausrath)=135 (Perry) ; *cf.* G. Williams, *Class. Rev.*, N.S. ix (1959), p. 99.

[c] See 1062 E—1063 A *supra* and *Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus* 75 B-C ; for τοῖς ἐπ' ἄκρον προκόπτουσιν see τὸν ἐπ' ἄκρον προκόπτοντα in 1061 F *supra*.

son[a] intoxicates us and fills us full of confusion and delirium no less than were the bitches which, Aesop says,[b] started to drink up the sea in their craving for some hides afloat upon it and burst before they had laid hold on the hides. For we too, expecting by means of reason to attain virtue and be happy, before we arrive at virtue are ruined and undone by reason, overloaded as we have been with much neat and bitter vice, if in fact, as these Stoics say,[c] even those at the summit of progress have no alleviation or abatement or respite in their stupidity and unhappiness.

20. Well then again, the man who asserts that the genesis of vice has not been useless,[d] look what a useful possession[e] he shows vice to be for those who have it. He writes in his work concerning Right Actions[f] that the base man has need of nothing, has use for nothing, that to him nothing is serviceable, nothing congenial, nothing appropriate. So how is it then that vice is useful, vice in conjunction with which not even health is serviceable or opulence or progress ? And does one not have need of the things which are, as the Stoics themselves call them, some "promoted" and "acceptable" and, yes by heaven, "useful" and others "in conformity with

[d] See 1065 A-B *supra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1050 F.

[e] For this meaning of χρῆμα καὶ κτῆμα *cf.* [Isocrates], *Ad Demonicum* 28 ; Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* i, 16 ; O. Hense, *Teletis Reliquiae*[2], p. 37, 6-9 (with Plato, *Euthydemus* 280 C-E and Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1120 a 8-9) ; Plutarch, *Cimon* x, 5 (484 E-F) and *De Cupiditate Divitiarum* 525 B. In legalizing bequests of property Solon τὰ χρήματα κτήματα τῶν ἐχόντων ἐποίησεν (*Solon* xxi, 3 [90 A]).

[f] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 674 (pp. 168, 37–169, 4). See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 A-B with the notes there and also 1061 F *supra*.

(1068) δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσιν; εἶτα τούτων οὐδεὶς ἔχει χρείαν, ἂν μὴ γένηται σοφός. οὐδὲ τοῦ
B σοφὸς οὖν γενέσθαι χρείαν ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος. οὐδὲ διψῶσιν οὐδὲ πεινῶσιν ἄνθρωποι πρὶν σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· διψῶντες γοῦν[1] ὕδατος οὐκ ἔχουσι χρείαν οὐδ' ἄρτου πεινῶντες.

ἐστὲ[2] ξένοισι μειλίχοις ἐοικότες
στέγης τε[3] μοῦνον καὶ πυρὸς κεχρημένοις.

οὗτος οὐκ εἶχε χρείαν ὑποδοχῆς; οὐδὲ χλαίνης ἐκεῖνος ὁ λέγων

δὸς χλαῖναν Ἱππώνακτι· κάρτα γὰρ[4] ῥιγῶ;

ἀλλὰ βούλει παράδοξον εἰπεῖν τι καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ἴδιον; λέγε τὸν σοφὸν μηδενὸς ἔχειν χρείαν μηδὲ δεῖσθαί τινος· ἐκεῖνος ὅλβιος, ἐκεῖνος ἀπροσδεής, ἐκεῖνος αὐτάρκης μακάριος τέλειος. νυνὶ δὲ τίς ὁ
C ἴλιγγος οὗτος τὸν μὲν ἀνενδεᾶ[5] δεῖσθαι ὧν ἔχει ἀγαθῶν τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἐνδεᾶ[6] μὲν εἶναι πολλῶν δεῖσθαι δὲ μηδενός; τουτὶ γὰρ λέγει Χρύσιππος, ὡς οὐ δέονται μὲν ἐνδέονται δὲ οἱ φαῦλοι, πεττῶν δίκην δεῦρο κἀκεῖ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας μετατιθείς. πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὸ δεῖσθαι πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ

[1] γοῦν -Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 24, n. 3); οὖν -E, B.
[2] ἐστὲ -Turnebus (*pace* Pohlenz [ἔστε -Dübner]); ἔσται -E, B, mss. of Hephaestion (ε superscript over ι -I), *Encheiridion* v, 2 (p. 16, 13 [Consbruch]).
[3] τε -E; omitted by B. [4] γὰρ -E; omitted by B.
[5] ἀνενδεᾶ -Bernardakis; ἀνενδεῆ -E, B.
[6] ἐνδεᾶ -Bernardakis; ἐνδεῆ -E, B.

[a] Health, wealth, and progress, which have just been mentioned, all fall into these classes (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 135, 136, and 142). See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 A, note *d* for

nature"?[a] And then, no one has use for these things unless he has become a sage. Consequently the base man has no use for becoming a sage. And before having become sages men are not thirsty or hungry; at any rate, if thirsty, they have no use for water or, if hungry, for bread.

Like mild and modest guests you are whose wants
Are shelter only and the warmth of fire.[b]

Did this man have no use for hospitality? Or for a cloak either that man who says

Oh please, a cloak, for Hipponax is freezing cold?[c]

But you wish to say something paradoxical and extraordinary and original? Say that the sage has use for nothing and has no need of anything: it is he who is blessed, he who is free from all other wants, he who is self-sufficient, blissful, perfect.[d] But now what is this state of vertigo in which he who is in want of nothing is in need of the goods which he has but the base man, while in want of many things, is in need of nothing? For this is what Chrysippus says,[e] that the base are not in need but are in want, thus shifting the common conceptions about like pieces in a game of draughts.[f] All men, in fact, believe that being in

εὔχρηστα; 1042 D, note *b* for κατὰ φύσιν; 1045 F, note *c* for ληπτά; and 1047 E, note *a* for προηγμένα.

[b] Anacreon, frag. 85 (Diehl, *Anth. Lyr. Graec.* i², 4, p. 186)=98 (Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca* ii, p. 188)=425 (Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci*, p. 209).

[c] See *Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere* 1058 D *supra*.

[d] See *supra* 1060 B and 1063 C-D and *Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere* 1058 B-C.

[e] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 674 (p. 169, 5-8) with Seneca, *Epistle* ix, 14-15.

[f] For the figure *cf.* [Plato], *Eryxias* 395 B and Shorey's note on *Republic* 487 c 2-3 (*L.C.L.* ii, p. 14, note *f*).

(1068) ἐνδεῖσθαι[1] νομίζουσιν, ἡγούμενοι τὸν οὐχ ἑτοίμων οὐδ' εὐπορίστων δεόμενον ἐνδεῖσθαι. κεράτων γοῦν καὶ πτερῶν οὐδεὶς ἐνδεὴς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὅτι μηδὲ δεῖται τούτων· ἀλλ' ὅπλων ἐνδεεῖς λέγομεν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ ἱματίων, ὅταν ἐν χρείᾳ γενόμενοι μὴ τυγχάνωσι μηδ' ἔχωσιν. οἱ δὲ οὕτως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν
D ἀεί τι παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας φαίνεσθαι λέγοντες ὥστε πολλάκις ἐξίστασθαι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιθυμίᾳ καινολογίας,[2] ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα.

21. Σκόπει δὲ μικρὸν ἀνωτέρω ἀναγαγὼν[3] ἑαυτόν. ἕν τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας λεγομένων ἐστὶ τὸ μηδένα φαῦλον ὠφελεῖσθαι. καίτοι παιδευόμενοί γε πολλοὶ προκόπτουσι καὶ δουλεύοντες ἐλευθεροῦνται καὶ πολιορκούμενοι σῴζονται καὶ πηρούμενοι[4] χειραγωγοῦνται καὶ θεραπεύονται νοσοῦντες. " ἀλλ' οὐκ ὠφελοῦνται τούτων τυγχάνοντες οὐδ' εὖ πάσχουσιν οὐδ' εὐεργέτας ἔχουσιν οὐδ' εὐεργετῶν ἀμελοῦσιν." οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἀχαριστοῦσιν οἱ φαῦ-
E λοι· καὶ μὴν οὐδ' οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. ἀνύπαρκτον οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἀχάριστον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀποστεροῦσι

[1] ἐνδεῖσθαι -Turnebus and Amyot's version; μὴ δεῖσθαι -E, B.
[2] καινολογίας -E (*pace* Pohlenz), Basil.; κενολογίας -B, Aldine.
[3] For the hiatus *cf.* ἄνω ἔχειν and κάτω ἄνωθεν in *De Facie* 924 C.
[4] Xylander (*cf.* Reiske *ad loc.*); πληρούμενοι -E, B.

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i, 87-88.
[b] *Cf.* the charge frequently repeated by Cicero in the *De Finibus*, *e.g.* iii, 5; iv, 7 and 56; v, 22.
[c] *Cf.* Plato, *Republic* 528 A 6 (ἄναγε . . . εἰς τοὐπίσω) with Shorey's note *ad loc.* (*L.C.L.* ii, p. 175, note *e*); and for ἀνωτέρω *cf.* Plutarch, *Adv. Colotem* 1110 C (ἀνωτέρω . . . γέγραφεν).

need is prior to being in want, holding that he who needs what is not at hand and not easily procurable is in want of it. At any rate, no man is in want of horns and wings, because no man is in need of these either; but we speak of them as being in want of weapons and money and clothes whenever they have got a use for these things without having or obtaining them.[a] The Stoics, however, are always so eager to be openly saying something at odds with the common conceptions that they often abandon their own too in their desire for novel expression[b]; and so it is in this case.

21. Fall back to a point a little above[c] and consider. Among the assertions that are at odds with the common conceptions[d] one is that nobody who is base receives any benefit.[e] Yet there are many men who make progress by being educated and who are liberated from slavery and who are rescued from sieges and who in their blindness are led by the hand and who in illness get medical treatment. "Yes,[f] but by getting these things they do not get any benefit or have any good done to them and they don't have benefactors or disregard for benefactors." The base, then, are not ungrateful either; and neither are the men with intelligence. Consequently, ingratitude is non-existent, for the latter

[d] τὰς ἐννοίας = τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας (see page 663, note *c supra*).
[e] See 1068 A *supra* (οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῷ χρήσιμον κ.τ.λ.) and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 B (page 483), note *d*; and *cf.* especially *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 94 (p. 23, 18-20): . . . μηδένα δὲ φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε ὠφελεῖν· εἶναι γὰρ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι κινεῖσθαι κατ' ἀρετήν.
[f] ἀλλ' οὐκ ὠφελοῦνται . . . καὶ φαῦλοι τυγχάνουσιν = *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 672 (p. 168, 15-23).

(1068) χάριν λαμβάνοντες οἱ δὲ λαμβάνειν χάριν[1] οὐ πεφύκασιν. ὅρα δὴ τί πρὸς ταῦτα λέγουσιν· ὅτι ἡ χάρις εἰς τὰ μέσα διατείνει, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι σοφῶν ἐστι, χάριτος δὲ καὶ φαῦλοι[2] τυγχάνουσιν. εἶθ' οἷς χάριτος μέτεστι, τούτοις οὐ μέτεστι χρείας; ὅπου δὲ διατείνει χάρις, ἐκεῖ χρήσιμον οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐδ' οἰκεῖον; ἄλλο δὲ τί ποιεῖ τὴν ὑπουργίαν χάριν ἢ τὸ πρός τι χρήσιμον ὑπάρξαι τῷ δεομένῳ τὸν παρασχόντα;

22. ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄφες. ἡ δὲ πολυ-
F τίμητος ὠφέλεια τίς ἐστιν, ἣν ὡς μέγα τι τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐξαίρετον φυλάττοντες οὐδ' ὄνομα λείπουσιν αὐτῆς[3] τοῖς ⟨μὴ⟩[4] σοφοῖς;

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἂν εἷς σοφὸς ὁπουδήποτε[5] προτείνῃ τὸν δάκτυλον φρονίμως, οἱ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην
1069 σοφοὶ πάντες ὠφελοῦνται. τοῦτο τῆς φιλίας[6] ἔργον αὐτῶν, εἰς τοῦτο τοῖς κοινοῖς ὠφελήμασι τῶν σοφῶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τελευτῶσιν. ἐλήρει δ'[7] Ἀρι-

[1] E ; χάριν λαμβάνειν -B.
[2] E ; καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι -B.
[3] αὐτοῖς -E (with οἱ changed to ῆ), B.
[4] ⟨μὴ⟩ -added by Meziriac.
[5] E ; ὁποδήποτε -B.
[6] ὠφελείας -Xylander.
[7] δ' ⟨ἄρ'⟩ -H. van Herwerden (*Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinae* [1882], p. 123).

[a] *Cf.* Plato, *Gorgias* 520 c 5-6 (ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν).

[b] For this argument against the existence of ingratitude *cf.* Seneca, *De Beneficiis* v, 12, 3-4.

[c] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 A-B *supra*.

[d] This is implied by the definition of ὠφελεῖν and ὠφελεῖσθαι (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 94 [see note *e* on 1068 D *supra*] and frag. 117 [p. 28, 17-18]) ; *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 587 (τὰ παρακείμενα

do not withhold gratitude [a] when gratified and the former are naturally incapable of being gratified.[b] Now see what they say to this : that gratification extends to the intermediates [c] and that, while to confer and receive benefit is characteristic of sages,[d] even base men get gratification.[e] In that case, do those who partake of gratification have no use for it ? And does nothing serviceable or congenial come within the extension of gratification ? But what else makes the service rendered a gratification except the provider's having been in some respect serviceable to the one in need of it ?

22. COMRADE. Well, let these questions go. But what is the highly prized benefit that they reserve as something grand exclusively for the sages, leaving not even its empty name to those who are ⟨not⟩ wise ?

DIADUMENUS. If a single sage anywhere at all extends his finger prudently, all the sages throughout the inhabited world are benefited.[f] This is their amity's work [g] ; this is the end in which for their common benefits the virtues of the sages issue. It

τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς . . . ὠφελήματα ὄντα μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις συμβαίνειν) and frag. 673 for the same restriction of ὠφέλιμα.

[e] On this and what follows *cf.* Seneca, *Epistle* lxxxi, 8-14 and *De Beneficiis* v, 13, 2–14, 5.

[f] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 627 ; *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 626 (p. 160, 22-25) and frag. 93 (with Madvig's note on Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 69) and Seneca, *Epistle* cix, 1-16.

[g] According to the Stoics amity can exist only among sages and does exist among *all* of them : *cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 223 ; *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 630 (p. 161, 7-9 [*cf.* p. 160, 15-17]), 631, and 635 ; Epictetus, *Diss.* II, xxii ; Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik . . .*, pp. 106-109 ; Elorduy, *Sozialphilosophie*, pp. 160-174 ; A.-J. Voelke, *Les rapports avec autrui dans la philosophie grecque* (Paris, 1961), pp. 122-123 and pp. 176-177.

(1069) στοτέλης, ἐλήρει δὲ Ξενοκράτης, ὠφελεῖσθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ θεῶν ὠφελεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ γονέων ὠφελεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ καθηγητῶν ἀποφαινόμενοι τὴν δὲ θαυμαστὴν ἀγνοοῦντες ὠφέλειαν, ἣν οἱ σοφοὶ κινουμένων κατ' ἀρετὴν ⟨ὑπ'⟩[1] ἀλλήλων ὠφελοῦνται κἂν μὴ συνῶσι μηδὲ γιγνώσκοντες τυγχάνωσι. καὶ μὴν πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἐκλογὰς καὶ τὰς τηρήσεις καὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας, ὅταν χρησίμων ὦσι καὶ ὠφελίμων,[2] τότε χρησίμους καὶ ὠφελίμους ὑπολαμβάνουσι, καὶ κλεῖδας ὠνεῖται καὶ ἀποθήκας φυ-
B λάττει χρηματικὸς ἀνήρ

πλούτου[3] διοίγων θάλαμον ἥδιστον χερί·

τὸ δ' ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ πρὸς μηδὲν ὠφέλιμα καὶ τηρεῖν ἐπιμελῶς καὶ πολυπόνως οὐ σεμνὸν οὐδὲ καλὸν ἀλλὰ[4] καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν. ὁ γοῦν[5] Ὀδυσσεὺς εἰ[6] τὸν δεσμὸν ἐκεῖνον ἐκμαθὼν παρὰ τῆς Κίρκης κατεσημαίνετο δι' αὐτοῦ μὴ τὰ παρ' Ἀλκινόου[7] δῶρα, τρίποδας καὶ λέβητας καὶ εἵματα καὶ χρυσόν, ἀλλὰ συρφετόν τινα καὶ λίθους καὶ ⟨τὰ τοιαῦτα⟩[8] συναγαγὼν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα πραγματείαν καὶ κτῆσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τήρησιν εὐδαιμονικὸν ἔργον ἡγεῖτο καὶ

[1] ⟨ὑπ'⟩ -added by Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 18); κοινούμενοι τὴν ἀρετὴν ⟨ὑπ'⟩ -Reiske.

[2] χρησίμων . . . ὠφελίμων -Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], p. 116); χρήσιμοι . . . ὠφέλιμοι -E, B.

[3] E, B; ὄλβου -Stobaeus (*Anth.* iv, 97, 16=v, p. 802, 9 [Hense]).

[4] ἀλλὰ -Leonicus, Basil.; καὶ -E, B, Aldine; ⟨ἀλλὰ⟩ καὶ -Dübner; ⟨ἀλλ' ἀπειρόκαλον⟩ καὶ -Pohlenz.

[5] γοῦν -Pohlenz; οὖν -E, B; δ' οὖν -Helmbold (*Class. Phil.* l [1955], p. 221).

[6] εἰ -E; εἰς -B.

[7] παρ' Ἀλκινόου -Basil.; παρὰ ληκύθου -E; παρὰ λυκήθου -B, Aldine.

was silly of Aristotle and silly of Xenocrates[a] to declare that men are benefited by gods and benefited by parents and benefited by teachers and yet not to recognize the amazing benefit which sages receive ⟨from⟩ the virtuous motions of one another[b] even if they are not together and happen not even to be acquainted. Moreover, all men suppose that selecting and safeguarding and managing are serviceable and beneficial actions when their objects are serviceable and beneficial, and a moneyed man buys keys and guards his stores

Wealth's lovely closet opening with his hand[c];

but to select and safeguard with care and toil things that are of no benefit for anything is not grand or fair but ridiculous. At any rate, if Odysseus with that knot which he had learned from Circe had sealed up not the gifts given him by Alcinous, tripods and basins and garments and gold,[d] but litter and stones and, when he had got together ⟨things of this kind⟩, had regarded the trouble taken about them and their acquisition and safeguarding as a work of

[a] Xenocrates, frag. 94 (Heinze); but the reference is probably no more to any single statement of his than is the reference to Aristotle, for whose remarks on this matter see *e.g. Eth. Nic.* 1099 b 11-13, 1161 a 15-18, 1162 a 4-7, 1164 b 2-6, 1179 a 24-30.

[b] *Cf.* 1076 A *infra* (. . . ὠφελεῖσθαι . . . κινουμένου) and the definitions of ὠφελεῖν—ὠφελεῖσθαι (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 23, 19-20), quoted in note *e* on 1068 D *supra*.

[c] Euripides, *Bellerophon*, frag. 285, 8 (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 444).

[d] *Cf. Odyssey* viii, 438-448; and for the gifts themselves *cf.* also *Odyssey* xiii, 10-14, 120-124, 217-218, and 368-369.

[8] ⟨τὰ τοιαῦτα⟩ -H. C.; καὶ . . . vac. 8 . . . συναγαγὼν -E, B; ⟨σκύβαλα⟩ -Xylander; ⟨ἄχυρα⟩ -Pohlenz.

(1069) μακάριον, τίς ἂν ἐζήλωσε τὴν ἀνόητον ταύτην πρό-
C νοιαν καὶ κενόσπουδον ἐπιμέλειαν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο
τῆς Στωικῆς ὁμολογίας τὸ καλόν ἐστι καὶ σεμνὸν
καὶ μακάριον, ἕτερον δ' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἐκλογὴ καὶ
τήρησις ἀνωφελῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἀδιαφόρων[1]· τοι-
αῦτα γὰρ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔτι[2] μᾶλλον,
εἴ γε κρασπέδοις καὶ ἀμίσι χρυσαῖς καὶ νὴ Δία
ληκύθοις,[3] ὅταν τύχωσι, παραβάλλουσι τὸν μέγι-
στον πλοῦτον· εἶθ' ὥσπερ οἱ θεῶν τινων ἢ δαι-
D μόνων ἱερὰ δόξαντες ὑπερηφάνως καθυβρίσαι καὶ
λοιδορῆσαι μετανοήσαντες εὐθὺς ὑποπίπτουσι καὶ
κάθηνται ταπεινοὶ κατευλογοῦντες καὶ μεγαλύ-
νοντες τὸ θεῖον, οὕτως ἐκεῖνοι νεμέσει τινὶ τῆς
D μεγαλαυχίας ταύτης καὶ κενολογίας περιπεσόντες
αὖθις ἐν τούτοις ἐξετάζονται τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις καὶ
μηδὲν πρὸς αὐτούς, μέγα βοῶντες ὡς ἔν ἐστιν[4]

[1] ἀδιαφόρων -Leonicus, Basil.; διαφόρων -E, B, Aldine.
[2] ἔτι -Meziriac; ἐστι -E, B.
[3] E; λυκήθοις -B.
[4] ἕν ἐστιν -Meziriac (implied by Xylander's version); ἔνεστιν -E, B.

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[a] *i.e.* that the τέλος is τὸ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν (*S.V.F.* i, p. 45, 28-29: "quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam"); *cf.* page 673, note *c* and 1060 D-E *supra*.

[b] *i.e.* ἡ ἐκλογὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν (*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 14 and 15 [pp. 5, 40–6, 6], 64 [p. 16, 13-16], 191 [p. 46, 6-11; *cf.* Epictetus, *Diss.* II, x, 6]). This explication of the τέλος is supposed to have been introduced by Diogenes of Babylon (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 219, 11-18) and to have been adopted with modifications by his followers, Antipater of Tarsus and Archedemus (*S.V.F.* iii, pp. 252, 37–253, 7 and p. 264, 22-24); and chapters 23-27 of the present essay have been taken to represent the polemic of Carneades against Antipater's formulation (M. Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 22-26 and *Stoa* i, pp. 186-189 with ii, pp. 95-96; *cf.* 734

happiness and bliss, who would have coveted this stupid foresight and frivolous diligence? Nevertheless, in the Stoic doctrine of consistency [a] this is what is fair and grand and blissful: it is nothing but selection and safeguarding of things that are useless and indifferent,[b] for such is the character of the things that are in conformity with nature and still more of the externals,[c] if the greatest riches are in fact placed by the Stoics on a level with tassels and golden chamber-pots and, yes by heaven, as they sometimes are, with oil-flasks.[d] Then, as those who have meant arrogantly to insult and revile shrines of certain gods or spirits straightway repent and then cower and abase themselves, extolling and exalting the divinity, just so these Stoics have met with a kind of retribution for this arrogance and vainglory of theirs and again in the case of these things that are indifferent and of no concern to them [e] show their metal [f] by shouting mightily that a single thing is

Margaret Reesor, *T.A.P.A.*, lxxxii [1951], pp. 105-106 and with emphasis on the orthodoxy of Diogenes and his followers: W. Wiersma, *Mnemosyne*, 3 Ser. v [1937], pp. 219-228; M. van Straaten, *Panétius* [Amsterdam, 1946], pp. 152-153; Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, p. 130, n. 2 and pp. 136-140).

[c] For τὰ κατὰ φύσιν as ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀνωφελῆ see 1060 B-E *supra*; and for τὰ ἐκτός *cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 122 (p. 29, 25-29) and 764 (p. 190, 16-17) and Plutarch, *Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 23 E-F and 36 D.

[d] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 153 (pp. 36, 42–37, 3); see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 B *supra*. Wealth is a conventional example of ἀδιάφορα (*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 70 [p. 17, 20-21], 117 [p. 28, 5-16], and 119 [p. 28, 29-31]), and the Stoics denounced the Academy for holding that it is not useless (1065 A *supra*).

[e] *Cf.* 1060 D-E *supra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1041 E-F (=*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 139 [pp. 33, 36–34, 12]).

[f] For ἐξετάζονται *cf.* Plutarch, *Quomodo Adulator ab*

(1069) ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ σεμνόν, ἡ τούτων ἐκλογὴ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα οἰκονομία, καὶ τούτων μὴ τυγχάνοντας[1] οὐκ ἄξιόν ἐστι βιοῦν ἀλλ' ἀποσφάττειν ἑαυτοὺς ἢ ἀποκαρτερεῖν, πολλὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ χαίρειν φράσαντας.[2] τὸν τοίνυν Θέογνιν αὐτοὶ παντελῶς ἀγεννῆ καὶ μικρὸν ἡγοῦνται λέγοντα

χρὴ πενίην φεύγοντα καὶ ἐς μεγακήτεα[3] πόντον
ῥιπτεῖν καὶ πετρῶν, Κύρνε, κατ' ἠλιβάτων,

E οὕτως[4] ἀποδειλιῶντα πρὸς τὴν πενίαν ἀδιάφορον οὖσαν· ἀλλ' αὐτοί γε ταὐτὰ[5] πεζῷ λόγῳ παρακελεύονται καὶ λέγουσιν ὅτι χρὴ νόσον φεύγοντα μεγάλην καὶ ἀλγηδόνα σύντονον, ἐὰν μὴ παρῇ ξίφος ἢ κώνειον, εἰς θάλατταν ἀφεῖναι[6] καὶ κατὰ πετρῶν ῥιπτεῖν ἑαυτόν, ὧν οὐδέτερον βλαβερὸν οὐδὲ κακὸν οὐδ' ἀσύμφορόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ κακοδαίμονας ποιεῖ τοὺς περιπίπτοντας.

23. "Πόθεν οὖν" φησὶν "ἄρξωμαι;[7] καὶ τίνα λάβω τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ ὕλην τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀφεὶς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ[8] φύσιν;" πόθεν δ'

[1] E ; τυγχάνοντα -B.
[2] E ; φάσκοντας -B.
[3] E, B ; βαθυκήτεα -*De Stoic. Repug.* 1039 F.
[4] ὡς -Pohlenz (but *cf.* Castiglioni, *Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 83).
[5] Wyttenbach ; ταῦτα -E, B.
[6] ἀφιέναι -Bernardakis.
[7] Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 18) ; ἄρξομαι -E, B.
[8] κατὰ -Meziriac (implied by Amyot's version) ; παρὰ -E, B.

Amico Internoscatur 74 B ; Philo in Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* viii, 11, 7 (i, p. 455, 21 [Mras]) ; Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 223.

[a] See 1060 C-D and 1063 C-F *supra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 C-E.

[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 167 (p. 39, 29-33) and Theognis, 175-176 ; see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1039 F *supra*.

good and fair and grand, the selection of these things and their management, and that, if men don't obtain them, it's not worth being alive but they should bid a long farewell to virtue and cut their own throats or starve themselves to death.[a] So then, by these very people Theognis is held to be utterly mean and petty for saying [b]

From want you must flee, oh my friend, though headlong you plunge in the motion
Down cliffs sharp and sheer or below the yawning abyss of the ocean,

thus playing the coward in the face of poverty, a thing which is indifferent ; but they give the same prescription themselves in prose and say that, if sword or hemlock be not at hand, one must cast oneself into the sea or hurl oneself down from rocks in flight from severe disease and intense pain,[c] neither of which (according to them) is injurious or evil or inconvenient or makes unhappy those who meet with it.[d]

23. "What, then," says he,[e] "will be my point of departure and what shall I take as duty's principle and virtue's matter, once I have abandoned nature and what is in conformity with nature ?" Why, my

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 757 (p. 187, 33-35) and 768 (p. 191, 3-20).

[d] See 1060 C *supra* ; *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 117 (p. 28, 5-10), 166 (p. 39, 15-17), 168 (p. 39, 34-38), and 256 (pp. 60, 31-61, 3).

[e] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 491 (*cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1035 C *supra* and *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 282), supposedly from the polemic of Chrysippus against Ariston (Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik . . .*, p. 185 ; Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, p. 43, n. 3). For τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχήν *cf. S.V.F.* i, p. 47, 14-16 and iii, frags. 186 and 497 ; for ὑλὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς see 1071 B *infra*.

(1069) Ἀριστοτέλης, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ Θεόφραστος ἄρχονται; τίνας δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Πολέμων λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχάς; οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτοις ἠκολούθηF κεν[1] ὑποτιθεμένοις στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἐπὶ τούτων ἔμειναν ὡς αἱρετῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν προσλαβόντες ⟨ἐν⟩[2] αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοῦσαν οἰκείως χρωμένην ἑκάστῳ τέλειον ἐκ τού-

[1] E ; ἠκολούθησεν -B.

[2] ⟨ἐν⟩ -added by Pohlenz (*cf.* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, p. 130, 20-21 and p. 132, 8-11 [Wachsmuth]).

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[a] This with what follows through 1069 F is printed as frag. 78 of Xenocrates by R. Heinze (*Xenokrates*, p. 189), who took it to be serious evidence for a Xenocratean doctrine elaborated in detail by Polemon (*op. cit.*, p. 148). More recently K. von Fritz (*R.-E.* xxi/2 [1952], col. 2527, 51-63) has cited it with what follows in 1070 A as confirmation of the statement that Polemon δογματίζει χωρὶς μὲν ἀρετῆς μηδέποτε ἂν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπάρχειν δίχα δὲ καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι (Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* II, xxii, 133, 7). See the next note *infra*.

[b] *S.V.F.* i, frag. 183. *Cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Post.* i, 19 : ". . . partem illam bene vivendi a natura repetebant (*scil.* Peripatetici et vetus Academia [i, 18 *supra*]) . . . constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et vita." . . . 22 : ". . . utrisque hic bonorum finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura.". . . 23 : ". . . Ex hac descriptione . . . officii ipsius initium reperiebatur. . . ." The authority expressly cited for this account is Antiochus of Ascalon (i, 14, 35, and 43). Before him Carneades had maintained that the Stoic doctrine of good and evil was only verbally different from that of the Peripatetics (Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 41 and *Tusc. Disp.* v, 120) ; but it was Antiochus who made it a basic tenet of his that the ethics of the Old Academy was a single doctrine professed alike by Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and

good sir, what is the point of departure for Aristotle and for Theophrastus ; and what do Xenocrates and Polemon take as principles ? [a] And has not Zeno too followed them in their assumption that nature and what is in conformity with nature are basic elements of happiness ? [b] Those former men, however, held by these things as beneficial and good and objects of choice [c] ; and, having taken virtue in addition as operating ⟨among⟩ them by making proper use of each,[d] they thought that with these

Polemon and that Zeno, who had studied with Polemon (*S.V.F.* i, frags. 1, 10, 11, and 13 ; *cf.* Pohlenz, *Stoa* ii, p. 14 and C. O. Brink, *Phronesis*, i [1955/56], p. 143, n. 107), had taken over this doctrine in all its essentials and had disguised it in a novel terminology (Cicero, *De Finibus* v, 7 and 14, 16 with 21-22, and 74-75 ; *De Nat. Deorum* i, 16 ; *Acad. Prior.* ii, 131 ; *De Legibus* i, 38 and 53-55 ; *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vii, 25). Rejected as historically false by Pohlenz (*Stoa* i, pp. 250-253), this reconstruction in so far as it derives from Polemon the principle of φύσις and τὸ κατὰ φύσιν in Zeno's ethics was later defended as substantially correct by K. von Fritz (*R.-E.* xxi/2 [1952], cols. 2526, 22–2529, 57) and has since been given a somewhat more plausible interpretation by C. O. Brink (*Phronesis*, i [1955/56], pp. 143-144).

With Plutarch's phrase, στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, *cf.* Philo Jud., *Quod Det. Potiori Insid. Soleat* 8 (i, p. 260, 7-10 [Cohn]).

[c] *Cf.* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, 7, 13 and 14 (p. 118, 16-17 and p. 125, 10-19 [Wachsmuth]) ; Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 41 (". . . cum Peripatetici omnia quae ipsi bona appellant pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum . . .").

[d] *Cf.* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, 7, 13 ; 7, 14 ; and 7, 18 (p. 119, 11-19 ; pp. 126, 17–127, 2 ; pp. 127, 25–128, 9 ; p. 130, 18-21 ; and p. 132, 8-14 [Wachsmuth]) ; Cicero, *De Finibus* ii, 34 (". . . sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum . . . virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis ") with *Acad. Post.* i, 21-23 ; St. Augustine, *Civ. Dei* xix, 3 (". . . bona sunt tamen, et secundum istos [*scil.* Academicos

(1069) των και ὁλόκληρον ᾤοντο συμπληροῦν βίον καὶ συμπεραίνειν, τὴν ἀληθῶς τῇ φύσει πρόσφορον καὶ συνῳδὸν ὁμολογίαν ἀποδιδόντες. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ οἱ τῆς γῆς ἀφαλλόμενοι καὶ καταφερόμενοι[1] πάλιν ἐπ'
1070 αὐτὴν ἐταράττοντο, ταὐτὰ πράγματα ληπτὰ καὶ οὐχ αἱρετὰ καὶ οἰκεῖα καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀνωφελῆ μὲν εὔχρηστα δὲ καὶ οὐδὲν μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀρχὰς δὲ τῶν καθηκόντων ὀνομάζοντες· ἀλλὰ οἷος ὁ λόγος τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ βίος τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων, ἃ ἔπραττον οἷς ἔλεγον οἰκεῖα καὶ σύμφωνα παρεχόντων. ἡ δὲ τούτων αἵρεσις, ὥσπερ ἡ παρ' Ἀρχιλόχῳ γυνὴ

τῇ μὲν ὕδωρ ⟨ἐφόρει⟩[2]
δολοφρονέουσα χειρὶ θητέρῃ[3] δὲ πῦρ,

[1] B ; καταφορόμενοι -E.

[2] ⟨ἐφόρει⟩ -Amyot, Xylander, Stephanus (*Var. Lect.*), MSS. of *De Primo Frigido* 950 E and *Demetrius* i, 5 (905 E) ; omitted by E and B.

[3] Hiller (after Dübner in 950 F) ; τῇ -E, B (τῇ ἑτέρῃ δὲ -MSS. of *De Primo Frigido* 950 F ; τῇ δ' ἑτέρῃ -MSS. of *Demetrius* XXXV, 6 [905 E]) ; τητέρῃ -Bernardakis (after Schneidewin ; but *cf.* Chatzidakis, *Athena*, xiii [1901], p. 483).

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veteres] etiam ipsa propter se ipsa diligit virtus utiturque illis et fruitur sicut virtutem decet" [from Varro's account after Antiochus]). *Cf.* also the polemical "correction" which in order to emphasize τὸ χρηστικὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς would change the definition of Critolaus into τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐνεργούμενον (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, 7, 3b=p. 46, 16-17 [Wachsmuth] ; see the next note *infra*).

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iv, 58 (". . . naturalia . . ., quae coniuncta cum honestis vitam beatam perficiunt et absolvunt"); Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* II, xxi, 128, 5 (συμπληροῦσθαι τοίνυν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τῆς τριγενείας τῶν ἀγαθῶν) and Diogenes Laertius, v, 30 (τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν συμπλήρωμα ἐκ τριῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι [*cf.* συμπλήρωσις ἀγαθῶν in Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima cum Mantissa* ed. I. Bruns, pp. 162,

constituents they were filling out and finishing off a perfect and integrated life [a] by presenting the consistency that is truly in conformity and harmony with nature.[b] For they were not in the state of confusion of those who are leaping from the ground and tumbling down on it again, calling the same things acceptable and not objects of choice and congenial and not good and unbeneficial but yet useful and of no concern to us but yet principles of our duties [c] ; but as was the doctrine such was the way of life of those former men, who in their conduct exhibited actions congenial and consistent with the statements that they made.[d] The system of these Stoics, however, like the woman of whom Archilochus says [e]

In one of her hands there was water,
A crafty lure, for fire the other ⟨bore⟩,

26-27 and 167, 26]). This form of expression may reflect the definition of the τέλος ascribed to Critolaus the Peripatetic, τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν συμπεπληρωμένον (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, 7, 3b=p. 46, 10-13 [Wachsmuth]) ; *cf.* Clement, *Stromata* II, xxi, 129, 10 (. . . τὴν ἐκ τῶν τριῶν γενῶν συμπληρουμένην . . .) and for polemical "correction" of the definition Stobaeus, *Ecl.*, p. 46, 13-17 and p. 126, 12-18 (Wachsmuth) with Pohlenz, *Grundfragen*, p. 41 and F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, x, pp. 67-68 on Critolaus, frags. 19 and 20.

[b] In contrast to τῆς Στωικῆς ὁμολογίας (1069 C *supra*). With τῇ φύσει . . . συνῳδόν *cf.* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, 7, 13 (p. 119, 12-13 [Wachsmuth]).

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 123 (p. 30, 1-4) ; *cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iv, 20 ; iv, 62-63 ; iv, 72 ; v, 90 and see 1060 E and 1068 A *supra*.

[d] *Cf.* the remark of Polemon (Diogenes Laertius, iv, 18) and the commentary on it by Margherita Isnardi, *Parola del Passato*, xi (1956), pp. 429-432.

[e] Archilochus, frag. 93 (Bergk ; Edmonds)=86 (Diehl)=184 (West), quoted by Plutarch in *Demetrius* XXXV, 6 (905 E) and *De Primo Frigido* 950 E-F.

(1070) τοῖς μὲν προσάγεται τὴν φύσιν τοῖς δ' ἀπωθεῖται δόγμασι· μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἔργοις καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς αἱρετῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἔχονται τῶν κατὰ φύσιν, τοῖς δ' ὀνόμασι καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασιν ⟨ὡς⟩[1] ἀδιά-
B φορα καὶ ἄχρηστα καὶ ἀρρεπῆ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀναίνονται καὶ προπηλακίζουσιν.

24. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καθόλου τἀγαθὸν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι χαρτὸν νοοῦσιν εὐκταῖον εὐτυχὲς ἀξίαν ἔχον τὴν μεγίστην αὔταρκες ἀπροσδεές, ὅρα τὸ τούτων παρατιθεὶς ἀγαθόν. ἆρά γε χαρτὸν ποιεῖ[2] τὸ φρονίμως τὸν δάκτυλον προτεῖναι; τί δ'; εὐκταῖόν ἐστι φρονίμη στρέβλωσις; εὐτυχεῖ δὲ ὁ κατακρημνίζων ἑαυτὸν εὐλόγως; ἀξίαν δ' ἔχει τὴν μεγίστην ὃ πολλάκις αἱρεῖ λόγος ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ προέσθαι; τέλειον δὲ καὶ αὔταρκές ἐστιν οὗ [μὴ][3] παρόντος,
C ἂν μὴ τυγχάνωσι τῶν ἀδιαφόρων, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν οὐδὲ βούλονται ζῆν; γέγονε δὲ ἕτερος λόγος ὑφ' οὗ μᾶλλον ἡ συνήθεια παρανενόμηται, τὰς μὲν γνησίας ὑφαιροῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀποσπῶντος ἐννοίας ὥσπερ τέκνα νόθας δὲ ὑποβάλλοντος[4] ἑτέρας[5] θηριώδεις καὶ ἀλλοκότους καὶ ταύτας ἀντ' ἐκείνων ἐκτιθηνεῖσθαι καὶ στέργειν ἀναγκάζοντος—καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν τοῖς

[1] ⟨ὡς⟩ -added by Meziriac.
[2] οἴει -Reiske; " praestaret νοεῖς " -Pohlenz.
[3] [μὴ] -omitted in versions of Amyot and Xylander, deleted by Reiske.
[4] Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], p. 105); προσβάλλοντος -E, B.
[5] ἑτέρας -B (αι superscript over ε); ἑταίρας -E.

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iv, 43 (". . . naturam videntur sequi . . . rursus naturam relinquunt") and 47-48.
[b] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* v, 89 (" Bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est, quod contra malum; nec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis. . . .") and iv, 22 (" Quae est igitur ista philosophia quae communi more in foro loquitur, in libellis suo? ").
[c] See 1068 F *supra.*
[d] See 1063 E and 1069 D *supra*, and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 D.
[e] *Cf.* 1084 B *infra* (ὑπερβολή . . . παρανομίας εἰς . . . τὴν συνήθειαν).
[f] *Cf.* 1084 A *infra* (τὰς κοινὰς καὶ συνήθεις ἐξοικίζοντες ἐννοίας . . . ἑτέρας ἐπεισάγουσιν ἀλλοκότους καὶ ξένας).

calls in nature for some doctrines and for others thrusts it out,[a] or rather the Stoics in their works and acts cling to the things that are in conformity with nature as good things and objects of choice, but in word and speech they reject and spurn them ⟨as⟩ indifferent and useless and insignificant for happiness.[b]

24. Now, since the good as universally conceived by all men is gratifying, desirable, fortunate, of the highest value, sufficient in itself, and wanting nothing else, look at the good of these Stoics in comparison. Do you consider the prudent extension of a finger[c] gratifying? What? Is prudent torture desirable? Is he being fortunate who with good reason plunges over a precipice? Is that of the highest value which reason often requires them to give up for the sake of what is not good? And is that perfect and sufficient in itself which they can have and still not endure or desire to live unless they get the things that are indifferent?[d] Has there ever been another doctrine which did greater outrage to common experience,[e] itself snatching away and abducting the genuine conceptions like babes from her breast while substituting other spurious ones, brutish and uncouth, and constraining her to nurse and to cherish these in place of those[f]—and this

(1070) περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν αἱρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν οἰκείων τε καὶ ἀλλοτρίων, ἃ μᾶλλον ἔδει θερμῶν [τε][1] καὶ ψυχρῶν λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων σαφεστέραν ἔχειν τὴν ἐνάργειαν[2]· ἐκείνων μὲν γὰρ ἔξωθέν εἰσιν αἱ φαντασίαι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπεισόδιοι, ταῦτα δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν[3] τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν; οἱ δὲ ὥσπερ εἰς τὸν ψευδόμενον ἢ τὸν
D κυριεύοντα μετὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐμβάλλοντες εἰς τὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τόπον ἔλυσαν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐν αὐτῷ μυρίας δ' ἐποίησαν.

25. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι δυεῖν ἀγαθῶν, τοῦ μὲν τέλους τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, μεῖζόν ἐστι τὸ τέλος καὶ τελειότερον, ὑπ'[4] οὐδενὸς ἀγνοεῖται. γιγνώσκει δὲ

[1] [τε] -deleted by Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxiv [1930], p. 48, n. 3). [2] Stephanus; ἐνέργειαν -E, B.

[3] ἀρχῶν -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], pp. 105-106); ἀγαθῶν -E, B; "cogitari potest etiam ἀφορμῶν" -Pohlenz (but *cf.* A. Grilli, *Paideia*, vii [1952], p. 208 and *Il problema della vita contemplativa*, p. 116, n. 1).

[4] ὑπ' -Basil.; ὃ ἐπ' -E, B, Aldine.

[a] For οἰκείων τε καὶ ἀλλοτρίων see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 B.

[b] See note *c* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1047 C with the references there to 1074 B and 1083 C *infra*; and observe the combination, εἰς τὴν ἐνάργειαν καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν, in 1084 B *infra*.

[c] *Cf.* Hierokles, *Ethische Elementarlehre* ed. H. von Arnim, col. 6, 1-24; O. Luschnat, *Philologus*, cii (1958), pp. 191-192; and note *b* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1041 E (ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις). For the terminology, ἐπεισόδιοι . . . σύμφυτον, *cf.* Plutarch, *De Virtute Morali* 451 C (σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν) and *Quaest. Naturales* 914 B (the heat of the sea as σύμφυτος contrasted to that of other liquids as ἐπεισόδιος καὶ ἀλλοτρία).

[d] See 1059 D-E *supra*.

[e] This argument, mentioned by Plutarch in *De Tuenda Sanitate* 133 B-C and *Quaest. Conviv.* 615 A, was formulated by Diodorus Cronus to support his definition of "possible"

too in matters concerning good things and evil and objects of choice and avoidance and things congenial and repugnant,[a] the clarity[b] of which ought to be more manifest than that of things hot and cold and white and black, since the mental images of these are incidental to the sense-perceptions entering from without whereas the former are generated intrinsically[c] from the principles within us? The Stoics, however, charging with their dialectic upon the topic of happiness as they did upon "the liar"[d] or "the dominator"[e] resolved none of the ambiguities in it but created myriads of them.

25. Moreover, there is no one who does not recognize that, if one of two goods is the goal and the other subserves the goal, the goal is a greater and more perfect good.[f] Even Chrysippus recognizes the

(see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1055 E [page 589, note *c*]) and was attacked in different ways by Cleanthes and Chrysippus (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 283, 284, and 954). Diodorus contended that, since what has occurred is necessarily so and the impossible does not follow from the possible, what is not or will not be is not possible (*cf.* Döring, *Megariker*, frags. 130-139 and pp. 132-135). For recent attempts to reconstruct and analyse the course of his argument see A. N. Prior, *Time and Modality* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 86-88; O. Becker, *Erkenntnis und Verantwortung: Festschrift für Theodor Litt* (Düsseldorf, 1960), pp. 250-263; P.-M. Schuhl, *Le Dominateur et les Possibles* (Paris, 1960) with the review of Schuhl's book by K. von Fritz, *Gnomon*, xxxiv (1962), pp. 138-152; J. Hintikka, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, i (1964), pp. 101-114; G. Stahl, *Rev. Philosophique*, cliii (1963), pp. 239-243; R. Blanché, *Rev. Philosophique*, clv (1965), pp. 133-149; Dorothea Frede, *Aristoteles und die "Seeschlacht"* (Göttingen, 1970), pp. 93-125; and R. L. Purtill, *Apeiron*, vii, 1 (May 1973), pp. 31-36.

[f] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Topics* 116 b 22-26 and *Eth. Nic.* 1111 b 26-29 and 1145 a 4-6 (with 1094 a 18-22 and 1097 a 25–b 6); Plato, *Gorgias* 499 E and *Lysis* 219 C—220 B.

(1070) καὶ Χρύσιππος τὴν διαφοράν, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ[1] Ἀγαθῶν· τοῖς γὰρ τέλος ἡγουμένοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνομολογεῖ καὶ τίθησιν ⟨αὐτὴν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ μὴ τέλος εἶναι τίθησιν.⟩[2] ἐν δὲ[3] τοῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης, εἰ μέν τις ὑπόθοιτο τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος, οὐκ οἴεται σῴζεσθαι ⟨ἂν⟩[4] τὸ δίκαιον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τέλος ἀλλὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, οἴεται. τὰς δὲ λέξεις οὐκ οἴομαί σε δεῖσθαι[5] νῦν ἀκούειν ἐμοῦ καταλέγοντος· τὸ γὰρ
E τρίτον περὶ Δικαιοσύνης βιβλίον ἔστι πανταχόθεν λαβεῖν. ὅταν οὖν αὖθις, ὦ φίλε, μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν λέγωσι μηδενὸς ἀγαθοῦ μεῖζον εἶναι μηδ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' ἴσον τῷ τέλει τὸ μὴ τέλος, οὐ ταῖς κοιναῖς μόνον ἐννοίαις ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς αὑτῶν λόγοις φαίνονται μαχόμενοι. καὶ πάλιν εἰ δυεῖν κακοῖν ὄντων[6] ὑφ' οὗ μὲν γιγνόμεθα χείρονες ὅταν παραγένηται τὸ δὲ βλάπτει μὲν οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ χείρονας, παρὰ[7] τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι μὴ λέγειν ἐκεῖνο μεῖζον εἶναι κακὸν ὑφ' οὗ γιγνόμεθα χείρονες ὅταν παραγένηται τοῦ

[1] E; τῷ τρίτῳ τῷ περὶ -B.
[2] ⟨αὐτὴν . . . τίθησιν⟩ -H. C.; καὶ τίθησιν ἔν -E, B; καὶ τίθησιν ⟨lacuna⟩· -Wyttenbach.
[3] Meziriac; ἔν τε -E; ἔν γε -B.
[4] ⟨ἂν⟩ -added by Sandbach (*cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 D and 1040 C: σῴζοιμεν ἄν).
[5] δεῖσθαι -E; omitted by B.
[6] κακοῖν ὄντων -Pohlenz (κακοῖν -Amyot, Xylander); καὶ κοινῶς -E, B.
[7] παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι . . . οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ χείρονας -omitted by B.

[a] *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 25 (pp. 8, 38–9, 4).
[b] This refers to Herillus of Carthage, a pupil of Zeno's (*cf. S. V.F.* i, pp. 91-93 and H. von Arnim, *R.-E.* viii [1912], cols. 683, 20–684, 50), against whom Cleanthes wrote a monograph (*S. V.F.* i, p. 107, 3) and whose position was apparently demolished by Chrysippus (*S. V.F.* i, frag. 414). For ἀνομολογεῖ = " disagrees " *cf.* Pseudo-Galen (Porphyry), *Ad Gaurum* xiii, 7 (p. 53, 20-21 [Kalbfleisch]).
[c] See page 681, note *b supra* and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1036 A, where ἐπιστήμην . . . καθ' ἣν ὁμολογουμένως βιωσόμεθα (*cf. S. V.F.* iii, p. 5, 6 and p. 6, 9) shows how Chrysippus regarded the relation of ἐπιστήμη to the τέλος.
[d] *S. V.F.* iii, frag. 23 (p. 8, 17-21); see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 D and 1040 C.
[e] For the doctrine that all goods are equally good and all evils equally evil see *supra* 1060 E-F and 1064 F, *De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 C, and *S. V.F.* iii, frags. 92 and 93.

difference, as is clear in the third book concerning Goods,[a] for he disagrees with those who hold knowledge to be the goal[b] and maintains ⟨that it is a good subserving the goal and for this very reason maintains that it is not the goal.⟩[c] Also in the books concerning Justice[d] he thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good. I don't think you need to hear me now recite the passage word for word, for the third book concerning Justice can be had everywhere. So, my friend, whenever the Stoics assert on the other hand that no good is more or less good than any other[e] but that which is not the goal is equal to the goal, they are obviously in conflict not only with the common conceptions but with their own doctrines as well. Again, if there are two evils, from one of which when it befalls us we become worse men while the other injures but does not make us worse, it is at odds with the common conception to deny that the one from which when it befalls us we become worse men is a greater evil than the one

(1070) ὃ[1] βλάπτει μὲν οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ χείρονας μηδὲ κακίονα βλάβην τὴν κακίονας ἡμᾶς ἀποτελοῦσαν. ἀλλὰ ὁμολογεῖ γε Χρύσιππος εἶναί τινας φόβους καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀπάτας αἳ βλάπτουσι μὲν ἡμᾶς χείρονας δ' οὐ ποιοῦσιν. ἔντυχε δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν πρὸς
F Πλάτωνα γεγραμμένων περὶ Δικαιοσύνης· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλων ἕνεκα τὴν ἐκεῖ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εὐρησιλογίαν ἄξιον ἱστορῆσαι, πάντων ἁπλῶς πραγμάτων καὶ δογμάτων οἰκείων ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀλλοτρίων ἀφειδοῦσαν.[2]

26. Παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι δύο τέλη καὶ σκοποὺς προκεῖσθαι τοῦ βίου καὶ μὴ πάντων ὅσα πράττομεν
1071 ἐφ' ἕν τι γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφοράν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τέλος ἐπ' ἄλλο[3] δὲ τῶν πραττομένων ἕκαστον ἀναφέρεσθαι. τούτων δ' αὐτοὺς ὑπομένειν ἀνάγκη θάτερον. εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν ⟨τὰ⟩[4] πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ⟨ἀγ⟩αθὰ[5]

[1] τοῦ ὃ -Wyttenbach ; τὸ δὲ -E (missing from B).
[2] Meziriac (implied by Amyot's version) ; ἀπιδοῦσαν -E, B.
[3] ἄλλω -B (with *o* superscript over *ω*).
[4] ⟨τὰ⟩ -added by Wyttenbach.
[5] Wyttenbach ; φύσιν . . . vac. 3 . . . αθὰ -E, B.

[a] μηδέ is here used with consecutive force as the negative of the consecutive καί (*cf.* W. J. Verdenius, *Mnemosyne*, 4 Ser. ix [1956], p. 249, lines 5-9 and p. 250, lines 1-11).
[b] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 455.
[c] See note *b* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1040 A.
[d] σκοπός is here a synonym of τέλος (*cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 3 and 10) and was so used by Chrysippus (*De Stoic. Repug.* 1040 E-F *supra* [*S.V.F.* iii, p. 8, 30-34]) and even by Antipater (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 255, 22), despite the distinction between the two ascribed to Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and all their followers (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 16 : . . . τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν σκοπὸν

which injures but does not make us worse and so [a] to deny that the injury which renders us more evil is more evil. Yet Chrysippus does admit [b] that there are certain fears and griefs and deceptions which injure us but do not make us worse. Read the first of his books concerning Justice written against Plato,[c] for it is worth while for other reasons also to observe the man's verbal ingenuity there sparing absolutely no fact or doctrine at all, either his own or another's.

26. It is at odds with the common conception that life have two goals or aims [d] set up for it and that the point of reference for all our actions be not some single thing, but it is still further at odds with the common conception that one thing be the goal and each particular action be referred to another. Yet in one of these alternatives they (the Stoics) must acquiesce.[e] For, if [f] it is not ⟨the⟩ primary things conforming with nature that are themselves good [g]

ἐκκεῖσθαι τέλος δ' εἶναι τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ὅπερ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν). The Stoics had expressly repudiated the charge that their doctrine implied two different τέλη (*cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 22 [*S.V.F.* iii, p. 6, 34-35]). On this and what follows in chaps. 26-27 *cf.* M. Soreth, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, I (1968), pp. 48-72 and especially pp. 58 ff.
[e] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iv, 39-41.
[f] εἰ γὰρ . . . ἐνδεικνυμένους τὴν διαφοράν (1071 B *infra*) = *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 195 (p. 46, 28-38).
[g] For τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν *cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 140, 141, and 181 ; Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 20-23 (*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 188, 497, and 186) ; Schäfer, *Ein frühmittelstoisches System*, pp. 294-311, who holds that the term was coined in the debates between Carneades and his Stoic opponents ; Pohlenz, *Grundfragen*, pp. 13-14 and 17-21, who ascribes it to Zeno himself.

(1071) μή ἐστιν ἡ δ' εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λῆψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρὰ ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο δεῖ[1] πάντα ἔχειν τὰ πραττόμενα τὴν ἀναφοράν, τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν. εἴπερ δ' ἄρ'[2] οἴονται μὴ στοχαζομένους μηδ' ἐφιεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκείνων τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, ⟨ἐπ'⟩[3] ἄλλο οὗ ἕνεκα δεῖ[4] ἀναφέρεσθαι τὴν τούτων ἐκλογὴν καὶ μὴ ταὐ-
B τό[5]· τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως, ἐκεῖνα δ' αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος[6] ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὕλη τις ὑπόκειται τὴν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ τοὔ-

[1] δεῖ -E ; δὲ -B.
[2] δ' ἄρ' -Wyttenbach (reading οἱ δ' ἄρ') ; γὰρ -E, B.
[3] ⟨ἐπ'⟩ -added by Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 18 : ἐπ' ἄλλο δεῖ . . .).
[4] οὗ ἕνεκα δεῖ -H. C. ; ἕνεκα οὗ δεῖ -E ; οὗ δεῖ ἕνεκα -B ; ἔχειν, ἄλλο ⟨εἶναι τὸ τέλος τούτου⟩ ἕνεκα οὗ δεῖ -Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, p. 338, n. 5 [on p. 339]).
[5] ταὐτό -H. C. ; ταῦτα -E, B.
[6] οὐ τέλος -Xylander ; εὐτελὲς -E, B.

[a] This appears to be a conflation of the definitions formulated by Diogenes and Antipater (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 219, 11-18 and p. 252, 37-38) ; see note *b* on 1069 c *supra* and 1072 c *infra* : οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Here and in what follows λῆψις and λαμβάνειν are used in the technical Stoic sense (see note *c* on 1060 E *supra* and note *c* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1045 F).

[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, pp. 252, 39–253, 2 (Antipater) and p. 5, 7, in the critique by Posidonius (frag. 187, 26-27 [Edelstein-Kidd]).

[c] With this conclusion, which is the position assumed by Carneades against the Stoics (*cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* v, 19-20 and ii, 42 ; *Tusc. Disp.* v, 84 ; *Acad. Prior.* ii, 131), all actions would be performed in view of something other than the τέλος, as Cato in fact asserts in *De Finibus* iii, 22 (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 135, 17-21).

but the rational selection and acceptance of them,[a] that is each man's doing all that in him lies for the purpose of obtaining the primary things conforming with nature,[b] it is to this that all actions performed must have their reference, to the obtaining of the primary things conforming with nature[c] ; and, if then they think that men achieve the goal not by desiring or aiming at the possession of those things,[d] the selection of these must be referred ⟨to⟩ another purpose and not to the same one,[e] for the prudent selection and acceptance of those things is the goal, whereas the things themselves and the obtaining of them are not the goal but are given as a kind of matter[f] having "selective value"[g]—for this, I

[d] The emphasis is on τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκείνων, as is shown by 1071 c *infra*, βιαζόμενοι μὴ τὸ τυγχάνειν . . . τοῦ στοχάζεσθαι . . . εἶναι τέλος. . . . *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* v, 20 (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 44).

[e] *i.e.* the Stoics must in fact set up two distinct τέλη if obtaining τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν is not the purpose of selecting them, for then the selecting itself must have a purpose different from the τέλος of all particular actions, since the latter according to the Stoics themselves is τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι . . . φρονίμως but (*cf.* 1071 E and 1072 C *infra*) selection can be φρόνιμος καὶ εὐλόγιστος only if it is πρός τι τέλος. *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iv, 46 : "non enim in selectione virtus ponenda erat, ut id ipsum quod erat bonorum ultimum aliud aliquid acquireret."

[f] *Cf.* . . . ὕλην τῆς ἀρετῆς . . . τὸ κατὰ φύσιν (Chrysippus in 1069 E *supra*) ; Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 61 (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 189, 36-38) : "prima autem illa naturae . . . sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia sapientiae" ; *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 114 ; Epictetus, *Diss.* I, xxix, 2-3 and II, v, 1-8.

[g] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 28, 27-28 and p. 30, 9-11 (=p. 251, 35-38 [Antipater, frag. 52]), where the coinage is ascribed to Antipater (*cf.* R. Philippson, *Philol. Wochenschrift*, lvi [1936], cols. 598-599) ; Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 20 (*S.V.F.*

(1071) *νομα λέγειν καὶ γράφειν αὐτούς, ἐνδεικνυμένους τὴν διαφοράν.*

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. *Ἀνδρικῶς μὲν ἀπομεμνημόνευκας καὶ ὃ λέγουσι καὶ ὡς λέγουσι.*

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. *Σκόπει δὲ ὅτι ταὐτὸ πάσχουσι τοῖς τὴν σκιὰν ὑπεράλλεσθαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐφιεμένοις· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολείπουσιν ἀλλὰ συμμεταφέρουσι τὴν ἀτοπίαν τῷ λόγῳ, πορρωτάτω τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἀφισταμένην. ὡς γὰρ εἰ τοξεύοντα φαίη τις οὐχὶ πάντα*
C *ποιεῖν τὰ παρὰ αὐτὸν*[1] *ἕνεκα τοῦ βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλὰ ἕνεκα τοῦ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρὰ αὐτόν,*[2] *αἰνίγμασιν ὅμοια καὶ τεράστια δόξειεν ἂν περαίνειν· οὕτως οἱ τριπέμπελοι βιαζόμενοι μὴ τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ στοχάζεσθαι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τέλος ἀλλὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν καὶ*[3] *ἐκλέγεσθαι μηδὲ τὴν ἔφεσιν τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ δίωξιν εἰς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἐκάστῳ τελευτᾶν ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔφεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ δίωξιν ἀναφέρεσθαι,*

[1] *παρ' αὐτὸν* -Reiske (*cf.* 1071 A *supra*: *πάντα τὰ παρὰ ἑαυτὸν*); *περὶ αὐτὸν* -E, B.

[2] *παρ' αὐτὸν* -Reiske; *περὶ αὐτὸν* -E, B.

[3] *καὶ* -Pohlenz (*cf.* 1071 B *supra*: *τέλος . . . τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν*); *τὸ* -E, B.

iii, frag. 143). This paraphrase of Cicero's and *διδόντων τῶν πραγμάτων* (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 251, 36) seem to support the interpretation of the ambiguous *ἐκλεκτική* as "objective" (*e.g.* Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, p. 98 and pp. 100-101); but according to Pohlenz (*Stoa* i, p. 187 *sub finem*) Antipater coined the term in order to emphasize the "subjective" character of the value given to *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* by selection, and there is support for this interpretation in such a text as Seneca, *Epistle* xcii, 11-13 (". . . quid erit tunc in illis bonum? hoc unum, bene eligi. . . . non in re bonum est sed

think, is the very expression by which in their talk and their writing they indicate the distinction.

COMRADE. You have done nobly in recalling both what they say and their way of saying it.

DIADUMENUS. Observe, however, that the same thing happens to them as to those who long to outleap their own shadow: the absurdity which is furthest removed from the common conceptions is not outdistanced by their reasoning but is carried along with it. For, if someone should say that an archer in shooting does all that in him lies not for the purpose of hitting the mark but for the purpose of doing all that in him lies,[a] it would be thought that he was spinning some monstrous and enigmatic yarns; and just so the babbling dotards who insist that in aiming at the things conforming with nature the goal is not the obtaining of the things conforming with nature but the accepting and selecting and that being healthy is not the end in which issue for each individual his desire and pursuit of health but on the contrary being healthy has reference to the desire and pursuit of it, who consider walks of a certain

in electione quali. actiones nostrae honestae sunt, non ipsa quae aguntur. . . ."). For an attempt to reconcile the two interpretations *cf.* Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 136-140, especially p. 140, n. 3 *sub finem*.

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Finibus* iii, 22 (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 18) with M. Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), p. 24, n. 4. To Carneades, who had apparently used the example of the archer to prove that obtaining *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* must be the *τέλος*, Antipater replied that even the archer achieves his *τέλος* when he shoots skilfully at his target (*σκοπός*), whether or not his arrow happens then to hit it. *Cf.* O. Rieth, *Hermes*, lxix (1934), pp. 26-29 and pp. 32-37; W. Wiersma, *Περὶ τέλους* (Groningen, 1937), pp. 71-75; Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 145-146.

(1071) περιπάτους τινὰς καὶ ἀναφωνήσεις καὶ τομὰς νὴ Δία καὶ φαρμακείας εὐλογίστους τέλη ποιούμενοι τῆς ὑγιείας, οὐχὶ τούτων ἐκείνην, ὅμοια ληροῦσι τῷ λέγοντι

δειπνῶμεν ἵνα θύωμεν, ἵνα λουώμεθα.

D μᾶλλον δ' ἐκεῖνος[1] εἰωθός τι καὶ νενομισμένον ἀλλάττει καὶ ταράττει[2] τὴν τάξιν, ἃ ⟨δὲ⟩[3] οὗτοι λέγουσι τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχει τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνατροπὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν· " οὐ σπουδάζομεν εὐκαίρως περιπατεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ πέττειν τὴν τροφὴν ἀλλὰ ⟨πέττειν τὴν τροφὴν⟩[4] ἕνεκα τοῦ περιπατεῖν εὐκαίρως." ἦπου καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἡ φύσις τοῦ ἑλλεβόρου χάριν πεποίηκεν, οὐ τῆς ὑγιείας τὸν ἑλλέβορον. τί γὰρ ἄλλο καταλείπεται αὐτοῖς εἰς ὑπερβολὴν παραδοξολογίας ἢ τοιαῦτα ληρεῖν; τί γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦ λέγοντος γεγονέναι τὴν ὑγίειαν τῶν φαρμάκων ἕνεκα, μὴ τὰ φάρμακα τῆς ὑγιείας, ὁ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τὴν
E περὶ τὰ φάρμακα καὶ σύνθεσιν καὶ χρῆσιν αὐτῶν αἱρετωτέραν ποιῶν τῆς ὑγιείας, μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν μὲν

[1] ἐκεῖνος -Meziriac ; ἐκεῖνο -E, B.
[2] ταράττει -Reiske ; παρὰ -E, B.
[3] ⟨δὲ⟩ -added by Meziriac.
[4] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by Wyttenbach (implied by the versions of Amyot and Xylander) ; ἀλλὰ ἕνεκα (without lacuna) -E, B.

[a] See Plutarch, *De Tuenda Sanitate* 133 F and Aristotle, *Physics* 194 b 32-33 (*cf. Anal. Post.* 94 b 8-9 and *Metaphysics* 1013 a 32-35).

[b] Plutarch, *De Tuenda Sanitate* 130 A-F ; Galen, *De Sanitate Tuenda* v, 10, 41-44 (p. 158, 22-34 [Koch]) ; Caelius Aurelianus, *Tard. Pass.* i, 37 and 164 and ii, 93.

[c] The relation of medicine to health had been used as an example by Carneades in attacking the Stoic doctrine of the τέλος (Cicero, *De Finibus* v, 16) ; and the analogy had been rejected by the Stoics, who insisted that the relation to the τέλος is quite different for prudence, the art of living, from what it is for such an art as medicine (*De Finibus* iii, 24-25 and 32). Aristotle had already stated that, since an incurable patient can receive excellent medical treatment, the function of the medical art cannot be identical with making the patient healthy (*Rhetoric* 1355 b 12-14 and *Topics* 101 b 5-10 ; *cf.* Cicero, *De Inventione* i, 6 and Quintilian, *Instit. Orat.* ii, 17, 23-26).

[d] *Comica Adespota*, frag. 464 (Kock).

kind[a] and vocal exercises[b] and, yes by heaven, surgical operations and rational uses of drugs to be the goals of health, not this the goal of those,[c] they are talking foolishness like that of the character who says

Let's feast that we may sacrifice, that we may bathe.[d]

Or rather that character alters something customary and conventional in that he upsets its order, ⟨whereas⟩ what these people say involves the utter overthrow and ruin of the facts : " Our concern is not to take a walk at the right time for the purpose of digesting our food but ⟨to digest our food⟩ for the purpose of taking a walk at the right time." Nature also, no doubt, has created health for the sake of hellebore, not hellebore for the sake of health. In fact, to achieve the ultimate paradoxicality what else remains for them except to make such silly statements ? For what is the difference between one who asserts that health has come to be for the sake of drugs, not drugs for the sake of health and one who more than health makes the selection of the drugs and their composition and use an object of choice or rather holds that health is not an object of

(1071) οὐδὲ ὅλως[1] αἱρετὸν ἡγούμενος ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματείᾳ τὸ τέλος τιθέμενος καὶ τὴν ἔφεσιν ἀποφαίνων ⟨τέλος⟩[2] τῆς τεύξεως, οὐ τῆς ἐφέσεως τὴν τεῦξιν; "τῇ γὰρ ἐφέσει νὴ Δία τὸ εὐλογίστως καὶ τὸ φρονίμως πρόσεστι." πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φήσομεν, ἂν ὡς πρὸς τέλος ὁρᾷ[3] τὴν τεῦξιν ὧν διώκει καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ εὐλόγιστον αὐτῆς ἀφαιρεῖται, πάντα ποιούσης ἕνεκα τοῦ τυχεῖν οὗ τυχεῖν οὐ σεμνὸν οὐδὲ μακάριόν ἐστιν.

F 27. ⟨Ἐπειδὴ δ'⟩[4] ἐνταῦθα ⟨τοῦ⟩[5] λόγου γεγόναμεν, τί ἂν[6] φαίης μᾶλλον εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ τὸ μὴ λαβόντας ἔννοιαν ἀγαθοῦ μηδὲ[7] σχόντας ἐφίεσθαι τἀγαθοῦ καὶ διώκειν; ὁρᾷς[8] γὰρ ὅτι καὶ Χρύσιππος εἰς ταύτην μᾶλλον[9] συνελαύνει τὸν Ἀρίστωνα τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὡς τῶν πραγμάτων ⟨οὐ διδόντων⟩[10]

[1] οὐδόλως -E, B.

[2] ⟨τέλος⟩ -added by Meziriac (implied by Xylander's version); τῆς τεύξεως ⟨τέλος⟩ -Reiske.

[3] Meziriac (implied by the versions of Amyot and Xylander); ὁρᾶν -E, B.

[4] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by Wyttenbach (implied by Amyot's version); ἐστιν . . . vac. 9 -E, 10 -B (at the end of line) . . . ἐνταῦθα.

[5] ⟨τοῦ⟩ -added by Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, N.S. lii [1924], p. 106).

[6] τί ἄν -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 18); πᾶν -E, B.

[7] μηδὲ -Stephanus; δὲ μὴ -E, B.

[8] ὅρα -Meziriac.

[9] [μᾶλλον] -deleted by Wyttenbach; but *cf.* Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, pp. 56-57 and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1054 C *supra*.

[10] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by Bernardakis (*cf.* 1072 A *infra* [. . . ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆς οὐ δίδωσι]); τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν -E, B.

[a] Health is among τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν and is λῃπτόν, not αἱρετόν: see 1060 B-C *supra* and *S.V.F.* iii, frags. 141 and 142.

choice at all[a] but supposes the goal to reside in occupation with the drugs and declares desire to be ⟨the goal⟩ of attainment, not attainment that of desire? "Yes, by heaven," (they say) "for desire has as its attribute 'rationally,' that is 'prudently.'"[b] By all means, we shall say, if it regards the attainment and possession of what it pursues as related to the goal[c]; but otherwise its rationality is annulled, for it does anything and everything for the purpose of obtaining what it is neither grand nor blissful to obtain.

27. ⟨And since⟩ we have come to this point in the argument, what would you say is more at odds with the common conception than the proposition that men, without having grasped or got a conception of good, desire the good and pursue it? Because you see that this is rather the perplexity to which Chrysippus also reduces Ariston,[d] on the ground that the objects[e] ⟨do not provide⟩ for getting the notion

[b] This means not only that what the Stoics regard as τέλος is rational ἔφεσις rather than any or all ἔφεσις but primarily that "rationally" characterizes "to desire" and not "to attain," so that, since this "rationally," which is to say "prudently," distinguishes the τέλος, they are right in regarding the τέλος as ἔφεσις, *i.e.* as τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς . . . ἐκλογαῖς (1072 C *infra*) and τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι . . . φρονίμως (1071 B *supra*) and not as τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν (1071 C *supra*). For ἔφεσις *cf.* Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 303, 30-31 (τὸ οὖ ἡ ἔφεσις, ὅπερ σκοπὸν οἱ νεώτεροι καλοῦσιν . . .) and [Alexander], *Quaest. Moral.*, p. 142, 26-30 (Bruns).

[c] See 1072 C *infra*: ἐκλογὴ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν εὐλόγιστος ἡ ⟨μὴ⟩ πρός τι γενομένη τέλος.

[d] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 26 (p. 9, 5-11). See for Ariston and the attacks on him by Chrysippus *De Stoic. Repug.* 1034 D (with note *d* there) and *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 27 (p. 9, 12-17).

[e] See note *d* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 A and *S.V.F.* ii, p. 48, 19-20.

(1071) τὴν πρὸς τὸ μήτ' ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀδιαφορίαν ἐπινοῆσαι τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ μὴ προεπινοηθέντων· οὕτως γὰρ αὐτῆς[1] φανεῖσθαι τὴν ἀδιαφορίαν προϋφισταμένην, εἰ νόησιν μὲν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἔστι
1072 λαβεῖν μὴ πρότερον τἀγαθοῦ νοηθέντος ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' αὐτὴ μόνον τἀγαθόν ἐστιν. ἴθι δὲ καὶ σκόπει τὴν ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς ταύτην ἀρνουμένην ἀδιαφορίαν καλουμένην δὲ ὁμολογίαν, ὅπως δὴ καὶ ὁπόθεν παρέσχεν αὐτὴν[2] ἀγαθὸν νοηθῆναι. εἰ γὰρ τἀγαθοῦ χωρὶς οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὴν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἀδιαφορίαν, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φρόνησις ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆς[3] οὐ δίδωσι τοῖς ἀγαθὸν μὴ προεννοήσασιν. ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσερῶν τέχνης οὐ γίγνεται νόησις οἷς μὴ πρότερον αὐτῶν ἐκείνων γέγονεν, οὕτως ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἔστιν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν μὴ τἀγαθὰ καὶ
B τὰ κακὰ προεννοήσαντας.

[1] Wyttenbach ; αὐτῆς -E, B.
[2] Wyttenbach ; αὐτὴν -E, B ; αὐτὸν -Aldine ; αὐτὸ -Basil.
[3] Wyttenbach ; αὐτῆς -E ; αὐτοῖς -B.

[a] *Cf.* Marcus Aurelius, xi, 16 : . . . οὐδὲν αὐτῶν (*scil.* τῶν ἀδιαφόρων) ὑπόληψιν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἡμῖν ἐμποιεῖ . . . ἡμεῖς δέ ἐσμεν οἱ τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν κρίσεις γεννῶντες . . . .

[b] *i.e.* if the preceding statement, τῶν πραγμάτων . . . προεπινοηθέντων, be granted, as Ariston is presumed to have granted it (*cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 374 for Ariston on ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν).

[c] As Ariston did assert that ἀδιαφορία is the τέλος and the only good (*S.V.F.* i, frags. 351, 360, and 362).

[d] If ἀρνουμένην is thus taken as passive, then just as τὸ γένος τῶν ἀρνουμένων ἐπαίνων (*Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur* 58 A) is adulation though denied to be such

of indifference to what is neither good nor evil if there has not been a prior notion of the good and the evil,[a] for thus [b] the state of indifference would obviously have subsistence prior to itself, if a conception of it cannot be had without prior conception of the good but only itself and nothing else is the good.[c] Come now and consider this that the Stoa denies is indifference [d] and calls consistency. How and whence did it ever come to provide the conception that it is itself good ? For, if apart from the good it is not possible to conceive indifference to what is not good, *a fortiori* prudence about things good [e] does not provide a notion of itself for those who have not had a prior conception of good ; but just as a conception of skill about things salubrious and unhealthy does not occur to men to whom there has not previously occurred a conception of these things themselves [f] so it is not possible for men to get a conception of knowledge about things good and evil without having had a prior conception of the things that are good and the things that are evil.

so it is here implied that the τέλος of the Stoa, though called ὁμολογία (see 1069 c *supra* with note *a* there), is despite all protestations really ἀδιαφορία, an insinuation which might have been speciously supported by occasional *obiter dicta* (*cf.* Epictetus, *Diss.* II, v, 20 ; Marcus Aurelius, vii, 31 and xi, 16). It is possible, however, that ἀρνουμένην is not passive and that Plutarch means ". . . this Stoic principle which disowns indifference and is called consistency."

[e] For the objective genitive with φρόνησις *cf.* Aristotle, *De Sensu* 437 a 2-3 (ᾗ τε τῶν νοητῶν . . . φρόνησις καὶ ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν).

[f] See 1066 E-F *supra* and Sextus, *Adv. Math.* xi, 186-187, where the same argument is used against the existence of Stoic φρόνησις.

(1072) ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ.[1] Τί οὖν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ φρόνησις.
ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Τί δὲ ἡ φρόνησις;
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμη.
ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Πολὺς οὖν ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ἀφῖκται.
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.[2] Τὴν γὰρ ὑπέρου περιτροπήν, ἵνα μὴ σκώπτειν δοκῇς, ἔασον· καίτοι τόν γε λόγον αὐτῶν ὅμοιον ἐκείνῳ πάθος κατείληφε. φαίνεται γὰρ εἰς τὴν τἀγαθοῦ νόησιν αὐτὴν νοῆσαι δεόμενος φρόνησιν ⟨τὴν δ' αὖ φρόνησιν⟩[3] ἐν τῇ περὶ τἀγαθὸν ζητῶν νοήσει καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἑτέρας ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀεὶ τὴν ἑτέραν διώκειν ἀπολειπόμενος δὲ ἑκατέρας τῷ πρὸ αὐτῆς νοουμένου[4] δεῖσθαι τοῦ χωρὶς νοηθῆναι μὴ δυναμένου. καὶ κατ' ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον
C ἔστι τὴν οὐκέτι διαστροφὴν ἀλλ' ἐκστροφὴν αὐτῶν τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἀπαγωγὴν τελέως εἰς τὸ μηδὲν καταμαθεῖν. οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον

[1] The distribution of questions and answers here was made by Wyttenbach. Madvig objected (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 670), and Pohlenz gave both questions and answers to Diadumenus, who thus speaks without interruption down to Πολὺς οὖν . . .

[2] Pohlenz has Diadumenus recommence here; but Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], p. 116) has the comrade continue through ἔασον and makes Diadumenus begin with Καίτοι . . .

[3] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by Bernardakis; ⟨αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν φρόνησιν⟩ -Meziriac after Amyot's version.

[4] νοουμένου -H. C.; νοουμένῳ -E, B; τῷ ⟨τὸ⟩ πρὸ αὐτῆς νοούμενον -Wyttenbach; τῷ ⟨πρὸς τὸ⟩ πρὸ αὐτῆς νοούμενον -Pohlenz.

[a] For φρόνησις is identical with εὐδαιμονία (*De Stoic. Repug.* 1046 E) and with ἀρετή (*De Stoic. Repug.* 1034 C-D), which

COMRADE. What, then, is good?
DIADUMENUS. Nothing but prudence.[a]
COMRADE. And what is prudence?
DIADUMENUS. Nothing but knowledge of goods.[b]
COMRADE. So "Corinthus, Zeus's son,"[c] has come with a rush upon their doctrine.
DIADUMENUS. Yes, for, lest you seem to scoff, leave out "the pestle's endless roundabout,"[d] although it is a condition like that in which their doctrine is involved, since it is obvious that for the conception of the good it needs to conceive prudence itself ⟨but⟩ seeks ⟨prudence again⟩ in the conception of the good and that it is compelled always to pursue the one before the other and falls short of either by needing that conceived before it which cannot be conceived apart from it.[e] There is another way also of discerning in their doctrine that which goes beyond distortion and is dislocation and complete reduction of it to nullity. They suppose[f] the rational selection

alone is good (see 1064 B *supra* and *S.V.F.* iii, pp. 154, 6 and 165, 21).

[b] See 1066 D *supra* with note *d* there. *Cf.* Plato, *Republic* 505 B 6–C 5: there are those who say that the good is φρόνησις but who, when asked to say what φρόνησις, can say only φρόνησις ἀγαθοῦ.

[c] Proverbial for "the eternal refrain," "the same old story over and over again." *Cf.* Pindar, *Nemean* vii, 105; Plato, *Euthydemus* 292 E; Leutsch, *Corpus Paroem. Graec.* i, p. 63 (no. 21).

[d] *Cf.* Plato, *Theaetetus* 209 D 8–E 4; Leutsch, *Corpus Paroem. Graec.* i, p. 168 (no. 25).

[e] For the construction, νοουμένου δεῖσθαι τοῦ . . . μὴ δυναμένου, *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1057 A-B (οὐ συγκατατιθεμένων . . . δεομένους ἡμῶν ἀλλὰ πραττόντων . . .), *Conjugalia Praecepta* 143 B (. . . ὡς δεομένας αὐτῶν βοηθούντων), and 1085 D-E *infra* (. . . ἀέρος δεῖται συνιστάντος αὐτὴν . . .).

[f] *S.V.F.* iii, p. 253, 8-11 (Antipater, frag. 59).

(1072) ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐκλογὴ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν εὐλόγιστος ἡ ⟨μὴ⟩[1] πρός τι γενομένη τέλος, ὡς προείρηται. τί οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο, φασίν, ἢ τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογαῖς. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οἴχεται καὶ διαπέφευγεν ἡ ἔννοια τἀγαθοῦ· τὸ γὰρ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς σύμπτωμα δήπουθέν ἐστι γιγνόμενον ἀπὸ ἕξεως τῆς εὐλογιστίας. διὸ ταύτην μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους τὸ τέλος δ' οὐκ ἄνευ ταύτης ἀναγκαζόμενοι νοεῖν,
D ἀπολειπόμεθα τῆς ἀμφοῖν νοήσεως. ἔπειτα, ὃ μεῖζόν ἐστι, τῷ μὲν δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν ἀγαθῶν ἔδει καὶ ὠφελίμων καὶ συνεργῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκλογὴν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ μήτε συμφέροντα μήτε τίμια μήθ' ὅλως αἱρετὰ πῶς εὐλόγιστόν ἐστιν; ἔστω γάρ, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν· ὅρα τοίνυν ὡς εἰς πάγκαλόν τι καὶ σεμνὸν αὐτοῖς ὁ λόγος ἐξήκει κεφάλαιον. ἔστι γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τέλος κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν.

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ οὑτωσὶ[2] μὲν ἀκούοντι τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀλλόκοτόν τι φαίνεται δεινῶς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ
E φραζόμενον· ἔτι δὲ δέομαι μαθεῖν πῶς τοῦτο συμβαίνει.

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Προσεκτέον οὖν σοι μᾶλλον. οὐ γὰρ

[1] ⟨μὴ⟩ -added by Meziriac ; ἡ πρὸς -E, B.
[2] οὑτωσὶ -Wyttenbach ; οὕτω σοι -E, B.

[a] 1071 E *supra*.

[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frag. 512 (. . . τὸν σοφὸν . . . εὐλόγιστον . . . ἀπὸ ἕξεως καὶ διαθέσεως εὐλογίστου). For the relation of ἕξις and ἐνέργεια *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 130, 7-8 and iii, p. 57, 35-37 (with Epictetus, *Diss.* II, xviii, 1-7 and III, xxv, 8); and for σύμπτωμα *cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 49, 12-14.

of the things that are in conformity with nature to be the essence of the good ; but, as was said before,[a] a selection is not rational which has ⟨not⟩ been made relative to some goal. What, then, is this ? Nothing else, they say, but rational behaviour in the acts of selecting the things that are in conformity with nature. Well then, in the first place the conception of the good has gone and fled, for rational behaviour in the acts of selecting is, I presume, an occurrence proceeding from a habitude, rationality.[b] Consequently, since in conceiving this we are compelled to start from the goal and in conceiving the goal not to leave this out, we fall short of the conception of both. Then, what is more, in strict reason the rational selection ought to be a selection of things good and beneficial and conducive to the goal, for what is rational about selecting things that are not useful or valuable or objects of choice at all ? For grant that it is, as they say themselves,[c] rational selection of the things that have value for being happy ; then observe that the sum total reached by their calculation is something exceedingly fair and grand, for what is the goal according to them, it seems, is rational behaviour in the selection of the things that have value for rational behaviour.

COMRADE. Nay, at first hearing of the words, comrade, the formulation does strike one as something terribly strange ; but I still need to learn how this result comes about.

DIADUMENUS. You must attend more closely, then,

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, p. 253, 12-18 (Antipater, frag. 59), only lines 14-16 of which should be printed as a " fragment " of Antipater's. *Cf.* W. Wiersma, Περὶ τέλους (Groningen, 1937), p. 71.

(1072) τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστὶν αἴνιγμα[1] συνιέναι. ἄκουε δὴ καὶ ἀποκρίνου. ἆρ' οὖν τέλος ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς[2] τὸ[3] εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν;

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Λέγουσιν[4] οὕτως.

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν πότερον[5] ὡς ἀγαθὰ ἐκλέγονται ἢ ὡς ἀξίας τινὰς ἔχοντα ἢ προαγωγὰς ⟨καὶ⟩[6] τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἢ πρὸς ἕτερόν τι τῶν ὄντων;

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Οὐ νομίζω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τέλος.

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἤδη τοίνυν ἀποκαλύψας ὅρα τὸ συμβαῖνον αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν· ἄλλην γὰρ οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὔτ' ἔχειν φασὶν οὔτε νοεῖν οἱ ἄνδρες ἢ τὴν πολυ-
F τίμητον εὐλογιστίαν ταύτην περὶ τὰς ἐκλογὰς τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν εἰσιν οἱ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον οἰόμενοι λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον εἰς ταύτας καταδύεσθαι[7] τὰς εὑρησιλογίας.[8]

[1] ἐστὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ αἴνιγμα -R. G. Bury (Pohlenz, *Moralia* vi/2, p. 224). [2] κατ' αὐτοὺς -Basil. ; κατὰ τοὺς -E, B.
[3] τὸ -E ; omitted by B, Basil.
[4] E, B (ντας superscript over υσιν -B[1]) ; λέγοντας -Aldine, Basil. [5] πρότερον -E, B (πο superscript over προ -B[1]).
[6] ⟨καὶ⟩ -supplied by Xylander ; προαγωγὰς . . . vac. 3 -E, 4 -B . . . τοῦτο ; ⟨; εἰ δὲ⟩ -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, 3 Ser. x [1942], p. 43) ; ⟨; ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Ὡς ἔχοντα προαγωγάς. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Καὶ⟩ -Wyttenbach.
[7] Wyttenbach (*Index Graec. Plutarchi, s.vv.* καταδύω and καταλύω) ; καταλύεσθαι -E, B.
[8] εὑρησιλογίας -*cf.* 1070 F *supra*, *De Stoic. Repug.* 1033 B, and L. Dindorf in Stephanus, *Thes. Ling. Graec. s.v.* εὑρεσιλογέω ; εὑρεσιλογίας -E ; εὑρεσιολογίας -B.

[a] *Cf.* 1072 C *supra*.
[b] Wyttenbach's longer supplement, adopted by Pohlenz,

for it is a riddle not to be read by just anybody. Listen now, and answer. Isn't the goal according to them rational behaviour in the acts of selecting the things that are in conformity with nature ? [a]

COMRADE. So they say.

DIADUMENUS. And the things that are in conformity with nature, do they select them on the ground that they are good or on the ground that they have certain values or advantages ⟨and⟩ [b] that relative to the goal or to some entity other than the goal ?

COMRADE. Not to anything else, I believe, but to the goal.

DIADUMENUS. Well then, look at their predicament, for you have already revealed it : the goal is rational behaviour in the acts of selecting the things that have value for rational behaviour, for the gentlemen deny [c] having or conceiving any essence of the good or happiness other than this highly prized rationality about the acts of selecting the things that have value. But there are those who think that this argument is directed against Antipater and not against the Stoic system, for, they say, it is he who under pressure from Carneades takes cover in these verbal ingenuities.[d]

is wrong, as is proved by the fact that Diadumenus on the basis of the reply to his question says . . . τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς . . . In other words, ἢ προαγωγὰς here is not an alternative to ἀξίας but an explication of it ; *cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 35, 15-19 : τὰ οἰκεῖα ⟨καὶ⟩ προηγμένα καὶ εὔχρηστα καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχοντα . . . πρός τι προῆκται καὶ . . . διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται καὶ προῆχθαι πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ ἡ προαγωγὴ αὐτῶν δῆλον ὡς συνεργεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν (which the Stoics denied, of course, as they denied that the objects of selection are ἀγαθά [*cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 31, 10-22]).

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, p. 253, 19-23 (Antipater, frag. 59).

[d] See note *b* on 1069 C *supra*. The expression, εἰσιν . . . οἱ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον οἰόμενοι . . ., which according to von

(1072) 28. Τῶν δὲ περὶ ἔρωτος φιλοσοφουμένων ἐν τῇ Στοᾷ παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας τῆς ἀτοπίας πᾶσιν
1073 αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν. αἰσχροὺς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς νέους, φαύλους γ' ὄντας καὶ ἀνοήτους, καλοὺς δὲ τοὺς σοφούς· ἐκείνων δὲ τῶν καλῶν μηδένα μήτ' ἐρᾶσθαι μήτ' ἀξιέραστον εἶναι. καὶ οὐ τοῦτό πω δεινόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐρασθέντας αἰσχρῶν παύεσθαι λέγουσι καλῶν γενομένων. καὶ τίς ἔρωτα γιγνώσκει τοιοῦτον, ὃς ἅμα σώματος μοχθηρίᾳ ⟨μοχθηρίας⟩[1] ψυχῆς βλεπομένης[2] συνέχεται καὶ ἀνάπτεται[3] κάλλους δὲ ἅμα φρονήσει μετὰ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης ἐγγιγνομένου κατασβέννυται καὶ ἀπομαραίνεται; οὓς μηδὲν οἶομαι τῶν κωνώπων διαφέρειν· χαίρουσι γὰρ λάμπῃ καὶ ὄξει,
B τὸν δὲ πότιμον καὶ χρηστὸν οἶνον ἀποπετόμενοι φεύγουσιν. ἣν δὲ λέγοντες καὶ ὀνομάζοντες ἔμφασιν κάλλους ἐπαγωγὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἔρωτος λέγουσι, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν· ἐν γὰρ αἰσχίστοις καὶ

[1] ⟨μοχθηρίας⟩ -added by Pohlenz.
[2] βλεπομένης -Pohlenz ; βλεπομένη -E, B.
[3] ἀνάπτεται -Pohlenz ; ἄγεται -E ; γίνεται -B.

Arnim (*S.V.F.* i, p. xii) proves that Plutarch " argumenta ab aliis tradita et accepta prodit," is a concession which suggests that Plutarch himself thought or wished to think the argument relevant against the whole Stoic system. Bonhöffer contended (*Die Ethik . . .*, p. 181, n. 1) that in any case the restriction was meant to apply only to the polemic against the last formulation ascribed to the Stoics, εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ . . . πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν (1072 D). Schäfer's contention (*Ein frühmittelstoisches System*, p. 298) that Ἀντίπατρον is a mistake made in ignorance by Plutarch's source and that it should have been Διογένη is merely an attempt to make the evidence fit his own historical hypothesis.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 719 (p. 181, 3-9). See *Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere* 1057 F—1058 A *supra* with the notes there ; Zeller, *Phil. Griech.*, III/1, p. 291, n. 2 ; Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, pp. 288-290 ; Pohlenz, *Stoa* ii, p. 76 (lines 3-16) ; D. Babut, *Rev. Ét. Grecques*, lxxvi (1963), pp. 55-63 and especially pp. 61-63.

[b] *Cf. Quaest. Conviv.* 663 D and Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* 535 a 1-4 ; in *Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere* 1058 A it is with κάνθαροι that the Stoic love is compared.

[c] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 719 (p. 181, 9-13).

[d] *Cf.* in the Stoic definition of love διὰ κάλλους ἔμφασιν = διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 180, 18 and 34-35 with p. 164, 10-11 [*ex pulchritudinis specie*]). For ἔμφασις *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 24, 20-21 (εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ἐμφάσεις, αἱ ὡς ἂν ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι) with Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, pp. 159 and 164 and Epictetus, *Diss.* II, xi, 15.

28. All members of the school, however, are involved in the absurdity of the philosophical tenets of the Stoa that are at odds with the common conceptions on the subject of love. For their position is [a] that, while the young are ugly, since they are base and stupid, and the sages are fair, none of these who are fair is either loved or worth loving. And this is not yet the awful part. They say further that, when the ugly have become fair, those who have been in love with them stop. Now, who recognizes love like this, which at the sight of ⟨depravity⟩ of soul together with depravity of body is kindled and sustained and at the birth in them of beauty together with prudence accompanied by justice and sobriety wastes away and is extinguished ? Lovers like that, I think, do not differ at all from gnats, for they delight in scum and vinegar but palatable and fine wine they fly from and avoid.[b] And in the first place there is no plausibility in their assertion [c] that love is incited by what in their terminology they call a semblance of beauty,[d] for in the very ugly and very vicious a

(1073) κακίστοις οὐκ ἂν ἔμφασις γένοιτο κάλλους, εἴπερ, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἡ μοχθηρία τοῦ ἤθους ἀναπίμπλησι τὸ εἶδος. ἔπειτα κομιδῇ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν[1] ἐστιν ἀξιέραστον εἶναι τὸν αἰσχρὸν ὅτι μέλλει ποτὲ καὶ προσδοκᾶται[2] κάλλος ἕξειν κτησάμενον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ γενόμενον καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἐρᾶσθαι.

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Θήρα γάρ τις, φασίν, ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως ἀτελοῦς μὲν εὐφυοῦς δὲ μειρακίου πρὸς ἀρετήν.

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Εἶτα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πράττομεν ἄλλο νῦν
C ἢ τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν ἐλέγχομεν οὔτε πιθανοῖς πράγμασιν οὔθ' ὡμιλημένοις ὀνόμασι τὰς κοινὰς ἐκστρέφουσαν ἡμῶν καὶ παραβιαζομένην ἐννοίας; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἦν ὁ κωλύων τὴν περὶ τοὺς νέους τῶν σοφῶν σπουδήν, εἰ πάθος αὐτῇ μὴ πρόσεστι, θήραν ἢ φιλοποιίαν[3] προσαγορευομένην.[4] ἔρωτα δ' ⟨ἔδει⟩[5] καλεῖν ὃν πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ πᾶσαι νοοῦσι καὶ ὀνομάζουσι[6]·

⟨πάντες δ' ἠρήσαντο παραὶ⟩[7] λεχέεσσι κλιθῆναι[8]

[1] Wyttenbach ; ἐπεὶ κομιδῇ παρά τινων οἷον -E, B.
[2] E ; μέλλει καὶ προσδοκᾶται ποτὲ -B.
[3] φιλοποιίαν -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 19) ; φιλοπαιδείαν -E, B.
[4] προσαγορεύειν -Hartman (*De Plutarcho*, p. 608) but *cf.* *Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae* 818 A (κωλύειν ἐξαμαρτάνοντας).
[5] δ' ⟨ἔδει⟩ -Wyttenbach ; δὲ -E, B.
[6] ὀνομάζουσι ⟨, οἷον τὸ⟩ -Wyttenbach ; ὀνομάζουσι ⟨, ὡς Ὅμηρος⟩ -Pohlenz.
[7] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by Wyttenbach from *Odyssey* i, 366 ; ὀνομάζουσι . . . vac. 20 -E, 24 -B . . . λεχέεσσι.
[8] κληθῆναι -E, B ; corrected by Stephanus.

[a] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 719 (p. 181, 14-15) ; *cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, p. 180, 30-31. See also Plutarch, *Amatorius* 751 A (εἰς

semblance of beauty could not appear if in fact, as they say, depravity of character defiles the outward form. In the second place, it is utterly at odds with the common conception for the ugly person to be worth loving because he is going to have beauty some day and is expected to get it but to be loved by no one once he has got it and has become handsome and virtuous.

COMRADE. Yes, for love, they say,[a] is a kind of chase after a stripling who is undeveloped but naturally apt for virtue.[b]

DIADUMENUS. Why then, my dear sir, are we now trying to do anything else but convict their system of doing violence to our common conceptions and turning them inside out with implausible facts and unfamiliar terms ? For there was nobody trying to keep the zeal of sages about young men from being called a " chase " or " making friends " [c] if passion is not part of it ; but one ⟨ought⟩ to call " love " what all men and women understand and call by the name :

⟨All of them hotly desired⟩ to be couched ⟨by her side⟩ in the bride-bed [d]

Ἔρως γνήσιος ὁ παιδικός ἐστιν . . . αὐτὸν ὄψει . . . περὶ θήραν νέων . . . ἐγκελευόμενον πρὸς ἀρετὴν τοῖς ἀξίοις ἐπιμελείας) ; and for the earlier use of the figure *cf.* C. J. Classen, *Untersuchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern* (Berlin, 1960), especially pp. 5-6, 11-13, 24, and 29.

[b] *Cf.* *S.V.F.* i, frag. 248 (. . . τῶν νέων τῶν ἐπιφαινόντων διὰ τοῦ εἴδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐαν) and with this the words of Plutarch (*Amatorius* 767 B), ποιεῖν ἔμφασιν εὐφυΐας πρὸς ἀρετήν.

[c] ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιΐας (*cf.* *S.V.F.* iii, p. 96, 18 and 29, p. 97, 2-3 and 33-34, p. 164, 3-4 and 10 [" conatum amicitiae faciendae "], p. 180, 18).

[d] *Odyssey* i, 366 and xviii, 213.

(1073) ⟨καὶ

οὐ γὰρ πώποτέ μ' ὧδε θεᾶς⟩[1] ἔρος[2] οὐδὲ γυναικὸς
⟨θυμὸν⟩[3] ἐνὶ στήθεσσι περιπροχυθεὶς ἐδάμασσεν.

29. Εἰς τοιαῦτα μέντοι πράγματα τὸν ἠθικὸν λόγον ἐκβάλλοντες[4]

ἑλικτὰ κοὐδὲν[5] ὑγιὲς ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ

εὐτελίζουσι ⟨τοὺς ἄλλους⟩[6] καὶ διασύρουσιν, ὡς δὴ μόνοι τὴν φύσιν καὶ συνήθειαν ὀρθοῦντες ᾗ χρὴ καὶ
D καθιστάντες[7] τὸν λόγον ἄλλ' ἀποστρέφειν καὶ ἐπάγειν[8] ταῖς ἐφέσεσι καὶ διώξεσι καὶ ὁρμαῖς πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἕκαστον. ἡ δὲ συνήθεια τῆς διαλεκτικῆς διέραμα[9] γιγνομένη χρηστὸν μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ὑγιὲς ἀπολέλαυκεν, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἀκοὴ νοσώδης ὑπὸ κενῶν ἤχων δυσηκοΐας καὶ ἀσαφείας ἐμπέπλησται· περὶ ἧς αὖθις ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες, εἰ βούλει, διαλεξόμεθα.[10] νυνὶ δὲ τὸν φυσικὸν αὐτῶν λόγον, οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ περὶ τελῶν διαταράττοντα τὰς κοι-

[1] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by Wyttenbach from *Iliad* xiv, 315; κληθῆναι . . . vac. 15 -E, 16 -B . . . ἔρως.
[2] ἔρως -E, B; corrected by Stephanus.
[3] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by Stephanus from *Iliad* xiv, 316; γυναικὸς . . . vac. 5 -E, 9 -B . . . ἐνὶ.
[4] E; ἐκβάλλον -B; ἐμβάλλοντες (?) -Pohlenz, but *cf.* Euripides, *Cyclops* 20 and Plato, *Politicus* 298 B 5-6.
[5] Dübner; καὶ οὐδὲν -E, B.
[6] ⟨τοὺς ἄλλους⟩ -added by Wyttenbach after Xylander's version; ⟨εὖ μάλα τοὺς ἄλλους⟩ εὐτελίζουσι -Pohlenz.
[7] Wyttenbach; καθίστανται -E, B.
[8] Apelt (*Philologus*, lxii [1903], p. 288); ἀλλὰ ἀποστρέφει καὶ ἐπάγει -E, B; ὃς ἅμα (ἄμα -Wyttenbach) ἀποστρέφει καὶ ἐπάγει -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 670).
[9] Wyttenbach; διερὰ μὲν -E, B.
[10] Aldine, Basil.; διαλεξώμεθα -E, B.

⟨and

Come, for never before⟩ hath desire ⟨of a goddess⟩ or woman
Thus overwhelmed the ⟨heart⟩ in my breast and reduced it to bondage.[a]

29. Yet, while casting the theory of morals off upon troubles like this

Twisted, unsound, and all circuitous,[b]

they belittle and disparage ⟨the rest of us⟩ as if they alone uphold nature and common experience [c] as it must be done and alone put reason in a position to avert all else [d] and to bring each man by his desires and pursuits and impulses to that which is naturally congenial.[e] Common experience, however, in becoming a funnel for their dialectic has made no sound or useful gain but like a sickly ear has been filled by senseless noises with uncertainty and hardness of hearing. Later on, if you wish, we shall make a fresh start and discuss that subject [f]; but now let us run through the fundamental principles of their physical

[a] *Iliad* xiv, 315-316.
[b] Euripides, *Andromache* 448, quoted also in *De Herodoti Malignitate* 863 E and *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1102 C.
[c] See σῴζουσι τὴν συνήθειαν at 1063 D *supra* and *cf.* Epictetus, *Diss.* I, xxvii, 20-21.
[d] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 A-B *supra* (. . . ἀποσπᾶν τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀποστρέφειν ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων) with the note there.
[e] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 43, 16-20.
[f] Supposedly a promise of the essay, Περὶ συνηθείας πρὸς τοὺς Στωικούς (no. 78 in the *Catalogue of Lamprias*), *cf.* Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), p. 1 and Ziegler, *R.-E.* xxi/i (1951), col. 761, 5-17, and the consequences drawn from this by Babut (*Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, pp. 35-39); but αὖθις . . . εἰ βούλει is sometimes a way of dismissing further discussion of a subject (*cf.* Plato, *Protagoras* 361 E 5-6 and *Republic* 430 C 4-5 with Adam's note *ad loc.*).

(1073) νὰς προλήψεις, ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις καὶ πρώτοις ἐπιδράμωμεν.

30. Καθόλου μὲν ἄτοπον καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν εἶναι μέν τι μὴ ὂν δ' εἶναι, ⟨τούτων δὲ πολλά
E τιν' εἶναι⟩[1] μὲν οὐκ ὄντα δ' εἶναι λεγόντων ἀτοπώτατόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγόμενον. κενὸν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἔξωθεν τῷ κόσμῳ περιθέντες οὔτε σῶμα τὸ πᾶν οὔτ' ἀσώματον εἶναι λέγουσιν. ἕπεται δὲ τούτῳ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν· ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν ἐπειδὴ[2] ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν. τὸ δὲ πᾶν οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὔτε τι ποιήσει οὔτε[3] τι πείσεται τὸ πᾶν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν τόπῳ ἔσται· σῶμα γὰρ δήπου τὸ ἐπέχον τόπον,

[1] ⟨. . .⟩ -added by H. C. (*cf. Adv. Colotem* 1116 B); ⟨καὶ εἶναι⟩ μέν ⟨τινα⟩ μὴ ὄντα δ' εἶναι ⟨· πολλὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα αὐτῶν⟩ λεγόντων -Wyttenbach; ⟨ἀλλὰ πόλλ' αὐτῶν εἶναι⟩ -Pohlenz.

[2] καλοῦσιν. ἔπειτα -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 670); ἔπειτα δ' -Pohlenz; ἐπειδὴ ⟨δὲ⟩ . . . [ὥστε] -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 19).

[3] οὔτε -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 19); οὐδέ -E, B.

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[a] Plutarch presumably thought that this objection would not be valid against Plato's μὴ ὄν, which Colotes misinterpreted (*Adv. Colotem* 1115 D [*cf. Sophist* 258 D—259 B]).

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 525 (p. 167, 19-26).

[c] *Cf. Adv. Colotem* 1116 B (πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ μέγαλα . . . ὄντα μὲν μὴ εἶναι τινὰ δ' εἶναι λέγουσι). For τι as the most general class or highest category of the Stoics, comprising both bodies (ὄντα) and incorporeals (μὴ ὄντα), *cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 329, 332-334, and 371; Sextus, *Adv. Math.* X, 234-236; Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, pp. 90-91; Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 13-19.

[d] For the Stoic terms τὸ πᾶν, τὸ ὅλον, and ὁ κόσμος and their distinctions see the references in note *c* on 1066 B *supra*.

[e] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1054 B-C (chap. 44) *supra* with

theory, which confounds the common preconceptions no less than does their theory of goals.

30. While in general it is absurd and at odds with the common conception to say that something is but is non-existent,[a] ⟨these men⟩, asserting[b] ⟨that many things are something⟩ but are not existent,[c] reach the height of absurdity in what they say about the sum of things.[d] For, after enveloping the universe on the outside in infinite void,[e] they assert that the sum of things is neither body nor incorporeal. The consequence of this is that the sum of things is non-existent, for they call bodies alone existent[f] since it is the property of an existent to be subject and object of action[g]; but the sum of things is not existent, so that the sum of things would be neither subject nor object of any action. But it would not be in place either, for it is body surely that occupies place[h];

note *a* and for the Stoic distinction of τόπος, χώρα, and κενόν the references in note *d* there.

[f] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 319, 320, 329, and 361; *Anon. Proleg. to Platonic Philosophy* ix, 2-4 and 14 (p. 19 Westerink = p. 204 Hermann [*Platonis Dialogi* vol. vi]); *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 316 (with iii, p. 249, 8-9), 328, and 469.

[g] For this formula *cf.* Plato, *Sophist* 247 D 8–E 3; Aristotle, *Topics* 139 a 4-8 and 146 a 22-23; Lucretius, i, 440-441. The attempts to emend ἐπειδή are misconceived, for the clause gives the reason why the Stoics call bodies alone existent, the second premise, here unexpressed, being that what is incorporeal οὔτε ποιεῖ τι οὔτε πάσχει (*cf.* 1080 F *infra*; *S.V.F.* i, frag. 90 and ii, frag. 363; Alexander, *De Sensu*, p. 73, 19-20 [Wendland]); compare the Stoic proof that φωνή is body (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 140 and 387) and the similar Epicurean proof that the soul is corporeal (Epicurus, *Epistle* i, 67 and Lucretius, i, 440-448).

[h] "Place" being defined as that which is occupied by body (*S.V.F.* i, p. 26, 23; ii, p. 163, 20-22 [*cf.* p. 163, 6-7] and p. 164, 1-2 and 10-12).

(1073) οὐ σῶμα δὲ τὸ πᾶν, ὥστ' οὐδαμοῦ[1] τὸ πᾶν. καὶ μὴν ⟨ᾧ⟩[2] τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον συμβέβηκε, τοῦτο τὸ[3] μένον· ὥστ' οὐ μένει τὸ πᾶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπέχει τόπον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κινεῖται, πρῶτον ὅτι καὶ τῷ κινουμένῳ τόπου δεῖ καὶ χώρας ὑποκειμένης,
F ἔπειτα ὅτι τὸ [μὴ][4] κινούμενον ἢ αὐτὸ κινεῖν ἢ ὑφ' ἑτέρου πάσχειν πέφυκε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον ἔχει τινὰς νεύσεις ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ῥοπὰς κατὰ βάρος ἢ κουφότητα, κουφότης δὲ καὶ βάρος[5] ἤτοι σχέσεις τινὲς ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ἢ διαφοραὶ
1074 πάντως[6] σώματος· τὸ δὲ πᾶν[7] οὐ σῶμά ἐστιν, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη μήτε βαρὺ μήτε κοῦφον εἶναι τὸ πᾶν μηδ' ἔχειν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεως ἀρχήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινήσεται τὸ πᾶν· ἕτερον γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦ παντός. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοῖς ὅπερ λέγουσι μήτε μένον[8] εἶναι τὸ πᾶν μήτε κινούμενον. ὅλως δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ λέγειν σῶμα τὸ πᾶν μηδ' ἔνεστι[9] κατ' αὐτοὺς σῶμα δ' οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ λίθοι, τὸ μὴ ὂν σῶμα σώματα μέρη ἕξει καὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος μέρη ὄντα ἔσται[10]

[1] οὐδαμοῦ -Dübner ; οὐδ' ἄλλου -E, B.
[2] ⟨ᾧ⟩ -added by Wyttenbach.
[3] τοῦτό ἐστι -Wyttenbach ; τοῦτο [τὸ] -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], p. 106).
[4] [μὴ] -deleted by Hutten (omitted by versions of Xylander and Amyot) ; μὲν -Wyttenbach.
[5] Wyttenbach (implied by versions of Xylander and Amyot) ; κουφότητος δὲ καὶ βάρους -E, B.
[6] Meziriac (" omnino " -Xylander) ; παντὸς -E, B.
[7] Bernardakis ; τὸ δ' ἅπαν -E, B. [8] Leonicus ; μόνον -E, B.
[9] μηδ' ἔνεστι -Pohlenz ; μὴ δέον ἐστὶ -E, B.
[10] ἔσται ὄντα (but with order corrected superscript) -B.

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 500.
[b] Motion is " change of place " or " change from place to place " (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 492 and 496) ; and space is to

and the sum of things is not body, so that the sum of things is nowhere. Moreover, ⟨what⟩ has happened to occupy the same place, this is what is at rest[a] ; consequently the sum of things is not at rest, for it does not occupy place. Yet it is not in motion either, first because what is in motion also must have a place and space underlying it[b] and then because what is [not] in motion is naturally either moving itself or being acted upon by another. Now, what is moved by itself has of itself certain tendencies and inclinations according to its weight or lightness,[c] and lightness and weight are either some kind of relative states or forces or at all events differentiae of body ; but the sum of things is not body, so that of necessity the sum of things is neither heavy nor light and does not have of itself a principle of motion. But furthermore the sum of things would not be in motion by the agency of another either, for there is nothing other than the sum of things. Consequently it is necessary for them to say, as in fact they do,[d] that the sum of things is neither at rest nor in motion. Quite generally, since according to them there is not even a possibility of saying that the sum of things is body but heaven and earth and animals and plants and men and stones are body, what is not body will have bodies as its parts and of the non-existent there will be parts that are existent and

the place of any body as the partially occupied to the fully occupied (*S.V.F.* i, p. 26, 24 ; ii, p. 162, 42 f. and p. 163, 22-24), so that space might be called the sum or the place of all places (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1141).
[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 499 and 989 (p. 289, 1-9), and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1054 F—1055 C with note *d* on 1053 E *supra*.
[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 525 (p. 167, 26-27) ; *cf.* ii, frag. 500 (p. 161, 39-40).

(1074) καὶ τὸ μὴ βαρὺ χρήσεται βαρέσι μορίοις[1] καὶ κούφοις τὸ μὴ κοῦφον· ὧν οὐδ' ὀνείρατα λαβεῖν μᾶλλον
B ἔστι παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας. καὶ μὴν οὕτως οὐδὲν ἐναργές ἐστι καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐχόμενον ἐννοιῶν ὡς τό, εἴ τι μὴ ἔμψυχόν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο ἄψυχον εἶναι καὶ πάλιν, εἴ τι μὴ ἄψυχον, ἐκεῖνο ἔμψυχον εἶναι· καὶ ταύτην οὖν ἀνατρέπουσι τὴν ἐνάργειαν[2] οὗτοι,[3] τὸ πᾶν ὁμολογοῦντες μήτ' ἔμψυχον εἶναι μήτ' ἄψυχον. ἄνευ δὲ τούτων, ἀτελὲς μὲν οὐδεὶς νοεῖ τὸ πᾶν, οὗ γε δὴ μηδὲν μέρος ἄπεστιν, οὗτοι δὲ τέλειον οὔ φασιν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν· ὡρισμένον γάρ τι τὸ τέλειον, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ὑπ' ἀπειρίας ἀόριστον. οὐκοῦν ἔστι τι κατ' αὐτοὺς ὃ μήτ' ἀτελὲς μήτε τέλειόν ἐστιν.
C ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε μέρος ἐστὶ τὸ πᾶν—οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ μεῖζον—οὔθ' ὅλον, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι· τεταγμένου γὰρ τὸ ὅλον κατηγορεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ πᾶν δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀόριστον[4] εἶναι καὶ ἄτακτον. αἴτιον τοίνυν οὔτε τοῦ παντὸς ἕτερόν ἐστι τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι παρὰ τὸ πᾶν ἕτερον, οὔτ' ἄλλου τὸ πᾶν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὑτοῦ· ποιεῖν γὰρ οὐ πέφυκε, τῷ δὲ ποιεῖν τὸ αἴτιον νοεῖ-

[1] Leonicus ; *βαρέσιν ὁρίοις* -E, B.
[2] Leonicus, Basil. ; *ἐνέργειαν* -E, B, Aldine.
[3] Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 670) ; *οὕτω* -E, B.
[4] *ἀοριστίαν* -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], p. 106).

[a] See note *c* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1047 c *supra*.
[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 525 (p. 167, 27-28). They maintained, of course, that the cosmos itself is animate (*S.V.F.* i, frags. 110-112 and ii, frags. 633-635).
[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 525 (pp. 167, 28–168, 3).
[d] It is the *κόσμος* by itself without the surrounding void that is *ὅλον* (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 522-524).
[e] *ἀπειρία* is called *ἄτακτος* (*Adv. Colotem* 1114 B) and element or principle of *ἀταξία* (*De Defectu Orac.* 428 F). It has already been said above that *τὸ πᾶν* of the Stoics is

what is not heavy will possess heavy members and what is not light light ones. One could not find even dreams that are more at odds with the common conceptions than this. Moreover, nothing is so clear and so coherent with the common conceptions as the notion that, if something is not animate, it is inanimate and contrariwise, if something is not inanimate, it is animate. Well, this clear apprehension [a] too these men subvert when they acknowledge [b] that the sum of things is neither animate nor inanimate. All this apart, while no one thinks incomplete the sum total, which of course lacks none of its parts, these men deny [c] that the sum of things is complete because what is complete is something determinate and the sum of things is made indefinite by its infinitude. Well then, according to them there is something that is neither incomplete nor complete. But furthermore the sum of things is neither a part —for nothing is larger than it—nor a whole, as they say themselves,[d] for it is of orderly arrangement that wholeness is predicated and the sum of things by reason of its infinitude is both indefinite and without arrangement.[e] As to cause, furthermore, neither does the sum of things have another as cause, since there is nothing other besides the sum of things, nor is the sum of things cause of anything else or of itself either, for to produce is not in its nature and producing is implied in the conception of cause. Well then,

ὑπ' ἀπειρίας ἀόριστον, but that is no reason to object to the repetition here in the combination *καὶ ἀόριστον καὶ ἄτακτον* (*cf. Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus* 76 B, *De An. Proc. in Timaeo* 1014 D). Being *τεταγμένον*, a whole must also be *ὡρισμένον* ; and *τὸ πᾶν* of the Stoics is by its *ἀπειρία* prevented from being *either*.

(1074) ται. φέρε τοίνυν πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐρωτᾶσθαι τί νοοῦσι τὸ μηδὲν καὶ τίνα τοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπίνοιαν λαμβάνουσιν. ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν ὡς τὸ μήτ' αἴτιον ὑπάρχον μήτ' αἴτιον ἔχον μήθ' ὅλον μήτε μέρος μήτε τέλειον μήτ' ἀτελὲς μήτ' ἔμψυχον μήτ' ἄψυχον μήτε κινούμενον μήτε μένον που μηδὲ[1] ὑπάρχον
D μήτε σῶμα μήτ' ἀσώματον, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν; ὅταν οὖν ὅσα πάντες οἱ λοιποὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς οὗτοι μόνοι τοῦ παντὸς κατηγοροῦσι, ταὐτὸν ὡς ἔοικε φαίνονται τῷ μηδενὶ τὸ πᾶν ποιοῦντες. οὐδὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν τὸν χρόνον, τὸ κατηγόρημα, τὸ ἀξίωμα, τὸ συνημμένον, τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον, οἷς χρῶνται μὲν μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων ὄντα δ' οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι. καίτοι τό γ' ἀληθὲς ὂν μὴ εἶναι μηδὲ[2] ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ καταληπτὸν εἶναι καὶ πιστὸν ᾧ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ὄντος μὴ μέτεστι, πῶς [οὖν][3] οὐ πᾶσαν ἀτοπίαν[4] ὑπερβέβληκεν;

31. Ἀλλά, μὴ δοκῇ ταῦτα λογικωτέραν[5] ἔχειν
E τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἀψώμεθα τῶν φυσικωτέρων. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν

[1] Kolfhaus (*Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, p. 57) ; μήτε -E, B.
[2] Bernardakis ; μήτε -E, B.
[3] [οὖν] -deleted by Meziriac.
[4] Meziriac ; ἀτυχίαν -E, B. [5] λογιωτέραν -B.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 335. The last four items here belong to the class of τὰ λεκτά listed with the void, time, and place in *Adv. Colotem* 1116 B-C as things that the Stoics say ὄντα μὲν μὴ εἶναι τινὰ δ' εἶναι. They are all incorporeals (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 331, 166 [p. 48, 22-24], 170, and 521) and therefore not existent. For κατηγόρημα (predicate) *cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 183-184 and Plutarch, *Plat. Quaest.* 1009 C-D ; for ἀξίωμα (proposition) and συμπεπλεγμένον (conjunction) see note *c* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1047 D *supra* ; for συνημμένον

suppose all men are asked what they conceive nothing to be, that is what notion they get of nothing. Would they not say that what neither is a cause nor has a cause, is neither whole nor part, neither complete nor incomplete, neither animate nor inanimate, neither in motion nor at rest anywhere, and is not either body or incorporeal, this and not anything else is nothing ? So, since all that for the rest of mankind are predicates of nothing are by these Stoics alone predicated of the sum of things, it seems that they are clearly making the sum of things identical with nothing. Nothing must, then, be meant moreover by time, predicate, proposition, conditional, conjunction, of which they among philosophers make most use but which they say are not existent.[a] Yet to hold that what is true is not existent and does not subsist but that that is apprehended and apprehensible and credible which has no part in the reality of what exists,[b] how can there be any absurdity unsurpassed by this ?

31. Lest the difficulty involved in these matters seem to be too much of a logical one, however, let us take up those of a more physical character. Since, then, as they say themselves,

(conditional) *cf.* Mates, *Stoic Logic*, p. 43 and Plutarch, *De E* 386 F—387 A.

[b] *Cf. Adv. Colotem* 1116 B (τὸ τῶν λεκτῶν γένος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τἀληθῆ πάντ' ἔνεστι) and *Plat. Quaest.* 1009 C (ἀξίωμα . . . , ὃ πρῶτον λέγοντες ἀληθεύουσιν ἢ ψεύδονται) with *S.V.F.* ii, p. 48, 22-26 and p. 61, 34-42. Plutarch disregards the Stoic distinction between τὸ ἀληθές and ἀλήθεια, according to which the former, being a proposition and so incorporeal, is not existent whereas ἀλήθεια, being knowledge, *i.e.* the mind in a certain condition, is corporeal and therefore existent (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 132 and Mates, *Stoic Logic*, pp. 33-36).

(1074) Ζεὺς ἀρχὴ Ζεὺς μέσσα[1] Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται,

ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, μάλιστα μὲν ἔδει τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας, εἴ ⟨τι⟩[2] ταραχῶδες ἢ πλανητὸν ἐγγέγονεν αὐταῖς, ἰωμένους ἀπευθύνειν καὶ κατορθοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον· εἰ δὲ μή, ⟨πεισ⟩θέντας[3] γ'[4] ἐᾶν ὡς ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἕκαστοι καὶ τῆς συνηθείας πρὸς τὸ θεῖον—

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθὲς[5] ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε
ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου 'φάνη[6]·

οἱ δὲ ὥσπερ ἀφ' ἑστίας ἀρξάμενοι τὰ καθεστῶτα κινεῖν καὶ πάτρια τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης οὐδεμίαν, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἔννοιαν ὑγιῆ[7] καὶ ἀκέραιον ἀπο-
F λελοίπασι. τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ἢ γέγονεν ὃς οὐκ ἄφθαρτον νοεῖ καὶ ἀίδιον τὸ θεῖον; ⟨οὐδ⟩ὲν[8] ταῖς κοιναῖς προλήψεσι περὶ θεῶν ὁμολογουμένως ἀναπεφώνηται μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα·

τῷ ἔνι τέρπονται μάκαρες θεοὶ ἤματα πάντα

[1] Stephanus (so *De Defectu Orac.* 436 D) ; *μέσα* -E, B.
[2] ⟨τι⟩ -added by Leonicus.
[3] Pohlenz ; *θέντάς* -E, B ; *μεθέντας* -Wyttenbach.
[4] γ' -Bernardakis ; *τε* -E, B.
[5] *οὐ γάρ τοινῦν καὶ χθές* -E, B ; corrected by Dübner.
[6] *καὶ οὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξότου* (*ἐξ ὅτου* -B) *φανῇ* -E, B ; corrected by Wyttenbach.
[7] *ὑγιᾶ* -Bernardakis.
[8] ⟨οὐδ⟩ὲν -H. C. ; *ἐν* -E, B ; *ἃ ἐν* -Basil. ; ⟨ἢ τί⟩ *ἐν* -Leonicus ; *τί* [*ἐν*] -Pohlenz.

[a] Quoted in this form by Plutarch in *De Defectu Orac.* 436 D and by the Scholiast on Plato's *Laws* 715 E. The line appears with *κεφαλή* instead of *ἀρχή* in [Aristotle], *De Mundo* 401 a 29 and Porphyry, Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων, frag. 3 (J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*, p. 3*, 13). See Orpheus, frag.

Zeus is beginning and middle and Zeus the fulfilment of all things,[a]

they ought above all to have straightened out and set to rights the conceptions about the gods by repairing ⟨anything⟩ in them that may have become confused or have gone astray but otherwise ought to have let people persuaded by the law and common experience be each as he is in his relation to the divinity—

For these things live not now and yesterday
But always, and none knows when they appeared [b] ;

but instead they began to upset from the very hearth and foundation, as it were, the established traditions in the belief about the gods [c] and, generally speaking, have left no conception intact and unscathed. For what other human being is there or has there been in whose conception the divinity is not indestructible and everlasting ? [d] ⟨No⟩thing has ever been uttered that is more consistent with the common preconceptions about the gods than words like these :

There in delight dwell days without end the divinities blessed [e]

B 6 (D.-K.) and *Orphicorum Fragmenta* coll. O. Kern, pp. 90-93 (frags. 21 and 21a). For Stoic use of verses ascribed to Orpheus and Musaeus *cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1078 and Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* i, 41.

[b] Sophocles, *Antigone* 456-457 ; quoted by Plutarch in *Quaest. Conviv.* 731 c.

[c] With the language and sentiment *cf. Amatorius* 756 B ; and for the proverbial expression *ἀφ' ἑστίας ἀρξάμενοι* see *De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 549 E with the note by De Lacy and Einarson (*L.C.L.*, vol. vii, p. 189, note *d*).

[d] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1051 E-F *supra.*

[e] *Odyssey* vi, 46 ; quoted by Plutarch in *Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 20 E.

(1074) ⟨καὶ⟩[1]

ἀθανάτων τε θεῶν χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων τ' ἀνθρώπων

1075 καὶ τὸ

κεῖνοι[2] γάρ τ' ἄνοσοι καὶ ἀγήραοι
πόνων τ' ἄπειροι, βαρυβόαν
πορθμὸν πεφευγότες Ἀχέροντος.

καὶ ἴσως ἐντύχοι τις ἂν ἔθνεσι βαρβάροις καὶ ἀγρίοις θεὸν μὴ νοοῦσι, θεὸν δὲ νοῶν μὴ νοῶν δ' ἄφθαρτον μηδ' ἀίδιον ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲ εἷς γέγονεν. οἱ γοῦν ἄθεοι προσαγορευθέντες οὗτοι, Θεόδωροι καὶ Διαγόραι καὶ Ἵππωνες, οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν εἰπεῖν τὸ θεῖον ὅτι φθαρτόν ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν ὡς ἔστι τι ἄφθαρτον, τοῦ μὲν ἀφθάρτου τὴν ὕπαρξιν μὴ ἀπολείποντες τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ[3] τὴν πρόληψιν φυλάττοντες. ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης, ἐμπεπλη-

[1] Added by Dübner (" item " -Xylander's version).
[2] Basil. ; 'κεῖνοι -E, B, Aldine.
[3] E ; τοῦ θεοῦ δὲ -B.

[a] *Iliad* v, 442.

[b] Pindar, frag. 143 (Bergk, Schroeder, Snell) = 147 (Turyn) = 131 (Bowra) ; quoted by Plutarch in *De Superstitione* 167 E and *Amatorius* 763 C.

[c] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* i, 62 ; Simplicius, *In Epicteti Ench.* 222 C—223 A (pp. 356-357 [Schweighaeuser] = p. 95 [Dübner]).

[d] Besides *De Stoic. Repug.* 1051 E-F and the statement of Antipater which Plutarch there quotes *cf.* Epicurus, *Epistle* iii, 123 with Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* i, 45 and Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 33 and 44.

[e] Hippo, frag. A 8 (D.-K) ; G. Giannantoni, *I Cirenaici* VIII : Teodoro, A 27 (p. 473) = E. Mannebach, *Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta*, p. 100 (Adnot. 269). Theodorus of Cyrene is mentioned as an atheist by Plutarch in *De Tranquillitate Animi* 467 B and *Phocion* xxxviii, 3 (759 C) ;

⟨and⟩

Gods, who are proof against death, and the treaders of earth, who are mortal,[a]

and the verse

These are ageless and proof against all disease,
Immune from labours, having been spared
Woe's Acherontical flood of wailing.[b]

One might perhaps chance upon barbaric and savage tribes that have no conception of god,[c] but not a single man has there been who having a conception of god did not conceive him to be indestructible and everlasting.[d] At any rate, those who have been called atheists, Theodorus and Diagoras and Hippo and their like,[e] did not venture to say of divinity that it is subject to destruction but did not believe that there is anything indestructible, preserving the preconception of god while not admitting the existence of what is indestructible.[f] Chrysippus and Cleanthes,

and Diagoras of Melos (concerning whom *cf.* F. Jacoby, *Diagoras* Ὁ Ἄθεος [*Abhand. Deutschen Akad. Wiss. zu Berlin, Kl. für Sprachen, Lit. und Kunst*, 1959, Nr. 3]) is coupled with Critias in *De Superstitione* 171 C. Diagoras and Theodorus together are Cicero's examples of absolute atheists (*De Nat. Deorum* i, 2 ; i, 63 ; and i, 117) ; *cf.* also [Plutarch], *De Placitis* 880 D and Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 218 and *Adv. Math.* ix, 51-59. The charge that Hippo was ἀσεβής is early (frag. A 2 [D.-K.]), but the testimony for his atheism is later and weaker (*cf.* frags. A 4, 6, 9 and B 2-3 [D.-K.]).

[f] Their very atheism testifies to the universality of the conception of divinity as necessarily indestructible, for it was because they could not admit the existence of anything indestructible that they denied the existence of gods. There is no other evidence that any of the atheists named by Plutarch here did so argue ; but *cf.* the arguments, formulated apparently by Carneades, to prove that god, if there were a god, would be φθαρτός, that this is absurd and at

(1075) κότες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν
B τὴν γῆν τὸν ἀέρα τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον οὐδ' ἀίδιον ἀπολελοίπασι πλὴν μόνου τοῦ Διός, εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὥστε καὶ τούτῳ τὸ φθείρειν προσεῖναι τοῦ φθείρεσθαι μὴ ἐπιεικέστερον· ἀσθενείᾳ γάρ τινι καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἕτερον φθείρεται καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰς ἑαυτὸ φθειρομένοις τρεφόμενον σῴζεται. ταῦτα δ' οὐχ ὡς ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπων συλλογιζόμεθα ἔχειν[1] τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἕπεσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς
C περὶ Θεῶν καὶ Προνοίας Εἱμαρμένης τε καὶ Φύσεως γράμμασι διαρρήδην λέγουσι τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους ὑπὸ πυρός, τηκτοὺς κατ' αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ κηρίνους ἢ καττιτερίνους ὄντας. ἔστιν οὖν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὡς τὸ ἄνθρωπον ἀθάνατον εἶναι καὶ τὸ θεὸν θνητὸν εἶναι· μᾶλλον δ' οὐχ ὁρῶ τίς ἔσται θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον διαφορά, εἰ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ζῷον λογικὸν καὶ φθαρτόν ἐστιν. ἂν γὰρ αὖ τὸ σοφὸν τοῦτο καὶ καλὸν ἀντιθῶσι, θνητὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ θνητὸν δὲ τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ φθαρτόν,[2] ὅρα τὸ συμβαῖνον

[1] <περι>έχειν -Pohlenz (but *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1054 A : πολλὴν ἀτοπίαν . . . τούτων ἐχόντων).
[2] Basil. ; ἀλλ' ἄφθαρτον -E, B, Aldine.

odds with the common conception, and that therefore god does not exist (Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 140-181 [*cf.* Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* iii, 29-34], *n.b.* ix, 143 and 147).
[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 315, 19-23 and ii, frag. 1077.
[b] *S.V.F.* i, frag. 536 and ii, frag. 1049 (p. 309, 26-36).

however, who in theory have, so to speak, filled full of gods heaven, earth, air, and sea,[a] have held [b] that none of all these many is indestructible or everlasting except Zeus alone, in whom they consume all the rest.[c] The result is that he too has the attribute of destruction, which is not more fitting than that of being destroyed, for some weakness is the reason both why what changes into a different thing is destroyed and why that is preserved which is nourished on the destruction of others that it absorbs. These absurdities unlike many of the others we do not infer as involved in their premises and as consequences of their doctrines [d] ; but they shout aloud themselves in the writings on the Gods and Providence, on Destiny and Nature and state expressly that all the other gods have come into being and will be destroyed by fire,[e] being in their opinion capable of melting as if made of wax or of tin.[f] Now, as the notion that man is immortal is at odds with the common conception so also is the notion that god is mortal, or rather I do not see what difference there would be between god and man if god too is an animal rational and subject to destruction. For, if they retort with this fine subtlety that man is mortal whereas god is not mortal but is subject to destruc-

[c] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1051 F—1052 A and 1052 C *supra* ; *cf. De Defectu Orac.* 420 A (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 310, 1-4) : . . . θεῶν ὄντων τοσούτων τὸ πλῆθος ἑνὶ χρωμένους ἀιδίῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ. . . .
[d] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 C : καὶ τοῦτ' οὐ δεῖ συλλογίζεσθαι.
[e] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 A *supra* ; *cf. De Defectu Orac.* 425 E-F and 426 B.
[f] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 602 (*n.b.* p. 185, 31-32) ; Pohlenz, *Stoa* ii, pp. 45-47.

(1075) αὐτοῖς· ἢ γὰρ ἀθάνατον εἶναι[1] φήσουσιν ἅμα τὸν θεὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν ἢ μήτε θνητὸν εἶναι μήτ' ἀθάνατον. ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ πλάττοντας ἐξεπίτηδες
D ἕτερα παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ὑπερβάλλειν τὴν ἀτοπίαν· λέγω δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐπεὶ τούτοις γε τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων οὐδὲν ἄρρητον οὐδ' ἀνεπιχείρητόν ἐστι παρειμένον. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ⟨ὡς ἡγεμονικὸν⟩[2] ἐξομοιῶσαι πάντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόν. ἀλλ' οὔτι ⟨γ', εἰ⟩[3] οἱ ἀστέρες θεοὶ ὄντες πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν φθορὰν συνεργοῦσι, τῷ ἡλίῳ συνεργοῦντές τι[4] πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν, πολὺς ἂν εἴη γέλως ἡμᾶς περὶ
E σωτηρίας αὐτοῖς προσεύχεσθαι καὶ σωτῆρας ἀνθρώπων νομίζειν, οἷς κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ τὸ σπεύδειν ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῶν φθορὰν καὶ ἀναίρεσιν;

32. Καὶ μὴν αὐτοί γε[5] πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσι τῶν πραγμάτων[6] " ἰού, ἰού, φεῦ,

[1] εἶναι -E ; omitted by B.

[2] ⟨ὡς ἡγεμονικὸν⟩ -supplied by H. C. ; ἥλιον . . . vac. 4 + 7 -E ; vac. 11 -B . . . ἐξομοιῶσαι ; ⟨ὠφελεῖν ἐν τῷ⟩ -Kalbfleisch (*cf.* Kolfhaus, *Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, p. 58) ; ⟨συνεκπυρούμεν'⟩ or ⟨αὐτὰ συνεργοῦντ'⟩ -Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 28, n. 2) ; ⟨τότε συσπεύδοντ'⟩ -Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], p. 116).

[3] ἀλλ' οὔτι ⟨γ', εἰ⟩ -H. C. ; ἀλλ' ὅτι . . . vac. 3 -E ; vac. 5 -B . . . οἱ ; ἀλλ' εἴ τι οἱ -Xylander ; ἄλλο τι ⟨οὖν, εἰ⟩ οἱ . . . ἀναίρεσιν ; -Kalbfleisch (*cf.* Kolfhaus, *loc. cit.*) ; ἀλλ' εἰ π⟨άντες⟩ οἱ -Sandbach (*loc. cit.*) ; ἀλλ' ὅτε ⟨δὴ καὶ⟩ οἱ -Pohlenz.

[4] συνεργοῦντές τι -Basil. ; συνεργοῦντος ἐστι -E, B ; συνεργοῦντές γε -Wyttenbach ; συνεργοῦντές ⟨γέ⟩ τι -Pohlenz ; [τῷ ἡλίῳ, συνεργοῦντές τι πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν] -deleted by Sandbach (*loc. cit*).

[5] γε -Wyttenbach ; τε -E, B.

[6] ⟨ἐν⟩ οὐδενὶ . . . γραμμάτων -Wyttenbach ; ⟨κατ'⟩ οὐδὲν . . . γραμμάτων -Pohlenz.

tion,[a] look at their predicament : they would be saying either that god is at once immortal and subject to destruction or that he is neither mortal nor immortal. Not even by purposely inventing fictions at odds with the common conception is it possible to surpass the absurdity of this. I mean it is not possible for others, since there is nothing, however absurd, that these Stoics have left unsaid or untried. Cleanthes, furthermore, in his championship of the conflagration asserts[b] that the sun ⟨as ruling faculty⟩[c] assimilates to itself and transforms into itself the moon and all the rest of the stars. ⟨If⟩ the stars,[d] however, while being gods, contribute to their own destruction by giving the sun some co-operation towards the conflagration,[e] would it not be highly ridiculous for us to address prayers for our safety to them and to believe them to be saviours of men, when what is natural to them is eagerness for their own destruction and abolition ?

32. Moreover, the Stoics themselves[f] make no end of fuss crying woe and shame upon Epicurus for

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1049 (p. 309, 37-38) and see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 c with note *a* on page 566 *supra*.

[b] *S.V.F.* i, frag. 510 (*cf.* Festa, *Stoichi Antichi* ii, p. 149) ; *cf. S.V.F.* i, frags. 511, 512, and 497.

[c] *De Stoic. Repug.* 1053 B *supra* and *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1052 suggest that in this context Cleanthes may have emphasized the sun's rôle as ἡγεμονικόν, which was peculiar to his doctrine (*cf. S.V..F.* i, frag. 499).

[d] Plutarch apparently makes no distinction between ἀστήρ here and ἄστρον, used just above.

[e] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 189, 24-25 (Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 29, n. 2 and *Stoa* ii, p. 47).

[f] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1126 and Epicurus, frag. 368 (Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 248, 11-14) ; see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1051 D-E and 1052 B *supra*.

(1075) φεῦ " βοῶντες, ὡς συγχέοντα τὴν τῶν θεῶν πρόληψιν ἀναιρουμένης τῆς προνοίας· οὐ γὰρ ἀθάνατον καὶ μακάριον μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ κηδεμονικὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον προλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ νοεῖσθαι τὸν θεόν· ὅπερ ἀληθές ἐστιν. εἰ δ' ἀναιροῦσι τὴν περὶ θεοῦ πρόληψιν οἱ μὴ ἀπολείποντες πρόνοιαν, τί ποιοῦσιν οἱ προνοεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν τοὺς θεοὺς[1] λέγοντες μὴ ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς μηδ' ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δοτῆρας ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρων, ἀρετὴν μὲν μὴ διδόντας πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ τέκνων γενέσεις
F καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντας, ὧν οὐδὲν ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ λυσιτελὲς οὐδὲ αἱρετὸν οὐδὲ συμφέρον ἐστίν; ἢ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐκ[2] ἀναιροῦσι τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας, οὗτοι δὲ καὶ περιυβρίζουσι καὶ χλευάζουσιν, Ἐπικάρπιόν τινα θεὸν λέγοντες εἶναι[3] καὶ Γενέθλιον καὶ
1076 Παιᾶνα καὶ Μαντεῖον,[4] οὐκ ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τῆς γενέσεως οὐδὲ τῆς πολυκαρπίας ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν τοῖς λαμβάνουσι;

33. Τὸ τρίτον τοίνυν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας ἐστὶ μηδενὶ τοσοῦτον τοὺς θεοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν ὅσον εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέρουσιν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ Χρύσιππον οὐδὲ τοῦτο περίεστιν αὐτοῖς· ἀρετῇ τε γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερέχειν τὸν Δία τοῦ Δίωνος

[1] E ; τοὺς θεοὺς ἡμῶν -B.
[2] [οὐκ] -deleted by Hartman (*De Plutarcho*, p. 608) ; ἢ οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 671).
[3] E ; εἶναι λέγοντες -B.
[4] μαντεῖον -E ; μαντικὸν -B.

violating the preconception of the gods because he does away with providence, for they say that god is preconceived and conceived to be not only immortal and blessed but also humane and protective and beneficent. This is true. If, however, the preconception about god is annulled by those who do not admit providence, what are they doing who assert that the gods do provide for us, to be sure, but do not benefit us and are dispensers of things not good but indifferent,[a] since they do not give virtue but give wealth and health and the birth of offspring and the like, none of which is beneficial or advantageous or useful or an object of choice ? [b] Or [c] do the former not annul the conceptions about the gods, to be sure, while the latter in addition insult and make a mock of them by asserting that there is a god Guardian of Harvests and Guardian of Births and Healer and Oracular [d] though health or birth is not a good nor is abundant harvest either but they are indifferent and of no benefit to those who get them ?

33. The third feature of the conception about gods is the notion that the gods differ from men in nothing so much as they do in happiness and virtue. According to Chrysippus,[e] however, they have not even this advantage, for Zeus does not excel Tom [f] in

[a] See page 709, note *b supra*.
[b] *Cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 D *supra*.
[c] For this use of ἢ *cf.* Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* 312 B 57—313 A 18. The negative, the force of which despite its position goes through the whole sentence, should not be tampered with (*cf.* P. Shorey, *T.A.P.A.*, xlvii [1916], pp. 220-222 in his article, " Illogical Idiom ").
[d] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1048 C *supra*. For Γενέθλιος *cf. Adv. Colotem* 1119 E and Plato, *Laws* 729 C 5-8 ; for Παιάν *cf. Quaest. Conviv.* 745 A and Cornutus, xxxii (pp. 69, 17–70, 2 [Lang]) ; for Μαντεῖος *cf. De Tranquillitate Animi* 472 A-B and Aristophanes, *Birds* 722 and Euripides, *Troiades* 454.
[e] *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 246 ; *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 C-D *supra*.
[f] See page 681, note *a supra*.

(1076) ὠφελεῖσθαί θ' ὁμοίως ὑπ' ἀλλήλων τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν Δίωνα, σοφοὺς ὄντας, ὅταν ἄτερος[1] θατέρου τυγχάνῃ κινουμένου. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὃ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν[2] ὑπάρχει καὶ θεοῖς παρ' ἀνθρώπων, σοφῶν γενομένων,[3] ἄλλο δ' οὔ. ἀρε-
B τῆς[4] δὲ μὴ ἀπολειπόμενον ἄνθρωπον οὐδὲν ἀποδεῖν εὐδαιμονίας λέγουσιν ἀλλ' ἐπίσης εἶναι μακάριον τῷ Διΐ[5] τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν ἀτυχῆ, διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις σώματος ἐξάγοντα τοῦ ζῆν ἑαυτόν, εἴπερ εἴη σοφός. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος οὐδαμοῦ γῆς οὐδὲ γέγονεν, ἄπλετοι δὲ μυριάδες ἀνθρώπων κακοδαιμονοῦντες ἐπ' ἄκρον ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἀρχῇ τὴν ἀρίστην ἐχούσῃ διοίκησιν. καίτοι τί μᾶλλον ἂν γένοιτο παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ[6] τοῦ Διὸς ὡς ἔνι ἄριστα διοικοῦντος ἡμᾶς ὡς ἔνι χείριστα
C πράττειν; εἰ γοῦν, ὃ μηδὲ θέμις ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, ἐθελήσειε μὴ Σωτὴρ μηδὲ Μειλίχιος εἶναι μηδ' Ἀλεξίκακος ἀλλὰ[7] τἀναντία τῶν καλῶν τούτων προσηγοριῶν, οὐδὲν ἔστι προσθεῖναι τοῖς οὖσι κακὸν[8] οὔτ' εἰς πλῆθος οὔτ' εἰς μέγεθος, ὡς οὗτοι

[1] ἄτερος -van Herwerden (*Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinae* [1882], p. 123); ἕτερος -E, B.
[2] E; ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις -B.
[3] κινουμένων -Pohlenz.
[4] ἀρετῆς -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 20 [*cf.* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, p. 98, 15, Wachsmuth]); ἀρετῇ -E, B.
[5] B; δῖ . . . vac. 1 . . . τῷ -E.
[6] ἢ -Wyttenbach (implied by versions of Amyot and Xylander); τὴν -E, B.
[7] ἀλλὰ -Meziriac; μὴ δὲ -E, B.
[8] κακὸν -Xylander; καλὸν -E, B.

[a] See 1068 F—1069 A *supra*.
[b] This phrase is a proper and necessary limitation of ἀνθρώπων, and Pohlenz's emendation is therefore at best unnecessary.

virtue and Zeus and Tom, being sages, are benefited alike by each other whenever the one encounters a movement of the other.[a] For this, not anything else, is the good that men get of the gods and the gods also of men, once these have become sages.[b] They assert that not being deficient in virtue man has no lack of happiness[c] but the unfortunate who commits suicide because of bodily disease and mutilation[d] is blissful, if he be a sage, in the same degree as Zeus the Saviour. This sage does not exist, however, and has not existed anywhere on earth[e]; but there are countless myriads of human beings at the extremity of unhappiness in Zeus's commonwealth or realm which has the very best administration. Yet what could be more at odds with the common conception than the notion that with Zeus administering affairs in the best possible fashion we are in the worst possible plight? At any rate, if—what is illicit even to mention—he should wish not to be Saviour or Gracious or Averter of Evil[f] but the contrary of these fair appellations, any evil in addition to the number or magnitude of the evils there are is impossible, according to the assertion of these

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 248 and 764, and Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii, 7, 11g (pp. 98, 14–99, 2 [Wachsmuth], partially printed in *S.V.F.* iii, p. 14, 8-13).
[d] See 1069 E *supra*.
[e] With this and the remainder of the chapter *cf.* Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* iii, 79 and see 1066 A-B *supra* with the references in note *b* on pages 712 f.
[f] In *Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1102 E Μειλίχιος and Ἀλεξίκακος are distinguished from Zeus; for the latter as an epithet of Zeus *cf.* H. Usener, *Götternamen*[3], p. 313, n. 33 and for the former *cf.* M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* i (1955), pp. 411-414.

(1076) λέγουσι, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐπ' ἄκρον ἀθλίως ⟨καὶ⟩[1] μοχθηρῶς βιούντων καὶ μηδὲ τῆς κακίας ἐπίδοσιν μηδὲ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς κακοδαιμονίας δεχομένης.

34. Οὐ μὴν ἐνταῦθα τὸ δεινότατόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ Μενάνδρῳ μὲν εἰπόντι θεατρικῶς

ἀρχὴ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κακῶν
τὰ λίαν ἀγαθὰ

δυσκολαίνουσι—τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν—αὐτοὶ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν[2] ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς παρέσχηκεν· ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας
D δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχε. κινεῖ[3] δ' αὐτὴν ὁ λόγος ἐνυπάρχων καὶ σχηματίζει, μήτε κινεῖν ἑαυτὴν μήτε σχηματίζειν πεφυκυῖαν. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸ κακόν, εἰ μὲν δι' οὐδέν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν ἀρχήν, ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γεγονὸς ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν οἴονται τὸν Δία μὴ κρατεῖν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μερῶν μηδὲ χρῆσθαι κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον ἑκάστῳ, παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν[4] λέγουσι καὶ πλάττουσι ζῷον, οὗ πολλὰ τῶν μορίων ἐκφεύγει τὴν βούλησιν ἰδίαις ἐνεργείαις χρώμενα καὶ πράξεσιν, αἷς τὸ ὅλον ὁρμὴν οὐ δίδωσιν οὐδὲ κατάρχει κινήσεως. οὕτως γὰρ κακῶς

[1] ⟨καὶ⟩ -added by Wyttenbach.
[2] B; ἀγαθῶν -E.
[3] ἔσχε. κινεῖ -Meziriac (implied by Amyot's version); ἔσχηκεν εἰ -E, B.
[4] Meziriac; ἐπίνοιαν -E, B.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1168.
[b] Menander, frag. 786 (Koerte-Thierfelder)=frag. 724 (Kock).
[c] See 1085 B-C and 1085 E—1086 A *infra* (*S.V.F.* ii, frags.

Stoics, since all human beings are living in the extremity of wretchedness and depravity, and vice does not admit of increment or unhappiness of augmentation.

34. The most dreadful part about it is[a] not this, however, but that, while they are cross with Menander for his theatrical pronouncement

Of human ills the chiefest origin
Is things exceeding good[b]

—for this, they say, is at odds with the common conception—, yet they do themselves make god, though good, the origin of things evil. For matter has not of itself brought forth what is evil, for matter is without quality and all the variations that it takes on it has got from that which moves and fashions it.[c] That which moves and fashions it, however, is the reason existing in it, since its nature is not to move or fashion itself. The necessary result is that what is evil, if it has no cause, is a product of what is non-existent but, if its cause is the moving principle, is a product of god.[d] For, if they think that Zeus does not have control of his own parts and does not use each of them in conformity with his own reason, their assertion is also at odds with the common conception and they are imagining a living being many of whose parts elude its will in performing their own private operations and actions without impulse given or motion initiated by the whole organism. For, in

313 and 380), *De Stoic. Repug.* 1054 A-B *supra* (*S.V.F* ii, pp 147, 44–148, 2), *De Iside* 369 A (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1108); *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vii, 134; *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 303, 309-311, 318, and 326; and Plotinus, *Enn.* I, viii, 10 on the question, how matter can be evil though ἄποιος.
[d] *Cf. De An. Proc. in Timaeo* 1015 B.

(1076) E ⟨οὐδὲν⟩[1] συντέτακται τῶν ψυχὴν ἐχόντων ὥστ' ἀβουλοῦντος αὐτοῦ προϊέναι πόδας ἢ φθέγγεσθαι γλῶτταν ἢ κέρας[2] κυρίττειν ἢ δάκνειν ὀδόντας· ὧν ἀνάγκη τὰ πλεῖστα πάσχειν τὸν θεόν, εἰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν αὐτοῦ μέρη ὄντες οἱ φαῦλοι ψεύδονται καὶ ῥᾳδιουργοῦσι καὶ τοιχωρυχοῦσι καὶ ἀποκτιννύουσιν ἀλλήλους. εἰ δέ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἔστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς βούλησιν ἀλλὰ πᾶν μὲν ἔμψυχον οὕτως ἴσχεσθαι καὶ οὕτω κινεῖσθαι πέφυκεν ὡς ἐκεῖνος ἄγει κἀκεῖνος ἐπιστρέφει καὶ ἴσχει καὶ διατίθησιν,

ὅδ' αὖτ' ἐκείνου φθόγγος ἐξωλέστερος.

F μυριάκις[3] γὰρ ἦν ἐπιεικέστερον ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ Διὸς ἐκβιαζόμενα τὰ μέρη πολλὰ δρᾶν ἄτοπα παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν καὶ βούλησιν ἢ μήτ' ἀκρασίαν εἶναι μήτε κακουργίαν ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Ζεὺς αἴτιος. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ τὸν κόσμον[4] εἶναι πόλιν καὶ πολίτας τοὺς ἀστέρας, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ φυλέτας καὶ ἄρχοντας δηλονότι καὶ βουλευτὴν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ
1077 τὸν ἕσπερον πρύτανιν ἢ ἀστυνόμον, οὐκ οἶδ' ⟨εἰ⟩[5]

[1] ⟨οὐδὲν⟩ -Bernardakis (οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω κακῶς συντέτακται -Basil.) ; ⟨τί⟩ -Dübner.
[2] E, B ; κέρα -Dübner.
[3] Meziriac ; μυρία -E, B.
[4] τὸ τὸν κόσμον -Pohlenz ; τὸ τὸνεῖκος μὲν -E (εἶ apparently a later insertion) ; τὸ τὸ νεῖκος μὲν -B ; τὸν μὲν κόσμον -Xylander ; τόν γε κόσμον -Meziriac.
[5] οἶδ' ⟨εἰ⟩ -Giesen (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 45, n. 2) ; οἶδα -E, B.

fact, ⟨nothing⟩ that has life has been so badly organized that against its will its feet move forward or its tongue gives utterance or its horns butt or its teeth bite ; but most of this must be what happens to god if, contrary to his will, the base, while being parts of him, deceive and cheat and rob and kill one another. If, however, as Chrysippus says,[a] it is not possible for even the slightest of his parts to be otherwise than in conformity with the will of Zeus but it is the nature of every animate thing to stay and to move as Zeus guides it and as he turns and stops and arranges it,

This has a more pernicious sound than that.[b]

For it was ten thousand times more fitting to think that owing to the weakness and impotence of Zeus his parts break out and do many monstrous deeds contrary to his nature and his will than to say that there is neither incontinence nor villainy for which Zeus is not responsible. But furthermore the thesis that the universe is a city and the stars citizens—and, if so, obviously fellow-tribesmen too and officers of state and the sun a senator and the evening-star presiding magistrate or chief of police [c]—I know not ⟨whether⟩ notions like this do not show those who

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 937 (p. 269, 34-38) ; see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1050 A-D and 1056 C *supra*.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 417 (frag. 417) and Kock, *Comic. Attic. Frag.* iii, p. 614 (frag. 1240).
[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 645 ; *cf.* especially Manilius, *Astronomicon* v, 734-745 and Philo Jud., *De Specialibus Legibus* i, 13-14=v, p. 4, 1-7 (Cohn). Plutarch's *De Exilio* 601 A is not a parallel despite the similar terminology ; nor despite Pohlenz is Dio Chrysostom's *Oratio* xix (=xxxvi [von Arnim]), 29-38, which is rather closer to the more general thesis that the universe is a city common to gods and men (see 1065 F *supra* with note *c* there).

(1077) μὴ τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν λεγόντων καὶ ἀποφαινομένων ἀποδείκνυσιν ἀτοπωτέρους.

35. Ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικώτερον[1] λεγομένων ἆρ' οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι σπέρμα πλέον εἶναι καὶ μεῖζον ἢ τὸ γεννώμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ; τὴν γοῦν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν[2] πᾶσι καὶ ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς ⟨καὶ ἡμέροις⟩[3] καὶ ἀγρίοις ἀρχὰς τὰ μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχρα καὶ μόλις ὁρατὰ τῆς τῶν μεγίστων γενέσεως λαμβάνουσαν. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πυροῦ στάχυν οὐδ' ἄμπελον ἐκ γιγάρτου μόνον ἀλλ' ἐκ πυρῆνος ἢ βαλάνου τινὸς ὄρνεον διαφυγούσης ὥσπερ ἐκ μικροῦ[4] σπινθῆρος ἐξάψασα
B καὶ ῥιπίσασα τὴν γένεσιν ἔρνος ἢ βάτου ἢ δρυὸς ἢ φοίνικος ἢ πεύκης περιμήκιστον ἀναδίδωσιν, ᾗ καί φασιν ⟨αὐτοὶ⟩[5] τὸ μὲν σπέρμα ⟨παρὰ⟩[6] τὴν ἐπὶ μικρὸν ὄγκον ἐκ πολλοῦ σπείρασιν ὠνομάσθαι τὴν δὲ φύσιν ἐμφύσησιν[7] οὖσαν καὶ διάχυσιν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀνοιγομένων καὶ λυομένων λόγων ἢ[8] ἀριθ-

[1] Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 20); *φυσικωτέρων* -E, B.
[2] *ὁρῶμεν* ⟨*ἐν*⟩ -Pohlenz.
[3] ⟨*καὶ ἡμέροις*⟩ -added by Wyttenbach.
[4] *μικροῦ τινὸς* -B.
[5] ⟨*αὐτοὶ*⟩ -supplied by Wyttenbach; *φασιν . . .* vac. 5 -E; vac. 7 -B . . . *τὸ*; ⟨*ἔνιοι*⟩ -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], p. 106); ⟨*ὀρθῶς*⟩ -Pohlenz.
[6] ⟨*παρὰ*⟩ -added by Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], p. 106), *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 F (*τὴν ψυχὴν ὠνομάσθαι παρὰ τὴν ψῦξιν*).
[7] *ἐμφύσησιν* -Leonicus; *ἐμφύσεσιν* -E; *εὐφύσεσιν* -B; *ἐκφύσησιν* -Xylander.
[8] *ἢ* -E; *καὶ* -B.

[a] With the whole of this chapter *cf.* Philo Jud., *De Aeternitate Mundi* 100-103=vi, pp. 103, 11–104, 13 (Cohn-Reiter), of which 101-103=*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 619.

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 744. For this kind of Stoic etymologizing *cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 F *supra*; *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 896 and 914; and K. Barwick, "Probleme der stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik" (*Abhand. der Sächsischen Akad. der Wiss. zu Leipzig, Phil.-Hist. Kl.*, xlix, 3 [1957]), pp. 29-33 and 58-79.

[c] *Cf.* Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* iii, 29, 2-3 and *Epistle* xxxviii, 2.

[d] *Cf. S.V.F.* i, p. 36, 5-9 and p. 111, 25-28; *S.V.F.* ii, p. 161, 28-30 and p. 212, 21-34. The *λόγοι* are the Stoic *σπερματικοὶ λόγοι* (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 713, 717, 739, and 1074), which as constitutive factors are here called alternatively *ἀριθμοί* (*cf.* Plutarch, *De Recta Ratione Audiendi* 45 c; *S.V.F.* iii, p. 20, 20-22 and p. 136, 14-15; A.-J. Festugière, *Class. Phil.*, xlviii [1953], pp. 239-240). The latter term used in this sense is no indication of "Platonic-Pythagorean influence," even though the Neo-Pythagoreans did give their *ἀριθμοί* the characteristics of the Stoic *σπερματικοὶ λόγοι* (M. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie*, p. 116 and pp. 179-180).

try to refute them to be more absurd than the people who assert and maintain them.

35. Of their more strictly physical assertions, however, isn't it at odds with the common conception to say that a seed is ampler and bigger than what is produced from it?[a] At any rate, we see that nature for all things, both animals and plants⟨, both cultivated⟩ and wild, takes as origins for the generation of the biggest what are little and petty and scarcely visible. For it is not only that she sends up an ear of wheat from a grain or a vine from a grape-seed; but from the pip of a fruit or some acorn missed by a bird, from a tiny spark, as it were, she kindles generation and fans it into flame and sends up a lofty shoot of bramble or of oak or of palm or of pine, wherefore they say[b] ⟨themselves⟩ that the seed has been named *sperm* ⟨after⟩ the *spir*aling of a large mass into a little one[c] and nature has been named *physis* because it is dif*fus*ion or expansion of the formulae or factors which it explicates or resolves.[d]

(1077) μῶν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε[1] κόσμου πάλιν[2] τὸ πῦρ οἷον[3] σπέρμα λέγουσιν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ[4] τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν εἰς[5] σπέρμα μεταβάλλειν[6] τὸν κόσμον, ἐκ βραχυτέρου σώματος καὶ ὄγκου χύσιν[7] ἔχοντα πολλὴν καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ προσεπιλαμβάνοντα χώραν ἄπλετον ἐπινεμομένην τῇ αὐξήσει, γεννωμένου δ' αὖθις ὑποC χωρεῖν τὸ μέγεθος καὶ συνολισθαίνειν, δυομένης καὶ συναγομένης περὶ τὴν γένεσιν εἰς ἑαυτὴν τῆς ὕλης.

36. Ἀκοῦσαι τοίνυν ἔστιν αὐτῶν καὶ γράμμασιν ἐντυχεῖν πολλοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς διαφερομένων καὶ βοώντων ὡς πάντα πράγματα συγ-

[1] τοῦ γε -Wyttenbach ; τοῦτε -E, B ; τοῦ [τε] -von Arnim.
[2] πλέον -Pohlenz.
[3] οἷον -Kolfhaus (*Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, p. 59) ; ὃ -E, B ; [ὃ] -deleted by Wyttenbach ; [πῦρ ὃ] -von Arnim, Pohlenz.
[4] κατὰ -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 20) ; μετὰ -E, B ; εἶναι ‹μεῖζον› καὶ μετὰ -von Arnim ; εἶναι‹, τὸ πῦρ ὃ› [καὶ] μετὰ -Pohlenz.
[5] εἰς -Wyttenbach from the version of Xylander ; εἰ -E, B ; ‹ὅτε› εἰς -von Arnim.
[6] μεταβάλλειν -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 20) ; μετέβαλε -E, B ; μεταβαλεῖν -Wyttenbach.
[7] χύσιν -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 23) ; φύσιν -E, B.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 618 (pp. 187, 41–188, 4). For the Stoic doctrine of the periodic conflagration and restoration of the universe see 1065 B, 1067 A, 1075 B-D and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 C and 1053 B-C *supra*.

[b] *Cf. Aquane an Ignis Utilior* 955 E (τὸ πῦρ . . . οἷον σπέρμα τοῦτ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τε πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἐκλαμβάνειν κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν) and *S.V.F.* ii, p. 183, 42-43 and p. 184, 12-14 ; *S.V.F.* ii, p. 188, 6-9 and 28-29.

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 188, 19-26 and p. 189, 8-10.

[d] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 171, 28-29 ; p. 185, 34-35 ; p. 186, 27-31 ; and p. 188, 24-28.

[e] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 188, 20-21 and 29-32 and *De Stoic.*

On the other hand, however, they assert[a] that fire is as the seed of the universe and that in the course of the conflagration the universe changes into seed,[b] having its lesser corporeal mass greatly diffused[c] and taking over from the void an immense additional space upon which it encroaches by its growth,[d] but that when the universe is being generated again the magnitude shrinks and dwindles, the matter subsiding and contracting into itself in the process of generation.[e]

36. Furthermore, they can be heard and in many writings can be seen quarrelling with the Academics and crying out[f] that the latter confuse all things

Repug. 1053 B *supra* (σβεννύμενον δ' αὖθις καὶ παχυνόμενον εἰς . . . τὸ σωματοειδὲς τρέπεσθαι).

[f] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 112. This controversy between the Stoics and the Academics (for which *cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 49-59 and 84-86 ; Sextus, *Adv. Math.* vii, 252 and 403-411) was part of their debate about the possibility of distinguishing true mental images or impressions from false ones. The Stoics maintained that every existing thing is qualitative individuation (ἰδίως ποιός) of substance or matter (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i, 20, 7 = pp. 178, 13–179, 5 [Wachsmuth] = *Dox. Graeci*, pp. 462, 22–463, 4 [*cf.* Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, p. 15, n. 8] ; Marcus Aurelius, xii, 30 and ix, 25 ; *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 395 and 378), matter itself being without quality (see 1076 C-D *supra* and note *c* there), so that a single qualification of any quantity of substance must be a single individual and there cannot ever be two or more discrete things that are exactly alike (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 113 and 114 ; Seneca, *Epistle* cxiii, 15-16). To this the Academic reply was not a proof that discrete substances otherwise identical really exist but the contention that there are existing things which, though admittedly many, are yet in fact indistinguishable from one another (Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 85-86 and Sextus, *Adv. Math.* vii, 408-411 ; *cf. S.V.F.* i, frags. 347 and 625). The notion that no two things in nature are exactly alike was not exclusively Stoic : *cf.* Lucretius, ii, 342-376 ; Quintilian, *Instit. Orat.* x, 2, 10.

(1077) χέουσι ταῖς ἀπαραλλαξίαις, ἐπὶ δυεῖν οὐσιῶν ἕνα ποιὸν εἶναι βιαζόμενοι. καίτοι τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων οὐ διανοεῖται καὶ τοὐναντίον οἴεται θαυμαστὸν εἶναι καὶ παράδοξον εἰ μήτε φάττα φάττῃ μήτε μελίττῃ μέλιττα μήτε πυρῷ πυρὸς ἢ σύκῳ τὸ τοῦ λόγου σῦκον ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ γέγονεν ἀπαράλλακτον. ἐκεῖνα δ' ὄντως
D παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν, ἃ λέγουσιν οὗτοι καὶ πλάττουσιν, ἐπὶ μιᾶς οὐσίας δύ' ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποιοὺς καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἕνα ποιὸν ἰδίως ἔχουσαν ἐπιόντος ἑτέρου δέχεσθαι καὶ διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους. εἰ γὰρ δύο, καὶ τρεῖς καὶ τέτταρες ἔσονται καὶ πέντε καὶ ὅσους οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι περὶ μίαν οὐσίαν· λέγω δ' οὐκ ἐν μέρεσι διαφόροις ἀλλὰ πάντας ὁμοίως περὶ ὅλην τοὺς ἀπείρους. λέγει γοῦν Χρύσιππος ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἡ[1] ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα

[1] ἡ -E ; omitted by B.

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* ii, 53 (" eorum qui omnia cupiunt confundere ") and 54.

[b] *Cf. Comica Adespota*, frag. 189 (Kock) ; Herodas, vi, 60 ; Leutsch, *Corpus Paroem. Graec.* i, p. 293 (no. 37).

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 396. This is not, as J. R. Mattingly contends it is (*Philos. Rev.*, xlviii [1939], pp. 278-279), what the Stoics said or meant but is an inference drawn from the statement about the ecpyrosis that Plutarch proceeds to cite (λέγει γοῦν Χρύσιππος). For the Stoics any amount of matter is as many and only as many discrete and different substances as it has ἰδίως ποιοί, and Chrysippus expressly stated (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 397) that δύο ἰδίως ποιοὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐ δύνανται εἶναι (*cf.* A. C. Pearson, *Journ. of Philology*, xxx [1907], pp. 212-214 ; E. Bréhier, *Rev. d'Hist. de la Philos.*, i [1927], pp. 219-220). The contradiction

with their indistinguishable likenesses [a] by insisting upon the existence of a single qualification in the case of two substances. Yet there is no human being who does not make this supposition and think that on the contrary it is amazing and paradoxical if in all of time there have not been two doves or two bees or two grains of wheat or the proverbial two figs [b] indistinguishably like each other. What's really at odds with the common conception are those assertions made by these Stoics and their fictions about a single substance's having got two individual qualifications,[c] which is to say that one and the same substance with a single individual qualification takes on a second when it supervenes and continues to keep both of them alike. For, if two, there could also be three and four and five and more than could be told in a single substance—I mean not in different parts of it but all the countless qualifications alike in the whole of it. At any rate, Chrysippus asserts [d] that Zeus, that is the universe, is like the human being [e] and his providence is like its soul,[f] that consequently, when the conflagration has taken place, Zeus, who

cannot be explained away as Miss Reesor has tried to do (*A.J.P.*, lxxv [1954], pp. 46-47) or accounted for in the way attempted by C. Petersen (*Philosophiae Chrysippeae Fundamenta*, pp. 90-91).

[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 1064.

[e] *Cf. S.V.F.* iii, p. 217, 10-12 (Diogenes of Babylon τὸν κόσμον γράφει τῷ Διὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ περιέχειν τὸν Δία καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ψυχήν). The universe, identified with Zeus (*De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 C-D *supra* and *De Facie* 926 D ; *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 168, 5-8 and p. 169, 32), has body and soul in the " diacosmesis " but becomes all soul in the " ecpyrosis " (*De Stoic. Repug.* 1053 B-C *supra*).

[f] *Cf.* Cicero, *Acad. Post.* i, 29 and *De Nat. Deorum* ii, 58 (*S.V.F.* i, p. 44, 19-21) ; *S.V.F.* ii, p. 187, 13.

(1077) τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶθ' Ε ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους.

37. Ἀφέντες οὖν ἤδη τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ προσευξάμενοι κοινὰς φρένας διδόναι καὶ κοινὸν νοῦν, τὰ περὶ στοιχείων πῶς ἔχει αὐτοῖς ἴδωμεν. παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι σῶμα σώματος εἶναι τόπον καὶ σῶμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος, κενὸν μηδετέρου περιέχοντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους εἰς τὸ πλῆρες ἐνδυομένου καὶ δεχομένου τὸ ἐπιμιγνύμενον τοῦ διάστασιν οὐκ ἔχοντος[1] οὐδὲ χώραν ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν.

[1] ἔχοντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους -E, B ; [ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους] -deleted by Hutten.

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[a] See 1075 B *supra* and note *c* there.

[b] Implying that a single substance has two qualitative individuations, Zeus = κόσμος (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 186, 35-38) and πρόνοια = soul alone. The opponents of Chrysippus then argued that in conformity with his paradigm for avoiding such a conclusion (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 397) πρόνοια should be destroyed in the " ecpyrosis " (Philo Jud., *De Aeternitate Mundi* 47-51 = vi, pp. 87, 14–88, 25 [Cohn-Reiter]).

[c] For the Stoic " ether " see note *e* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1053 A *supra*, and for the " ecpyrosis " as " etherialization " of the body of the universe *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 188, 22-23.

[d] Explicitly as such this subject is not attacked until chapter 48 (1085 B *infra*) ; but the doctrine of thorough blending, with which Plutarch here begins and on which all Stoic physical theory was held to depend (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 475, especially p. 156, 16-18), and the related questions of continuity and discreteness and of the corporeality of all existents are fundamental to his criticism of the Stoic treatment of στοιχεῖον, so that despite a few digressions suggested by the context the intervening chapters are not irrelevant

alone of the gods is indestructible,[a] withdraws to his providence, and then both, having come together, persist in the single substance [b] of the ether.[c]

37. So, leaving the gods at last with a prayer for the gift of common sense and common intelligence, let us see how the Stoics treat the subject of the elements.[d] It is at odds with the common conception [e] for one body to be place for another [f] and for one to pass through another if void is contained in neither but plenum enters into plenum and the admixture is received by that which because of its continuity has not interval or space within itself.[g] These men,

to the subject here announced (*cf.* Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], pp. 29-30).

[e] παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν . . . τῷ μεγίστῳ = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 465 (p. 151, 16-23) ; *cf.* Alexander, *De Mixtione*, p. 218, 10-24 and p. 220, 23-34 (Bruns) with p. 227, 10-12 (= *S.V.F.* ii, p. 156, 16-19) and for the Stoic doctrine of thorough blending, the compenetration of one another by two or more bodies, each itself a plenum, *cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 463-481 and W. J. Den Dulk, ΚΡΑΣΙΣ (Leiden, 1934), pp. 41-48. Our most extensive sources for the doctrine are the present chapter, the essay *De Mixtione* (Περὶ κράσεως καὶ αὐξήσεως) by Alexander of Aphrodisias (*cf. De An. Libri Mantissa*, pp. 139, 30–141, 28 [Bruns] and *Quaestiones*, p. 57, 7-30 [Bruns]), a discussion by Plotinus (*Enn.* II, vii ; *cf.* IV, vii, 8[2]), and the attack on blending by Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 56-62). Sympathetic interpretations of the doctrine have been attempted by Bréhier (*Théorie des Incorporels*, pp. 39-44), A. Schmekel (*Die Positive Philosophie . . .* i [Berlin, 1938], pp. 250-255), and Sambursky (*Physics of the Stoics*, pp. 13-17).

[f] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 468 (. . . τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἐν ἴσῳ ἑτέρῳ σώματι . . .) and Alexander, *De An. Libri Mantissa*, p. 140, 10-20 (Bruns).

[g] *Cf.* Alexander, *De Anima*, p. 20, 8-10 (Bruns) ; *De An. Libri Mantissa*, p. 139, 33-36 (= *S.V.F.* ii, p. 156, 36-39) ; *De Mixtione*, p. 218, 21-24 (Bruns) and, for διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν, *ibid.*, p. 218, 5-6 (= *S.V.F.* ii, p. 155, 35-36).

(1077) οἱ δ' οὐχ ἓν εἰς ἓν οὐδὲ δύο οὐδὲ τρία καὶ[1] δέκα συνωθοῦντες ἀλλὰ πάντα μέρη τοῦ κόσμου κατα-
F κερματισθέντος ἐμβάλλοντες εἰς ἓν ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι καὶ τοὐλάχιστον αἰσθητὸν ἀποφάσκοντες[2] ἐπιλείψειν[3] ἐπιόντι[4] τῷ μεγίστῳ, νεανιεύονται δόγμα ποιούμενοι τὸν ἔλεγχον[5] ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἅτε δὴ μαχομένας ὑποθέσεις ταῖς ἐννοίαις λαμβάνοντες. αὐτίκα γοῦν ⟨ἀκόλουθον⟩[6] τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πολλὰ τερατώδη[7] καὶ ἀλλόκοτα προσδέχεσθαι τοὺς τὰ σώ-
1078 ματα τοῖς σώμασιν ὅλοις ὅλα κεραννύντας. ὧν ἐστι καὶ τὸ "τὰ τρία τέσσαρα εἶναι"· τουτὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι λέγουσιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ παράδειγμα τῶν ἀδιανοήτων, τούτοις δὲ συμβαίνει τὸν ἕνα κύαθον τοῦ οἴνου πρὸς δύο κεραννύμενον ὕδατος, εἰ μέλλει μὴ ἀπολείπειν ἀλλ' ἐξισοῦσθαι, παράγοντας ἐπὶ[8] πᾶν καὶ διασυγχέοντας ἓν' ὄντα δύο ποιεῖν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς[9] δύο τῆς κράσεως ἐξισώσει· τὸ γὰρ μένειν ἕνα καὶ δυεῖν παρεκτείνειν καὶ ποιεῖν[10] ἴσον ⟨ἑαυτὸν

[1] καὶ -E, B ; ⟨ἢ⟩ καὶ -von Arnim ; ἢ -Pohlenz (but *cf. Ad Principem Ineruditum* 780 E : οὐ Φειδίου . . . οὐδὲ Πολυκλείτου καὶ Μύρωνος).

[2] ἀποφάσκοντες -Bernardakis ; ἐπιφάσκοντες -E, B ; ἔτι φάσκοντες ⟨οὐκ⟩ -Wyttenbach ; ⟨οὐδὲ⟩ τοὐλάχιστον αἰσθητὸν [ἐπι]φάσκοντες -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, 3 Ser. x [1942], p. 43).

[3] Stephanus ; ἐπιλήψειν -E, B.

[4] ἐπιὸν -von Arnim.

[5] τὸ ἀνέλεγκτον -Pohlenz (but *cf.* Sandbach, *Class. Rev.*, N.S. iv [1954], pp. 249-250).

[6] ⟨ἀκόλουθον⟩ -added by Pohlenz.

[7] τερατώδη ⟨δεῖ⟩ -Giesen (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, Theses # 5).

[8] ἐπὶ -Wyttenbach ; εἴ τι -E, B.

[9] τοὺς -E ; omitted by B ; [τῇ . . . ἐξισώσει] -deleted by Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], p. 116).

however, compressing into one thing not one other and not even two or even three or ten but stuffing all parts of the finely shredded universe into any single thing they find and denying that the slightest perceptible thing would be inadequate for the largest that encounters it,[a] recklessly make themselves a doctrine of the objection advanced to refute them just as they do in many other cases, inasmuch as they make assumptions that are in conflict with the common conceptions. It is ⟨a consequence⟩ of this reasoning, for example, that many prodigiously strange things are admitted by those who blend bodies with bodies in their entirety. Among them is even the proposition, "three are four," for, while others use this expression by way of hyperbole as an example of things that are inconceivable,[b] for these men it does turn out that, if the single ladleful of wine being blended with two of water is not to fall short of the water but is to match it, in dispersing the ladleful over all the water and dissolving[c] it throughout they make it two, though it is one, by the equalization of blending it with two. For to remain one ladleful and to make ⟨itself⟩ coextensive with

[a] *Cf.* Alexander, *De Anima*, p. 20, 10-15 (Bruns) ; Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 530, 19-24 ; Philoponus, *De Aeternitate Mundi* vii, 17 (p. 281, 12-22 [Rabe]).

[b] *Cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1038 F *supra.*

[c] Not to be taken in the technical Stoic sense of σύγχυσις, which is distinguished from κρᾶσις (*cf.* Alexander, *De Mixtione*, p. 220, 29-35 [Bruns] ; *S.V.F.* ii, p. 153, 23-26 and 39 ff. and p. 154, 15-28).

[10] [καὶ ποιεῖν] -deleted by Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 21) ; καὶ ποιεῖ -Giesen (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 31, n. 2).

(1078) ἔσται τὸ ἥμισυ ποιεῖν ἴσον⟩[1] τῷ διπλασίῳ· εἰ δέ,[2] ὅπως ἐξίκηται[3] τῇ κράσει πρὸς τοὺς δύο, δυεῖν λαμβάνει[4] μέτρον ἐν τῇ διαχύσει, τοῦτο[5] μέτρον ἅμα καὶ τριῶν ἐστι καὶ τεσσάρων, τριῶν μὲν ὅτι τοῖς δύο εἷς μέμικται τεσσάρων δὲ ὅτι δυσὶ μεμιγ-
B μένος ἴσον ἔσχηκε πλῆθος οἷς μίγνυται. τοῦτο[6] δὴ συμβαίνει τὸ καλὸν αὐτοῖς ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς σῶμα σώματα, καὶ[7] τὸ τῆς περιοχῆς ἀδιανόητον. ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰς ἄλληλα χωρούντων τῷ κεράννυσθαι, μὴ θάτερον μὲν περιέχειν περιέχεσθαι δὲ θάτερον καὶ τὸ μὲν δέχεσθαι τὸ δ' ἐνυπάρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ οὐ κρᾶσις ἀφὴ δὲ καὶ ψαῦσις ἔσται τῶν ἐπιφανειῶν, τῆς μὲν ἐντὸς ὑποδυομένης τῆς δ' ἐκτὸς περιεχούσης τῶν δ' ἄλλων μερῶν ἀμίκτων καὶ καθαρῶν ⟨καὶ καθ'⟩[8] ἓν δὲ διαφερομένων. ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη,[9] γιγνομένης ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τῆς ἀνακράσεως, ἐν ἀλλήλοις τὰ μιγνύμενα γίγνεσθαι[10] καὶ ταὐτὸν ὁμοῦ
C τῷ ἐνυπάρχειν περιέχεσθαι καὶ τῷ δέχεσθαι περιέχειν θάτερον· καὶ μηδέτερον[11] αὐτῶν αὖ πάλιν δυ-

[1] ⟨ἑαυτὸν . . . ἴσον⟩ -added by H. C. (*cf.* Alexander, *De An. Libri Mantissa*, p. 141, 13-14 [Bruns]); ποιεῖν ἴσον τῷ διπλασίῳ ⟨τὸ ἥμισυ παράλογόν ἐστιν⟩ -Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], p. 116); ποιεῖν ἴσον ⟨ἴσον⟩ τῷ διπλασίῳ -Pohlenz.

[2] ἔτι δέ -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 671 [with λαμβάνειν *infra*]).

[3] εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἐξισοῦται -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 21).

[4] Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], p. 116), and implied by Amyot's version; λαμβάνειν -E, B; λαμβάνων -Giesen (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 31, n. 2).

[5] τὸ αὐτὸ -Sandbach (*loc. cit.*).

[6] τοῦτό ⟨τε⟩ -Sandbach (*loc. cit.*).

[7] κατὰ -Wyttenbach.

[8] ⟨καὶ καθ'⟩ -added by H. C.; καθαρῶν ἐνδιαφερομένων -Wyttenbach; καθαρῶν οὐδὲ διαφερομένων -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 21).

[9] Wyttenbach; ἀνάγκης -E, B.

[10] E; μίγνυσθαι -B.

[11] von Arnim; μὴ δ' ἕτερον -E, B; μήθ' ἕτερον . . . συμβαίνει μήτ' ἀμφότερα -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 671).

two and equal to them ⟨would be to make what is half equal⟩ to its double; but, if in order to suffice for blending with the two it does acquire in the diffusion a measurement of two ladles, this is at the same time a measurement both of three and of four —of three because one ladleful has been mixed with the two and of four because, once having been mixed with two, it is equal in amount to those with which it is mixed.[a] This pretty pass they come to, then, by stuffing bodies into body—and to the inconceivability of encompassment. For it is necessarily not the case[b] that of bodies permeating each other in being blended one encompass and the other be encompassed or one be the receptacle and the other be in it, since in that case there would be not blending but contact,[c] that is contiguity of the surfaces, the one within subjacent and the one without encompassing it and the rest of the parts unmixed and pure and severally distinct too. If blending occurs in the way they require, however, it is necessary that the things being mixed get into each other and the same thing be at once encompassed by being in the other and encompass it by being its receptacle; and on

[a] *Cf.* Alexander, *De An. Libri Mantissa*, p. 141, 9-22 and Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 60-61 and 96.

[b] ἀνάγκη γὰρ . . . ἀναπίμπλασθαι βιαζομένης = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 465 (p. 151, 24-33); *cf.* Alexander, *De Mixtione*, pp. 220, 37–221, 6 (Bruns).

[c] *Cf.* 1080 E *infra*: τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἁφὴν ἀλλὰ κρᾶσιν ποιεῖν.

(1078) νατὸν εἶναι συμβαίνει, ἀμφότερα[1] τῆς κράσεως δι' ἀλλήλων διιέναι καὶ μηδὲν ἐπιλείπεσθαι[2] μηδενὸς μόριον ἀλλὰ ⟨πᾶν⟩[3] παντὸς ἀναπίμπλασθαι βιαζομένης. ἐνταῦθα δήπου[4] καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον[5] ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς Ἀρκεσιλάου σκέλος ἥκει ταῖς ἀτοπίαις ἐπεμβαῖνον[6] αὐτῶν μετὰ γέλωτος. εἰ γάρ εἰσιν αἱ κράσεις δι' ὅλων, τί κωλύει,[7] τοῦ σκέλους ἀποκοπέντος καὶ κατασαπέντος καὶ ῥιφέντος εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ διαχυθέντος, οὐ τὸν Ἀντιγόνου μόνον στόλον διεκπλεῖν, ὡς ἔλεγεν Ἀρκεσίλαος,
D ἀλλὰ τὰς Ξέρξου χιλίας καὶ διακοσίας καὶ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς ὁμοῦ τριακοσίας τριήρεις ἐν τῷ σκέλει ναυμαχούσας; οὐ γὰρ ἐπιλείψει δήπουθεν προϊὸν[8] οὐδὲ παύσεται ἐν τῷ μείζονι τοὔλαττον· ἢ πέρας ἡ κρᾶσις ἕξει καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον αὐτῆς ἁφὴν ὅπου λήγει ποιησάμενον εἰς ὅλον οὐ δίεισιν ἀλλ' ἀπαγορεύσει[9] μιγνύμενον. εἰ δὲ μεμίξεται δι' ὅλων, οὐ μὰ Δία[10] τὸ σκέλος ἐνναυμαχῆσαι παρέξει τοῖς Ἕλλησιν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δεῖται σήψεως καὶ μετα-

[1] συμβαίνειν δ' ἀμφότερα -Wyttenbach; συμβαίνει δ' ἀμφότερα -von Arnim; συμβαίνειν, ἀμφότερα -Pohlenz.
[2] ἔτι λείπεσθαι -von Arnim (but *cf. Epinomis* 978 B 1).
[3] ⟨πᾶν⟩ -added by Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 611).
[4] δήπου -Bernardakis; δεῖ τοῦ -E; δὴ -B.
[5] Dübner; θρυλλούμενον -F, B (*cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1050 B *supra*).
[6] B; ἐπεμβαίνων -E.
[7] B; κωλύειν -E.
[8] E; προιὼν (but with ω changed to o) -B.
[9] Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 24, n. 3); ἀπαγορεύει -E, B.
[10] οὔ μα (μὰ -E) δία -E, B; εὖ μάλα -Pohlenz.

[a] *Cf.* Alexander, *De Mixtione*, p. 215, 10-12 (Bruns) and p. 217, 9-12 (=*S.V.F.* ii, pp. 154, 36–155, 3); Hierokles, *Ethische Elementarlehre* ed. H. von Arnim, col. 4, 6-10.

the other hand again it follows that neither condition is possible, since the blending constrains both things to penetrate each other and no part to lack any part but ⟨every part⟩ to be filled full of all.[a] Here, I presume, is where the leg too that Arcesilaus made a commonplace in his discourses enters trampling in mockery upon their absurdities. In fact, if blends are thorough, what is to prevent not only the fleet of Antigonus, as Arcesilaus said, from sailing through the leg that has been amputated, decayed, flung into the sea, and dissolved but the 1200 triremes of Xerxes together with the 300 of the Greeks[b] from fighting a naval battle within the leg? For surely the lesser spreading in what is greater would not run short and would not stop either; otherwise the blend would have a limit, and its extremity, having made contact at the point where it terminates, would not penetrate the whole but would leave off being mixed. If it should be, however, that the mixture has been thorough, it is not the leg, by heaven,[c] that would be affording the Greeks room for a naval battle; but, while this does require decay, that is a

[b] Approximately the number of ships engaged at Salamis in 480 B.C. according to Aeschylus, *Persae* 337-343, the passage to which Plutarch himself refers in his *Themistocles* xiv, 1 (119 B).

[c] Pohlenz's emendation (εὖ μάλα) is superficially attractive but spoils the sense. Plutarch recognizes that the jest of Arcesilaus is beside the point because, since it implies alteration of the leg before blending occurs, the leg is *not* an element in the blend. The elements that enter into the blend must retain their own characters (*cf.* Alexander, *De Mixtione*, pp. 216, 28–217, 2 [=*S.V.F.* ii, p. 154, 23-28] and p. 220, 26-35 [Bruns]); and this according to the Stoic theory a single drop of the putrefaction fallen into the ocean should do.

(1078) βολῆς, εἷς[1] δέ τις κύαθος ἢ μία σταγὼν αὐτόθεν εἰς τὸ Αἰγαῖον ἐμπεσοῦσα πέλαγος ἢ τὸ Κρητικὸν[2] ἐφίξεται[3] τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ καὶ τῆς Ἀτλαντικῆς θα-
E λάττης, οὐκ ἐπιπολῆς ψαύουσα τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἀλλὰ πάντῃ διὰ βάθους εἰς πλάτος ὁμοῦ καὶ μῆκος ἀναχεομένη. καὶ ταῦτα προσδέχεται Χρύσιππος εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν Ζητημάτων οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος οἴνου σταλαγμὸν ἕνα[4] κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν· καί, ἵνα δὴ μὴ τοῦτο θαυμάζωμεν, εἰς ὅλον φησὶ τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμόν. ὧν οὐκ οἶδα τί ἂν ἀτοπώτερον φανείη.

38. Καὶ μὴν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν μήτ' ἄκρον ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν σωμάτων μήτε πρῶτον μήτ' ἔσχατον ⟨μέρος εἶναι⟩[5] μηδὲν εἰς ὃ λήγει τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ

[1] εἷς -Dübner ; εἰ -E, B. [2] E ; κριτικὸν -B.
[3] Wyttenbach ; ἀφίξεται -E, B.
[4] σταλαγμῷ ἑνὶ -Giesen (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 32).
[5] ⟨μέρος εἶναι⟩ -added by von Arnim (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 159, 9) ; ⟨εἶναι⟩ -Pohlenz.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 480. *Cf.* Alexander, *De An. Libri Mantissa*, p. 140, 22 (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 157, 1-2) and p. 141, 19-21 ; Diogenes Laertius, vii, 151 (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 479). In this passage of Diogenes συμφθαρήσεται conflicts with the other accounts of the Stoic theory, for σύμφθαρσις characterizes σύγχυσις as distinguished from κρᾶσις (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 154, 15-19 and 32-34) ; and so the preceding ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται, which has been used to discredit Plutarch's assertion (H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* i [Harvard University Press, 1956], p. 383, n. 81), is also suspect as a misinterpretation if it is not simply an error for ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 155, 24 : εἰς τὴν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔκτασιν). Chrysippus made his assertion in direct contradiction of Aristotle's (*De Generatione* 328 a 26-28).

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 485 (p. 159, 7-11). Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 25) suggests that Plutarch included

transformation, a single ladleful or just a single drop once fallen into the Aegean or the Cretan sea would reach the Ocean and the Atlantic, not in superficial contact with the surface but everyway diffused from top to bottom throughout both breadth and length at once. And this Chrysippus straightway admits in the first book of the Physical Questions,[a] where he says that nothing keeps a single drop of wine from tempering the sea ; and, no doubt in order that this may not amaze us, he says that the drop in the blending will extend to the whole universe. What could be manifestly more absurd than this I do not know.

38. Moreover, it is at odds with the common conception that[b] ⟨there be⟩ in the nature of bodies neither extremity nor any first or last ⟨part⟩[c] in

chaps. 38-39 because, " having turned to φυσικὰ ζητήματα α' for his quotation at the end of 37, [he] could not resist picking out a couple of points from the same book " ; but that the subject of chaps. 38-40 was regarded as essential to the question of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων may be seen from the way Alexander treats the former when attacking the latter in *De Mixtione*, p. 221, 25 ff. (Bruns).

[c] *Cf.* οἱ σῶμα μηδὲν εἰς ἔσχατον μέρος περαίνοντες in 1079 A and μηδὲν μέρος ἔσχατον μηδὲ πρῶτον ἀπολείποντες in 1080 E *infra*, where it appears that the Stoics did not deny " extremities " to body but insisted that these extremities are incorporeal limits and not parts of the bodies which they limit. Plutarch in his attack here, however, disregards the distinction which they drew between πέρας and ἔσχατον μέρος ; and, perhaps misled by this and by Bréhier (*Théorie des Incorporels*, pp. 39-40), Sambursky (*Physics of the Stoics*, p. 96) misinterprets the passage as evidence for the notion that the Stoics " discarded the conception of the distinct surface of a body. . . . " Sextus in *Adv. Math.* x, 28 assumes that τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ σώματος πέρατα are parts of the body ; but in *Adv. Math.* iii, 24-25 he tries to prove that every πέρας is a part of that of which it is the extremity and as such has magnitude.

(1078) σώματος ἀλλ' ἀεί ⟨τι⟩[1] τοῦ ληφθέντος ἐπέκεινα φαινόμενον εἰς ἄπειρον καὶ ἀόριστον ἐμβάλλειν τὸ
F ὑποκείμενον. οὔτε γὰρ μεῖζον οὔτ' ἔλαττον ἔσται νοεῖν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μέγεθος, εἰ τὸ προϊέναι τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἀμφοτέροις ὡσ⟨αύτως⟩[2] συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλ' ἀνισότητος αἴρεται[3] φύσις· ἀνίσων γὰρ νοουμένων, τὸ μὲν προαπολείπεται τοῖς ἐσχάτοις μέρεσι τὸ δὲ παραλλάττει καὶ περίεστι. μὴ οὔσης δ' ἀνισότητος, ἕπεται μὴ ἀνωμαλίαν εἶναι μηδὲ τραχύτητα σώματος· ἀνωμαλία μὲν γάρ ἐστι
1079 μιᾶς ἐπιφανείας ἀνισότης πρὸς ἑαυτήν, τραχύτης δ' ἀνωμαλία μετὰ σκληρότητος, ὧν οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσιν οἱ σῶμα μηδὲν εἰς ἔσχατον μέρος περαίνοντες ἀλλὰ πάντα πλήθει μερῶν ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἐξάγοντες. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἐναργές ἐστι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ πλειόνων συνεστηκέναι μορίων ἢ τὸν δάκτυλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πάλιν τὸν κόσμον ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον; ταῦτα[4] γὰρ ἐπίστανται καὶ διανοοῦν-

[1] ⟨τι⟩ -added by Dübner.
[2] Pohlenz ; ὡς -E, B ; [ὡς] -deleted by Wyttenbach.
[3] ἀναιρεῖται -van Herwerden, Westman ; but see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1051 B *supra*.
[4] Wyttenbach ; αὐτὰ -E, B.

[a] Any part taken as ultimate must as a *part* be corporeal and so have " beyond it " an extremity, which, if a *part*, will also be corporeal and have " beyond it " an extremity, and so on without limit. See 1080 D-E *infra* (τοῖς . . . ἀεί τι τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἅπτεσθαι πρότερον λαμβάνουσι καὶ μηδέποτε τοῦ προάγειν ἐπέκεινα παυομένοις), and *cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* iii, 81 (εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν [*scil.* τὸ πέρας], ἐπεὶ πᾶν σῶμα πέρας ἔχει, κἀκεῖνο τὸ πέρας σῶμα ὂν ἕξει πέρας, κἀκεῖνο ὁμοίως, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς ἄπειρον) and for the pattern of the argument Zeno of Elea, frag. B 1 (i, p. 255, 15-21 [D.-K]=Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 141, 2-6 with the remark of Simplicius [*ibid.*, p. 139, 17-18] : . . . πρὸ τοῦ λαμβανομένου ἀεί τι εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἐπ' ἄπειρον τομήν).

which the magnitude of the body terminates but that, whatever be taken, the invariable appearance ⟨of something⟩ beyond it reduce the object to infinity and indefinitude.[a] For it would not be possible to conceive one magnitude as greater or less than another if for the parts of both alike it is characteristic to proceed to infinity ; but the nature of inequality is abolished, for, when things are conceived as unequal, it is by the ultimate parts that the one leaves off before the other and the other passes it by and is in excess of it.[b] And, if inequality does not exist, it follows that unevenness does not exist or roughness of body either, for unevenness is inequality of a single surface with itself[c] and roughness is unevenness along with hardness,[d] none of which is left by those who[e] bring no body to an end in an ultimate part but in number of parts extend all bodies to infinity. Yet is it not completely clear that a man consists of more parts than the man's finger does and the universe again of more parts than does the man ? This all men know and have in

[b] The reason given here is simply that the extent of magnitudes not determined by *ultimate* parts could not be distinguished. It is not, as it has been said to be (S. Luria, *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, B ii [1933], p. 169), the objection that any two magnitudes would be equal because both would contain infinitely many parts ; nor is it the objection raised by Epicurus in *Epistle* i, 56-57 (p. 16, 6-12 [Usener]).

[c] *Cf. Anonymi Logica et Quadrivium* ed. J. L. Heiberg, p. 73, 16-17, and Hero, *Definitiones* 10 (p. 22, 10-13 [Heiberg]) with Sextus, *Adv. Math.* iii, 95 (τὸ ἔχον ἐξ ἴσου τὰ μέρη κείμενα, τουτέστι τὸ ὁμαλόν) ; for heterogeneity or lack of uniformity in general *cf.* Plato, *Timaeus* 58 A 1.

[d] *Cf.* Plato, *Timaeus* 63 E 8-10.

[e] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 485 (p. 159, 11-12).

(1079) ται πάντες ἂν μὴ Στωικοὶ γένωνται· γενόμενοι δὲ Στωικοὶ τἀναντία λέγουσι καὶ δοξάζουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πλειόνων μορίων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ δάκτυλος οὐδὲ ὁ κόσμος ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἐπ' ἄπειρον γὰρ ἡ
B τομὴ βράττει[1] τὰ σώματα, τῶν δ' ἀπείρων οὐδέν ἐστι πλέον οὐδ' ἔλαττον οὐδὲ ὅλως ὑπερβάλλει[2] πλῆθος[3] ἢ παύσεται τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὑπολειπομένου μεριζόμενα καὶ παρέχοντα πλῆθος ἐξ αὐτῶν.

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀμύνονται[4] ταύτας τὰς ἀπορίας;

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Εὐμηχάνως κομιδῇ καὶ ἀνδρείως. λέγει γὰρ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐρωτωμένους ἡμᾶς εἴ τινα ἔχομεν μέρη καὶ πόσα καὶ ἐκ τίνων συγκείμενα μερῶν καὶ πόσων διαστολῇ χρήσεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ὁλοσχερὲς τιθέντας ὡς ἐκ κεφαλῆς καὶ θώρακος καὶ σκελῶν συγκείμεθα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀπορούμενον· " ἐὰν δ' ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσχατα

[1] H. C.; *πράττει* -E, B; *προάγει* -Wyttenbach.

[2] Stephanus; *ὑπερβάλλειν* -E, B; *ὑπερβάλλον* -Pohlenz; *ὑπερβάλλει <τι κατὰ τὸ τῶν μερῶν>* -von Arnim (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 159, 5 [with *ἐπ' ἄπειρον γὰρ . . . ἔλαττον* in parentheses]).

[3] [*πλῆθος*] -deleted by Wyttenbach.

[4] *Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀμύνονται* -Pohlenz (*Τί οὖν οὐκ ἀμύνονται* -Dübner; *Τί οὖν; ἀμύνονται* -van Herwerden); *ὅτιοὖν οὐκ ἀμύνονται* -E, B (*ἀμείνονται* -B); *πῶς οὖν ἀμύνονται* -Basil.; *τίσιν οὖν ἀμύνονται* -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 21); . . . *ὁτιοῦν.* ΛΑΜΠΡ. *Πῶς οὖν ἀμύνονται* -Bernardakis.

[a] *γενόμενοι δὲ Στωικοὶ . . . παρέχοντα πλῆθος ἐξ αὐτῶν* = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 484. This is not Stoic doctrine, however, but an argument against the Stoics based upon the supposed implication of their doctrine, an argument used by Lucretius also (i, 615-627) to prove that there must be minima. The Stoics themselves refused to say that any body or any continuum consists of an infinite number of parts (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 482 [p. 158, 17-19 and 24-26] and the remark of

mind if they have not become Stoics; but, once they have become Stoics, their statements and opinions are to the contrary effect[a] that the man is not made up of more parts than the finger is or the universe of more parts than the man, for by division bodies are triturated[b] to infinity and among infinites none is more or less and none exceeds another in multitude at all[c] or else the parts of the one exceeded would stop being divided and making multitudes of themselves.

COMRADE. What then? Don't they grapple with these difficulties?

DIADUMENUS. Oh, quite ingeniously and manfully. For Chrysippus says[d] that, when asked whether we have any parts and how many and of what parts they are composed and how many, we shall make a distinction, in the large sense affirming that we are composed of head and trunk and limbs—for this was all there is to the difficulty in question—; " but,"

Chrysippus *infra* = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 483), so that this passage, if it anticipates the notion of an infinite set containing an equivalent sub-set, indicates not that this was formulated by the Stoics (Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, p. 97) but rather that their opponents formulated it as a " gibe at the Stoics " (D. A. Steele in *Paradoxes of the Infinite* by Dr. Bernard Bolzano translated from the German [London, 1950], p. 38, note 5).

[b] For the word *βράττει* in this sense *cf.* Aristophanes, frag. 271 and Plato, *Sophist* 226 B 6; for the figure *cf.* the scholia to Iamblichus, *In Nicomachi Arithmeticam Introductionem*, p. 126, 4-8 (Pistelli).

[c] Against such arguments based upon the position that all infinites are equal *cf.* Newton's letter to Bentley, 17 January 1692/93 (*Correspondence* edited by H. W. Turnbull [Cambridge, 1961], iii, p. 239), quoted by H. A. J. Munro in his note (ii, p. 82) on Lucretius, i, 622.

[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 483.

(1079) μέρη τὸ[1] ἐρωτᾶν προάγωσιν, οὐδέν" φησι "τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν ὑπολεπτέον, ἀλλὰ ῥητέον οὔτ' ἐκ
C τίνων[2] συνεστάναι καὶ ὁμοίως[3] οὔτ' ἐξ ὁπόσων,[4] οὔτ' ⟨ἐξ⟩[5] ἀπείρων οὔτ' ἐκ πεπερασμένων." καί μοι δοκῶ ταῖς ἐκείνου κεχρῆσθαι λέξεσιν αὐταῖς, ὅπως συνίδῃς ὃν τρόπον διεφύλαττε τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας, κελεύων ἡμᾶς νοεῖν τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον οὔτ' ἔκ τινων[6] οὔτ' ἐξ ὁποσωνοῦν μερῶν, οὔτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων οὔτ' ἐκ πεπερασμένων συγκείμενον. εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ τὸ ἀδιάφορον, οὕτως πεπερασμένου τι καὶ ἀπείρου μέσον ἐστίν, εἰπόντα τί τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔδει λῦσαι τὴν ἀπορίαν· εἰ δέ, ὡς τὸ μὴ ἴσον εὐθὺς ἄνισον καὶ τὸ μὴ φθαρτὸν ἄφθαρτον, οὕτως τὸ μὴ πεπερασμένον ἄπειρον νοοῦμεν, ὅμοιόν ἐστιν, οἶμαι, [τῷ][7] τὸ σῶμα εἶναι
D μήτ' ἐκ πεπερασμένων μήτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων τῷ[8] λόγον

[1] τὸ -E ; τοῦ -B ; τῷ -Wyttenbach (?).
[2] E, B ; ἔκ τινων -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 21), but see ἐκ τίνων . . . καὶ πόσων (1079 B *supra*).
[3] [καὶ ὁμοίως] -deleted by Giesen (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, p. 33).
[4] E, B ; ὁποσωνοῦν -Giesen (*loc. cit.*) ; [καὶ ὁμοίως] οὔτ' ἐκ ποσῶν ⟨καὶ ὁμοίως⟩ -Rasmus (*loc. cit.*).
[5] οὔτ' ⟨ἐξ⟩ -Rasmus (*loc. cit.*) ; αὖτε -E, B ; οὔτε -Basil. ; εἴτ' ἀπείρων εἴτε πεπερασμένων -von Arnim (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 158, 34).
[6] Bernardakis ; ἐκ τίνων -E, B.
[7] [τῷ] -omitted by Basil., deleted by Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 21).
[8] τῷ -H. C. ; καὶ -E, B ; τὸ -Pohlenz (retaining τῷ τὸ σῶμα *supra*).

[a] This injunction must fit the question in 1079 B *supra* to which it was addressed, ἐκ τίνων . . . καὶ πόσων now pressed ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσχατα μέρη, and not necessarily Plutarch's tendentious interpretation of it *infra*, οὔτ' ἔκ τινων οὔτ' ἐξ ὁποσωνοῦν μερῶν . . . συγκείμενον.

[b] Plutarch forgets or quietly suppresses for the sake of his polemic the fact that the injunction of Chrysippus had to do with *ultimate* parts.

[c] This does not mean, as Luria supposed (*Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, B ii [1933], p. 139), that Chrysippus assumed any μέσον between finite and infinite ; Plutarch's statement here is not even parallel to his ascription of μήτ' ἴσας εἶναι μήτ' ἀνίσους to Chrysippus in 1079 E-F *infra*. For the indifferent as intermediate between good and evil see *supra* 1064 C (page 701, note *a*) and 1066 E.

[d] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Topics* 147 b 4-6 and Plato, *Parmenides* 161 C 7-8.

[e] *Cf. De Sollertia Animalium* 960 B-C and see 1075 C *supra*.

he says, "if they press their questioning on to the ultimate parts, nothing like these is to be taken up in response but one must say neither of what ultimate parts one consists nor—in like manner too—of how many, neither infinitely nor finitely many."[a] I think it well to have made use of his very words, in order that you may behold the way in which he kept watch and ward over the common conceptions, bidding us conceive each several body as composed neither of any particular parts[b] nor of any number of them whatever, neither an infinite nor a finite number. For, if there is something intermediate between finite and infinite as the indifferent is between good and evil, he ought to have resolved the difficulty by saying what this is[c] ; but, if we conceive what is not-finite to be infinite in the way we do what is not-equal to be *eo ipso* unequal[d] and what is not subject to destruction to be indestructible,[e] then to say that a body is made up of parts neither finite nor infinite is, I think, like saying that an

(1079) εἶναι μήτ' ἐξ ἀληθῶν λημμάτων μήτ' ἐκ ψευδῶν μήτ' ἐξ ⟨ἁπλῶν μήτ' ἐξ οὐχ ἁπλῶν.⟩[1]

39. Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐπινεανιευόμενός φησι τῆς πυραμίδος ἐκ τριγώνων συνισταμένης τὰς πλευρὰς κατὰ τὴν συναφὴν ἐγκεκλιμένας[2] ἀνίσους μὲν εἶναι μὴ ὑπερέχειν[3] δὲ ᾗ μείζονές εἰσιν. οὕτως ἐτήρει τὰς ἐννοίας. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι μεῖζον καὶ μὴ ὑπερέχον, ἔσται τι μικρότερον καὶ μὴ ἐλλεῖπον, ὥστε καὶ ἄνισον μήθ' ὑπερέχον μήτ' ἐλλεῖπον, τουτέστιν ἴσον τὸ ἄνισον καὶ οὐ μεῖζον τὸ μεῖζον οὐδὲ μικρότερον
E τὸ μικρότερον. ἔτι τοίνυν ὅρα τίνα τρόπον ἀπήντησε Δημοκρίτῳ, διαποροῦντι φυσικῶς καὶ ἐμψύχως[4] εἰ κῶνος τέμνοιτο παρὰ τὴν βάσιν ἐπιπέδῳ, τί χρὴ διανοεῖσθαι τὰς τῶν τμημάτων ἐπιφανείας,

[1] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by H. C. (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 66, 28-30); ἐξ . . . vac. 10+8 -E; vac. 16 -B; ⟨ἀδυνάτων μήτ' ἐκ δυνατῶν⟩ -Pohlenz.

[2] Bernardakis; ἐκκεκλιμένας -E, B.

[3] Leonicus, Basil.; ὑπάρχειν -E, B.

[4] ἐπιτυχῶς or εὐφυῶς -Wyttenbach (εὐλόγως in *Index Graec. Plutarchi*).

[a] Both of which the Stoics would declare to be impossible, for they insisted that every proposition is either true or false (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 166, 186, 187, 192, 193, 196; see note *b* on 1066 E *supra*) and either atomic or molecular (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 182, 203, 205; Mates, *Stoic Logic*, pp. 28-33).

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 489 (p. 159, 31-34).

[c] Chrysippus meant that they do not protrude (*cf.* Aristotle, *Categories* 10 a 23 with Porphyry, *Categ.*, p. 134, 11-12) beyond the straight edge in which any two of the triangular faces meet and which is their common πέρας, although down that edge the faces become continuously larger. By κατὰ τὴν συναφὴν ἐγκεκλιμένας he could not have meant "inclined towards the apex," and as reported here he did not say that adjacent sides or faces are unequal to each other or refer to laminae into which the pyramid is divided by parallel sections or to any process of convergence to a

argument is made up of premises that are neither true nor false, neither ⟨atomic nor molecular.⟩[a]

39. In addition he has the audacity to say[b] that the pyramid, being composed of triangles, has its faces unequal, to be sure, as they are inclined along the juncture but without exceeding where they are larger.[c] This was his way of preserving the common conceptions. For, if there is something larger without exceeding,[d] there will be something smaller without falling short, so that there will also be something unequal without either exceeding or falling short, that is what is unequal will be equal and what is larger will not be larger or what is smaller smaller. Furthermore, look at the way in which he met[e] the difficulty raised by Democritus[f] scientifically and vividly with the question, if a cone should be cut by a plane parallel to its base,[g] what one must suppose

imit,—all of which is read into the passage by Sambursky (*Physics of the Stoics*, pp. 94 and 140-141), as some of it was by Luria before him (*Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, B ii [1933], pp. 171-172). Luria conjectured that Chrysippus had borrowed this example of the pyramid from the Atomists, whereas it is more probable that he put it forward as counter-evidence in his polemic against Democritus about the cone (1079 E-F *infra*).

[d] The word which Chrysippus had used in its meaning "to protrude" is now taken in its common mathematical sense, for which *cf.* Plato, *Phaedo* 96 E 3-4 and *Parmenides* 150 D 5–E 5; Aristotle, *Topics* 125 a 20-22; Nicomachus, *Arithmetica Introductio* I, xvii, 3 (p. 44, 13-20 [Hoche]).

[e] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 489 (pp. 159, 34–160, 8).

[f] Democritus, frag. B 155 (D.-K.).

[g] Contrary to what Heiberg, Heath, and many others have asserted this does not imply "indefinitely near to the base"; for the expression *cf.* Aristotle, *Topics* 158 b 31 with [Alexander], *Topics*, p. 545, 7-12 and Archimedes, *De Sphaera* I, xvi, lemma 2 (I, p. 74, 1 [Heiberg]).

(1079) ἴσας ἢ ἀνίσους γιγνομένας· ἄνισοι μὲν γὰρ οὖσαι τὸν κῶνον ἀνώμαλον παρέξουσι, πολλὰς ἀποχαράξεις λαμβάνοντα βαθμοειδεῖς καὶ τραχύτητας· ἴσων δ' οὐσῶν, ἴσα τμήματα ἔσται καὶ φανεῖται τὸ τοῦ κυλίνδρου πεπονθὼς ὁ κῶνος, ἐξ ἴσων συγκείμενος καὶ οὐκ ἀνίσων κύκλων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτατον. ἐνταῦθα δὴ τὸν Δημόκριτον ἀποφαίνων ἀγνοοῦντα
F τὰς μὲν ἐπιφανείας φησὶ μήτ' ἴσας εἶναι μήτ' ἀνίσους ἄνισα δὲ τὰ σώματα τῷ μήτ' ἴσας εἶναι μήτ' ἀνίσους τὰς ἐπιφανείας. τὸ μὲν δὴ νομοθετεῖν τῶν

[a] How Democritus resolved the dilemma, if he tried to do so, is not indicated here or elsewhere. Some have thought that by it he meant to prove the inapplicability of atomism to mathematics (O. Apelt, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* [Leipzig, 1891], pp. 265-266; A. Wasserstein, *J.H.S.*, lxxxiii [1963], p. 189). It is usually assumed, however, that the dilemma is somehow connected with the theorem concerning the volume of a pyramid (and of a cone?), the undemonstrated enunciation of which is ascribed to Democritus (Archimedes, *Opera Omnia* iterum ed. J. L. Heiberg, II, p. 430, 2-9); and on this tenuous basis some scholars have maintained that he believed the cone to consist of an infinite number of infinitely thin laminae (*e.g.* Sir Thomas Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics* i, pp. 179-181) and others that he believed it to consist of a large but finite number of atom-thin laminae (J. Mau, *Zum Problem des Infinitesimalen bei den antiken Atomisten* [Berlin, 1954], pp. 22-25) or of sub-atomic and mathematically indivisible magnitudes (S. Luria, *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, B ii [1933], pp. 138-148). The way in which he came to the theorem being unknown, however, it is possible that theorem and dilemma had entirely different contexts, for he may have posed the latter as a stumbling-block for Protagoras in his polemic against him (*cf.* Democritus, frags. A 114 and B 156 with Protagoras, frag. B 7 [D.-K.] and R. Philippson, *Hermes*, lxiv [1929], pp. 180-182).

[b] This does not imply, as Plutarch contends (1080 B *infra*),

the surfaces of the segments prove to be, equal or unequal :—for, if unequal, they will make the cone uneven by giving it many step-like notches and asperities ; and, if they are equal, the segments will be equal, and the cone, being composed of circles that are equal and not unequal, will manifestly have got the properties of the cylinder—which is the height of absurdity.[a] Here is just where Chrysippus declares Democritus to be in ignorance and says that the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal but the bodies are unequal in that the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal.[b] Now really, to ordain that, the

that Chrysippus posited " an intermediate between equal and unequal which is neither one nor the other." Such a *μέσον* or *τρίτον γένος* (S. Luria, *op. cit.*, p. 139 [see note *c* on 1079 c *supra*]) is ruled out by Plutarch's own unwitting testimony to the Stoic assertion that the predicates " equal " and " not-unequal " are equivalent (1080 c [page 826, note *b*] *infra*). Nor has the passage anything to do with the " limiting process " read into it by Sambursky (*Physics of the Stoics*, pp. 93-95). Chrysippus meant simply that neither of the predicates, " equal " and " unequal," is applicable to what Democritus called the " surfaces," because these are in fact just the single geometrical plane which cuts the cone into segments and is the incorporeal *πέρας* of their division and contact (see 1080 E *infra*). The " equality " or " inequality " of the surfaces in the dilemma of Democritus implies a " cut " that is not geometrical but physical and so is the removal of an intervening segment, however fine ; and this is why Chrysippus went on to say (1080 A *infra*) that the nicks envisaged in the first horn of the dilemma are produced by the inequality of the bodies (*i.e.* the segments remaining after the removal of the physical " cut ") and not by any inequality of the supposedly contiguous surfaces, which in geometrical division are the one common *πέρας*. When this is taken twice in thought, as Aristotle would say (*e.g. Physics* 263 a 23-26 and b 12-14), to be the upper surface of one segment and the lower of the next, it is because " they,"

(1079) ἐπιφανειῶν μήτ' ἴσων ⟨μήτ' ἀνίσων⟩[1] οὐσῶν τὰ σώματα συμβαίνειν ἄνισα εἶναι θαυμαστὴν ἐξουσίαν αὐτῷ[2] τοῦ γράφειν ὅ τι ἂν ἐπίῃ διδόντος ἐστί. τοὐναντίον γὰρ ὁ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ἐναργείας[3] νοεῖν δίδωσι τῶν ἀνίσων σωμάτων ἀνίσους εἶναι τὰς ἐπι-
1080 φανείας καὶ μείζονα τὴν τοῦ μείζονος, εἴ γε μὴ μέλλει τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ᾗ μεῖζόν ἐστιν, ἐστερημένην ἐπιφανείας ἕξειν. εἰ γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσι τὰς τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἐπιφανείας αἱ τῶν μειζόνων ἀλλὰ προαπολείπουσιν, ἔσται[4] σώματος πέρας ἔχοντος μέρος ἄνευ πέρατος καὶ ἀπεράτωτον. εἰ γὰρ λέγει ὅτι βιαζόμενος οὕτω ⟨ταύτας νοεῖσθαι σῴζει τὸν κῶνον, ἐλέγχεται φάσκων·⟩[5] "ἃς γὰρ ὑφορᾶται περὶ τὸν κῶνον ἀναχαράξεις ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἀνισότης δήπουθεν οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἐπιφανειῶν ἀπεργάζεται." γελοῖον οὖν τὸ τὰς ἐπιφανείας ὑπεξαιρούμενον[6] ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἐλεγχομένην[7] ἀπολιπεῖν ἀνωμαλίαν. ἀλλ' ἂν μένωμεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως,
B τί μᾶλλόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα πλάττειν; εἰ γὰρ ἐπιφάνειαν ἐπιφανείᾳ θήσομεν μήτ' ἴσην εἶναι μήτ' ἄνισον, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἔσται μεγέθει φάναι[8] καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμῷ μήτ' ἴσον εἶναι

[1] μήτ' ἴσων ⟨μήτ' ἀνίσων⟩ -Bernardakis after Wyttenbach (μὴ ἴσων ⟨μήτ' ἀνίσων⟩ or μὴ ⟨ἀν⟩ίσων) ; μὴ ἴσων οὐσῶν -E, B.
[2] αὐτῷ -Stephanus (αὐτῷ -Basil.) ; αὐτὰ -E, B.
[3] Leonicus, Basil. ; ἐνεργείας -E, B.
[4] ἔσται -E ; ἔστω -B.
[5] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by H. C. ; ουτω . . . vac. 14+16 . . . ἃς -E ; οὕτω . . . vac. 32 . . . ἃς -B ; οὕτω ⟨τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἐλέγχεται (Δημόκριτος), αὐτὸν ἐλέγχει φάσκων·⟩ "ἃς -Pohlenz.
[6] E ; ἐξαιρούμενον -B.
[7] B ; ἐλελεγχομένην -E.
[8] Stephanus ; φᾶναι -E, B.

being really one, are neither equal nor unequal that the continuous segments so delimited can be unequal.

surfaces being neither equal ⟨nor unequal⟩, the bodies are consequently unequal is the mark of a man who gives himself amazing licence to write whatever comes into his head, for what reason together with clear apprehension [a] provides is the contrary conception that of unequal bodies the surfaces are unequal and the surface of the larger body is larger, unless, of course, this body is to have the excess by which it is larger deprived of a surface. For, if the surfaces of the larger bodies do not exceed those of the lesser but leave off before doing so, there will be of body that has a limit a part that is without limit and so limitless. For, if he says that by insisting upon such ⟨a conception of these surfaces he saves the cone, he is confuted by his own remark :⟩ "for the nicks in the cone about which he has misgivings are produced by the inequality of the bodies, surely, and not by that of the surfaces." [b] It is ridiculous, then, to exclude the surfaces and in the bodies leave unevenness confirmed. If, however, we adhere to the assumption, what is more at odds with the common conception than to imagine things like this? For, if we do affirm that surface is neither equal nor unequal to surface, it will be possible also to say of magnitude in relation to magnitude and of number in relation to number that it is neither equal nor un-

[a] See 1074 B and 1070 C (page 745, note *b*) *supra*.

[b] ἃς γὰρ . . . ἀπεργάζεται, as Pohlenz saw, are certainly the words of Chrysippus (the subject of ὑφορᾶται being Democritus) ; and the sentence should have been included in *S. V.F.* ii, 489. For its meaning in the reply of Chrysippus to Democritus see note *b* on 1079 F *supra*.

(1080) μήτ' ἄνισον, καὶ ταῦτ' ἴσου καὶ ἀνίσου[1] μέσον, ὃ μηδέτερόν[2] ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔχοντας εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ νοῆσαι δυναμένους. ἔτι δ' οὐσῶν ἐπιφανειῶν μήτ' ἴσων μήτ' ἀνίσων, τί κωλύει καὶ κύκλους νοεῖσθαι μήτ' ἴσους μήτ' ἀνίσους; αὐταὶ[3] γὰρ δήπουθεν αἱ τῶν[4] κωνικῶν τμημάτων ἐπιφάνειαι κύκλοι εἰσίν· εἰ δὲ κύκλους, καὶ διαμέτρους κύκλων θετέον μήτ' ἴσους μήτ' ἀνίσους· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ γωνίας καὶ τρί-
C γωνα καὶ παραλληλόγραμμα καὶ παραλληλεπίπεδα καὶ σώματα. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μήκη ἐστὶ μήτ' ἴσα μήτ' ἄνισα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ βάθος[5] ἔσται καὶ πλάτη[6] καὶ σώματα. εἶτα πῶς τολμῶσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς τὰς κοινότητας[7] εἰσάγουσι καὶ ἀμερῆ τινα κινήματα μαχομένως[8] μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε μένειν ὑποτιθεμένοις, αὐτοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀξιώματα ψευδῆ λέγοντες

[1] ταῦτα ἴσου καὶ ἀνίσου -Basil. ; ταύταις οὐκ ἀνίσου -E, B.
[2] ὃ μηδέτερόν -Wyttenbach ; ὃ μὴ δεύτερον -E, B ; τὸ μηδέτερόν -Aldine.
[3] αὐταὶ -Basil. ; αὐτὰ -E, B.
[4] αἱ τῶν -Wyttenbach ; ὄντων -E, B.
[5] βάθος -Bernardakis (βάθη -Wyttenbach) ; βάρος -E, B.
[6] πλάτη -Wyttenbach ; πληγὴ -E, B.
[7] κενότητας -Leonicus.
[8] κινήματα μαχομένως -H. C. ; καὶ μαχόμενον -E, B ; καὶ μαχόμενα -Basil. ; καὶ 'Αχιλλέα -Wyttenbach (" nisi forte complura exciderunt ") ; καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον -Rasmus [*Prog.* 1872, p. 22) ; καὶ μαχόμενον <τὸ> -Pohlenz.

[a] Body being traditionally defined by the three dimensions (*cf.* Aristotle, *Topics* 142 b 24-25), though later with the addition of ἀντιτυπία to distinguish physical body from geometrical solid : *cf. Dox. Graeci*, p. 310 A 9-12 and p. 449, 6-11 ; *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 357 (with p. 127, 5-7 and p. 162, 29-31) and iii, p. 259, 24-26 ; Sextus, *Adv. Math.* i, 21 and ix, 367.

[b] τολμῶσιν . . . ὑποτιθεμένοις is one Stoic " fragment " and the rest of the sentence (αὐτοὶ . . . ἐστὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις) another, neither of which is to be found in *S.V.F.*

equal, and that too though we are unable to mention and cannot even conceive an intermediate between equal and unequal which is neither one nor the other. Moreover, given surfaces neither equal nor unequal, what's to prevent the conception of circles also neither equal nor unequal ? For the surfaces of the conic segments are themselves, I presume, circles. And, if circles, one must affirm that diameters of circles too are neither equal nor unequal ; and, if so, angles also and triangles and parallelograms and parallelepipeds and bodies, for, if lengths are neither equal nor unequal to one another, so will it also be in the case of depth and breadths and so of bodies.[a] Then how do the Stoics dare to censure [b] those who adduce the common characteristics [c] and who suppose certain indivisible movements to be self-contradictorily neither in motion nor at rest,[d] when they say themselves that propositions like the fol-

[c] On these the Epicureans based their analogical inferences against which the Stoics polemized (*cf.* P. H. and E. A. De Lacy, *Philodemus : On Methods of Inference* [Philadelphia, 1941], p. 23, n. 1 and pp. 162-171), the kind of argument used by Epicurus (*Epistle* i, 58-59) to establish the existence of the minimal and partless parts that constitute the atom and measure it (*cf.* ἡ γὰρ κοινότης . . . ἱκανὴ τὸ μέχρι τούτου συντελέσαι [pp. 17, 20–18, 1, Usener]). The " emendation " of Leonicus adopted by subsequent editors is therefore unnecessary and wrong.

[d] The text is corrupt, and the exact restoration is uncertain ; but ἀμερῆ should be governed by ὑποτιθεμένοις (*not* by εἰσάγουσι), and in view of ἀμερῆ . . . μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε μένειν what the Stoics are here said to censure is most probably the doctrine ascribed to Epicurus in frag. 278 (Usener), on which *cf.* J. Mau, *Philologus*, xcix (1955), pp. 99-111. According to Plutarch (1073 E—1074 A *supra*) the Stoics themselves had said that " neither at rest nor in motion " is true of τὸ πᾶν.

(1080) εἶναι· " εἴ τινα μή ἐστιν ἴσα ἀλλήλοις, ἐκεῖνα ἄνισά ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις " καὶ " οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ἴσα ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ ἄνισα δ' ἐστὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις "; ἐπεὶ δέ φησιν εἶναί τι μεῖζον οὐ μὴν ὑπερέχον, ἄξιον ἀπορῆσαι πότερον ταῦτ' ἐφαρμόσει ἀλλήλοις. εἰ
D μὲν γὰρ ἐφαρμόσει, πῶς μεῖζόν ἐστι θάτερον; εἰ δ' οὐκ ἐφαρμόσει, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δ' ἐλλείπειν; ⟨ἢ⟩[1] τῷ μηδέτερον ὑπερέχειν[2] καὶ οὐκ ἐφαρμόσει τῷ μείζονι [ἢ][3] καὶ ἐφαρμόσει τῷ[4] μεῖζον εἶναι θάτερον; ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τοιαύταις ἀπορίαις γίγνεσθαι τοὺς τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας μὴ φυλάττοντας.

40. Καὶ μὴν τὸ μηδενὸς ἅπτεσθαι μηδὲν παρὰ

[1] ⟨ἢ⟩ -added by Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 671).
[2] Leonicus; ὑπάρχειν -E, B.
[3] [ἢ] -deleted by H. C.; τῷ μεῖζον εἶναι -Madvig (*loc. cit.*).
[4] τῷ -H. C. (τῷ ⟨μὴ⟩ -Madvig, *loc. cit.*); τὸ -E, B.

[a] The Stoics are right in calling this proposition false, for μὴ εἶναι ἴσα, " not to be equal," is not the same as εἶναι μὴ ἴσα, " to be not-equal " (*cf.* Aristotle, *Anal. Prior.* 51 b 25-28).

[b] This is the regular form of a Stoic negation of a conjunction (*cf.* 1084 D *infra* and Mates, *Stoic. Logic*, p. 31). It was inattention to this that led to the excision or " emendation " of the οὐκ before ἄνισα. Literally translated the proposition is " not (*i.e.* not both): these are equal to each other and these are not-unequal to each other." Since according to the Stoics this negation is false, they held to be true the corresponding unnegated proposition, " *both* these are equal to each other *and* these are not-unequal to each other," *i.e.* equal and not-unequal are equivalent. Plutarch, however, must have taken the negated proposition to mean " these aren't equal and not unequal " in the sense that they aren't equal without being not-unequal and the Stoics to

lowing are false: " if certain things aren't equal to each other, those things are unequal to each other " [a] and " it is not so that these things are equal to each other and are not-unequal to each other "? [b] And, when Chrysippus says that there is something larger without, however, exceeding, it is proper to raise the question whether these things [c] will coincide with each other. For, if they will coincide, how is one larger [d]; and, if they won't, how can it fail to be necessary for one to exceed and the other to fall short? ⟨Or⟩ will it both not coincide and coincide with the larger, the former in that neither exceeds and the latter in that the other is larger? [e] For such are the difficulties into which those who do not observe the common conceptions necessarily get themselves.

40. Moreover,[f] the proposition that nothing

have declared this to be false. In short, he misinterprets the first example to mean that they denied the equivalence of οὐκ ἴσα and ἄνισα and the second to mean that they denied the equivalence of ἴσα and οὐκ ἄνισα. So the initial οὐκ before ἔστι should not be excised either, as it was by D. Konstan (*Class. Rev.*, N.S. xxii [1972], pp. 6-7), who has generously informed me by letter that he has had second thoughts about this proposal.

[c] *i.e.* the μεῖζον οὐ μὴν ὑπερέχον and the μικρότερον καὶ μὴ ἐλλεῖπον, which Plutarch thinks is implied by the former (see 1079 D *supra*).

[d] *Cf.* Euclid, *Elements* i, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι 7.

[e] This is a sarcastic question formulated upon the pattern of ἄνισα . . . τῷ μήτ' ἴσας μήτ' ἀνίσους . . . (1079 F *supra*) and on the basis of μὴ ὑπερέχειν δὲ ἢ μείζονές εἰσιν (1079 D *supra*) as Plutarch understands it. Will Chrysippus in accordance with this, he asks, say that just because neither surface exceeds the other the two do *not* coincide and because one is larger than the other they *do*?

[f] καὶ μὴν . . . παυομένοις = *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 486.

(1080) τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν. οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τοῦτο,[1] ἅπτεσθαι μὲν ἀλλήλων τὰ σώματα μηδενὶ δὲ ἅπτεσθαι. τοῦτο δ' ἀνάγκη προσδέχεσθαι τοῖς μὴ ἀπολείπουσιν ἐλάχιστα μέρη σώματος ἀλλ' ἀεί τι[2] τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἅπτεσθαι πρότερον λαμβάνουσι καὶ μηδέποτε τοῦ
E προάγειν ἐπέκεινα παυομένοις.[3] ὃ γοῦν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα προφέρουσι τοῖς τῶν ἀμερῶν προϊσταμένοις, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μήθ' ὅλοις ὅλων ἁφὴν εἶναι μήτε μέρεσι μερῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἁφὴν ἀλλὰ κρᾶσιν ποιεῖν, τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι δυνατόν, μέρη τῶν ἀμερῶν οὐκ ἐχόντων. πῶς οὖν οὐκ αὐτοὶ τούτῳ περιπίπτουσι, μηδὲν μέρος ἔσχατον μηδὲ πρῶτον ἀπολείποντες;[4] ὅτι νὴ Δία ψαύειν[5] κατὰ πέρας τὰ σώματ' ἀλλήλων, οὐ[6] κατὰ μέρος λέγουσι· τὸ δὲ πέρας σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἅψεται τοίνυν σῶμα σώματος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ οὐχ ἅψεται πάλιν, ἀσωμάτου μεταξὺ ὄντος. εἰ

[1] τούτου <τὸ> -Pohlenz.
[2] ἀλλ' ἀεί τι -Wyttenbach ; ἀλλὰ εἴ τι -E, B.
[3] τοῦ . . . παυομένοις -Wyttenbach ; τοὺς . . . παυομένους -E, B.
[4] Bernardakis ; ἀπολιπόντες -E, B.
[5] νὴ Δία ψαύειν -Wyttenbach ; μὴ διαψαύειν -E, B.
[6] ἀλλήλων, οὐ -H. C. ; ὅλα ὅλων οὐ -E, B ; <οὐχ> ὅλα ὅλων οὐ<δὲ> -Wyttenbach ; <ἀλλ' οὐχ> ὅλα ὅλων οὐ<δὲ> -Pohlenz.

[a] *Cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 258-266. This is presented here as one of the alternative absurdities implied by the Stoic theory of πέρας (ἅψεται τοίνυν . . . καὶ οὐχ ἅψεται πάλιν . . . [1080 E *infra*]) ; it does not refer, as Luria supposes, to a denial of ἁφή by atomists (*Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, B ii [1933], pp. 154-155 and n. 129).

[b] *i.e.* of whatever part is taken to be in contact they take a part nearer than the whole of the former to that with which it is supposed to be in contact, and they continue this process indefinitely. See page 812, note *a supra* ; and

touches anything[a] is at odds with the common conception ; and not less so is this, that bodies do touch one another but touch one another with nothing. Yet this must be accepted by those who do not admit minimal parts of body but are always taking some part before that which seems to be touching and never cease from going on beyond it.[b] At any rate, their own chief objection to the advocates of indivisibles is this,[c] that there is contact neither of wholes with wholes nor of parts with parts, for the result of the former is not contact but blending[d] and the latter is not possible, since indivisibles do not have parts.[e] How is it, then, that they do not fall into this trap themselves, since they admit no last part and no first either ? Because they say, by heaven, that bodies are in contact with one another at a limit, not at a part ; and the limit is not body.[f] Well then, body will touch body with an incorporeal[g] and, again, will not touch it, since an incorporeal is between them.[h] And, if it does touch, it will be by

cf. Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 261 = *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 45-46 (p. 130, 10-16 [Bekker]).

[c] ὃ γοῦν αὐτοὶ . . . σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν = *S. V.F.* ii, frag. 487.

[d] *Cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 260 and *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 42 and 45 (p. 130, 8-10 [Bekker]) ; [Aristotle], *De Lin. Insec.* 971 a 28-30. For the contrary see 1078 B *supra* : οὕτω γὰρ οὐ κρᾶσις ἁφὴ δὲ καὶ ψαῦσις. . . .

[e] *Cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* iii, 35 and ix, 387 ; Aristotle, *Physics* 231 b 2-6 with Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 927, 1-9.

[f] *Cf. S. V.F.* ii, frag. 488 ; Cleomedes, *De Motu Circulari* I, i, 7 (p. 14, 1-2 [Ziegler]) ; and see note *c* on 1078 E *supra*.

[g] *Cf.* the similar inference drawn by Philoponus (*De Generatione*, pp. 158, 27–159, 3 and p. 160, 7-11) concerning the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus : . . . διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ· τούτῳ γὰρ ἅπτονται ἀλλήλων.

[h] *Cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 265 and iii, 82 = ix, 435.

(1080) δὲ ἅψεται, καὶ ποιήσει τι καὶ πείσεται[1] τῷ ἀσω-
F μάτῳ τὸ σῶμα· ποιεῖν γάρ τι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλ-
λήλων τῷ[2] ἅπτεσθαι τὰ σώματα πέφυκεν. εἰ δὲ
ἀφὴν ἴσχει τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ συναφὴν
ἕξει καὶ κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφυΐαν. ἔστιν ἄρ'[3] ἐν ταῖς
συναφαῖς καὶ κράσεσιν ἢ μένειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μὴ
μένειν ἀλλ' ἐφθάρθαι τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων.
ἑκάτερον δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι· φθορὰς μὲν γὰρ
ἀσωμάτων καὶ γενέσεις οὐδ' αὐτοὶ καταλείπουσι,
1081 κρᾶσις δὲ καὶ συναφὴ σωμάτων ἰδίοις χρωμένων
πέρασιν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. τὸ γὰρ πέρας ὁρίζει καὶ
ἵστησι τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν· αἱ δὲ κράσεις εἰ μὴ
μερῶν παρὰ μέρη παραθέσεις εἰσὶν ⟨ἀλλ'⟩ ἀλλή-
λοις[4] ὅλα τὰ κιρνάμενα συγχέουσιν, ὥσπερ οὗτοι
λέγουσι, φθορὰς ἀπολειπτέον[5] περάτων ἐν ταῖς μί-
ξεσιν εἶτα γενέσεις ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσι· ταῦτα δ'

[1] E ; πήσεται -B.
[2] τῷ -Giesen (*De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus*, Theses *ad loc.*), implied by Xylander's version ; καὶ -E, B.
[3] ἔστιν ἄρ' -Pohlenz ; ἔτι γὰρ -E, B.
[4] ⟨ἀλλ'⟩ ἀλλήλοις -H. C. (ἀλλήλοις ⟨ἀλλ'⟩ -Wyttenbach) ; ἀλλ' ὅλοις -Bernardakis.
[5] ἀπολειπτέον -E, B (but with ει superscript over η -B[1]).

[a] The change of καὶ ἅπτεσθαι to τῷ ἅπτεσθαι is required by the argument, of which Pohlenz makes nonsense by changing ποιεῖν γάρ to ποιεῖν δέ. According to the Stoics only bodies ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει ὑπ' ἀλλήλων (see note *g* on 1073 E *supra*) ; but, if it is by an incorporeal limit that bodies touch one another, it must be by an incorporeal that they act upon one another, for this they do only by touching one another even according to the Stoics themselves (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 342 and 343). With this *cf.* the sceptical arguments (Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 255 and 258) that, surface being incorporeal, a material effect cannot be produced by superficial contact and that, contact being impossible, there can be neither agent nor patient.

what is incorporeal that the body produces an effect and is affected, for it is by touching that bodies naturally produce an effect and are affected by one another.[a] And, if body gets contact by what is incorporeal, so will it also have conjunction and blending and coalescence.[b] Then it is necessary that in the conjunctions and blendings the limits of the bodies either remain or not remain but have been destroyed ; but either alternative is at odds with the common conception, for not even the Stoics themselves allow destruction and generation of incorporeals and there could not be blending and conjunction of bodies possessed of their own limits.[c] For the limit bounds and fixes[d] the nature of the body ; and, if blendings are not the juxtapositions of parts to parts ⟨but⟩, as these men say, fuse with one another in their entirety the things being blended,[e] one must admit destruction of the limits in the minglings and then their generation in the segregations,

[b] All three of these Stoic degrees of unification are used by Plutarch in *Conjugalia Praecepta* 142 E—143 A. *Cf.* also *S.V.F.* ii, p. 302, 18-21 and iii, p. 38, 7-9 ; for συναφή *S.V.F.* ii, p. 124, 20-22 and p. 129, 13 ; and for συμφυΐα Plutarch, *Adv. Colotem* 1112 A and Philo Jud., *In Flaccum* 71 (vi, p. 133, 6 [Cohn-Reiter]).

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 158, 13 ; Simplicius, *Categ.*, p. 125, 5-6 (on Aristotle, *Categories* 5 a 1-6).

[d] The text is sound (*pace* Sandbach, *Class. Rev.*, N.S. iv [1954], p. 249 and *Class. Quart.*, N.S. vi [1956], pp. 87-88) ; *cf. De Defectu Orac.* 428 F (. . . ὁρίζουσα καὶ καταλαμβάνουσα . . .), *De An. Proc. in Timaeo* 1023 C (. . . ὁρίζων καὶ περιλαμβάνων . . .) and 1015 E (. . . οὐκ ἀνέστησε τὴν ὕλην . . . ἀλλ' ἔστησεν . . .).

[e] See 1077 E-F and 1078 B-C *supra* ; here too συγχέουσιν is used without regard to the Stoic distinction between σύγχυσις and κρᾶσις (see note *c* on 1078 A *supra*).

(1081) οὐδεὶς ἂν ῥᾳδίως νοήσειεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν[1] καθ' ὅ γε ἅπτεται τὰ σώματα ἀλλήλων κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ πιέζεται καὶ θλίβεται καὶ συντρίβεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· ἀσώματον δὲ ταῦτα πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν οὐ δυνατόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοητόν[2] ἐστι. τοῦτο δὲ βιάζονται
B νοεῖν ἡμᾶς. εἰ γὰρ ἡ σφαῖρα τοῦ ἐπιπέδου κατὰ σημεῖον ἅπτεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ σύρεται κατὰ σημεῖον διὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου· κἂν ᾖ μίλτῳ[3] τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἀληλιμμένη,[4] μιλτίνην ἐνομόρξεται τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ γραμμήν· ⟨κἂν ᾖ⟩[5] πεπυρωμένη,[6] πυρώσει τὸ ἐπίπεδον· ἀσωμάτῳ[7] δὲ χρώζεσθαι καὶ ἀσωμάτῳ πυροῦσθαι σῶμα παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν. ἂν δὲ δὴ κεραμεᾶν[8] ἢ κρυσταλλίνην[9] σφαῖραν εἰς ἐπίπεδον φερομένην λίθινον[10] ἀφ' ὕψους νοήσωμεν, ἄλογον εἰ μὴ συντριβήσεται, πληγῆς πρὸς ἀντίτυπον γενομένης, ἀτοπώτερον δὲ τὸ συντριβῆναι κατὰ πέρας
C καὶ σημεῖον ἀσώματον προσπεσοῦσαν. ὥστε πάντῃ[11] τὰς περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων αὐτοῖς ταράττεσθαι προλήψεις μᾶλλον δ' ἀναιρεῖσθαι, πολλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων παρατιθεμένοις.

[1] μὴν -Basil.; μή τι -E; μήτοι -B (τοι superscript).
[2] van Herwerden; διανοητέον -E, B.
[3] ἢ μίλτῳ -Leonicus (ἡ μίλτῳ -Basil.); ἡ μία τῷ -E, B.
[4] Basil.; ἀληλιμμένην -E, B.
[5] ⟨κἂν ᾖ⟩ -supplied by Bernardakis; γραμμὴν . . . vac. 5 -E; vac. 7 -B . . .; ⟨ὡσαύτως⟩ -Westman.
[6] Basil.; πεπυρωμένην -E, B; πεπυρρωμένη, πυρρώσει . . . πυρροῦσθαι -Bernardakis (". . . estant jaulne, elle jaulnira . . ." -Amyot).
[7] Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 671); ἀσώματον -E, B.
[8] Dübner; κεραμέαν -E, B.
[9] E; κρυσταλίνην -B.
[10] Leonicus, Basil.; πίθινον -E, B.
[11] ἀνάγκη -Castiglioni (*Gnomon*, xxvi [1954], p. 84).

and these processes no one could easily conceive.[a] But, furthermore, it is where bodies touch each other that they are also pressed and squeezed and crushed by each other; and for an incorporeal to do these things or have them done to it is not possible,—nay, it is not even thinkable. Yet this is the conception that they force upon us. For, if the sphere touches the plane at a point, it is also obviously drawn over the plane on a point; and, if its surface has been smeared with ruddle, it will tinge the plane with a red line[b] ⟨and, if⟩ it has been heated, it will make the plane hot. But for body to be tinged by an incorporeal and to be made hot by an incorporeal is at odds with the common conception. And, finally, if we imagine a sphere of earthenware or of crystal falling from a height on a plane of stone, it is unreasonable that it will not be crushed at its impact upon a resistant object but more absurd for it to be crushed by impinging on a limit, that is an incorporeal point. The result is that the preconceptions about incorporeals and bodies are everyway upset or rather are annihilated by the Stoics' associating with them[c] many of their impossible notions.

[a] *Cf.* the Aristotelian position that the πέρατα like "forms" supervene and disappear instantaneously without being subject to the processes of becoming and perishing: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1002 a 28–b 11, 1044 b 21-29 (*cf.* Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato . . .*, notes 279 and 424); and *De Caelo* 280 b 6-9 with Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 998, 16-19.
[b] *Cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* iii, 27. It has been suggested that the argument derives ultimately from Protagoras (O. Apelt, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, p. 263; S. Luria, *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, B ii [1933], p. 119).
[c] For παρατιθεμένοις in this sense *cf.* Plato, *Phaedo* 65 E 8.

(1081) 41. Παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι χρόνον εἶναι μέλλοντα καὶ παρῳχημένον ἐνεστῶτα δὲ μὴ εἶναι χρόνον ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄρτι καὶ τὸ πρῴην ὑφεστάναι τὸ δὲ νῦν ὅλως μηδὲν εἶναι. καὶ μὴν τοῦτο συμβαίνει τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἐλάχιστον χρόνον μὴ ἀπολείπουσι μηδὲ τὸ νῦν ἀμερὲς εἶναι βουλομένοις ἀλλὰ ὅ τι ἄν τις ὡς ἐνεστὼς οἴηται λαβὼν διανοεῖσθαι τούτου τὸ μὲν μέλλον τὸ δὲ παρῳχημένον εἶναι φάσκουσιν· ὥστε μηδὲν κατὰ τὸ νῦν ὑπομένειν μηδὲ λείπεσθαι μόριον χρόνου παρόντος ἂν ὃς[1] λέγεται
D παρεῖναι τούτου τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ μέλλοντα τὰ δ' εἰς τὰ παρῳχημένα διανέμηται. δυεῖν οὖν συμβαίνει θάτερον, ἢ τὸ "ἦν χρόνος καὶ ἔσται χρόνος" τιθέντας ἀναιρεῖν τὸ "ἔστι χρόνος" ἢ ⟨τιθέντας τὸ⟩[2] "ἔστι χρόνος ἐνεστηκώς," οὗ τὸ μὲν ἐνειστήκει τὸ δ' ἐνστήσεται, καὶ[3] λέγειν ὅτι τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος τὸ μὲν μέλλον ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ παρῳχημένον καὶ τοῦ νῦν τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ὥστε

[1] ὃς -Leonicus ; ὡς -E, B.
[2] ⟨τιθέντας τὸ⟩ -added by H. C. ; ⟨σῴζοντας τὸ⟩ -Pohlenz ; ⟨εἰ⟩ -Bernardakis.
[3] [καὶ] -deleted by Bernardakis and Pohlenz.

[a] Παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν . . . εἶναι φάσκουσιν = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 519. For the Stoic theory of time criticized in this chapter and the next see Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 30-45 ; the treatment of the subject by Sambursky (*Physics of the Stoics*, pp. 101-106) is not to be trusted.

[b] See 1081 F *infra* (τὸ μὲν παρῳχημένον . . . καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν ἀλλὰ ὑφεστηκέναι φησὶ . . .) with note *a* there.

[c] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 158, 15-17 ; p. 160, 19-21 ; and p. 164, 22-26.

41. It is at odds with the common conception to hold [a] that there is future and past time and not present time but that, while recently and the other day subsist,[b] now is nothing at all. And yet this is what it comes to for the Stoics who do not admit a minimal time or wish the now to be indivisible [c] but say that whatever one may think one has grasped and has in mind as present is in part future and in part past,[d] so that there is left and remains coincident with now no part of actual time if the time said to be actual be divided into parts that are future and parts that are past.[e] What happens, then, is one of two things : either in making the affirmation "time was and time will be" they deny the proposition "time is" or ⟨in making the affirmation⟩ "there is time present," which in part was and in part will be present, they also assert that what exists is in part future and in part past and what is now is in part before and in part after,[f] so that now is what

[a] See 1081 F *infra* (τίθησι τοῦ ἐνεστηκότος χρόνου τὸ μὲν μέλλον εἶναι τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθός), and *cf.* the statement that no time κατ' ἀπαρτισμὸν ἐνεστάναι ἀλλὰ κατὰ πλάτος λέγεσθαι (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 164, 25-26) with that ascribed to Posidonius (*Dox. Graeci*, p. 461, 19-20 = frag. 98, 9-10 [Edelstein-Kidd]), τὸ δὲ νῦν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἐν πλάτει χρόνον καὶ οὐχὶ κατ' ἀπαρτισμὸν νοεῖσθαι. In *De E* 392 F Plutarch makes Ammonius, his own teacher, say . . . τὸ "ἐνέστηκε" καὶ τὸ "πάρεστι" καὶ τὸ "νῦν" . . . ὁ λόγος ἀπόλλυσιν. ἐκθλίβεται γὰρ εἰς τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ παρῳχημένον . . . διϊστάμενον.

[e] *Cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* x, 119-120 (p. 500, 25-27 [Bekker]).

[f] *Cf.* Posidonius in *Dox. Graeci*, p. 461, 17-22 = frag. 98, 7-12 (Edelstein-Kidd) : . . . τὸν δὲ παρόντα, ὃς ἔκ τινος μέρους τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος περὶ τὸν διορισμὸν αὐτὸν συνέστηκε· τὸν δὲ διορισμὸν σημειώδη εἶναι. . . . λέγεσθαι δὲ τὸ νῦν καὶ [κατὰ] τὸν ἐλάχιστον πρὸς αἴσθησιν χρόνον περὶ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ μέλλοντος καὶ παρεληλυθότος συνιστάμενον.

(1081) νῦν εἶναι τὸ μηδέπω νῦν καὶ τὸ μηκέτι νῦν· οὐκέτι[1] γὰρ νῦν τὸ παρῳχημένον καὶ οὐδέπω νῦν τὸ μέλλον. ⟨ἀνάγκη δὲ οὕτω⟩[2] διαιροῦσι λέγειν αὐτοῖς ὅτι καὶ το⟨ῦ τήμερον τὸ μὲν ἐχθὲς τὸ δ' αὔριον⟩[3] καὶ τοῦ τῆτες[4] τὸ μὲν πέρυσι[5] τὸ δ' εἰς νέωτα καὶ τοῦ ἅμα
E τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικέστερα τούτων κυκῶσι, ταὐτὰ[6] ποιοῦντες τὸ[7] "μηδέπω" καὶ τὸ "ἤδη" καὶ τὸ "μηκέτι" καὶ τὸ "νῦν" καὶ τὸ "μὴ νῦν." οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὸ "ἄρτι" καὶ τὸ "μετὰ μικρὸν" ὡς ἕτερα τοῦ "νῦν" μόρια καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ τὸ νῦν τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ νῦν τίθενται καὶ νοοῦσι καὶ νομίζουσι. τούτων ⟨δ'⟩[8] Ἀρχέδημος μὲν ἁρμήν[9] τινα καὶ συμβολὴν εἶναι λέγων τοῦ παρῳχημένου καὶ τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου τὸ "νῦν" λέληθεν αὐτὸν ὡς ἔοικε τὸν
F πάντα χρόνον ἀναιρῶν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ νῦν οὐ[10] χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ πέρας χρόνου πᾶν δὲ μόριον χρόνου τοιοῦτον οἷον[11] τὸ νῦν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν φαίνεται μέρος ἔχων ὁ σύμπας χρόνος ἀλλ' εἰς πέρατα διόλου καὶ συμβολὰς καὶ ἁρμὰς[12] ἀναλυόμενος. Χρύσιππος δὲ βου-

[1] οὐκέτι -Wyttenbach ; οὐκ ἔστι -E, B.
[2] ⟨ἀνάγκη δ' οὕτω⟩ -supplied by Bernardakis (⟨ἀνάγκη οὖν οὕτω⟩ -Wyttenbach after Amyot's version) ; μέλλον . . . vac. 7 -E ; vac. 6 -B . . . διαιροῦσι ; ⟨ἕπεται δ' οὕτω⟩ -Pohlenz.
[3] ⟨ῦ . . . αὔριον⟩ -supplied by Wyttenbach ; ὅτι καὶ το (τὸ -B) . . . vac. 26+3 -E ; vac. 10+12 -B . . . καὶ τοῦ -E, B.
[4] τῆτες -Wyttenbach ; φωτὸς -E, B.
[5] B ; πέρισυ -E.
[6] Wyttenbach ; ταῦτα -E, B.
[7] B ; ποιοῦντος, ὁ -E ; νοοῦντες τό -Kaltwasser.
[8] ⟨δ'⟩ -added by Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 24, n. 3).
[9] ἁρμήν -von Arnim (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 263, 32 ; *cf.* Alexander, *De Mixtione*, p. 216, 19, p. 217, 5-9, and p. 219, 3 [Bruns]) ; ἀρχήν -E, B.
[10] οὐ -Leonicus, Basil. ; ὁ -E, B.
[11] οἷον -E ; ἦν -B.
[12] ἁρμὰς -von Arnim (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 263, 36) ; ὁρμὰς -E, B.

is not yet now and what is no longer now,[a] for what is past is no longer now and what is future is not yet now. In dividing ⟨this way, however, they must⟩ assert that even ⟨today is in part yesterday and in part tomorrow⟩ and this year is in part last year and in part next year and what is simultaneous is in part before and in part after. For they make muddles no more reasonable than these when they identify "not yet" and "already" and "no longer" and "now" and "not now." All other men suppose and conceive and believe both "recently" and "soon" to be parts of time different from "now" and the latter to be after now but the former before now. Of these Stoics, however, Archedemus for one asserts[b] that "now" is a kind of juncture and connexion of what is past and of what is coming on ; and by this assertion he has unwittingly, as it seems, annihilated the whole of time, for, if now is not time but a limit of time and if every part of time is such as now is,[c] all time in its entirety obviously has no constituent part at all but is wholly resolved into limits and connexions and junctures. Chrysippus, on the other

[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Physics* 234 a 11-14 on the consequences of taking νῦν to be divisible.
[b] Archedemus, frag. 14 (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 263, 31-37) ; *cf.* Aristotle, *Physics* 222 a 10-20.
[c] But Archedemus probably denied that νῦν is a "part" of time just as Aristotle did (*Physics* 218 a 6-8 and 220 a 18-22).

(1081) λόμενος φιλοτεχνεῖν περὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐν μὲν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Κενοῦ καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ τὸ μὲν παρῳχημένον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν ἀλλὰ ὑφεστηκέναι φησὶ μόνον δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐνεστηκός· ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τετάρτῳ καὶ πέμπτῳ περὶ τῶν Μερῶν τίθησι τοῦ ἐνεστηκότος χρόνου τὸ μὲν μέλ-
1082 λον εἶναι τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθός. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ ὑπάρχον αὐτῷ τοῦ χρόνου διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα τό θ' ὑπάρχον[1] μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλως τοῦ χρόνου μηδὲν ἀπολείπειν[2] ὑπάρχον, εἰ τὸ ἐνεστηκὸς οὐδὲν ἔχει μέρος ὃ μὴ μέλλον ἐστὶν ἢ παρῳχημένον.

42. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ χρόνου νόησις αὐτοῖς οἷον ὕδατος περίδραξις, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον πιέζεται διαρρέοντος καὶ διολισθαίνοντος,[3] τὰ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ κινήσεων τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχει σύγχυσιν τῆς ἐναργείας.[4] ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ τοῦ νῦν τὸ μὲν εἰς τὸ παρῳχημένον τὸ δ' εἰς τὸ μέλλον διαιρεῖται, καὶ τοῦ κινουμένου

[1] *τό θ' ὑπάρχον* -R. G. Bury (in Pohlenz, *Moralia* vi/2, p. 224); *τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος* -E, B; [*τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος*] -deleted by Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 23); *τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος* <*καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος*> -Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxiv [1940], p. 24, n. 3).

[2] Bernardakis; *ἀπολιπεῖν* -E, B.

[3] B (*cf.* 966 E); *διολισθάνοντος* -E.

[4] Leonicus; *ἐνεργείας* -E, B.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 518; *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 164, 26-30 and for the distinction made here between *ὑφεστηκέναι* and *ὑπάρχειν* see A. A. Long, *Problems in Stoicism*, pp. 89-93; A. Graeser, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, xv (1971), pp. 303-305; and V. Goldschmidt, *Rev. Études Grecques*, lxxxv (1972), pp. 336-344; but *cf.* also the observation made by Apollodorus of Seleuceia (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 260, 22-23): *καὶ ὑπάρχειν ὁ πᾶς χρόνος λέγεται, οὐδενὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν ὑπάρχοντος ἀπαρτιζόντως.*

[b] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 517.

hand, wishing to treat the division with finesse says[a] in his treatise on the Void and in some others that the part of time that is past and the part that is future subsist but do not exist and only what is present exists; but in the third and fourth and fifth books on Parts he affirms[b] that of present time part is future and part has gone by. Consequently it turns out that he divides the existing part of time into parts that are non-existent and what does exist,[c] or rather that he leaves absolutely nothing of time existing if what is present has no part that is not future or past.[d]

42. The conception of time for them, then, is like clutching water, which falls away and slips through one's grasp the tighter one squeezes it,[e] while as to actions and motions it involves the utter ruin of clear apprehension.[f] For, if now is divided partly into what is past and partly into what is future, it is

[c] *Cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* vi, 67 (p. 761, 19-21 [Bekker]) and x, 199 (p. 517, 14-18 [Bekker]).

[d] *Cf.* Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 145 (pp. 154, 33–155, 2 [Bekker]) and *Adv. Math.* vi, 63=x, 192; Aristotle, *Physics* 217 b 32—218 a 6 (in the initial *ἀπορίαι*).

[e] In *De E* 392 A-B Ammonius, Plutarch's teacher, uses the same simile for the impossibility of apprehending the *θνητὴ φύσις*, all of which is *ἐν μέσῳ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς* (*cf.* H. von Arnim, *Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria* [Berlin, 1888], pp. 97-98 on Philo Jud., *De Josepho* 140-143=iv, p. 90, 2-17 [Cohn]). Pohlenz thought that only the zeal of polemic could have caused Plutarch in later life to turn against the Stoics this argument of his own (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 33), whereas the polemic itself is characterized as "shadow-boxing" by C. Andresen (*Logos und Nomos* [Berlin, 1955], p. 289), who holds that Plutarch's attitude towards time and that of the Stoics come to the same thing.

[f] See 1074 B and 1079 F *supra* and 1083 C *infra*.

(1082) κατὰ τὸ νῦν τὸ μὲν κεκινῆσθαι τὸ δὲ κινήσεσθαι
πέρας δὲ κινήσεως ἀνῃρῆσθαι καὶ ἀρχὴν μηδε-
B νὸς ⟨δ'⟩[1] ἔργου πρῶτον γεγονέναι μηδ' ἔσχατον
ἔσεσθαι μηδέν, τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πράξεων συνδιανε-
μομένων. ὡς γὰρ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος χρόνου τὸ μὲν
παρῳχῆσθαι τὸ δὲ μέλλειν λέγουσιν οὕτως τοῦ
πραττομένου τὸ μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι τὸ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι.
πότε τοίνυν ἔσχεν ἀρχὴν πότε δὲ ἕξει τελευτὴν τὸ
ἀριστᾶν τὸ γράφειν τὸ βαδίζειν, εἰ πᾶς μὲν ὁ ἀρι-
στῶν ἠρίστησε καὶ ἀριστήσει πᾶς δὲ ὁ βαδίζων ἐβά-
δισε[2] καὶ βαδιεῖται; τὸ δὲ δεινῶν, φασί, δεινότατον,
C εἰ τῷ ζῶντι τὸ ἐζηκέναι καὶ ζήσεσθαι συμβέβηκεν,
οὔτ' ἀρχὴν ἔσχε τὸ ζῆν οὔθ' ἕξει πέρας, ἀλλὰ ἕκα-
στος ἡμῶν ὡς ἔοικε γέγονε μὴ ἀρξάμενος τοῦ ζῆν
καὶ τεθνήξεται μὴ παυσόμενος.[3] εἰ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐσ-
τιν ἔσχατον μέρος ἀλλ' ἀεί τι[4] τῷ ζῶντι τοῦ
παρόντος εἰς τὸ μέλλον περίεστιν, οὐδέποτε γίγ-
νεται ψεῦδος τὸ "ζήσεσθαι Σωκράτη ⟨ζῶντα." καὶ⟩[5]
ὁσάκις ἀληθὲς ⟨ἔσται⟩[6] τὸ "ζῇ Σωκράτης" ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο[7]
ψεῦδος τὸ "τέθνηκε Σωκράτης." ὥστ', εἰ τὸ "ζήσεται Σωκράτης" ἀληθές ἐστιν
ἐν ἀπείροις χρόνου μέρεσιν, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνου μέρει

[1] ⟨δ'⟩ -added by Bernardakis.
[2] E, B (*pace* Pohlenz); ἐβάδιζε -Stephanus.
[3] E, B; παυσάμενος -Bernardakis.
[4] ἀλλ' ἀεί τι -Wyttenbach (after Xylander's version); ἀλλ' εἴ τι -E, B; ἀλλ' ἔτι -Stephanus.
[5] ⟨ζῶντα." καὶ⟩ -supplied by H. C.; σωκράτη . . . vac. 5 -E; vac. 2 -B . . . ὁσάκις; Σωκράτη," ⟨ἀλλ'⟩ -Bernardakis; this lacuna suppressed by Aldine, Basil.
[6] ⟨ἔσται⟩ -supplied by Pohlenz; ἀληθὲς . . . vac. 4 -E; vac. 5 -B . . . τὸ; ⟨ἐστι⟩ -Bernardakis; ⟨τὸ ζῇ Σωκράτης, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἀληθὲς⟩ -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 23).
[7] E, B; ἐστὶ τοσοῦτον -Aldine, Basil.

necessary also that of what at the moment now is in motion part have moved and the rest be about to move and that terminus and initiation of motion have been abolished ⟨and⟩ that there be no part of any deed that has been first or will be last, since actions are divided in correspondence with time. For, as the Stoics say that of the present time part has gone by and the rest is to come,[a] so it must be that part of what is being done has been done and the rest will be done. When, then, did lunching, writing, walking commence and when will they have an end if everyone lunching lunched and will be lunching and everyone walking walked and will be walking? And, what is, as people say, most outrageous of outrages,[b] if it is characteristic of one who is living that he has been living and will be living, his living neither had initiation nor will have a terminus; but each of us, as it seems, has come to be, though he did not begin living, and will die, though he will not stop living. For, if no part is last but some of the living being's actuality always extends into the future, it never becomes false that "Socrates will be living ⟨if he is living." And⟩ as often as ⟨it will be⟩ true to say "Socrates is living" so far will it be false to say "Socrates is dead." Consequently, if in infinitely many parts of time it is true to say "Socrates will be living,"[c] in no part of time will it be true to say

[a] See 1081 c *supra* and note *d* there.
[b] *Cf.* τὸ πάντων δεινότατον (Sextus, *Adv. Math.* viii, 178), πάντων γὰρ ὄντων . . . δεινῶν τοῦτο δεινότατον (Demosthenes, xxiv, 194), and similar turns of phrase common in the orators.
[c] It will be true to say it "infinitely many times" because that part of the specious present which is really future is itself infinitely divisible.

(1082) τὸ " τέθνηκε Σωκράτης " ἀληθὲς ἔσται. καίτοι τί πέρας ἂν ἔργου γένοιτο, ποῦ δὲ[1] λήξειε τὸ πραττόμενον, ἂν ὁσάκις ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ " πράττεται " τοσαυτάκις ἀληθὲς ᾖ καὶ τὸ " πραχθήσεται "; ψεύσεται γὰρ ὁ λέγων περὶ[2] τοῦ γράφοντος καὶ διαλεγομένου Πλάτωνος ὅτι παύσεταί ποτε Πλάτων
D ⟨γράφων καὶ⟩[3] διαλεγόμενος, εἰ μηδέποτε ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ " διαλεχθήσεται " περὶ τοῦ διαλεγομένου καὶ τὸ " γράψει " περὶ τοῦ γράφοντος. ἔτι τοίνυν ⟨εἰ⟩[4] τοῦ γιγνομένου[5] μέρος οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅπερ οὐκ ἤτοι γεγονός ἐστιν ἢ γενησόμενον καὶ παρεληλυθὸς ἢ μέλλον, γεγονότος δὲ καὶ γενησομένου[6] καὶ παρῳχημένου καὶ μέλλοντος αἴσθησις οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδενὸς ἁπλῶς[7] αἰσθησίς ἐστιν. οὔτε γὰρ ὁρῶμεν τὸ παρῳχημένον ἢ τὸ μέλλον οὔτ' ἀκούομεν οὔτ' ἄλλην τινὰ λαμβάνομεν αἴσθησιν τῶν γεγονότων ἢ γενησομένων· οὐδὲν ⟨οὖν,⟩[8] οὐδ' ἂν παρῇ τι, αἰσθητόν ἐστιν, εἰ τοῦ παρόντος ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν μέλλει τὸ δὲ παρῴχηκε καὶ τὸ μὲν γεγονός ἐστι τὸ δὲ γενησόμενον.
E 43. Καὶ μὴν αὐτοί γε σχέτλια ποιεῖν τὸν Ἐπίκουρον λέγουσι καὶ βιάζεσθαι τὰς ἐννοίας, ἰσοταχῶς τὰ σώματα κινοῦντα καὶ μηδὲν ἀπολείποντα

[1] ποῦ δ' ⟨ἂν⟩ -Bernardakis.
[2] περὶ -Wyttenbach ; πέρας -E, B.
[3] ⟨γράφων καὶ⟩ -added by Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, 3 Ser. x [1942], p. 44).
[4] ⟨εἰ⟩ -added by Pohlenz.
[5] Dübner ; γενομένου -E, B.
[6] Kolfhaus (*Plutarchi De Comm. Not.*, p. 59) ; γεγενημένου -E, B.
[7] οὐδενὸς οὖν ἁπλῶς -Basil.
[8] ⟨οὖν⟩ -added by Dübner.

[a] This does not follow, however, for the " infinitely many

" Socrates is dead." [a] And yet what terminus could a deed have and where could that terminate which is being done if as often as it is true to say " it is being done " it is true also to say " it will be done " ? For one who says of Plato writing and arguing that Plato will at some time stop ⟨writing and⟩ arguing will be making a false statement if it is never false to say of him who is arguing " he will be arguing " and of him who is writing " he will be writing." Furthermore, ⟨if⟩ of what is occurring no part is such as not either to have occurred or to be about to occur, *i.e.* to have gone by or to be coming on, and what has occurred and will be occurring, *i.e.* past and future, are not objects of sensation,[b] absolutely nothing is an object of sensation. For neither do we see what is past or what is future nor do we hear or get any other sensation of things that have occurred or will be occurring. Nothing⟨, then,⟩ is perceptible, not even if anything is actual, if always of what is actual part is to come and the rest has gone by, *i.e.* part has occurred and the rest will be occurring.

43. Moreover, the Stoics themselves say [c] that Epicurus does a shocking thing and violates the common conceptions by making the velocity of moving bodies equal and denying that any is swifter than any

parts of time " in question are together equal not to all time or all time to come but only to that part of the specious present of which they are divisions. *Cf.* the paradox (Alexander in Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 1296, 18-25 and Sextus, *Adv. Math.* ix, 269 and x, 346-350) : at what time did Socrates die, since it could have been neither when he was dying nor when he had died ?

[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 236, 1-3 and Aristotle, *De Memoria* 449 b 13-15.

[c] This passage is missing from *S.V.F.*

(1082) μηδενὸς ταχύτερον. πολλῷ δὲ τούτου σχετλιώτερόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπήρτηται τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὸ μηδὲν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς περικαταλαμβάνεσθαι, μηδ' εἰ[1] χελώνην, τὸ τοῦ λόγου, [φασί,][2] μετόπισθε διώκοι Ἀδρήστου ταχὺς ἵππος. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, τῶν μὲν κινουμένων κατὰ τὸ πρότερον ⟨πρότερον κινουμένων⟩[3] τῶν δὲ διαστημάτων ἃ διεξίασιν εἰς ἄπειρον ὄντων μεριστῶν, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσιν οὗτοι. εἰ γὰρ ⟨προφθάσῃ⟩[4] πλέθρῳ μόνον ἡ χελώνη τὸν ἵππον, οἱ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τέ-
F μνοντες ἑκάτερα δὲ κινοῦντες κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, οὐδέποτε τῷ βραδυτάτῳ προσάξουσι τὸ[5] τάχιστον, ἀεί τι διάστημα τοῦ βραδυτέρου προλαμβάνοντος εἰς ἄπειρα διαστήματα μεριζόμενον.[6] τὸ δ' ἔκ τινος φιάλης ἢ κύλικος ὕδατος ἐκχεομένου μηδέποτε πᾶν ἐκχυθήσεσθαι πῶς οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἢ πῶς οὐχ ἑπόμενον οἷς οὗτοι λέγουσι;
1083 τὴν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον ⟨πρότερον⟩[7] τῶν εἰς

[1] μὴδ' εἰ -B ; μηδὲ -E.
[2] [φασί] -deleted by Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 671) ; retained by Pohlenz with note, " sc. Stoici " (contrary to sense if not to syntax also).
[3] ⟨πρότερον κινουμένων⟩ -H. C. (*cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* x, 128 [τὸ κινούμενον . . . κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖσθαι], *et saepe*) ; ⟨καὶ τὸ ὕστερον⟩ -added by Leonicus.
[4] ⟨προφθάσῃ⟩ -H. C. (*cf. Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae* 806 E) ; εἰ γὰρ . . . vac. 8 -E ; vac. 9 -B . . . πλέθρῳ ; ⟨φθαίη⟩ -Xylander.
[5] τὸ -E ; τὸν -B.
[6] Leonicus ; μεριζομένου -E, B.
[7] ⟨πρότερον⟩ -H. C. ; ⟨διὰ⟩ -added by Pohlenz.

[a] This passage is missing from Usener's *Epicurea* ; but

other [a] ; but it is much more shocking than this and further removed from the common conceptions for nothing to be overtaken by anything not even if a tortoise, as the saying goes,[b] should from behind be pursued by the swift steed of Adrastus.[c] Yet it is necessary that this be the consequence if, while the moving bodies ⟨move antecedently⟩ over the antecedent part, the distances which they traverse are, as these men maintain, divisible *ad infinitum*.[d] For, if the tortoise ⟨have got the start⟩ of the horse by only half a dozen rods, those who divide this distance *ad infinitum* and make each of the two things move in sequence over the antecedent and subsequent parts will never bring what is swiftest up to what is slowest, since the slower is always getting ahead by some distance which is divided into an infinite number of distances.[e] And the notion that water being poured out of a bowl or a cup will never be all poured out, how is this not at odds with the common conception or how not a consequence of their assertions ? For motion ⟨antecedent⟩ over the antecedent

cf. Epicurus, *Epistle* i, 61-62 and frag. 277 (Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 197, 14-16) ; Sextus, *Adv. Math.* x, 129 ; and Alexander, *Quaestiones*, pp. 45, 28–46, 21 (Bruns).
[b] *Corpus Fabularum Aesopicarum* i, fasc. 2, pp. 130, 17–131, 21 = Lib. Myth. 2 (Hausrath-Haas) ; *cf.* Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 898, 30-33 and p. 1014, 5-6. See also Sextus (*Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 77 ; *cf. Adv. Math.* x, 154) who refers to the argument, however, not in refutation of the Stoic but in that of the Epicurean theory of motion.
[c] μετόπισθε . . . ἵππος is adapted from *Iliad* xxiii, 346-347.
[d] *Cf.* Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 76 and *Adv. Math.* x, 139-142 ; Alexander, *Quaestiones*, p. 35, 18-27 (Bruns).
[e] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Physics* 239 b 14-20 (Zeno's " Achilles ") with Themistius, *Phys.*, pp. 199, 23–200, 28 and Simplicius, *Phys.*, pp. 1014, 9–1015, 2.

(1083) ἄπειρον μεριστῶν κίνησιν οὐκ ἄν τις νοήσειε τὸ πᾶν διανύουσαν, ἀλλ' ἀεί τι[1] μεριστὸν ὑπολείπουσα ποιήσει πᾶσαν μὲν ἔκχυσιν πᾶσαν δ' ὀλίσθησιν καὶ ῥύσιν[2] ὑγροῦ καὶ φορὰν στερεοῦ καὶ βάρους μεθειμένου πτῶσιν ἀσυντέλεστον.

44. Παρίημι δὲ πολλὰς ἀτοπίας αὐτῶν τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐφαπτόμενος. ὁ τοίνυν περὶ αὐξήσεως λόγος ἐστὶ μὲν ἀρχαῖος. ἠρώτηται γάρ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, ὑπ' Ἐπιχάρμου· τῶν δ' ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ[3] οἰομένων μὴ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον μηδ' αὐτόθεν ἕτοιμον εἶναι τὴν ἀπορίαν πολλὰ κατηγοριάσανθ' ⟨οὗτοι καὶ⟩[4] κατεβόησαν ὡς τὰς προλήψεις ἀναιρούντων
B καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας ⟨φιλοσοφούντων· αὐτοὶ δ' οὐ μόνον οὐδὲ τὰς ἐννοίας⟩[5] φυλάττουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν προσδιαστρέφουσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἁπ-

[1] Leonicus; ἀλλὰ εἴ τι -E, B. [2] Aldine; ῥῦσιν -E, B.

[3] ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας -Bernardakis (but *cf. De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 549 E: τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ φιλοσοφούντων).

[4] Pohlenz; κατηγοριᾶσθαι . . . vac. 4 -E; vac. 7 -B . . . κατεβόησαν; κατηγοριάσαντο ⟨καὶ⟩ -Wyttenbach (after Amyot's version).

[5] Bernardakis (after Rasmus, *Prog.* 1872, p. 23: ⟨φιλοσοφούντων· οὐ μόνον οὐδ' αὐτοὶ τὰς ἐννοίας⟩); ⟨φιλοσοφούντων· αὐτοὶ δ' οὐχ ὅτι τὰς ἐννοίας⟩ -Pohlenz; lacuna suspected by Wyttenbach.

[a] *Cf.* Alexander, *Quaestiones*, p. 35, 27-28 (Bruns): ἢ γίνεται μὲν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον μόριον τοῦ μεγέθους πρότερον ἡ κίνησις . . .

[b] *Cf. De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 F and 1049 B *supra*. Such statements by reminding the reader that the essay restricts itself to one kind of absurdity insinuate that the Stoics are guilty of many other kinds also.

[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 762 (p. 214, 20-24), probably in his work περὶ Αὐξανομένου (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 131, 6-8).

[d] *Cf. De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 559 A-B and *Anon. in Platonis Theaetetum* (Pap. Berl. 9782), col. 71, 12-40 (p. 47 [Diels-Schubart]); Epicharmus, frag. B 2 (D.-K.)=170 (Kaibel)=152 (Olivieri); and L. Berk, *Epicharmus* (Groningen, 1964), pp. 90-92.

[e] For the charge and countercharge see 1058 E-F, 1060 A, 1061 A and D, 1062 A-B *supra*. At 1080 D *supra* the Stoics are characterized as τοὺς τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας μὴ φυλάττοντας, and at 1081 B-C *supra* the preconceptions are said to be annihilated by them.

[f] For the argument "in the schools" *cf. De Tranquillitate Animi* 473 D; *Theseus* xxiii, 1 (10 B-C); and the title of Plutarch's own lost discussion of the theme, Περὶ τοῦ μὴ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διαμένειν ἡμᾶς, ἀεὶ τῆς οὐσίας ῥεούσης (*Quaest. Conviv.* 741 c), which is used in *De E* 392 D (*cf.* Plato, *Symposium* 207 D 2—208 B 2; Aristotle, *Politics* 1276 a 34–b 13). The sceptic argument against αὔξησις is given by Sextus in *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 82-84; for Aristotle's discussion of the problem *cf. De Generatione* 320 a 8—322 a 33.

part of parts [a] that are divisible *ad infinitum* could not be conceived as getting through the sum of the parts, but by always leaving some divisible part remaining it would render incomplete all effusion and all sliding and flowing of a liquid and locomotion of a solid and falling of a weight that has been released.

44. I pass over many of the Stoic absurdities and hold to those that are at odds with the common conception.[b] Well then, the argument about growth is certainly ancient, for, as Chrysippus says,[c] it was propounded by Epicharmus [d]; and yet the members of the Academy, because they think that the question is not a very easy one and not to be disposed of out of hand, have been severely accused ⟨by the Stoics and⟩ decried on the ground that they annihilate the preconceptions and are at odds with the common conceptions ⟨in their speculations, whereas by the Stoics themselves not only are the common conceptions not⟩ observed but even sense-perception is distorted to boot.[e] For the argument is simple,[f] and

(1083) λοῦς ἐστι καὶ τὰ λήμματα συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι· τὰς ἐν[1] μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ῥεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι, τὰ[2] μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν μεθιείσας τὰ[3] δέ ποθεν ἐπιόντα προσδεχομένας, οἷς δὲ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς ἢ πλήθεσι ταὐτὰ[4] μὴ διαμένειν ἀλλὰ ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι, ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις ⟨καὶ ἀφόδοις⟩[5] ἐξαλλαγὴν τῆς οὐσίας λαμβανούσης· αὐξήσεις δὲ καὶ φθίσεις οὐ κατὰ δίκην ὑπὸ συνηθείας ἐκνενικῆσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς ταύτας λέγεσθαι, γενέσεις [δὲ][6] καὶ φθορὰς μᾶλλον αὐτὰς ὀνομάζεσθαι προσῆκον ὅτι τοῦ καθ-
C εστῶτος εἰς ἕτερον ἐκβιβάζουσι[7] τὸ δ' αὔξεσθαι καὶ τὸ μειοῦσθαι πάθη σώματός ἐστιν ὑποκειμένου καὶ διαμένοντος. οὕτω δέ πως τούτων λεγομένων καὶ τιθεμένων, τί ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ πρόδικοι τῆς ἐναργείας[8] οὗτοι καὶ κανόνες τῶν ἐννοιῶν; ἕκαστον ἡμῶν δίδυμον εἶναι καὶ διφυῆ καὶ διττόν—οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς Μολιονίδας οἴονται, τοῖς μὲν[9] ἡνωμέ-

[1] τὰς ἐν -E, B, Basil.; τὰς μὲν -Aldine; τὰς μὲν ἐν -Leonicus.
[2] τὰ -Wyttenbach; τὰς -E, B.
[3] τὰ -Wyttenbach; τὰς -E, B.
[4] ταὐτὰ -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, 3 Ser. x [1942], p. 44 [implied by the versions of Amyot and Xylander]).
[5] ⟨καὶ ἀφόδοις⟩ -added by van Herwerden.
[6] δὲ -B, and superscript in ligature -E[1]; deleted by Bernardakis.
[7] Wyttenbach (*cf. Animadversiones* on 243 D); ἐκβιάζουσι -E, B.
[8] Leonicus; ἐνεργείας -E, B.
[9] οἴονται, τοῖς μὲν -Pohlenz; οἰόμενοι -E, B; τοῖς μὲν -Basil.

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 762 (p. 214, 24-36).
[b] See note *c* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1047 C *supra*; and for the contention that the Stoics neglect or subvert this prin-

the Stoics admit the premises: that all particular substances are in flux and motion, sending off from themselves some parts and receiving others that come to them from elsewhere, that the numbers or amounts which such parts join and leave do not remain the same but become different, the substance undergoing transformation with the aforesaid accessions ⟨and withdrawals⟩, and that by customary usage it has become the fashion for these changes to be incorrectly called cases of growth and decay, although the appropriate names for them are rather generation and destruction because they make a thing pass out of its existing state into another, whereas growth and diminution are modifications of a body that persists and is their substrate. Something like this being the position taken (by the Academics) and the way in which it is stated, what, then, do the Stoics maintain,[a] these advocates of clear apprehension [b] and standards [c] of the common conceptions? That each of us is a pair of twins and biform and double—not as the poets think the Molionidae [d] are, unified

ciple which they advocate see 1084 B *infra* and 1074 B, 1079 F, and 1082 A *supra*.

[c] This is meant to be sarcastic, for the Stoics maintained that the common conceptions are the objective criteria of truth (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 154, 29-30) and the natural origin of their system (see 1060 A *supra*). A similar ironical use of κανών occurs in Philo Jud., *De Specialibus Legibus* iii, 164 (v, p. 195, 22-23 [Cohn]), where the nomothetes who have looked to opinion rather than to truth are said to be themselves οἱ τῶν δικαίων ὅροι καὶ κανόνες. *Cf.* also *Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat* 25 E, where Plutarch warns the young reader against taking the great heroes of poetry as κανόνες ἀρετῆς ἁπάσης καὶ ὀρθότητος.

[d] *Cf. De Fraterno Amore* 478 C and Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca* ii, 7, 2 (with Frazer's note, *L.C.L.* i, p. 248, n. 2).

(1083) *νους μέρεσι τοῖς δ' ἀποκρινομένους, ἀλλὰ δύο σώματα ταὐτὸν ἔχοντα χρῶμα ταὐτὸν δὲ σχῆμα ταὐτὸν δὲ βάρος καὶ τόπον ⟨τὸν αὐτὸν ὅμως δὲ διπλᾶ καίπερ⟩*[1] *ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀνθρώπων ὁρώμενα πρότερον· ἀλλὰ οὗτοι μόνοι*[2] *εἶδον τὴν σύνθεσιν ταύτην καὶ διπλόην καὶ ἀμφιβολίαν, ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός*
D *ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία τὸ δὲ ⟨ποιότης⟩,*[3] *καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ' αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον μήθ' ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τἀναντία θατέρῳ, συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμοῦ παρέχον ἅψασθαι. καίτοι λέγεται μὲν ὁ Λυγκεὺς ἐκεῖνος διὰ πέτρας καὶ διὰ δρυὸς ὁρᾶν, ἑώρα δέ τις ἀπὸ σκοπῆς ἐν Σικελίᾳ καθεζόμενος τὰς Καρχηδονίων ἐκ τοῦ λιμένος ναῦς ἐκ-*

[1] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by H. C.; *τόπον . . .* vac. 10+11 -E; vac. 10+9 -B . . . *ὑπὸ*; ⟨*καὶ ταῦτα*⟩ -Wyttenbach; ⟨*τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ταῦθ'*⟩ -Bernardakis; ⟨*τὸν αὐτόν, ὁποῖ' ἦν*⟩ -R. G. Bury.

[2] *μόνον* -Bernardakis.

[3] ⟨*ποιότης*⟩ -supplied by Wyttenbach; *τὸ δὲ . . .* vac. 7 -E; vac. 6 -B; ⟨*ποιόν*⟩ -Zeller (*Phil. Griech.* iii/1, p. 96, n. 4 [on p. 97]) after ⟨*ποιός*⟩ -Wyttenbach (in J. Bake's *Posidonii Rhodii Reliquiae*, p. 266); ⟨*ὄν*⟩ -C. Petersen (*Philosophiae Chrysippeae Fundamenta*, p. 51).

[a] *Cf. τὰ δὲ ἕτερα τινῶν λεγόμενα δεῖν καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι* in the explanation why the *ἰδίως ποιόν* is not other than the *οὐσία* even though they are not the same (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i, 20, 7 [pp. 178, 21–179, 5, Wachsmuth] = *Dox. Graeci*, p. 463, 1-4 = Posidonius, frag. 96, 20-24 [Edelstein-Kidd]).

[b] *ποιότης, i.e. τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν* (*cf. τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν* and *τὴν*

in some parts but separated in others, but two bodies with colour the same and shape the same and weight the same and place ⟨the same [a] but nevertheless duplicates, although⟩ discerned by no human being before; but these men alone caught sight of this combination and duplication and ambiguity, that each of us is two subjects, the one substance and the other ⟨quality⟩,[b] the former being always in flux and motion, neither growing nor diminishing nor remaining of any character at all, and the latter persisting and growing and diminishing and being affected in all respects contrary to the other,[c] though coalescent with it and conjoined and commingled and nowhere affording sensation a perception of the difference. Yet it is said that the famous Lynceus [d] would see through rock and tree, and someone from a look-out in Sicily where he sat saw the ships of the Carthaginians distant a run of a day and a night

ἑκάστου ποιότητα in *Dox. Graeci*, p. 462, 22-23 = Posidonius, frag. 96, 12-14 [Edelstein-Kidd]), the individuation of the *οὐσία i.e.* of *ὕλη* (see notes *f* and *c*, pages 799-800 *supra*). The Stoic assertion that this *ποιότης* is itself *σῶμα* (see 1085 E and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1054 A-B *supra*) gave opponents the opportunity to object that they made every individual two indistinguishable bodies; but they did apparently, like the Peripatetics, themselves assert that each is a double *ὑποκείμενον* (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 374 and Porphyry in Simplicius, *Categ.*, p. 48, 11-16 [Kalbfleisch]).

[c] *Cf.* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i, 20, 7 (p. 178, 10-21 [Wachsmuth]) = *Dox. Graeci*, p. 462, 20-27 = Posidonius, frag. 96, 10-20 (Edelstein-Kidd). This Stoic doctrine is scarcely more than a rewording of Aristotle's (*De Generatione* 321 b 22-34; *cf.* Alexander, *Quaestiones*, p. 13, 9-32 [Bruns]).

[d] *Cf. De Capienda ex Inimicis Utilitate* 87 B; Pindar, *Nemean* x, 61-63 with *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina* iii, pp. 179, 4–180, 14 (Drachmann); and Aristotle, *De Generatione* 328 a 14-15.

(1083) πλεούσας, ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ἀπεχούσας δρόμον, οἱ
E δὲ περὶ Καλλικράτη καὶ Μυρμηκίδην[1] λέγονται δη-
μιουργεῖν ἅρματα μυίας πτεροῖς καλυπτόμενα καὶ
διατορεύειν ἐν σησάμῳ γράμμασιν ἔπη τῶν Ὁμή-
ρου· ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἑτερότητα καὶ ⟨δια⟩-
φορὰν[2] οὐδεὶς διεῖλεν οὐδὲ διέστησεν, οὐδὲ[3] ἡμεῖς
ᾐσθόμεθα διττοὶ γεγονότες καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥέοντες
μέρει τῷ δ' ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἄχρι τελευτῆς οἱ αὐτοὶ
διαμένοντες. ἁπλούστερον δὲ ποιοῦμαι τὸν λόγον,
ἐπεὶ τέσσαρά γε ποιοῦσιν ὑποκείμενα περὶ ἕκαστον,
μᾶλλον δὲ τέσσαρα[4] ἕκαστον ἡμῶν· ἀρκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ
δύο πρὸς τὴν ἀτοπίαν. εἴ γε τοῦ μὲν Πενθέως
ἀκούοντες ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ λέγοντος ὡς δύο μὲν
F ἡλίους ὁρᾷ διττὰς δὲ Θήβας οὐχ ὁρᾶν αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ
παρορᾶν λέγομεν, ἐκτρεπόμενον καὶ παρακινοῦντα
τοῖς λογισμοῖς, τούτους δ' οὐ μίαν πόλιν ἀλλὰ πάν-
τας ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷα καὶ δένδρα πάντα καὶ
σκεύη καὶ ὄργανα καὶ ἱμάτια διττὰ καὶ διφυῆ τιθε-
μένους οὐ χαίρειν ἐῶμεν, ὡς παρανοεῖν ἡμᾶς[5] μᾶλ-
λον ἢ νοεῖν ἀναγκάζοντας; ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἴσως
1084 αὐτοῖς συγγνωστὰ[6] πλάττουσιν ἑτέρας φύσεις ὑπο-

[1] Bernardakis ; *μυρμηκίδη* -E, B.
[2] Wyttenbach (implied by Xylander's version) ; *φορὰν* -E, B (" fortasse servandum " -Westman [Pohlenz-Westman, *Moralia* vi/2, p. 233]).
[3] *οὐδ'* -Bernardakis ; *οὔτε* -E, B.
[4] *τέτταρα* -E, B (though both have *τέσσαρα* in the preceding line).
[5] E ; *παρανομεῖν ἡᾶς* -B.
[6] *σύγγνωστα* -E ; *σύγγνωστὰ* -B (with alpha superscript over the initial sigma) ; *συγγνωστέον* -Wyttenbach (but *cf. Adv. Colotem* 1117 c).

[a] *Cf.* Strabo, vi, 2, 1 (267) ; Aelian, *Var. Hist.* xi, 13 ;

sailing out of their harbour,[a] and Callicrates and Myrmecides and their fellows are said to fashion carriages canopied with the wings of a fly and to engrave in letters on a sesame-seed lines of Homer's poems [b] ; but this diversity and difference within us none determined or distinguished, and we did not perceive either that we had come to be double and are ever in flux in one part but in the other remain the same from birth to death. I am simplifying the theory, since they postulate four subjects in the case of each one or rather make each of us four [c] ; but even the two suffice to show the absurdity. If, in fact, when we hear Pentheus in the tragedy [d] stating that two suns he sees and double Thebes we say that he is not seeing but, being deranged and out of his wits, is seeing amiss, shall we not dismiss these Stoics as forcing us into misconception rather than conception with their supposition that not just a single city but all human beings and all animals and trees and furniture and instruments and clothes are double and biform ? Well, in this case perhaps it is excusable for them to fabricate diverse kinds of sub-

and especially Pliny, *N.H.* vii, 85 (where the works of Callicrates and Myrmecides and a different version of the microscopic writing are also given) with F. Münzer, *Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius* (Berlin, 1897), pp. 172-174.

[b] *Cf.* Pliny, *N.H.* vii, 85 and xxxvi, 43 ; Aelian, *Var. Hist.* i, 17 ; J. Overbeck, *Die antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der bildenden Künste bei den Griechen* (Leipzig, 1868), Nos. 2192-2201.

[c] *i.e.* make each a *ὑποκείμενον* in the third and fourth of their categories as well as in the first and second already mentioned (*cf.* A. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* [Berlin, 1846], pp. 220-221).

[d] Euripides, *Bacchae* 918-919.

(1084) κειμένων· ἄλλη γὰρ οὐδεμία φαίνεται μηχανὴ φιλοτιμουμένοις σῶσαι καὶ διαφυλάξαι τὰς αὐξήσεις.

45. Ἐν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τί παθόντες ἢ τίνας πάλιν ἄλλας ὑποθέσεις κοσμοῦντες ἐνδημιουργοῦσι σωμάτων διαφορὰς καὶ ἰδέας ὀλίγου δέω εἰπεῖν ἀπείρους τὸ πλῆθος οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ ὅτι τὰς κοινὰς καὶ συνήθεις ἐξοικίζοντες ἐννοίας μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλως ἀναιροῦντες καὶ διαφθείροντες ἑτέρας ἐπεισάγουσιν ἀλλοκότους καὶ ξένας. ἄτοπον γὰρ εὖ μάλα τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πάσας ἔτι δὲ φαντασίας καὶ πάθη
B καὶ ὁρμὰς καὶ συγκαταθέσεις σώματα ποιουμένους ἐν μηδενὶ φάναι[1] κεῖσθαι μηδὲ ὑπάρχειν τόπον ⟨δὲ⟩[2] τούτοις ἕνα τὸν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ πόρον στιγμιαῖον ἀπολιπεῖν, ὅπου τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν συστέλλουσι τῆς ψυχῆς,

[1] Stephanus; φᾶναι -E, B.
[2] ⟨δὲ⟩ -added here by Amyot; τόπον τούτοις ἕνα ⟨δὲ⟩ -Wyttenbach.

[a] See page 695, note *a supra*.
[b] *Cf.* 1070 c *supra*.
[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 848 (p. 230, 1-9).
[d] Since they are all dispositions or states of the soul or of the ἡγεμονικόν, itself a disposition of the soul (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 823 and frag. 132 [p. 42, 23-26] with Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii, 81 and Plutarch, *De Virtute Morali* 441 C-D and 446 F—447 A [*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 459]), and the soul itself is corporeal (see 1084 D-E *infra* [*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 806] and *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 443 [p. 146, 17-25], 467, 773, 774, 780, and 807), they are all bodies. See 1084 F *infra* for φαντασία; 1085 A-B *infra* for μνῆμαι; *S.V.F.* ii, p. 23, 20-24 for φαντασίαι, μνῆμαι, and τέχναι. And *cf.* Plutarch's *De Superstitione* 165 A; *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 305; and especially Seneca, *Epistle* cvi, 4-10 (*S.V.F.* iii, frag. 84) and *Epistle* cxvii, 2. That the virtues, vices, and affections were held by the Stoics to be perceptible has already been stated in 1062 C and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1042 E-F *supra*. For the Stoic doctrine attacked in

jects, for no other contrivance presents itself to their ambition to save and maintain the phenomena [a] of growth.

45. What made them manufacture within the soul, however, differences and kinds of body infinite, I had almost said, in number or what other assumptions in turn they are dressing up thereby, this one could not say but could say that they evict or rather altogether abolish and destroy the common and customary conceptions and import in their place others that are strange and foreign.[b] For it's pretty absurd of them [c] to take the virtues and the vices and all the skills and memories besides and mental images, moreover, and affections and impulses and acts of assent for bodies [d] and say that they do not reside or subsist in any subject ⟨but⟩ to have left these things a single place [e] no bigger than a point, the duct in the heart, into which they cramp the soul's ruling faculty,[f]

the present chapter see Pohlenz, *Zenon und Chrysipp*, pp. 183-185 and Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, pp. 22-23.
[e] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, pp. 220, 42–221, 2.
[f] According to most of the evidence the Stoics located the ἡγεμονικόν "in the heart" without further qualification (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 837, 879 [p. 235, 20-21], 885, 886, 898); and in [Plutarch], *De Placitis* 899 A (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 838) it is said that *all* of them located it in the *whole* heart or the "pneuma" of the heart, although this is controverted by the evidence of Diogenes of Babylon (*S.V.F.* iii, p. 217, 18-20 [*cf.* Pohlenz, *Stoa* ii, pp. 51-52]). Chrysippus himself, however, at least once specified its location as *in media sede cordis* (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 236, 15); and, since he also asserted that the left ventricle of the heart is filled with "psychic pneuma" (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 246, 13-14), it is most probable that the Diogenes said in [Plutarch], *De Placitis* 899 A (=Aëtius, iv, 5, 7 [*Dox. Graeci*, p. 391, 15-16]) to have located the ἡγεμονικόν in that ventricle is his pupil, Diogenes of Babylon, who is known to have written on the subject (*cf. S.V.F.* iii,

(1084) ὑπὸ τοσούτων σωμάτων κατεχόμενον ὅσων[1] τοὺς πάνυ δοκοῦντας ἀφορίζειν καὶ ἀποκρίνειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πολὺ πλῆθος διαπέφευγε. τὸ δὲ μὴ μόνον σώματα ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῷα λογικὰ καὶ ζώων τοσούτων[2] σμῆνος οὐ φίλιον[3] οὐδὲ ἥμερον ἀλλ' ὄχλον ἀντιστάτην ⟨ἐν⟩ καρδίαις[4] καὶ πολέμιον συνέχοντας[5] ἀποφαίνειν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν παράδεισον ἢ μάνδραν ἢ δούριον[6] ἵππον—ἢ τί ἄν τις ἃ πλάττουσιν οὗτοι διανοηθείη καὶ προσαγορεύσειεν;—ὑπερβολή τίς ἐστιν ὀλιγωρίας καὶ παρανομίας εἰς τὴν ἐνάργειαν[7] καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν. οἱ δ' οὐ μόνον τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ζῷα εἶναι λέγουσιν οὐδὲ C τὰ πάθη μόνον, ὀργὰς καὶ φθόνους καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, οὐδὲ καταλήψεις καὶ φαντασίας καὶ ἀγνοίας οὐδὲ τὰς τέχνας ζῷα, τὴν σκυτοτομικὴν τὴν χαλκοτυπικήν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσι, τὸν περίπατον ζῷον τὴν ὄρχησιν τὴν ὑπόδεσιν[8] τὴν προσαγόρευσιν τὴν λοιδορίαν. ἕπεται δὲ τούτοις καὶ

[1] Wyttenbach (implied by Xylander's version); ὅσον -E, B.
[2] τοσοῦτο -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 23); τοσοῦτον -Bernardakis.
[3] E; φίλον -B.
[4] ⟨ἐν⟩ καρδίαις -H. C.; κακίαις -E, B; καὶ βιατὰς [καὶ] -Madvig (*Adversaria Critica*, p. 671); [κακίαις] -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 23); καὶ βίαιον -Bernardakis; ⟨ἐν ἀρεταῖς καὶ⟩ κακίαις -Pohlenz.
[5] συνέχοντας -Sandbach (unpublished notes); νοῦν ἔχοντας -E, B; νοῦν ἔχοντα ⟨καὶ⟩ -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 23) and Bernardakis; νοῦν ἔχοντα ⟨ὥστ'⟩ -Pohlenz.
[6] E, B (so L^1, Q in *Sertorius* i, 6 [568 c]; Aristophanes, *Birds* 1128); δούρειον -Bernardakis.
[7] Wyttenbach; ἐνέργειαν -E, B.
[8] Amyot (" le chausser "); ὑπόθεσιν -E, B.

p. 215, 28-29), and not Diogenes of Apollonia (Diels-Kranz,

filled with so many bodies that their great multitude has eluded those who are highly reputed for distinguishing and separating one thing from another.[a] But to make these things not merely bodies but rational animals as well [b] and by confining ⟨in⟩ our hearts not a tame or friendly hive [c] but an adverse and hostile mob of so many animals to make each of us out to be a game-preserve or byre or wooden horse [d]—or what thought and name could one give the fictions of these Stoics?—, this is about the last degree in scorning and outraging clear apprehension and common experience.[e] They assert, however, that not only are the virtues and the vices animals and not only the affections, cases of anger and envy and grief and spiteful joy, or apprehensions and mental images and cases of ignorance or the skills—shoemaking and smithing—animals but besides these they further make [f] the activities bodies and animals —taking a walk an animal,[g] dancing, putting on one's shoes, greeting, reviling. It follows that laugh-

Frag. Vorsok.[6], ii, p. 57, 3-4; *cf.* F. Solmsen, *Mus. Helveticum*, xviii [1961]), p. 153, n. 21) or a scribal error for " Diocles " (*Dox. Graeci*, p. 204, n. 1).

[a] This is probably another thrust at the Stoics themselves, whose elaborate distinctions (*e.g. S.V.F.* iii, frags. 264-276 and 391-438) are called casuistry by Plutarch and Galen (*S.V.F.* iii, frags. 439-441).

[b] *Cf.* Seneca, *Epistle* cxiii, 1-26 (printed in part as *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 307) and *S.V.F.* iii, frag. 306.

[c] *Cf. De Virtute Morali* 441 B (referring to Plato's *Meno* 72 A as does also *De Amicorum Multitudine* 93 B).

[d] *Cf.* Plato, *Theaetetus* 184 D.

[e] See 1083 c (with note *b*) and 1073 c-D (chap. 29) *supra.*

[f] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 848 (p. 230, 9-10).

[g] *Cf.* Seneca, *Epistle* cxiii, 23 = *S.V.F.* i, frag. 525 and ii, frag. 836 (p. 227, 40-42).

(1084) γέλωτα ζῷον εἶναι καὶ κλαυθμόν· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ βῆχα καὶ πταρμὸν καὶ στεναγμὸν πτύσιν τε πάντως καὶ ἀπόμυξιν καὶ τὰ λοιπά· ἔνδηλα γάρ ἐστι. καὶ μὴ δυσχεραινέτωσαν ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ἀγόμενοι τῷ κατὰ μικρὸν λόγῳ, Χρυσίππου μνημονεύοντες ἐν
D τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν Ζητημάτων οὕτω προσάγοντος· " οὐχ ἡ μὲν νὺξ σῶμ' ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ ἑσπέρα καὶ ὁ ὄρθρος καὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς νυκτὸς σώματ' οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα σῶμ' ἐστὶν οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ νουμηνία σῶμα καὶ ἡ δεκάτη καὶ πεντεκαιδεκάτη καὶ ἡ τριακὰς καὶ ὁ μὴν σῶμ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ θέρος καὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός."

46. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς βιάζονται προλήψεις ἐκεῖνα δ' ἤδη καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἰδίας, τὸ θερμότατον περιψύξει καὶ πυκνώσει τὸ λεπτομερέ-
σταtον[1] γεννῶντες. ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ θερμότατόν ἐστι δήπου καὶ λεπτομερέστατον· ποιοῦσι δ' αὐτὴν τῇ
E περιψύξει καὶ πυκνώσει τοῦ σώματος[2] οἷον στομώσει τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλοντος ἐκ φυτικοῦ ψυχικὸν γενόμενον.[3] γεγονέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἔμψυχον

[1] E ; λεπτομερέστερον -B.

[2] σπέρματος -Pohlenz.

[3] τοῦ πνεύματος . . . ψυχικοῦ γενομένου -Rasmus (*Prog.* 1872, p. 23).

[a] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 665 ; *cf.* Zeller, *Phil. Griech.* iii/1, p. 124.

[b] οὕτω = κατὰ μικρόν, *i.e.* ἐκ προσαγωγῆς (*cf.* Aristotle, *Politics* 1306 b 14-15 and 1315 a 13) ; for the use of προσάγειν *cf.* Aristotle, *De Caelo* 304 a 13 and *De Gen. Animal.* 765 b 5-6.

[c] See 1062 A-B *supra* (chap. 8 *sub finem*).

[d] τὸ θερμότατον . . . πῦρ νοερόν = *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 806 (p. 223, 4-9). See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 E—1053 D (chap. 41) *supra*, to the content of which, though not necessarily to that passage itself, the ἐκεῖνα here refers (*cf.* M. Pohlenz, *Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 18).

ing is an animal and weeping ; and, if these, coughing is also and sneezing and groaning and, certainly, spitting and blowing the nose and the rest, for they are manifest. And let them not be vexed about being led to these things by the argument which advances little by little but remember that Chrysippus in the first book of the Physical Questions [a] draws to his conclusion in this fashion [b] : " It is not so that the night is a body and the evening and the dawn and midnight are not bodies ; and it is not so that the day is a body and not the first day of the month and the tenth and the fifteenth and the thirtieth and the month and the summer and the autumn and the year."

46. But, while in their insistence upon these notions they are at odds with the common preconceptions, they are already at odds with their own as well [c] when they insist upon those others, generating [d] what is hottest by a process of chilling and what is most subtile by a process of condensation. So they do, for the soul is surely most hot and most subtile and they produce it by the chilling and condensation of the body [e] which by tempering, as it were, changes the vital spirit that out of vegetable is become animal. But they also say that the sun has become

[e] Pohlenz to support his change of σώματος to σπέρματος refers to *S.V.F.* ii, frags. 805 and 741 ff. ; but the tempering occurs when at birth the articulated *body* meets the external air (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 805 [p. 222, 14-16] ; Hierokles, *Ethische Elementarlehre* ed. H. von Arnim, col. 1, 20-30 ; Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repug.* 1052 F and 1053 C-D *supra* and *De Primo Frigido* 946 C [τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι . . .]). If the text needed emendation at all, the simplest expedient would be to read μεταβάλλοντες instead of μεταβάλλοντος.

(1084) λέγουσι, τοῦ ὑγροῦ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς πῦρ νοερόν. ὥρα[1] καὶ τὸν ἥλιον διανοεῖσθαι περιψύξει γεννώμενον. ὁ μὲν οὖν Ξενοφάνης, διηγουμένου τινὸς ἐγχέλεις ἑωρακέναι ἐν ὕδατι θερμῷ ζώσας, "οὐκοῦν" εἶπεν "ἐν ψυχρῷ αὐτὰς ἑψήσομεν." τούτοις δὲ ἔποιτ' ἄν, εἰ περιψύξει τὰ θερμότατα γεννῶσι καὶ πυκνώσει τὰ κουφότατα, θερμότητι πάλιν αὖ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ διαχύσει[2] τὰ πυκνὰ καὶ διακρίσει τὰ βαρέα γεννᾶν, ἀλογίας τινὰ[3] φυλάττουσιν ἀναλογίαν καὶ ⟨ὁμολογίαν.⟩[4]

F 47. Ἐννοίας δ' οὐσίαν αὐτῆς καὶ γένεσιν οὐ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας ὑποτίθενται; φαντασία γάρ τις ἡ ἔννοιά ἐστι, φαντασία δὲ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ· ψυχῆς[5] δὲ φύσις ἀναθυμίασις, ἣν τυπωθῆναι μὲν ἐργῶδες

[1] E; ὅρα (with ὥ superscript over ὅ) -B.
[2] Kaltwasser (see 1053 A-B *supra*); συγχύσει -E, B.
[3] Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], p. 116), and implied by Xylander's version; τινὸς -E, B.
[4] ⟨ὁμολογίαν⟩ -H. C.; ἀναλογίαν καὶ . . . vac. 8 -E; vac. 7 -B . . . ἐννοίας; ἀναλογίαν καὶ ⟨ἀκολουθίαν⟩ -Pohlenz; ἀναλογίαν. Καὶ ἐννοίας -Stephanus (Amyot?).
[5] ψυχῆς -Bernardakis; ψυχῇ -E, B.

[a] *Cf. Non Posse Suaviter Vivi* 1107 B; [Plutarch], *De Placitis* 890 A (=*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 655); *S.V.F.* i, frags. 120 and 501. [b] Xenophanes, frag. A 17 (D.-K.).

[c] There is probably a pun intended in ἀλογίας . . . ἀναλογίαν, and Plutarch may well have added a direct thrust at the "consistency" of which the Stoics boasted (see 1062 E *supra* [. . . ἐν τοῖς δόγμασι τὴν ὁμολογίαν . . .] and *De Stoic. Repug.* 1033 A).

[d] φαντασία γὰρ . . . πάλιν ἐξιόντος=*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 847 (p. 229, 35-41).

[e] ἔννοια=ἐναποκειμένη νόησις (1085 A *infra* and note *e* there), and νόησις=λογικὴ φαντασία (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 24, 21-23 and p. 29, 31).

[f] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 53, 55, and 56 (with the whole of Sextus, *Adv. Math.* vii, 227-242, 372, 376-377; viii, 400-402; and *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii, 70). For the "interpretation" of τύπωσις as ἑτεροίωσις by Chrysippus *cf.* Pohlenz, *Stoa* i, p. 61 and ii, p. 36; and for its ineffectiveness *cf.* Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, pp. 149-151.

[g] *Cf. S.V.F.* i, frags. 139 and 141 (=519 and 520); iii, p. 216, 18-25; Marcus Aurelius, v, 33 (ἀναθυμίασις ἀφ' αἵματος) and vi, 15 (ἡ ἀφ' αἵματος ἀναθυμίασις καὶ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀνάπνευσις). Elsewhere the Stoics are said to define the soul as πνεῦμα συμφυὲς καὶ ἀναθυμίασις αἰσθητικὴ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ὑγρῶν ἀναδιδομένη (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 778 and [Plutarch], *De Vita Homeri*, 127=vii, p. 400, 18-20 [Bernardakis]); but what are probably more accurate accounts represent it as essentially "pneuma" which is nourished and sustained by the vaporous exhalation of the blood and the air inhaled in respiration (*S.V.F.* i, frag. 140=521; ii, frags. 777, 779, 782, and 783), and it is critical interpretation which reduces this "psychic pneuma" either to ἀναθυμίασις αἵματος (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 781) or to a mere "blend" of fire and air (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 786, 787, and 789).

animate by the change of liquid into intellectual fire.[a] Then it's time to think of the sun too as being generated by a process of chilling. Now, Xenophanes, when someone told of having seen eels living in hot water, said: "Well then, we'll boil them in cold"[b]; and it would be consequent for these Stoics, if they generate the hottest things by chilling and the lightest things by condensation, conversely to generate by heat the things that are cold and by diffusion the things that are solid and by rarefaction the things that are heavy, thus preserving in their irrationality some ratio and ⟨consistency.⟩[c]

47. And in what they suppose to be the essence and genesis of conception itself are they not at odds with the common conceptions? For[d] conception is a kind of mental image,[e] and a mental image is an impression in the soul[f]; but the nature of soul is vaporous exhalation,[g] on which it is difficult to make

(1084) διὰ μανότητα δεξαμένην δὲ τηρῆσαι τύπωσιν ἀδύνατον. ἥ τε γὰρ τροφὴ καὶ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῆς ἐξ
1085 ὑγρῶν οὖσα συνεχῆ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἀνάλωσιν, ἥ τε πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα[1] τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ἐπιμιξία καινὴν ἀεὶ ποιεῖ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξισταμένην καὶ τρεπομένην ὑπὸ τοῦ θύραθεν ἐμβάλλοντος ὀχετοῦ καὶ πάλιν ἐξιόντος. ῥεῦμα γὰρ ἄν τις ὕδατος φερομένου μᾶλλον[2] διανοηθείη σχήματα καὶ τύπους καὶ εἴδη[3] διαφυλάττον ἢ πνεῦμα φερόμενον ἐντὸς[4] ἀτμοῖς καὶ ὑγρότησιν ἑτέρῳ δ' ἔξωθεν ἐνδελεχῶς οἷον ἀργῷ[5] καὶ ἀλλοτρίῳ πνεύματι κιρνάμενον. ἀλλὰ οὕτως παρακούουσι[6] ἑαυτῶν ὥστε τὰς ἐννοίας ⟨ἐν⟩αποκειμένας[7] τινὰς ὁριζόμενοι νοήσεις μνήμας
B δὲ μονίμους καὶ σχετικὰς τυπώσεις τὰς δ' ἐπιστήμας καὶ παντάπασι πηγνύντες ὡς τὸ ἀμετάπτω-

[1] ἀέρα ⟨διὰ⟩ -added by von Arnim (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 229, 39).
[2] E ; τις μᾶλλον ὕδατος φερομένου -B.
[3] καὶ εἴδη -B ; added superscript after τύπους -E.
[4] ἐντὸς -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, lii [1924], p. 107) ; ἐν τοῖς -E, B.
[5] νεουργῷ -Wyttenbach (but *cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 218, 27).
[6] Wyttenbach ; παρακούοντες -E, B ; παρακούοντές ⟨εἰσι⟩ -Bernardakis.
[7] Pohlenz (*cf.* Plutarch, *De Sollertia Animalium* 961 c-D) ; ἀποκειμένας -E, B.

[a] For this objection *cf.* Sextus, *Adv. Math.* vii, 374-375, who, however, emphasizes the tenuousness and fluidity of the " pneuma " rather than its being in constant flux and who after this (376) introduces the interpretation of τύπωσις in the sense of ἑτεροίωσις as if this had been intended as an answer to the objection.

[b] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 228, 39-40.

[c] As Alexander says (*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 785), if soul is " breath," it is breath with a certain τόνος (see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1034 D *supra*) and not any and every inert breath, such as the circumambient is when it is inhaled.

an impression on account of its subtility and for which to receive and retain an impression is impossible. Liquids being the source of its nourishment, *i.e.* of its genesis, this is in process of continual accretion and consumption ; and its mixture with the air of respiration is for ever making a new thing of the vaporous exhalation as this is altered and transformed by the current which rushes in from without and withdraws again. For one could more easily suppose shapes and imprints and forms being kept by a stream of running water than by a moving breath [a] which is perpetually being blended with vapours and moistures within [b] and with another, an inert and alien breath as it were, from without.[c] The Stoics, however, are so heedless of themselves [d] as to define conceptions as a kind of conserved notions [e] and memories as abiding and stable impressions [f] and to fix absolutely firm the forms of knowledge as being unalterable and stead-

[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 847 (p. 229, 42-46).

[e] *Cf.* Plutarch, *De Sollertia Animalium* 961 c-D and Philo Jud., *Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis* 34 (ii, p. 63, 16-17 [Wendland]). These passages, neither of which is in *S.V.F.*, confirm Pohlenz's change to ἐναποκειμένας here and Pearson's of ἐπίνοια to ἔννοια in *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 89 (*Class. Rev.*, xix [1905], p. 457 ; *cf.* Helmbold, *Class. Rev.*, N.S. ii [1952], pp. 146-147).

[f] *Cf.* Epictetus, *Diss.* I, xiv, 8 ; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i, 61 (". . . esse memoriam signatarum rerum in mente vestigia") ; and the definition of memory as θησαυρισμὸς φαντασιῶν (*S.V.F.* i, frag. 64). That these impressions are " abiding and stable " does not mean that they all have τὸ ἀσφαλὲς καὶ βέβαιον ascribed to every memory of the sage (1061 c-D *supra*) ; but μνήμη was connected with μονή at least as early as Plato (*Cratylus* 437 B 3 ; *cf.* Aristotle, *Anal. Post.* 99 b 36—100 a 5 and *Topics* 125 b 6 ; Plotinus, *Enn.* IV, iii, 26, lines 52-54).

(1085) τον καὶ βέβαιον ἐχούσας εἶτα τούτοις ὑποτίθεσθαι βάσιν καὶ ἔδραν οὐσίας ὀλισθηρᾶς καὶ σκεδαστῆς καὶ φερομένης ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεούσης.

48. Στοιχείου γε μὴν καὶ ἀρχῆς ἔννοια[1] κοινὴ πᾶσιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώποις ἐμπέφυκεν, ὡς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἄκρατον εἶναι καὶ ἀσύνθετον· οὐ γὰρ στοιχεῖον οὐδ' ἀρχὴ τὸ μεμιγμένον ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν μέμικται. καὶ μὴν οὗτοι τὸν θεὸν ἀρχὴν ὄντα σῶμα νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες οὐ καθαρὸν οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν οὐδ' ἀσύνθετον ἀλλ' ἐξ[2] ἑτέρου καὶ διὰ ἕτερον[3] ἀποφαίνουσιν. ἡ δὲ ὕλη καθ' αὑτὴν ἄλογος C οὖσα καὶ ἄποιος τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀρχοειδές· ὁ θεὸς δέ,[4] εἴπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσώματος οὐδ' ἄυλος,

[1] E ; μὴν ἔννοια καὶ ἀρχῆς -B.
[2] ἀλλὰ ⟨σύνθετον⟩ ἐξ -Wyttenbach.
[3] E, B (*pace* Pohlenz) ; ἑτέρου -Aldine, Basil.
[4] δή -Pohlenz.

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 29, 37 and p. 30, 22-25 and 34-35 ; iii, pp. 26, 41–27, 3.

[b] *Cf.* Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 188 (= *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 96).

[c] *Cf.* ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις in note *b* on *De Stoic. Repug.* 1041 E.

[d] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1014 b 5-6 and 1059 b 34-35 ; Sextus, *Adv. Math.* i, 104 (p. 622, 15-18 [Bekker] and *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 152 (p. 156, 17-18 [Bekker]) ; Galen, *De Elementis* i, 1 (i, pp. 414, 9–415, 3 [Kühn]) ; Iamblichus, *De Comm. Math. Scientia*, p. 17, 12-13 (Festa).

[e] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 313.

[f] *Cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 85 and ii, frag. 300. The Stoics differentiated ἀρχή from στοιχεῖον (*S.V.F.* ii, frags. 299 [*cf.* A. Schmekel, *Die Positive Philosophie* i, Berlin, 1938, p. 245. n. 4], 408, and 409) ; but Chrysippus distinguished three senses of στοιχεῖον, and the third of these (*S.V.F.* ii, pp. 136,

fast [a] and then to place beneath these things as base and foundation a substance that slides and scatters and is always in motion and flux.[b]

48. Well anyway, of element or principle there has been bred in [c] practically all men a common conception, that it is simple and unmixed and incomposite,[d] for element or principle is not what has resulted from mixing but the ingredients of the mixture. Yet these Stoics [e] by making god, while a principle,[f] an intellectual body,[g] that is intelligence in matter,[h] make him out to be not pure or simple or incomposite but from something else and because of something else.[i] Matter, however, being in itself without rationality and without quality,[j] has simplicity and so the characteristic of a principle ; but god, if in fact he is not incorporeal and not im-

34–137, 6) fits what is said of god (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 113, 10-11 ; pp. 185, 43–186, 3 ; and p. 306, 20-21), one of the two Stoic ἀρχαί.

[g] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 112, 31-32 ; p. 299, 11-12 ; p. 306, 19-20 ; p. 307, 1-3.

[h] This explication emphasizes the two separate factors (*cf.* 1076 D *supra* [κινεῖ δ' αὐτὴν ὁ λόγος ἐνυπάρχων . . .] and *S.V.F.* ii, p. 112, 8 [. . . τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι] but also *S.V.F.* ii, p. 111, 10 [τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν θεόν]) ; the σῶμα νοερόν could also be interpreted as ὕλη πως ἔχουσα (*cf.* Plotinus, *S.V.F.* ii, p. 113, 30 and p. 115, 22) or νοῦς ὑλικός (*cf. S.V.F.* i, p. 42, 7-8 [νοῦν πύρινον] and *S.V.F.* ii, p. 306, 24-25 [νοῦν ἐναιθέριον of Stobaeus compared with νοῦν ἐν αἰθέρι of Pseudo-Plutarch]).

[i] τὸ ἐξ οὗ = ὕλη, τὸ διὰ ὅ = τὸ τέλος (*cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 162, 21-22). What is ἐξ ἑτέρου is not an ἀρχή (Aëtius, i, 2, 2 [*Dox. Graeci*, p. 275 A 24-28], *cf.* Plato, *Phaedrus* 245 D 2-3) ; and what is διὰ ἕτερον ought not to be god, since according to the Stoics god is διὰ ὃν τὰ πάντα (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 305, 20 ; p. 312, 23 and 32-33).

[j] See 1076 C-D *supra* and the references in note *c* there.

(1085) ὡς ἀρχῆς μετέσχηκε τῆς ὕλης. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὁ λόγος, οὐκ εὖ τὴν ὕλην ἄλογον ἀποδεδώκασιν· εἰ δὲ ἕτερα, καὶ[1] ἀμφοτέρων ταμίας[2] ἄν τις ὁ θεὸς εἴη καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἀλλὰ σύνθετον πρᾶγμα τῷ νοερῷ τὸ σωματικὸν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης προσειληφώς.

49. Τά γε μὴν τέσσαρα σώματα, γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ ἀέρα τε καὶ πῦρ, πρῶτα στοιχεῖα προσαγορεύοντες, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ καὶ καθαρὰ τὰ δὲ σύνθετα καὶ μεμιγμένα ποιοῦσι. γῆν μὲν γάρ φασι[3] D καὶ ὕδωρ οὔθ' αὑτὰ συνέχειν οὔθ' ἕτερα πνευματικῆς δὲ μετοχῇ[4] καὶ πυρώδους δυνάμεως τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττειν· ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ αὑτῶν τ' εἶναι δι' εὐτονίαν ἐκτικὰ[5] καὶ τοῖς δυσὶν ἐκείνοις ἐγκεκραμένα τόνον παρέχειν καὶ τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιῶδες. πῶς οὖν ἔτι γῆ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὕδωρ, εἰ μήθ' ἁπλοῦν μήτε πρῶτον μήθ' αὑτῷ διαρκὲς ἀλλ'

[1] [καὶ] -deleted by Wyttenbach.

[2] E; ἀμφοτέρων ἄν τις ὁ θεὸς εἴη ταμίας -B; διαφέροντα, μιγὰς -Sandbach (*Class. Quart.*, xxxv [1941], p. 116); [καὶ] ἀμφοτέρων ⟨ταμιεῖον, οὐ⟩ ταμίας -Pohlenz (*Hermes*, lxxiv [1939], p. 30, n. 4).

[3] φασι -von Arnim (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 146, 32); ἴσασι -E, B; εἰς ἀεὶ -Bernardakis; τιθέασι -Pohlenz.

[4] μετοχῇ -Wyttenbach (implied by versions of Amyot and Xylander); μετοχῆς -E, B.

[5] ἑκτικὰ -von Arnim (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 146, 35); ἐκτατικὰ -E, B; συνεκτικά -Pohlenz.

[a] *Cf.* Plotinus in *S.V.F.* ii, p. 114, 6-7 (καὶ ὁ θεὸς δεύτερος αὐτοῖς τῆς ὕλης· καὶ γὰρ σῶμα ἐξ ὕλης ὂν καὶ εἴδους) and p. 113, 28-30 (ὁ γὰρ θεὸς . . . παρά τε τῆς ὕλης ἔχων τὸ εἶναι καὶ σύνθετος καὶ ὕστερος . . .); Alexander, *De Mixtione*, p. 225, 13-16 (Bruns).

material, has got a share of matter as a participant in a principle.[a] For, if matter and rationality are one and the same thing, the Stoics have done ill in defining matter to be without rationality; and, if they are different things, god would also have both on deposit as a kind of trustee[b] and would be not a simple but a composite object with corporeality from matter added to intellectuality.[c]

49. In any case, the Stoics, while calling[d] the four bodies—earth and water and air and fire—primary elements,[e] make some of them, I know not how, simple and pure and the others composite and mixed, for they say that earth and water cohibit neither themselves nor other things but maintain their unity by virtue of participation in a pneumatic and fiery power, whereas air and fire because of their intensity are self-sustaining[f] and to the former two, when blended with them, impart tension and permanence and substantiality.[g] How, then, is earth still an element—or water—if it is not simple or primary or self-sufficient but for ever in want of something

[b] That is god's relation to both λόγος and ὕλη would be that of a participant, and essentially he would be neither.

[c] With Plutarch's argument in this chapter *cf.* the arguments of Sextus (*Adv. Math.* ix, 180-181), Alexander (*De Mixtione*, pp. 224, 32–226, 34), and Plotinus (*Enn.* vi, i, 26 and 27).

[d] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 444 (p. 146, 29-36).

[e] *Cf.* Plutarch, *De Primo Frigido* 947 d-e; *S.V.F.* ii, p. 112, 33-34 and p. 180, 4-7; and Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii, 31. From *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 413, however, it appears that Chrysippus at least would not seriously have called all four bodies *primary* elements or elements in the primary sense.

[f] On ἑκτικά, von Arnim's emendation which is here adopted, *cf.* Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, pp. 67-69.

[g] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, p. 144, 27-28; p. 145, 1-3; and p. 155, 32-36; and see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1053 f—1054 b *supra*.

(1085) ἐνδεὲς ἔξωθεν εἰσαεὶ[1] τοῦ συνέχοντος ἐν τῷ εἶναι καὶ σῴζοντος; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας αὐτῶν ἐπίνοιαν ἀπολελοίπασιν, ἀλλὰ πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν καὶ ἀσάφειαν οὕτως[2] ὁ λόγος λεγόμενος τῆς γῆς ⟨ὡς οὐσίας μὲν μὴ σώματος δ' οὔσης⟩[3] τινὸς καθ' ἑαυτήν. εἶτα πῶς οὖσα γῆ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἀέρος δεῖται συν-
E ιστάντος αὐτὴν καὶ συνέχοντος; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι[4] γῆ καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐδὲ ὕδωρ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕλην ὁ ἀὴρ ὧδε μὲν συναγαγὼν καὶ πυκνώσας γῆν ἐποίησεν ὧδε δὲ πάλιν[5] διαλυθεῖσαν καὶ μαλαχθεῖσαν ὕδωρ. οὐδέτερον οὖν τούτων στοιχεῖον, οἷς ἕτερον ἀμφοτέροις οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν παρέσχηκεν.

50. Ἔτι τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ὕλην ὑφεστάναι ταῖς ποιότησι λέγουσι, ὡς[6] σχεδὸν οὕτως τὸν ὅρον ἀποδιδόναι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας αὖ πάλιν οὐσίας καὶ σώματα ποιοῦσι. ταῦτα δὲ πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἰδίαν οὐσίαν αἱ ποιότητες ἔχουσι καθ'

[1] E, B ; εἰς ἀεὶ -Aldine ; ἐστὶν ἀεὶ -Wyttenbach.
[2] E, B ; οὗτος -Leonicus ; οὗτος ὁ λεγόμενος τῆς γῆς λόγος -Wyttenbach.
[3] ⟨. . .⟩ -supplied by H. C. ; γῆς . . . vac. 8+11 -E ; vac. 29 -B . . . τινὸς ; ⟨ὡς οὔσης⟩ -Wyttenbach ; ⟨νοουμένης ὡς οὐσίας⟩ -Pohlenz.
[4] E ; ἔτι -B.
[5] δὲ πάλιν -Wyttenbach ; πάλιν δὲ -E, B.
[6] ὡς -Bernardakis ; καὶ -E, B.

[a] *Cf.* Alexander's argument in *De Mixtione*, p. 224, 15-22 (Bruns)=*S.V.F.* ii, pp. 145, 40–146, 7.
[b] Its substantiality is derivative, as has just been said ; and yet, if it is of itself a definite body, it should be of itself a definite substance. So conversely in 1085 E-F *infra*, if qualities do not have their own substance but only share a common substance, they only participate in body and cannot be bodies.
[c] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 444 (p. 146, 36-40).

external to itself that cohibits it and preserves it in being ?[a] For not even a notion of their substance has been left by the Stoics ; but there is great confusion and obscurity in the account thus given of earth ⟨as being⟩ of itself a definite ⟨body, though not substance⟩.[b] And then, how is it that, being of itself earth, it has need of air to consolidate and cohibit it ? But in fact[c] it is not of itself earth or water either, but matter is made earth when air has constricted and condensed it in a certain way and water when again in a certain way it has been softened and dissolved.[d] Neither of these is an element, then, since something else has imparted substance and generation to both of them.[e]

50. Moreover, while they say[f] that substance, that is matter, underlies the qualities, so as practically to define them in this way,[g] on the other hand again they make the qualities substances, that is bodies.[h] This involves great confusion. For, if qualities have

[d] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frag. 309 with ii, p. 136, 21-23 and p. 134, 11-14. Plutarch's emphasis upon the agency of air in his interpretation here may have been influenced by δι' ἀέρος in the original of such passages as *S.V.F.* i, p. 28, 17 and ii, p. 180, 1 and 18, where, however, it does not express agency (see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1053 A *supra*=*S.V.F.* ii, frag. 579).
[e] So Plotinus says that even the Stoic " elements " are in fact ὕλη πως ἔχουσα (*S.V.F.* ii, p. 115, 17-21).
[f] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 380 (p. 126, 30-39).
[g] See *De Stoic. Repug.* 1054 A *supra* (πανταχοῦ τὴν ὕλην . . . ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι) ; *cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 86 and ii, frags. 317 and 318.
[h] *Cf. S.V.F.* ii, frags. 377, 383, 410 (p. 135, 22-23), and 467 ; see also 1084 A-B *supra* (page 855, note *d*), and for qualities as " vital spirits or aeriform tensions " see *De Stoic. Repug.* 1054 B *supra*.

(1085) ἣν σώματα λέγονται καί εἰσιν, οὐχ ἑτέρας οὐσίας
F δέονται· τὴν γὰρ αὑτῶν ἔχουσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μόνον
αὐταῖς ὑφέστηκε τὸ κοινόν, ὅπερ οὐσίαν οὗτοι καὶ
ὕλην καλοῦσι, δῆλον ὅτι σώματος μετέχουσι σώ-
ματα δ'[1] οὔκ εἰσι· τὸ γὰρ[2] ὑφεστὼς καὶ δεχόμενον
διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τῶν ἃ δέχεται καὶ οἷς ὑφέστηκεν.
οἱ δὲ τὸ ἥμισυ βλέπουσι· τὴν γὰρ ὕλην ἄποιον ὀνο-
1086 μάζουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας οὐκέτι βούλονται καλεῖν
ἀύλους. καίτοι πῶς οἷόν τε σῶμα ποιότητος ἄνευ
νοῆσαι,[3] ποιότητα σώματος ἄνευ μὴ νοοῦντας; ὁ
γὰρ συμπλέκων σῶμα πάσῃ ποιότητι λόγος οὐδε-
νὸς ἐᾷ μὴ σύν τινι ποιότητι σώματος ἅψασθαι τὴν
διάνοιαν. ἢ τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ ἀσώματον τῆς ποιό-
τητος μαχόμενος μάχεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄποιον τῆς
ὕλης ἔοικεν ἢ θατέρου θάτερον ἀποκρίνων καὶ
ἀμφότερα χωρίζειν[4] ἀλλήλων. ὃν δέ τινες αὐτῶν
προβάλλονται λόγον, ὡς ἄποιον τὴν οὐσίαν ὀνο-
μάζοντες οὐχ ὅτι πάσης ἐστέρηται ποιότητος ἀλλ'
ὅτι πάσας ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας, μάλιστα παρὰ τὴν
B ἔννοιάν ἐστιν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἄποιον νοεῖ τὸ μηδε-
μιᾶς ποιότητος ἄμοιρον οὐδ' ἀπαθὲς τὸ πάντα πά-

[1] δ' -Wyttenbach (implied by Amyot's version); γὰρ -E, B.
[2] γὰρ -Wyttenbach; δὲ -E, B.
[3] νοῆσαι -Kronenberg (*Mnemosyne*, N.S. lii [1924], p. 107); ποιῆσαι -E, B.
[4] Bernardakis; χωρίζει -E, B.

[a] *Cf. S.V.F.* i, frag. 87 (including ii, frag. 316) and ii, p. 115, 36-39.
[b] *Cf.* the argument of Plotinus (*Enn.* vi, i, 29, lines 1-6).
[c] See 1076 c-d and note *c* there.
[d] *Cf.* Albinus, *Epitome* xi, 1 (p. 65, 11-13 [Louis] = p. 166 21-23 [Hermann]).

their own substance, in virtue of which they are called and are bodies, they do not have need of another substance, for they have their own. But, if what underlies them is only this common thing that these Stoics call substance and matter,[a] it is clear that they participate in body but are not bodies, for what is substrate and receptacle must be different from the things that it receives and underlies.[b] These men, however, see by halves, for they give matter the epithet "without quality"[c] but will not go on and call qualities "immaterial." Yet how is it possible to conceive body without quality if they do not conceive quality without body? For the reasoning that implicates body in every quality permits the mind to grasp no body unconnected with some quality. It seems, then, either that its opposition to quality's being without body is also opposition to matter's being without quality or that in severing the one from the other it also separates both from each other.[d] The reasoning advanced by some of them,[e] as giving substance the epithet "without quality" not because it is devoid of every quality but because it has all qualities,[f] is most especially at odds with the common conception, for no one conceives as without quality what is without part in no quality or as impassive what is naturally always

[e] *S.V.F.* ii, frag. 380 (p. 126, 39-42).
[f] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vii, 137 = *S.V.F.* ii, p. 180, 7-8: τὰ δὴ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην. J. Westenberger thought that he had detected a reference to the reasoning here rejected by Plutarch in [Galen], *De Qualitatibus Incorporeis*, p. 472, 3-5 and p. 477, 11-13 (Kühn); *cf.* Westenberger's notes on 8, 13 and 13, 8 of his edition (Marburg, 1906), pp. 26-27 and p. 31.

(1086) σχειν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς οὐδ' ἀκίνητον τὸ πάντῃ κινητόν. ἐκεῖνο δ' οὐ λέλυται, κἂν ἀεὶ μετὰ ποιότητος ἡ ὕλη νοῆται, τὸ ἑτέραν αὐτὴν νοεῖσθαι καὶ διαφέρουσαν τῆς ποιότητος.

[a] *i.e.* 1085 F *supra*: τὸ γὰρ ὑφεστὼς . . . διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τῶν . . . οἷς ὑφέστηκεν.

being affected in all respects nor as immobile what is everyway movable. And, even if matter is always conceived along with quality, the former statement [a] has not thereby been refuted, that it is conceived as other than quality and different from it.

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